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Abstract 
This submission demonstrates the original contribution made by my published work in 
advancing knowledge and understanding in the field of land law and specifically the 
Torrens system of land registration (or more generally title by registration). My body of 
work references a series of integrated and interrelated research questions all of which 
go towards answering the following: To what extent have the judicial and legislative 
developments concerning title by registration achieved doctrinal coherence with the 
ideas that underlie a title by registration (or Torrens) system of land registration? Within 
this overarching question, the taxonomy of my work is structured as follows: doctrinal 
research into indefeasibility and the recognition of unregistered interests in the Torrens 
system, the relationship between possession and title by registration, and discourse 
on the application of economic theory and consumer law to title by registration. The 
overarching view I reach is that the Torrens system of land registration and the 
institutions that guard its principles (be it the Parliament, judiciary, academe, 
conveyancing agents, financial institutions, and electronic conveyancing regulators 
(Australian Registrars National Electronic Conveyancing Council and Property 
Exchange Australia)) must remain vigilant in ensuring that the Torrens system of land 
registration is not modified in such a way that its doctrinal coherence is undermined. 
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This thesis is submitted to Bond University in fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Published Work. This thesis represents my own 
original work towards this research degree and contains no material that has previously 
been submitted for a degree or diploma at this University or any other institution, except 
where due acknowledgement is made. 
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Chapter 1: The Interrelated Research Questions and Research Methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
There can be no doubting the value and importance of land to society. It can be a 
scarce commodity as well as a source of wealth and power. More prosaically, it is the 
physical connection that each of us has with the planet. 
Land is elemental: it is where life begins and it is where life ends. Land provides 
the physical substratum for all human activity; it is the essential base of all social 
and commercial interaction. We spend scarcely a moment out of contact with 
terra firma and our very existence is constantly sustained and shaped by the 
natural and constructed world around us.1 
Critical to the full realisation of the value of land is certainty around land ownership or 
title to land. If ownership is uncertain, economic growth will be hindered. Land law and 
enforceability of land title are the fulcra on which much of our wealth as a nation is 
built2 and, as such, they have a critical role in the reduction of poverty.3 If the market 
for land ownership evidences doctrinal uncertainty, damage will be done to the 
economy and we will see a fracturing of neighbourly relations and the creation of 
community discord. Uncertainty will increase risk in the transaction process, decrease 
investor confidence in the property market, and reduce funding from the mortgagee 
sector for property investment. Community expectations will not be met if title to land 
                                                          
1 Kevin Gray and Susan Gray, Elements of Land Law (Oxford University Press, 2005) 1. 
2 Land, (and in this context I exclude the fixtures on the land), is worth 34% of the assets on the balance sheet of 
Australia. If you include the fixtures on land, then this adds another 33% on the balance sheet (18% offices, 
factories and associated infrastructure; 15% residential dwellings): see Philip Lowe (Deputy Governor, RBA), 
‘National Wealth, Land Values and Monetary Policy’ (Paper presented at the 54th Shann Memorial Lecture, 
Perth, 12 August 2015) 1, 3. 
3 For a discussion of the importance of property titles as a measure to address poverty, see Sebastian Galiani 
and Ernesto Schargrodsky, ‘Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling’ (Ronald Coase Institute, 
Working Paper Series, No 7 Revised). Their introduction states the following: 
‘The fragility of property rights is considered a crucial obstacle for economic development. The main argument 
is that individuals underinvest if others can seize the fruits of their investments. In today’s developing world, a 
pervasive manifestation of feeble property rights are the millions of people living in urban dwellings without 
possessing formal titles of the plots of land they occupy. The absence of formal property rights constitutes a 
severe limitation for the poor. In addition to its investment effects, the lack of formal titles impedes the use of 
land as collateral to access the credit markets. It also affects the transferability of the parcels, making 
investments in untitled parcels highly illiquid. Moreover, the absence of formal titles deprives poor families of 
the possibility of having a valuable insurance and savings tool that could provide protection during bad times 
and retirement, forcing them instead to rely on extended family members and offspring as insurance 
mechanisms’: at 1 (citations omitted). 
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is uncertain, easily removed, or undermined by the conveyancing process, legislative 
development, or case law interpretation.  
In establishing title to land, two systems dominate world thinking. First, there are 
negative systems whereby the registration of a void instrument is ineffective to pass a 
valid interest. These systems operate merely to record ownership; registration does 
not overcome the lack of validity created by the void disposition. Second, there are 
positive systems that not only register title, but the act of registration creates and 
validates title.4 These title by registration systems, often described in Australia as the 
Torrens system of land registration, elevate the act of registration as the means by 
which title is granted. The Torrens system of land registration will cure the defects that 
would otherwise be embedded in the title. The title granted by registration will not be 
affected by past omissions or errors in the conveyancing process, though as always 
with the law, this broad principle will be subject to some exceptions.5 This simplicity is 
both its strength and its weakness. By this statutory fiat of title validation, it instantly 
obliterates the mistakes of the past, rendering them mere historical anomalies. But by 
so doing, it renders the new, now registered title, inherently vulnerable to defeat by 
subsequent actions resulting in registration.  
The vision of Sir Robert Torrens, the architect of title by registration was to introduce a 
land registration system that would remove any need to consider past inaccuracies in 
the conveyancing process, and to ensure that the business of transacting for land could 
be done with simplicity, with ease, with convenience, and that it would be fit for 
purpose. As Sir Robert Torrens noted in his monograph of the time, ‘The English Law 
of Property is admitted to be insecure, costly, cumbrous, tardy, injurious, and unsuited 
to the requirements of the inhabitants of these colonies.’6 His work sought to overcome 
these problems. 
                                                          
4    As O’Connor notes, it was the work of SR Simpson who adopted the positive and negative distinction as 
outlined here. See Pamela O’Connor, ‘Deferred and Immediate Indefeasibility: Bijural Ambiguity in Registered 
Land Title Systems’ (2009) 13(2) Edinburgh Law Review 194, 194-195 where she cites SR Simpson, Land 
Law and Registration, (Cambridge 1976), 15-16 who himself adopted the language from PE Norman, 
Photogrammetry and the Cadastral Study, (Netherlands, 1965), 8-10. As O’Connor notes at 195, the terms do 
not necessarily mean the same thing to every author. In most situations, a positive land registration system 
can be seen as a guarantee of title, but it can also be used in a more narrow sense to mean the conferral of 
title, with this title subject to overriding interests, or a right of rectification.  
5 See Charisse Griffith-Charles, The Impact of the Land Titling on Land Transaction Activity and Registration 
System Sustainability: A Case Study of St Lucia (unpublished PhD, University of Florida, 2004) 2 (copy held 
with author). 
6 Robert R Torrens, The South Australian System of Conveyancing by Registration of Title (Adelaide, 1859) 42. 
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Title by registration encompasses three elements7 that serve to give it coherence. First, 
there is a public register that records the interests and rights, such as fee simple 
ownership, the existence of easements and covenants,8 the rights of mortgagees, and 
certain leasehold interests. Entry onto the register establishes title. Unregistered 
interests remain enforceable though they are liable to be defeated by registered 
interests or in priority disputes with other unregistered interests. This is the first element 
— the importance of the register and the removal of dependent titles. 9  Visually 
expressed, the curtain10 need not be drawn back. The second element is that an 
interested party is able to rely on the register. The register operates as a mirror, (or a 
photo), identifying and reflecting back to the onlooker the major interests in land that 
attach to the specific parcel within the cadastre.11 The final element is that there will be 
compensation for those who suffer loss because of the register — the assurance fund. 
What title by registration does is create a positive incentive to register, provide a 
publically accessible register for all to access, and renders the unregistered interest as 
                                                          
7 See generally Murray Raff, ‘Torrens, Hübbe, Stewardship and the Globalisation of Property Law Systems’ 
(2009) 30 Adelaide Law Review 245-248. The architect of these three principles was Theodore Ruoff, who 
explored these ideas in An Englishman looks at the Torrens System: being some provocative Essays on the 
operation of the System after one hundred years, (LawBook Co., 1957). He had earlier identified these elements 
in ‘An Englishman looks at the Torrens System Part I: The Mirror Principle’ (1952) 26 Australian Law Journal 
118;  An Englishman looks at the Torrens System Part II: The Simplicity and the Curtain Principle’ (1952) 26 
ALJ 162. 
8 Though it should be noted that position concerning covenants differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For 
example, in Tasmania, restrictive covenants are noted on title, but still depend on the governing equitable rules 
for their enforceability (see ss 102-104A Land Titles Act 1980). A similar position applies in New South Wales, 
Victoria and Western Australia. See Anthony P Moore, Scott Grattan and Lynden Griggs, Bradbrook, MacCallum 
and Moore’s Australian Real Property Law (Thomson Reuters, 2016) [18.125]. In the remaining jurisdictions of 
Queensland, South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, it appears as though 
there is no express power to note restrictive covenants on title. 
9 As noted by Stein, ‘[s]urrender of the certificate is, dogmatically, a renunciation of the estate which reverts to 
the Crown. After the examination of the documents the registrar writes out a new certificate for the purchaser 
and notes the transfer of rights in the book. This typical feudal law construction of renunciation and regrant is 
what Torrens adopted from the Middle Ages English Charter Rolls and Copyhold book system. Additionally, it 
is believed that the Deed books of the Hanse towns of Hamburg, Lűbeck and Bremen contributed part of the 
model’: see Robert Stein, ‘The Principles, Aims and Hopes of Title by Registration’ (1983) 2 Adelaide Law 
Review 267, 273-274, quoting von Metzler, Das Anglo-Smerikanische Grundbuchwesen (Cram, de Gruyter & 
co, Hamburg, 1966) 50 (trans). 
10 Ruoff described this curtain principle in the following way: [The] curtain principle simplifies the duties of a 
disponee or his legal adviser by shutting out forbidden things from his view” Theodore Ruoff, An Englishman 
looks at the Torrens System Part II: The Simplicity and the Curtain Principle’ (1952) 26 ALJ 162, 164.  
11 It should be acknowledged that the mirror is not perfect and does not reflect statutory encumbrances such as 
environmental provisions, land tax, and heritage laws as exceptions to the paramountcy of the register. See for 
example Pamela O’Connor, Sharon Christensen and William Duncan, ‘Legislating for Sustainability: A 
Framework for Managing Statutory Rights, Obligations and Restrictions affecting Private Land’ (2009) 35(2) 
Monash University Law Review 233, 242-244, where the authors note that the number of rights, restrictions and 
obligations potentially affecting private land could be in the 100’s. What is difficult to determine is whether those 
rights operate in rem or only in personam. 
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something of lesser weight.12 Title by registration eliminates the rust of antiquity13 and 
with each transaction involving the issue of a new title from the Crown; the system 
guarantees the validity of the transaction and the title that is held by the registered 
owner. 14 Once registered, however, the title held by the proprietor is, in a sense, 
determinable by the fraudulent actions of another. Accordingly it is undeniable that title 
by registration inherently and necessarily includes a sliver of risk — the sliver is that 
title can be defeated by a transaction (which as noted may be fraudulent), but which 
once registered in the name of an innocent party gains not just priority, but sees the 
elimination of the historical title of the previous registered proprietor. The person 
defrauded is left to seek financial compensation.  
In Australia, through the prism of immediate indefeasibility,15 we favour transactional 
or dynamic certainty over the static certainty of ownership.16 Doctrinal coherence17 
within title by registration can undoubtedly lead, on occasions, to outcomes that are 
unfair. But this unfairness is no greater, and arguably considerably less than what can 
occur under general law. In responding to this perceived unfairness, the narrative that 
                                                          
12 See the comments by Simon Cooper, ‘Resolving Title Conflicts in Registered Land’ (2015) 131 Law Quarterly 
Review 108, 108. 
13   Though it should be noted that limitation statutes operate to prevent old or stale claims being asserted. The 
relevant statutes in each Australian state are as follows: Limitations Act 1969 (NSW); Limitation of Actions Act 
1958 (Vic); Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld); Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA); Limitation Act 2005 (WA); 
Limitation Act 1974 (Tas). Title to land cannot be lost to adverse possession in the Northern Territory (Land Title 
Act (NT), s 198) and the Australian Capital Territory (Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT), s 69). 
14 As noted in Gibbs v Messer [1891] AC 248, 254: ‘The main object of the [Torrens Act], and the legislative 
scheme for the attainment of that object, appears to [their Lordships] to be equally plain. The object is to save 
persons dealing with registered proprietors from the trouble and expense of going behind the register, in order 
to investigate the history of their author’s title, and to satisfy themselves of its validity. That end is accomplished 
by providing that everyone who purchases, in bona fide and for value, from a registered proprietor, and enters 
his deed of transfer or mortgage on the register, shall thereby acquire an indefeasible right, notwithstanding the 
infirmity of his author’s title.’ 
15 Immediate indefeasibility recognises that a purchaser of land obtains a title subject only to such estates and 
interests as are noted on the register. Deferred indefeasibility grants indefeasibility but only where the 
transaction is between two parties innocent of wrongdoing. For example, a transfer from a person stealing the 
identity of the registered proprietor to an innocent purchaser gives an immediately indefeasible title. Deferred 
indefeasibility would defer the grant of indefeasibility to a purchaser from the person who received title from the 
wrongdoer. Immediate indefeasibility is adopted in Australia: Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376 (Breskvar). 
16 Pamela O’Connor, ‘Deferred and Immediate Indefeasibility: Bijural Ambiguity in Registered Land Title Systems’ 
(2009) 13(2) Edinburgh Law Review 194, 195. Static security refers to the security of ownership, and the 
principle that without consent the law will prevent a deprivation of property. Dynamic security or security of 
transaction references the position where the law will give effect to a transfer to a person who has acted in good 
faith. See the work of O’Connor at 198. See also Anne C. Pickering, ‘New and Early Title Registration 
Jurisdictions — Lessons from Established Torrens Jurisdictions and other Essential Considerations’ (2011) 
LawAsia Journal 111, 114. 
17 Coherence within the law is a topic of modern consideration within the High Court. As noted, in a broader context 
of the discussion around common law and statute and the musings by the High Court on this issue: Sir Anthony 
Mason states: ‘It follows that the concept of doctrine of coherence applies both to analogical development of the 
common law from statute and to analogical development from the common law itself’: Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The 
Interaction of statute law and common law’ (2016) 90 Australian Law Journal 324, 337. 
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surrounds land administration must seek solutions that advantage the collective goals 
of the Torrens system while seeking to ameliorate the harm occasioned on the 
individual owner.18 With the relationship between the owner, the community, and land 
ever changing (with increasing individual responsibilities through local council edicts, 
bushfire awareness obligations, environmental and planning concerns, fauna and flora 
protection, heritage issues, and indigenous claims), title by registration must support, 
promote, and enhance land ownership in a way that meets broad community 
expectations while minimising individual injustice.  
Title by registration, one of the world’s great ‘multi-disciplinary and multi-lingual law’19 
reform projects, was designed and built for an emerging nation-state, with large tracts 
of undeveloped land and an urgent need for funding to finance the development of 
public infrastructure. 20  Today, with the nation-state emerged and the Australian 
federation now a developed and wealthy economy, the need for a system of land 
registration that serves to secure land ownership as a means to fund public 
infrastructure no longer remains. Despite this, the maturity of Australia’s title by 
registration scheme will see it remain as the preferred method for the property aspects 
of the cadastre. Nevertheless, this maturity will not remove the need to obtain a 
nuanced understanding of its operation and to continue to ask how it will evolve to 
meet new trends and new technologies.21  
It is suggested that title by registration is superior to other forms of land registration 
(most notably recording systems) and that despite the occasional individual injustice, 
the system is efficient, largely meets community expectations, and is sustainable as 
paper based conveyancing is left behind in the wake of electronic or e-conveyancing. 
Indeed, it is argued that if the appropriate measures are put in place as we 
progressively engage with electronic conveyancing,22 the same concerns that led Sir 
                                                          
18 An example of this can be seen in Pedulla v Panetta (2011) 16 BPR 30, 229 where an elderly woman who went 
into cloisters in Italy lost her Sydney residence through the actions of her brother and his partner, both of whom 
fled the country with the ill-gotten proceeds of their actions. Pedulla was compensated financially, but never 
recovered the property. 
19 Raff, above n 7, 245. 
20 For a discussion of the Wakefield method of systematic colonisation, see: 
<http://boundforsouthaustralia.com.au/journey-content/edward-gibbon-wakefield.html>. 
21 For example, one topic of interest today, specifically in developing economies, is the use of the blockchain 
technology to improve the accuracy of land registers: see Abishek Dobhal, Mathew Regan, ‘Immutability and 
Auditability: The Critical Elements in Property Rights Registries’ (Paper presented at the 2016 World Bank 
Conference on Land and Poverty, Washington DC, 14-18 March 2016). 
22 New South Wales is the lead jurisdiction on this: see Electronic Conveyancing (Adoption of National Law) Act 
2012. All other states and territories will enact, or have enacted complementary legislation. 
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Robert Torrens to act23 can be met without giving way to the ideas and principles that 
support title by registration. It is concluded that e-conveyancing, provided the right 
decisions around security are made, can, in fact, reinforce and further evolve the 
substantive law of title by registration to meet the aims of Sir Robert Torrens.  
The remainder of this chapter highlights this theme by focusing on the aims or goals 
of a land administration system, with this followed by an outline of the research 
methodology adopted in my work. The following chapter will then connect my 
publications over the last 18 years to this idea and the research methodology adopted. 
The final chapter will speak to the contemporary relevance of my work and its 
sustaining contribution to the literature on title by registration. Ultimately, the research 
question identified is whether doctrinal coherence has been achieved as legislation 
and case law continues its interpretation of title by registration. More specifically, I ask 
what will be, or should be, the continued role of non-registered interests in a Torrens 
system of land registration, the ongoing relevance of possessory interests, and how 
electronic conveyancing will change the security concerns and potentially the 
substantive law associated with this form of land administration.  
1.2 The Goals of a Land Administration System 
The traditional goal of a land administration system is to support the operation of land 
transfer, and through this, the economic development and growth of a nation.24 From 
the time of feoffment and livery of seisin, to registration of deeds, and now title by 
registration, the aim has always been to ensure that land can be transferred securely 
and with minimum transaction costs. These transaction costs can be identified as: 
i) information costs — the costs of finding the real estate that meets your needs, 
and ensuring its title; 
ii) bargaining costs associated with the contract; and 
                                                          
23 These concerns were the ‘complexity’ of the law, the ‘heavy costs’ associated with conveyancing, the embedded 
‘losses and much perplexity’, that it was ‘unsuited to requirements of a progressive community’ and the ‘value 
of land as a basis of credit was diminished’: Torrens, above n 6, 8. 
24 See the comments by Daniel Steudler, ‘A Framework for the Evaluation of Land Administration Systems’ 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 2004) 1 (copy held with author). 
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iii) the policing and enforcement costs associated with protecting the property from 
any adverse claims by a third party.25 
What any party seeks to do is reduce the transaction costs associated with 
conveyancing (an efficiency mantra), while still ensuring that one gets what one 
anticipated (ie meeting the party’s expectations). The system, be it recording or 
registration based, that best meets these endeavours, at the least cost collectively and 
individually, should be supported, and my clear and consistent view is that this system 
is title by registration.26 Title by registration will minimise the policing and enforcement 
costs, with this able to be achieved without undermining doctrinal coherence. 
Williamson suggests that doctrinal coherence requires that land registration systems 
achieve three goals:  
i) security of tenure for the landholders;  
ii) the recognition of the significant land rights that affect the majority of the 
population; and  
iii) to obtain and retain public trust in the system.27  
In achieving these goals there must be a connection between the legal principles 
formulated by the legislature or the judiciary, and the previously mentioned ideas of 
the mirror, curtain, and indemnity. If these goals are not met, the system is in crisis.28 
Our understanding of doctrinal coherence in terms of land registration systems must 
be tempered by the realisation that the community must be comfortable with the 
substantive legal outcomes delivered by the system. In reinforcing the importance of 
indefeasibility in meeting doctrinal coherence, ideas must be developed as to how 
individual notions of justice can be accommodated in what I have described as 
Australia’s ‘best export’. 29  This involves an examination of the key principles that 
                                                          
25 Luis J Arrieta-Sevilla, ‘A Comparative approach to the Torrens System’ (2012) 20 Australian Property Law 
Journal 203, 204-205. 
26 Eg, Joseph T Janczyk, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Land Title Systems for Transferring Real Property’ (1977) 
Journal of Legal Studies 2; L Griggs, ‘Torrens Title in a Digital World’ [2001] Murdoch University Electronic 
Journal of Law 20. 
27 Ian P Williamson, ‘Best Practices for Land Administration Systems in Developing Countries’ (Paper presented 
at the International Conference on Land Policy Reform, Jakarta, 25-27 July 2000) 15. 
28 Ibid. Along similar lines, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe has commented, ‘the function of 
land registration is to provide a safe and certain foundation for the acquisition, enjoyment and disposal of rights 
in land’: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Land Administration Guidelines with Special 
Reference to Countries in Transition (United Nations Publications, 1998) 11. 
29 Lynden Griggs, ‘The Assurance Fund: Government Funded or Private’ (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 250, 
257. 
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underlie Torrens,30 with the most important of these being indefeasibility, with the 
principles of the mirror, curtain, and indemnity, inexorably linked to this.  
1.3 Recording and Registration based Land Systems 
As previously noted, two land registration systems guide global thinking. Recording 
based systems, such as that which exists in much of the United States of America 
(US), France, the Netherlands, and Italy, register the deeds associated with land 
ownership, with this providing a public record of ownership or a registration of title.31 
The risk associated with the transaction that led to ownership, or the underlying 
ownership itself is protected through measures such as title insurance. 32  Title by 
registration jurisdictions (specifically Torrens jurisdictions) include Malaysia, 
Singapore, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, pockets within a small number of US states 
(Minnesota, Massachusetts, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Ohio, Washington, North 
Carolina), Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Ivory Coast, Congo, Tunisia, Madagascar, 
the Philippines, Dominican Republic, Ireland, Thailand, Iran, Australia, New Zealand, 
Trinidad-Tobago, Jamaica, Belize, Syria and Canada.33 In these jurisdictions: 
[The] title of the new registered proprietor is cleared of any errors, mistakes or 
hidden defects, the process of registration acting, if you like, as a publicly funded 
hospital that remedies the injuries embedded within that title - a purge of past 
omissions or incorrect additions occurring by fiat of registration.34  
                                                          
30 Sharon Christensen, and William Duncan, ‘Aligning Sustainability and the Torrens Register: Challenges and 
Recommendations for Reform’ (2012) 20(2) Australian Property Law Journal 112. 
31 See generally Arrieta-Sevilla, above n 25. 
32 For a discussion of title insurance see Lynden Griggs and Rouhshi Low, ‘Going through the Obstruction, the 
Torrens System Assurance Fund and Contemporary Solutions – a tale weaved from a story of a nun, a romantic 
triangle and sibling corruption’ (2014) 23 Australian Property Law Journal 17. 
33 See the discussion by Greg Taylor, The Law of the Land – the Advent of the Torrens System in Canada 
(University of Toronto Press, 2008) 19, regarding the spread of Torrens. However, it is important to note that 
the extent of adoption does differ significantly between jurisdictions. See also, Murray Raff, ‘Fraud and Land 
Title Registration Systems in International Comparative Perspective’ (Presentation to World Bank, Washington 
DC, March 11, 2016) 3-4. 
34 See Benito Arruñada, ‘A Transaction Cost View of Title Insurance and its Role in Different Legal Systems’ (2002) 
27 The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 582; Benito Arruñada, Institutional Foundations of Impersonal 
Exchange: Theory and Policy of Contractual Registries (University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
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1.4 The Common Origins of the Torrens System 
While there are as many forms of title by registration systems as there are jurisdictions, 
there is no doubt that it was the work of Sir Robert Torrens in the mid-1850’s in the 
then colony of South Australia that led to its introduction.35 While the sources of his 
inspiration are disputed 36  ‘the one-time Collector of Customs [was] elected to 
Parliament on a mandate of land law reform and eventually [enjoyed] a term as Premier 
in the month of September 1857.’37 In his own words, Torrens was greatly influenced 
by a friend of his who lost title to land, with this land being held within a recording based 
title system. His friend had made significant improvements to the land and despite this; 
no compensation was available for the loss of title.38 The context is also relevant. As 
an emerging British colony, South Australia was in desperate need of a financial base 
to be spent at the behest of the colonial administrators, and the sale of land in line with 
the Wakefield method of colonisation,39 a method that subsequently infiltrated New 
Zealand and Canada, was seen as the means to achieve this. If this was to occur 
however, the purchasers of real estate demanded certainty and security. Sir Robert 
Torrens answered this call. ‘Torrens proposed a system of “independent” titles: in 
essence, upon each conveyance the land would be surrendered to the Crown, which 
would then re-grant it to the purchaser’.40 Title by registration was then able to achieve 
reliability, simplicity, low-cost conveyancing, and suitability 41  to the circumstances 
facing mid-19th century South Australia. Today, in an era of electronic conveyancing 
and agents of the purchaser and vendor signing documents on behalf of these parties, 
rather than the parties signing themselves, can the system retain its coherence in light 
of the challenges posed by these changes? 42  My original research responds 
affirmatively and provides a dynamic assessment of where current thinking lies. 
                                                          
35 See generally, Taylor, above n 33. 
36 Ibid 19. It would be remiss not to mention that some legal historians have questioned Torrens role in the 
development of the system that now bears his name. For a discussion of this, see Taylor: at 33. 
37 Lynden Griggs, Rouhshi Low and Rod Thomas, ‘Accounting for Risk: the advent of Capped Conveyancing Title 
Insurance’ (2015) 24 Australian Property Law Journal 1, 2. 
38 Torrens, above n 6, v-vi. 
39 See above n 20. 
40 P Butt, Land Law (Thomson Reuters, 5th ed, 2006) [2003]. See Torrens, above n 6, 9, 34.  
41 These were seen as the hallmarks of what Torrens was trying to achieve, see Thomas R Ruoff, An Englishman 
looks at the Torrens System (LawBook Co, 1957). 
42 More will be said on this later, but the move from each party signing the contract and the forms that change 
ownership to one where an agent does this on the party’s behalf is quite probably the most fundamental change 
to conveyancing since the introduction of the Torrens system. 
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[The Torrens register]… does make things better, cure invalidities, and make 
people’s titles certain… The Torrens system therefore means the end of the need 
to look backwards for possible flaws.43 
1.5 The Critical Dispute 
Stripped of any embellishment or complication, the underlying dispute that occurs 
within land registration systems can be summarised in the following example: 
A, is the true owner of the land. Through the fraudulent actions of a third party, 
the land is transferred to B who is bona fide. B is now the registered/recorded 
owner of the land. Who is entitled to the land, and who is entitled to 
compensation?  
The answer to this lies at the crux of the difference between a recording based land 
registration system (ie general law land or old system title land in Australia) and title by 
registration systems such as Torrens. As Baird and Jackson state, ‘we can protect a 
latter owner’s interest fully, or we can protect the earlier owner’s interest fully. But we 
cannot do both’44 with numerous cases of fraud highlighting how easily the sale of land 
without the authority of the true owner can occur.45 At general law, we protect A — the 
previous owner — the property flows to this individual; and compensation, if possible, 
to B. Title by registration fundamentally changes this. In adopting liability-based rules 
as regards A, whereby the value of the interest in the  land is protected not by the 
return of the land, but the payment of compensation,46 B becomes the owner of the 
land and A may be entitled, at least in Australia, to state sourced compensation. Title 
by registration protects the security of the transaction; general law land protects the 
security of the existing owner.47 The differences between recording or deeds based 
                                                          
43 Taylor, aboven 33, 10. 
44 Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson, ‘Information, uncertainty, and the transfer of property’ (1984) 13 Journal 
of Legal Studies 299, 300. 
45 As a modern illustration, see the fraud highlighted in this Australian Federal Police Media Alert: 
<http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2013/august/media-release-arrest-in-nigeria-over-real-estate-
fraud-attempt-in-australia.aspx>. 
46   Judge Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089. 
47 O’Connor, above n 16. 
Introduction: The Interrelated Research Questions and Research Methodology 
 11 
land registration systems, and title by registration or Torrens systems, are summarised 
by Enemark as follows:48 
 
 System 
Deeds System Torrens System 
What the system 
does 
It tells us who owns what It tells us what is owned by whom. 
What does the 
register do? 
It records owners It records properties and connects owners to 
those properties. [Title is also validated] 
Legality of what is 
occurring 
Registration of Title – no assurance by 
the state. 
Protection to the static owner. 
Title by Registration – compensation for 
loss provided by the state, but this is not 
uniform across the Torrens jurisdictions. 
Protection generally afforded to the 
dynamic nature of the transaction, rather 
than static ownership. This is a 
consequence of immediate indefeasibility.49 
Role of the Cadastre Taxation – land tax imposition [the 
register also facilitated the transfer of 
information between parties interested in 
the one parcel of land, and was designed 
to reduce the extent to which land 
ownership had to be traced before a valid 
title could be claimed.] 
Identification and title connection between 
people and the land. 
How is it justified that the existing or past true owner of the land can lose title by the 
actions of someone acting fraudulently? The intuitive response for many would be that 
the existing landowner, the person who may have been in possession of that land for 
many years has an attachment and value associated with the land that is greater than 
the market value. In addition, members of the public could reasonably expect that their 
property cannot be illegally removed from their ownership and vested in the hands of 
another. Furthermore, many of the fraud-based scenarios involve financial institutions 
who have also been duped by the fraudster,50 and the economic interest of the banks 
could easily be met by compensating for their financial loss, rather than removing the 
title of the natural person and allowing the financial institution the right to exercise a 
power of sale over the land. The answer as to why Torrens moves in the direction it 
does derives largely from economics. Under Pareto optimality, the most efficient 
                                                          
48 Stig Enemark, ‘Land Administration Systems’ (overheads for lecture course, Land Administration Systems 2, 7th 
and 9th September 2004, overhead 8, copy held with authors). See also, Stig Enemark, ‘Land Administration 
Systems – managing rights, restrictions and responsibilities in land’ (Presentation to Map World Forum, 
Hyderabad, India, 10-13 February 2009). 
49 See generally, Rouhshi Low and Lynden Griggs, ‘Immediate Indefeasibility – is it under threat?’ (2011) 19 
Australian Property Law Journal 222. 
50 Eg, Yazgi v Permanent Custodians Ltd (2007) 13 BPR 24, 567; Solak v Bank of Western Australia [2009] VSC 
82; Perpetual Trustees Victoria v English [2010] NSWCA 32; Russo v Bendigo Bank and Reichman [1999] 3 
VR 376; Bank of South Australia v Ferguson (1998) 192 CLR 248. 
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distribution of resources would see no individual worse off.51 As the existing landowner 
may well have an interest in the land that cannot be measured by its economic value, 
Pareto optimality might suggest that in the dispute outlined above, A should prevail.52 
Under the Torrens system however, this is rejected. Where a dispute arises between 
the new purchaser and the previously registered proprietor, the system operates 
according to utilitarian principles. Instead of Pareto optimality, Kaldor-Hicks criterion is 
used, whereby gains and losses are looked at without recourse to the circumstances 
of the individual, and are instead considered as a whole.53 The question is which course 
of action will maximise the utility for the greatest number of people. This demands that 
we consider overall net benefit and determine whether the costs that were imposed on 
parties that were disadvantaged, exceed the benefits gained by the favoured parties. 
When this view from above is taken, and the economic interests of the two innocent 
parties are masked so that identification of the landowner vis-à-vis the financial 
institution is not possible, the Torrens systems delivers a lower cost, more 
economically efficient method of land transfer than recording based systems. 
The conclusion that Torrens systems deliver a more efficient method stems from the 
underlying principles of the curtain and the mirror. Without any need to investigate title, 
the conclusion we see in title by registration systems, specifically Torrens, is the 
destruction or deprioritising of the entitlement of the true or previous owner. For this 
disenfranchised individual, Australian states and territories will recompense this person 
in monetary terms, though not all international jurisdictions do this. In effect, the land 
register under a title by registration jurisdiction through its identification and publication 
of much of the relevant information that a transferee needs to know, will protect by 
property rules the interest of the purchasing party (ie through indefeasibility). The 
purchasing party, once registered, becomes subject to the risk that a later void and 
subsequently registered transaction could override their interest. The Torrens System 
undoubtedly leads to a dissonance between the security of title and security of the 
transaction, and as mentioned, it rejects the criterion of Pareto optimality because this 
‘affects the confidence that society requires for economic development.’54 The reason 
                                                          
51 Arrieta-Sevilla, above n 25, 210-212. 
52 The inadequacy of Pareto optimality as a guide for this scenario is that there is no way that someone cannot be 
worse off; irrespective of what method of land registration is adopted, someone will always be worse off. 
53 Arrieta-Sevilla, above n 25,  210.  
54 Ibid.  
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economic development is impaired in recording based land administration systems is 
that without a clear guarantee of security over the land that is the subject of the 
transaction, financial institutions will increase their costs to cover the greater risk. 
Capital markets are influenced, directly and adversely. In saying this, it should be noted 
that these conclusions are not limited to financial institutions — they apply more 
broadly. In addition to the effect on financial institutions, the real estate market will face 
greater obstacles as purchasers factor in the higher risk that the transaction will not 
deliver the benefits that it should, resulting in a dampening of economic activity and a 
decreased willingness to engage in the housing market. 55  By contrast, where the 
purchaser is aware that the transaction will deliver certainty of title, vendors can expect 
to gain, as buyers are more willing to pay a higher price for the property, with 
mortgagees more comfortable in lending. Additional support for this reasoning can be 
seen in the economic critiques comparing title by registration land systems with 
registration of title systems. In determining which system leads to lower transaction 
costs, and which register delivers the more accurate information, both Arruñada,56 and 
Miceli and Sirmans 57  conclude that the costs for the consumer of using title by 
registration registers will lead to better outcomes for the community. For purchasers 
within recording based systems, the purchaser will be required to take positive and 
costly steps to protect against loss, with the taking out of title insurance the most likely 
consequence. Having said this, Miceli and Sirmans do note that if considerations of 
distributive wealth are taken into account, both parties in conflict will prefer receipt of 
the land to the equivalent monetary value. These questions of distributive wealth lead 
to exceptions to the fundamental principles of Torrens. The narrative provided by the 
judiciary and the legislature in responding to this question of distributive justice need 
to articulate precisely and confidently why and when these exceptions are justified. 
Much of my work addresses this question as well as identifying steps consistent with 
Torrens that enhance the gatekeeper role of registration to limit the possibility of 
fraudulent transactions occurring and being registered. These steps can include 
enhanced verification of identity protocols, something currently occurring in the e-
conveyancing environment, and additional measures associated with certificate of 
                                                          
55 See the comments by Arrieta-Sevilla, ibid 211. 
56 Arruñada, above n 34, Chapter 5, The Choice of Registration Systems. 
57 Thomas J Miceli and C F Sirmans, ‘The Economics of Land Transfer and Title Insurance’ (1995) 10 Journal of 
Real Estate Finance and Economics 81. 
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titles, such as the use of embedded codes and holographic images to prevent 
fraudulent copying. 
Furthermore, when a title by registration system is combined with immediate 
indefeasibility we have a land registration model that is consistent with what should be 
expected by the public in a land registration system (although possibly not by individual 
members of the public who have lost ownership of land they once held), and with the 
legal principles that connect with these ideas. 58  With Pareto optimality, neither 
recording nor registration-based systems can be justified — at least one party is worse 
off. By contrast, with Kaldor-Hicks, title by registration and the adoption of immediate 
indefeasibility provides confidence and security with the conveyancing process, though 
there is the risk of loss of title to the innocent owner. The system provides the greatest 
good for the greatest number. With recording based systems or deferred indefeasibility 
within registration based systems, individual property owners may well attain some 
benefits, but this comes at the cost to all of society who now have greater obligations 
to undertake due diligence through the conveyancing process.  
While some readers may have sympathy for the typical family facing the risk of losing 
their major asset, and there may be a general perception that any financial institution 
involved is more able to bear risk-reduction costs, such sympathetic feelings have no 
role in economic analysis.59  
1.6 Indefeasibility – the Key to Torrens 
The Australian resolution to the dispute outlined above between A and B has clearly 
and succinctly been resolved in favour of B — the person who buys from the fraudster. 
In 1971, the High Court of Australia accepted the notion of immediate indefeasibility as 
the doctrine of choice for the Torrens system.60 Its resonance is still strong: 
[The] principle is so important, and adherence to it so essential, that registered 
title [can] be challenged, under the legislative provisions in each of the States, 
only in the most exceptional circumstances. The Torrens system has enabled 
                                                          
58 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376. 
59 Robin Edwards and Jennifer O’Reilly, ‘The Duel between Immediate and Deferred Indefeasibility’ [1999] 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 82, 110. 
60 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 385-386 (Barwick CJ); 391 (McTiernan J); 396-398 (Menzies J); 400 
(Windeyer J); 406 (Walsh J). 
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conveyance with certainty in Australia and, even though there may be occasions 
where notions of comparative justice may seem to have been transgressed, it is 
essential that indefeasibility of title is not undermined.61 
For some, immediate indefeasibility is seen as statutory magic62 in that what it does is 
ensure the recognition of a legally acceptable interest in land that begins from a 
transaction that would otherwise be void under principles of private law. But what 
immediate indefeasibility does is reinforce the notion that the collective goal of 
minimising the transaction costs associated with conveyancing and protecting the 
dynamic nature of the transaction, can only be supported by the adoption of immediate 
indefeasibility, though as noted in the quote above, there will undoubtedly be occasions 
where individual perceptions of justice will be challenged.63 Arguably,64 the acceptance 
of immediate indefeasibility may be traced to the work of Ruoff, who, in suggesting that 
the register was a mirror ‘exerted a powerful normative influence on the subsequent 
development of the Australian Torrens system.’65 The remaining ideas of Torrens, the 
curtain and the indemnity, are consistent with and support this visual image of what a 
mirror does, with the title reflecting only those interests that remain relevant to the land. 
The seminal New Zealand authority of Fels v Knowles66 explains the importance of the 
register: 
The cardinal principle of the [land registration statute] is that the register is 
everything, and that, except in cases of actual fraud on the part of the person 
dealing with the registered proprietor, such person, upon registration of the title 
under which he takes from the registered proprietor, has an indefeasible title 
against all the world. Nothing can be registered the registration of which is not 
                                                          
61 Perpetual Ltd v Barghachoun [2010] NSWSC 108, [25]. 
62 Seow Zhixiang, ‘Rationalising the Singapore Torrens System’ (2008) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 165, 
166. 
63 The criticisms of immediate indefeasibility have recently been articulated by Sam Boyle, ‘Fraud against the 
Registrar: Why the ‘De Jager line’ of authority is incorrect, and how unfairness caused it to arise’ (2015) 24 
Australian Property Law Journal 305. Boyle suggests that it is absurd that mortgagees registering forged 
mortgages should obtain the benefits of indefeasibility (see 324-326). Boyle considers that the weight of 
unfairness and the present ‘destabilisation of the case law’ (see 326) should lead to Australian courts 
considering deferred indefeasibility.  This author disagrees with Boyle in that deferred indefeasibility will only 
add transaction costs for all purchasers of real estate, and more nuanced measures to ameliorate the harshness 
of immediate indefeasibility can be introduced. These measures can include enhanced security protocols and 
increased requirements on financial institutions to verify identity.  
64  It should be noted that Australia did originally adopt deferred indefeasibility (Clements v Ellis (1934) 51 CLR 
217). This decision was overturned in Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 377, 387 (Barwick CJ). 
65 Christensen and Duncan, above n 30, 116.  
66  (1906) 26 NZLR 604. 
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expressly authorised by the statute. Everything which can be registered gives, in 
the absence of fraud, an indefeasible title to the estate or interest, or in the cases 
in which registration of a right is authorised, as in the case of easements or 
incorporeal rights, to the right registered.67 
1.7 The Move from Paper Based Conveyancing to Electronic Conveyancing 
My work reflects a critical analysis of this principle of indefeasibility, applied to a 
number of key areas of dispute within the Torrens system. My more recent work 
considers the legislative and technical issues, policy conundrums, and doctrinal issues 
that arise in the context of electronic conveyancing. The move to electronic based 
conveyancing is inexorable68 and presents key risks that derive from a change in the 
allocation of risk within the electronic environment, as well as the opportunity to commit 
frauds impossible through a paper-based system. Critically, the move to electronic 
conveyancing will, as noted, involve the most significant and fundamental changes to 
conveyancing practice that this country has seen since the introduction of the Torrens 
system some 170 years ago. Whereas the Torrens system required or mandated the 
change of the register following the lodgement of dealings signed by the parties to the 
transactions, electronic conveyancing will fundamentally alter this so that an agent — 
most likely a conveyancing agent or solicitor — will sign those documents on behalf of 
the transacting party. Embedded within the rules for the Property Exchange Australia 
(PEXA) are requirements for the solicitor or conveyancing agent to verify the identity 
of the party for whom they are acting and the owner of the land; connect these two; 
and, be confident within themselves that the client controls the right to deal with the 
land.69 If the move to electronic conveyancing were to result in a less secure land title 
system, sellers and buyers of real estate, mortgagees, and those involved with 
investment in property, can expect significantly higher conveyancing fees, and for the 
stakeholders such as the conveyancing agent, significantly higher insurance premia. 
With the move to electronic conveyancing now being rolled out, and its implementation 
                                                          
67 Ibid 620. The New Zealand authorities have recently suggested that immediate indefeasibility be retained, but 
that it be subject to an overriding judicial discretion to overturn in cases of manifest injustice. For a discussion 
of this, see Rod Thomas, ‘Reduced Torrens Protection: The New Zealand Law Commission Proposal for a New 
Land Transfer Act’, in press. 
68 Though note in the UK, progress has been halted. See the comments detailed in Land Registry, Report on 
responses to e-conveyancing secondary legislation part 3, 2011. 
69 Schedule 8, Model Participation Rules, Version 3, 2015 accessible at <www.arnecc.gov.au>. 
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likely to be completed in Australia by 2017, the casualties of the past that have included 
the e-conveyancing system originally rolled out in Victoria, as well as the steps taken 
in the United Kingdom will be long forgotten.70 Having said this, we will be doomed to 
repeat history should we forget the lessons learnt from those missteps. Accordingly, 
my work, which as long as 15 years ago, explored the possibility of aligning the transfer 
of property to the model that we see for the sale of equities, 71 will only come to 
realisation if our doctrinal understanding of what it is to be a true Torrens system 
remains clear and paramount in the minds of those who are tasked with implementing 
legislative developments, judicial interpretation, or policy evolution. 
1.8 Research Questions and Aim of the Research 
With this context in mind, my overarching research question has been to consider:  
• To what extent have the judicial and legislative developments concerning title 
by registration achieved doctrinal coherence with the ideas that underlie a title 
by registration (or Torrens) system of land registration? 
The hypothesis tested by this research is as follows: 
• Ameliorating the sometimes harsh results of Torrens disputes through reference 
to broad notions of fairness underpinned through common law or statutory 
exceptions, or recognition of possessory interests, or by lax security measures 
as we digitise the register and the process of conveyancing, will only undermine 
the ideas that provide the foundation to title by registration, and lead to as many, 
if not more questions than it resolves. 
This broader hypothesis requires consideration of the way in which equitable, or non-
registered interests are catered for within title by registration systems, the role of 
possessory interests within these systems, and the manner in which electronic 
                                                          
70 The Victorian E-conveyancing model was rejected by the conveyancing agents as it transferred risk to them. 
After spending some $40-50ml, only one transaction was carried out. See Benito Arruñada, ‘Leaky Title 
Syndrome’ (2010) New Zealand Law Journal 115, 118. In the United Kingdom, the introduction of e-
conveyancing was said to have led to a ‘massive increase’ in fraud. See Ross W Martin, ‘The Threat to 
Indefeasibility of Title under the Land Registration Act 2002’ [2012] Southampton Student Law Review 15, 22. 
71 For example, with the sale of equities on the Australian Stock Exchange, the buyer of equities need only 
establish their identity with an online broker, arrange for the integration of an account from which monies used 
for the purchase of equities can be withdrawn and to where monies from the sale of equities can be deposited, 
and then utilise private key infrastructure such as passwords to verify the identity of the individual when 
purchasing equities. 
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conveyancing has the potential to undermine or improve the key indicators of a 
successful land registration system. 
The aim of my research has been to: 
I) provide a doctrinal understanding of what the law is, and to highlight any 
inconsistencies within the current law and how they relate to the goals of title by 
registration; 
II) consider whether the system remains justifiable through the prism of economics 
and consumer law; and 
III) consider how key indicators for title by registration align with the introduction of 
electronic conveyancing and the changes in the process that this will necessarily 
involve.  
To this end, and while the change to electronic conveyancing was intended to have no 
effect on the substantive law, the argument raised in my recent work is that this will 
only be achieved if  the underlying elements of Torrens (the curtain, mirror and 
indemnity) are at the forefront of academic and legislative thinking as the jurisprudence 
of e-conveyancing system evolves. The importance of this cannot be underestimated. 
As judges and legislators ‘continually [strive] to perfect the law’s coherence’,72 so too 
must academics seek to ‘unite all the disparate elements of [title by registration] into 
one coherent whole.’73 
1.9 Research Methodologies 
The primary research method used has been to obtain a doctrinal understanding of 
title by registration in Australia to determine whether: 
• the ideas that originally drove Sir Robert Torrens to introduce the legal system 
that bears his name have been maintained; 
• the interpretation of the Torrens legislation and the common law principles 
supports these ideas; 
                                                          
72   Michael Gillooly, ‘Legal Coherence in the High Court: String Theory for Lawyers’ (2013) 87 Australian Law 
Journal 33, 48. 
73   Ibid. 
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• the irresistible move towards, and most recently, the enactment of electronic 
conveyancing can further advance the aims of title by registration; and 
• what are the key ingredients of a secure land registration system? 
‘In many cases the most difficult research question of all is what is the law and those 
engaged in doctrinal analysis will seek to answer this.’74 With ‘doctrinal’ representing 
the adverb form of the noun doctrine, the Macquarie Dictionary, in noting the etymology 
is originally Latin, then French and finally Middle English, defines doctrine as a ‘body 
or system of teachings relating to a particular subject.’ 75  As a discrete research 
methodology this has critically required the identification of the system that underpins 
title by registration and an examination of the case law and legislation (often across all 
six states and two territories),76 as well as the secondary material, including empirical 
data such as the extent of claims on the assurance fund, that influences our 
understanding of the Torrens system. In identifying the system that is title by 
registration, something significantly more than a synthesis of existing knowledge was 
required. It demanded that I question how the elements of the mirror, curtain, and 
indemnity align with the common law as enunciated by often diverse and diverging 
courts and, as we move from paper to electronic conveyancing, how title by registration 
will continue to evolve into a coherent and internally consistent legal system. The 
doctrinal method is one that aligns squarely with the demands of the profession of 
law,77 and can be said to be the starting point for all legal investigation. While it is ideally 
suited to the practice of legal problem solving, doctrinal study as an academic research 
methodology does significantly more. Without an understanding of what the law is, 
theoretical, comparative, and interdisciplinary research will not have the context that it 
needs to find its grounding. As identified by the Council of Australian Law Deans in 
noting the importance that doctrinal research plays in the academe of law: 
To a large extent, it is the doctrinal aspect of law that makes legal research 
distinctive and provides an often under-recognised parallel to “discovery” in the 
                                                          
74 Martin Dixon, ‘A Doctrinal Approach to Property Law Scholarship: Who Cares and Why?’ (2014) 3 Property Law 
Review 160, 161. 
75 Susan Butler (ed), The Macquarie Dictionary (Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2013). 
76 The current Torrens statutes are as follows: Real Property Act 1900 (NSW); Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic); 
Land Title Act 1994 (Qld); Real Property Act 1886 (SA); Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA); Land Titles Act 1980 
(Tas); Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT); Land Title Act (NT). 
77 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research – researching the jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), 
Research Methods in Law (Taylor and Francis, Florence, 2013) 28 (Chapter 1). 
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physical sciences. Doctrinal research, at its best, involves rigorous analysis and 
creative synthesis, the making of connections between seemingly disparate 
doctrinal strands, and the challenge of extracting general principles from an 
inchoate mass of primary materials. The very notion of ‘legal reasoning’ is a 
subtle and sophisticated jurisprudential concept, a unique blend of deduction and 
induction, that has engaged legal scholars for generations, and is a key to 
understanding the mystique of the legal system’s simultaneous achievement of 
constancy and change, especially in the growth and development of the common 
law. Yet this only underlines that doctrinal research can scarcely be quarantined 
from broader theoretical and institutional questions. If doctrinal research is a 
distinctive part of legal research, that distinctiveness permeates every other 
aspect of legal research for which the identification, analysis and evaluation of 
legal doctrine is a basis, starting point, platform or underpinning.78 
Doctrinal research in law is, as Hoecke describes, ‘a mainly hermeneutic 
[interpretative] discipline, with also empirical, argumentative, logical and normative 
elements.’79 It imposes a significant intellectual challenge, the capacity, particularly in 
a federation, to understand and make sense of different contexts and approaches, and 
requires great depth of knowledge. 80  This demands a research methodology that 
necessitates the generation of an idea that is worth investigating, and from this, the 
research process evolves to isolate where the information is to be found, much of which 
will be on the public record. 
More explicitly, this has required: 
I) The identification of the research question, with this often provoked by either 
case law developments, legislative change, private consultancy, or the work of 
                                                          
78 Council of Australian Law Deans, Statement on the Nature of Legal Research, (2005) 3 <www.cald.asn.au>.  
79 Mathias M Siems and Daithi M Sithigh, ‘Mapping Legal Research’ (2012) 71 Cambridge Law Journal 651, 653, 
citing Mark van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for what Kind of Discipline’ in Mark van Hoecke (ed), 
Methodologies of Legal Research (Oxford, 2011) 1, 17. 
80 See the comments by Richard A Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press, 2008) 211. Criticisms 
that doctrinal research is inflexible, formalistic, rigid and failing to connect the law to the context is, in the opinion 
of this author, wrong (see the authors cited by Rob van Gestel and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Revitalizing 
Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What about Methodology? (European University Institute Working Papers 
Law, 2011) 2. It fails to take account of the complexity of doctrinal legal research, the value it can add in ensuring 
that the legal system is not only coherent for legal practitioners and the academe, but that it can meet the 
broader community expectations; the context is always very much at the forefront of my thinking. My work has 
always sought to ensure that the fundamental tenets of the Torrens system evolve as the paper-based 
conveyancing moves to electronic conveyancing. 
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law reform bodies. In so doing, I sought to obtain objective evidence that the 
issue exists, and is worth researching. This approach required scoping the 
problem in a way that made the publication worthwhile in terms of adding to 
the current literature and has involved, at times, comparative and 
interdisciplinary work as well as the more traditional inductive reasoning81 of 
doctrinal legal research to identify a response to a specific legal problem. While 
it is accepted that inductive reasoning, the staple of legal analysis, does involve 
considerable risk, the research methodology adopted has been to further 
justify the conclusion ultimately made through the use of approaches that may 
be interdisciplinary (eg, consumer paradigms or economics), or through 
deductive reasoning that relates to and is transparently expressed in light of 
the elements that underpin title by registration, or the values that align 
themselves with this system of land registration. 
II) Having justified the problem, the next step was to isolate the criteria against 
which the current law was to be studied, and to identify inconsistencies 
between jurisdictions, or to isolate where the legislation or case law principle 
failed to align with the overarching elements. These criteria had to be justified, 
and in terms of title by registration systems, it has largely required identification 
of what a successful and secure land registration system should achieve. 
III) An overview of the primary and secondary material, (ie current cases, 
legislation, and literature) was then provided. This was done not in the sense 
of a literature review of the humanities, but to ensure that differences of opinion 
would be exposed, and contrasting viewpoints evaluated, against the identified 
criteria. It also ensured that what is new is built onto the current framework, 
and then judged as to whether it makes the system more or less coherent, and 
if less, what should be done to correct that (the research phase). 
IV) The process of writing then sought to synthesise, explain, evaluate, and where 
necessary creatively and originally address the shortcomings that are inherent 
in the current doctrinal understanding (the writing phase). ‘Deciding in hard 
                                                          
81 For a discussion of this, see Douglas Lind, ‘Basic Categories of Arguments in Legal Reasoning’ (2014) 11(4) 
The Judicial Review 429, 431: ‘the common law method of doctrinal development through case law, as well as 
the general norm known as “the Rule of Law” — that like cases should be decided alike — are grounded logically 
in inductive reasoning.’ 
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cases implies that existing rules will be stretched or even replaced but always 
in such a way that in the end the system is coherent again.’82 
My original work in answering the research question as to whether there has been, and 
will continue to be, doctrinal coherence within the Torrens system influences the 
development of the law through the identification of inconsistencies. At its heart, it 
ensures that the paramount confidence that we should have in title by registration is 
maintained and if needed, changed and enhanced. The consequences of a failure to 
do this are significant, not only for economic growth but for social cohesion as well. 
Allied with this has been interdisciplinary work83 where I seek to provide further support 
for the current operation of title by registration. The law does not exist in a vacuum and 
has both a functional and leadership role in ensuring community cohesion. If the 
application of an economics or consumer law framework did not support the coherence 
of title by registration, then the system would need to evolve or justify its ongoing 
shape. Finally, I have taken a law reform approach to the Torrens system and asked 
why in particular areas (possessory interests and easements being the most notable); 
the law should change. Necessary to this methodology has been a need to justify why 
change is warranted, or not, and how that change, or the existing state of affairs, meets 
the expectations of the community at large and aligns with the ideas that are the 
foundation of title by registration. 
1.10 Limitations of the Research 
There is no one system of title by registration. Within the Australian states and 
territories, let alone when international comparative work is undertaken, there are 
jurisdictional specific differences. Having said this, all title by registration systems 
within the Torrens family do emanate from a common origin and share at least two of 
the three elements and core ideas of the Torrens system (these being the curtain and 
the mirror; many countries don’t have an assurance fund or indemnity provision). My 
research has focussed at the applied level of whether the aims of title by registration 
systems, specifically Torrens, have provided a convincing narrative as to how the 
                                                          
82 van Gestel and Micklitz, above n 80, 26. 
83 For example Lynden Griggs, ‘Torrens Title in a Digital World’ (2001) 8(3) Murdoch University Electronic Journal 
of Law (Digital World); Lynden Griggs, ‘Resolving the Debate Surrounding Indefeasibility through the Eyes of a 
Consumer’ (2009) 17 Australian Property Law Journal 260 (Indefeasibility). 
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substantive law should operate in line with those principles, and in that narrative, 
whether the opportunity for fraud and other actions that weaken title by registration 
have been minimised. In doing this I have sought to address the overarching research 
question through deductive and inductive legal reasoning, to demonstrate that 
coherence can be maintained and enhanced if we adhere to the fundamental and 
underlying elements of the curtain, mirror, and the indemnity. 
Second, the Torrens system of land registration is not the only form of title by 
registration system currently operating. Germany, and adopters of the German style of 
land registration, such as Austria, Switzerland, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Greece, and to a lesser degree China and India, choose a form 
of title security where the registered title is also unchallengeable. In these European 
and Asian jurisdictions, the major difference with Torrens is that notaries authenticate 
the transactions submitted for registration. The United Kingdom form of land 
registration was heavily influenced by the German model,84 and while it was arguably 
intended to achieve the same level of security as indefeasibility, current cases seem 
to be ‘steadily derailing the orthodox, formalistic interpretation of the [English land 
registration statute]. 85  In the main, my research has not sought to undertake a 
comparative study between Torrens and other models of land registration systems, 
though it should be noted that, as I have written in my more recent articles,86 the 
requirement of verification of identity standards has seen a convergence between title 
by registration in the Torrens form, and the German idea of public faith in the register 
through the use of notaries.87  
                                                          
84 See the discussion in M Raff, ‘Fraud and Land Title Registration Systems in International Comparative 
Perspective’ (Paper presented at the 2016 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, Washington DC, 14-
18 March 2016). 
85 Amy Goymour, ‘Mistaken Registrations of Land: Exploding the Myth of Title by Registration’ (2013) 72 
Cambridge Law Journal 617, 646. For a discussion and comparison of the UK with Australia, see Penny 
Carruthers, ‘A Tanged Web Indeed: The English Land Registration Act and Comparisons with the Australian 
Torrens System’ (2015) 38(4) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1261. 
86 For example, see R Low and L Griggs, ‘Identity Verification in Conveyancing: The Failure of Current Legislation 
and Regulatory Measures, and Recommendations for Change’ (2012) 76 The Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 363. 
87 Raff, above n 84. 
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Third, while I am aware of the theoretical work of writers such as Merrill and Smith,88 
Coase, 89  and Calabresi and Melamed, 90  I have not sought, for the most part, to 
introduce this work into the body of my research. There is no doubting that, for 
example, the view of Coase that transaction costs can impede the operation of a 
market exchange for land, could be used to support a Torrens system of land 
registration when compared to a recording system, which necessarily involves higher 
search costs. Further, the operation of liability-based rules provides additional support 
for title by registration, something noted by me in 2001.91 Similarly, the work of Smith 
and others92 on numerus clausus could be applied to the Torrens system of land 
registration as the costs of registration based systems are reflected in the 
administrative costs of maintaining a registry that is publicly accessible, accurate, and 
in the case of Australia, supported by state-funded assurance funds. If the number of 
property interests expand, either the registry will need to evolve to cater for these 
interests, discussion of which has been undertaken in the Australian context by 
O’Connor, Christensen, and Duncan,93 or the costs of searching and finding out about 
these interests (the costs of gaining that information) will dramatically increase. By 
limiting the number of interests relevant to land, the transaction costs are lowered, 
which links with Coase’s argument that by lowering transaction costs, markets are 
enhanced. My work has been doctrinal and has sought to operate at the very coalface 
of how the Torrens system is operating in its interpretation and applicability to the 
substantive principles of property law, with the dissemination of this work occurring 
through peer-reviewed publications nationally and internationally, as well as, 
monographs and law reform submissions. 
                                                          
88 Eg, Thomas W Merrill and Henry E Smith, ‘The Property Contract Interface’ (2001) 101 Columbia Law Review 
773; Yun-chien Chang and Henry E Smith, ‘The Numerus Clausus Principle, Property Customs, and the 
Emergence of New Property Forms’ (2015) 100 Iowa Law Review 2275. 
89 Ronald H Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
90 Above n 46. 
91 See Griggs, above n 83, in quoting from the work of Calabresi and Melamed, above n 46; See also Louis Kaplow 
and Steven Shavell, ‘Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law 
Review 713. 
92   Such as Brendan Edgeworth, ‘The Numerus Clausus Principles in Contemporary Australian Property Law’ 
(2006) 32 Monash University Law Review 387; Pamela O’Connor, ‘Contractual Specifications of New Property 
Rights in Resources: The Problem of Measurement Costs’ (2013) 39 Monash University Law Review 38; 
Michael Weir, ‘Pushing the Envelope of Proprietary Interests: the Nadir of the Numerus Clausus Principle’ (2015) 
39 Melbourne University Law Review 651. 
93 Sharon Christensen, Bill Duncan and Pamela O’Connor, ‘Regulating for Sustainability’ (March 2011) 
<http://eprints.qut.edu.au/41637/1/1193-QUT_SustainPropertyW.pdf>. 
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Fourth, a PhD by Published Work necessarily involves a review deconstructing one’s 
research, which in my case extends over 18 years. This inevitably has involved a 
reflective view of what has been written in the past, and at times a more nuanced later 
reflection.
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Chapter 2:  Linking the Publications to the Research Questions and the 
Methodologies Adopted 
In this section I intend to demonstrate how my work has consistently argued in an 
innovative and chronologically progressive way that title by registration can retain its 
internal consistency, and still have the confidence of the community. In addition, I will 
show that it can provide security to the vast array of land interests that are recognised 
in Australia, and be an ongoing and trusted part of the cadastre on which to build the 
foundation of private land ownership. Within an overarching theme of coherence, built 
around a preference for the principle of immediate indefeasibility,94 my work seeks to 
answer whether there is doctrinal consistency within the Torrens system of land 
registration and why immediate indefeasibility is to be preferred over deferred 
indefeasibility. In this chapter, I first examine the underlying dilemma that led me on 
this path of research, before considering some of the key doctrinal areas of dispute. 
These areas include the importance of caveats, how and whether to recognise 
unregistered interests, the role of in personam interests, and most recently, the 
introduction of electronic conveyancing. I will also consider the ongoing debate in 
relation to indefeasibility, the current relevance of possessory interests, and how 
interdisciplinary analysis has been used to support my analysis. 
2.1 The Underlying Dilemma in Land Transactions 
In 1997,95 I began with the question that was to underlie my work for the next 18 years: 
how is land law going to resolve the ‘dilemma of competing claims to real property by 
people who can be designated as innocent parties’? 96  We know that when the 
registered landholder has had their identity stolen or their credentials forged, and their 
land has been transferred to a new purchaser, the law can favour either the new 
purchaser or the existing registered proprietor. This same question, addressed close 
                                                          
94 Immediate indefeasibility recognises that a purchaser of land obtains a title subject only to such estates and 
interests as are noted on the register. Deferred indefeasibility grants indefeasibility but only where the 
transaction is between two parties innocent of wrongdoing. For example, a transfer from a person stealing the 
identity of the registered proprietor to an innocent purchaser gives an immediately indefeasible title. Deferred 
indefeasibility would defer the grant of indefeasibility to a purchaser from the person who received title from the 
wrongdoer. Immediate indefeasibility is adopted in Australia: Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 385-386. 
95 Lynden Griggs, ‘Torrens Title – Arise the Registered and Unregistered, Befall the Legal and Equitable’ (1997-
1998) Deakin Law Review 35. 
96 Ibid. 
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to two decades ago, has new clothing in the form of electronic conveyancing — do the 
computer systems, IT controls, and the move from the parties individually signing to 
agents signing on behalf of the parties, provide a new fertile field of potential problems. 
When dealing with a dispute between two innocent parties in relation to land, the land, 
the subject of dispute, cannot be split. The coherence of the Torrens system is 
dependent on a recognition of this, and an understanding that to favour one person 
over the other is to make a conscious choice that will favour one party but disadvantage 
another — both of whom are not blameworthy for what has transpired. The articulation 
and transparency of the considerations that underpin those choices is what is critical. 
Indeed, reasonable people will often be at different ends of the continuum as to where 
we should be led in terms of resolution. In many scenarios, the contest is between the 
individual defrauded by the actions of another, with the imposter having taken security 
over the land from a duped financial institution.97 The contest will be between the 
mortgagee financial institution and the defrauded landowner, both of whom are 
innocent of any wrongdoing. In addressing my overarching research question, I 
suggest that: 
The solution in the case of registered or Torrens title land has been to protect, in 
the main, the innocent purchasers of title. This has permitted a conveyancing 
system, which is relatively inexpensive, quick, and for the most part, accurate, to 
flourish. The philosophy behind this system is the provision of a conclusive title, 
a registration system that the state guarantees as a mirror of the title.98 
2.2 What are the Key Elements? 
In my initial article,99 I undertook a doctrinal research methodology to consider the 
history of the Torrens system, the common law authorities, academic argument, and 
identify how these ideas and rules connect with the elements of Torrens. This article, 
published in the Deakin Law Review, examined whether the law of real property should 
be prepared to 
                                                          
97 For discussion around the taxonomy of frauds associated with title by registration transactions, see Lynden 
Griggs and Rouhshi Low, ‘Identity Fraud and Land Registration Systems: An Australian Perspective’ (2011) 75 
The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 285-308. 
98 Griggs, above n 95. 
99   Griggs, above n 95. 
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[D]ispense with the determination of priorities by the nature of the interest and 
instead turn to a system whereby Parliament mandates the registration of certain 
interests, the availability of caveating for those interests that cannot be registered 
and for priority to be resolved by the date of registration or lodgement of the 
caveat.100  
I submitted that coherency within title by registration would be achieved by some form 
of mandated caveating procedure for the unregistered interest, and that if the Register 
is to be the mirror of all matters influencing the title, then such a measure is needed 
and required. This article also noted that while the division between legal and equitable 
interests was not entertained by Sir Robert Torrens (his view was that unregistered 
interests were mere personal interests), 101  the more radical idea that the division 
between legal and equitable interests as they related to estates in land could be 
abolished was not likely to be accepted. I did suggest that the failure to address this 
division has allowed the ghosts of the registration of deeds system to continue to ‘haunt 
the interpretation of the new Torrens statute.’102  
By continuing this separation between legal and equitable through to priority 
disputes, we have allowed the goal of a cheap, safe and quick conveyancing 
system to be [contaminated] by historical divisions between law, equity, personal 
equities, and equities coupled with a proprietary interests — divisions which are 
not consistent and need not be maintained.103 
Accordingly, it is suggested that while we continue to identify interests as legal or 
equitable within a title by registration system, rather than registered or not, our dispute 
resolution processes, by adopting general law principles designed for a recording 
based land administration process, has the potential to undermine the coherence of 
the Torrens system.  
                                                          
100 Griggs, above n 95, 35. 
101 Mary-Ann Hughson, Marcia Neave, and Pamela O’Connor, ‘Reflections on the Mirror of Title: Resolving the 
Conflict between Purchasers and Prior Interest Holders’ (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 460, 461.  
102 Griggs, above n 95, 39, quoting William Duncan and Lindy Willmott, Mortgages Law in Australia (Federation 
Press, 2nd ed, 1996) 2. 
103 Griggs, above n 95, 46. The relationship between law and equity is considered further in section 2.3. 
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This early doctrinal research identified the three key elements that lay behind the 
Torrens system. These elements enable a structured and internally consistent 
framework to be applied to all Torrens disputes. These were, as previously noted: 
• the curtain, which need not be drawn back; 
•  the mirror, what is reflected back at you is all that binds you; and, 
• the indemnity: a person who has lost an interest in land due to the operation of 
the Torrens system, in circumstances where they would not have lost that 
interest under a recording based system, able to receive monetary 
compensation.  
I also suggested that the process for conveying land (subject to the additional 
requirements to ensure a good title be passed from vendor to purchaser) should be no 
more complex than the purchase and sale of equities on the stock exchange.104 The 
contemporary relevance of this, and demonstrating its ongoing resonance, is that my 
most current work draws more fully on this idea, as electronic conveyancing becomes 
a reality. My references in 1997 to the use of the stock exchange as an archetypal 
model for the conveyance of land were somewhat prescient given the recent 
establishment of the Property Exchange Australia (PEXA). 105  This entity, currently 
owned by the five most populous state governments and the major financial 
institutions, has established an electronic conveyancing framework that will allow a 
national approach to the process of conveyancing, if not provide some impetus to a 
national Torrens code. This development has the potential to advance the aims of the 
Torrens system, though as I have written,106 what we have learnt from the failures of 
other jurisdictions in establishing electronic conveyancing is the need to be mindful of 
security.107 In seeking to address these security measures I have suggested that what 
is critical is the need to verify identity, connect ownership of that person to the land, 
and ensure that they have the right to deal in relation to that land (ie commonly a 
mortgagee can control the right to deal).108 Staying true to the ideas that underpin the 
                                                          
104 Griggs, above n 95, 47. 
105 See Property Exchange Australia (PEXA) <www.pexa.com.au>. 
106 Rod Thomas, Lynden Griggs and Rouhshi Low, ‘Electronic Conveyancing in Australia – is anyone concerned 
about security’ (2014) 23 Australian Property Law Journal 1 (not primary author). 
107 Ibid 2. 
108 Rod Thomas, Rouhshi Low and Lynden Griggs, ‘Australasian Torrens Automation, Its Integrity and the 3 Proof 
Requirements’ (2013) 2 New Zealand Law Review 227-262 (not primary author). 
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Torrens system and the legal principles that flow from this must ultimately come down 
to preventing abuse of the register and ensuring the register accurately reflects all 
interests that pertain to that parcel of land. The importance of this work is that the 
electronic conveyancing protocols through the model operating rules and model 
participation rules109 reflect much of this thinking. 
[Q]uestions [concerning] who should bear the risk in terms of abuse of the 
register remain unclear and it is likely these questions will not be fully resolved 
until litigation transpires. What is certain is that too great a risk of abuse can 
lead to loss of public confidence in the register and increased transactional 
costs. We must balance the potential of the harshness of Torrens registration 
outcomes, on the one hand, and the need to have a land transaction that is 
inexpensive, secure and effective. 
2.3 What is the Role of Caveats and Restitution in meeting these Key Points? 
The conclusion that I reached in 1997 as to the importance of caveating still has 
relevance, with this highlighted by the High Court in Black v Garnock.110 In this case, a 
purchaser failed to caveat to protect their estate contract, and in the hours before 
settlement, a writ of execution was lodged against the title. The interest referenced by 
this writ, prevailed over the estate contract of the purchaser.111 What was significant 
about this case is that the judgement of Justice Callinan in perhaps a portend of things 
to come, lamented the catastrophic consequences for the purchaser. In his Honour’s 
view, these consequences would not have happened if the purchaser had lodged 
caveats in protection of their interests. No compensation was available from the 
assurance fund for what was ultimately a very significant loss.112  
The questions raised in this case would be unlikely to have arisen had those 
salutary practices [ie caveating] not fallen into disuse, whether by reason of 
electronic recording of dealings or otherwise, although it is difficult to understand, 
why some comparable prudent practice would not equally, and perhaps more 
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easily, have been adopted there to accommodate electronic lodgement, 
searching and recording.113 
Further doctrinal research into unregistered interests was explored again in 2001 in an 
article published in the Queensland University of Technology Law Journal.114 In this 
instance, I expanded my discussion of unregistered interests and raised the still 
contemporary issue of how restitutionary claims should fit within a modern land 
registration system dealing with registered/unregistered interests rather than the more 
historically based division between legal and equitable interests. In seeking to isolate 
whether there is doctrinal consistency between the ideas and principles that should 
drive the Torrens system I asked:  
[This conundrum] is at the heart of the issue in this paper. Should a personal 
equity arise in circumstances of what is ultimately policy motivated relief — where 
to allow the claim cuts back the operation of the Torrens legislation? That is, if 
the acts of the registered interest holder do not involve any misrepresentation, 
there is no misuse of power, no improper attempt to rely on legal rights and no 
knowledge of wrongdoing, should these goals of the Torrens system override the 
principles [that] permit a remedy being granted to an aggrieved individual.115  
In undertaking this examination,116 close consideration was given to the High Court 
decision in Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd. 117 Garcia and her then husband 
executed a registered mortgage over their home. The mortgage secured all monies 
that the parties presently owed and which they may come to owe in the future. 
Subsequently, Garcia signed a number of guarantees in favour of the National 
Australia Bank with those guarantees relating to the business activities of her husband. 
Following the separation and divorce between the parties, Garcia sought a declaration 
that the guarantees were of no force or effect. While this case was decided by the 
doctrine of unconscionability,118 my examination focused on the extent to which the 
National Australian Bank might have succeeded in arguing that its registered security 
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attained the status of indefeasibility. After all, there was no evidence before the court 
that suggested that the bank had engaged in any sense of personal dishonesty or 
moral turpitude, the normal criteria for establishing statutory fraud within the Torrens 
system. There was acceptance, however, that the bank had engaged in 
unconscionable behaviour. In holding in favour of Mrs Garcia, the High Court relying 
by analogy on its own jurisdiction to set aside gifts made by mistake; the ability to 
provide relief to a surety; and, the capacity to reject the enforceability of a document 
where there is a failure to disclose material features of the transaction.119 My view was 
that unconscionability of itself could not explain this result. Coherence demands that 
the connection between the equitable doctrine of unconscionability and the Torrens 
system of land registration be considered. My concern was that the aim of controlling 
certain species of transactions by equitable means might see the dilution or damaging 
of established ideas and undermine the principles that support what we are trying to 
achieve in establishing a radically new form of land administration.120 Relief was given 
to Mrs Garcia on the basis that the bank had been unconscionable in retaining the 
benefit of the guarantee, rather than that the bank had been unconscionable in this 
acquisition. This answer however, does not tell us on a justifiable basis as to why the 
lending bank ought to have relinquished its security. I echoed the concerns of Moore:  
[V]ague and amorphous concepts such as unconscionability would, if sufficient 
on its own to defeat a registered interest in land, drive a horse and buggy 
through the Torrens system. That is precisely the reason why the courts have 
insisted that a personal equity must be founded upon a recognised legal or 
equitable cause of action.121  
The contemporary relevance of this can be seen with the High Court recently endorsing 
a view that the Torrens system should not be undermined where there is no evidence 
of wrongdoing by the registered proprietor. The case, Farah Constructions v Say-
Dee,122 the subject of a case note by me in 2008,123 involved the appellant, Farah 
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Constructions, entering into commercial negotiations with the respondent, Say-Dee Pty 
Ltd, for the development of certain properties in Sydney. The respondent was to 
provide the financing for the joint venture, and the appellant was to undertake the 
project management. Farah Constructions were informed by the council that the 
proposed development would not be approved in its current form, but if the 
development were altered so that it encompassed neighbouring properties, it might 
succeed through the planning and development process. The man behind Farah 
Constructions, Farah Elias, did not inform the respondent of this, and the neighbouring 
properties were then purchased by his wife and teenage daughters, or by companies 
controlled by him.124 Whereas the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the 
purchase by the family members and the title held by them was defeasible, even 
though these relatives lacked any knowledge of wrongdoing, the High Court 
vehemently disagreed.125 While the New South Wales Court of Appeal allowed a claim 
of unjust enrichment to succeed, with this based on strict liability and in the absence 
of any fault by the defendants,126 the High Court considered their reasoning erroneous, 
exaggerated or flawed.127 Not surprisingly, given my doctrinal search for coherence in 
the Torrens system, I strongly endorsed the view of the High Court. Restitutionary 
claims made in the absence of any recognised legal or equitable cause of action should 
not be allowed to undermine the Torrens system. 
 [N]otions of what is fair or just must give way to the rule of ordered principle. To 
this end, the fundamental tenet of indefeasibility represents this rule. It is only 
from this genesis that the modifications and qualifications to the principle should 
be articulated and justified. To do otherwise, leaves the imprint of the Chancellor’s 
foot on recognised doctrines and fundamental tenets of Property Law. If, contrary 
to the statements of the High Court in Garcia, it is accepted that the basis of the 
result of that case was not unconscionability but, policy motivated relief, the… 
result for the Torrens system of land registration is that this policy-motivated 
restitutionary relief affords a recognised cause of action that supports the 
personal equity necessary for an in personam claim.128 
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This would only be acceptable and sustainable if the circumstances dictate that such 
a qualification to immediate indefeasibility was mandated. ‘Any analysis of a case 
involving Torrens land, should start from the fundamental precepts of indefeasibility of 
title and the irrelevancy of notice… [the courts must] also indicate that [any 
modification] is an isolated departure from the House of Torrens and its foundations.’129 
In communicating this, I was suggesting that for doctrinal coherence to be maintained, 
we could not undermine its operation by giving way to a subjective and arbitrary notion 
of fairness, which would sit uncomfortably and be irreconcilable with the principles of 
title by registration. In Farah Constructions, the High Court supported this view. 
2.4 Operating outside of the Register - The Continuing Resonance of In Personam 
In 2003, I connected the role of unregistered interests in land with the in personam 
action to query how doctrinal coherence might be maintained through an analysis of 
how claims of mistake could be used to undermine the indefeasibility trump card of 
Torrens.130 Within this paper, I was to articulate a concept of the Torrens system that 
is oft forgotten. This is, that the non-derivative nature of land ownership under Torrens 
involves a surrender of title from the vendor back to the Crown, with the purchaser of 
an indefeasible interest then gaining a new grant of title under the feudal system of 
land ownership that exists in respect of private land ownership in Australia.131 Once this 
theoretical underpinning is accepted, and it cannot be challenged in my view, ‘clear 
guidelines need to be drawn so that in cases of genuine mistake, some fair and 
equitable remedy is imposed … restitutionary relief based on a concept of unjust 
enrichment would embody Torrens with a termite like cancer to its woodwork.’132 This 
led to consideration of a number of decisions predominantly with a contract focus, with 
these decisions exploring and highlighting how the Torrens system of land registration 
could lead to unprincipled outcomes.  
My research methodology began with consideration of an old New Zealand case: 
Jonas v Jonas.133 In this 19th century decision, the vendor had agreed to sell to B and 
                                                          
129 Ibid. 
130 Lynden Griggs, ‘Indefeasibility and mistake – the utilitarianism of Torrens’ (2003) Australian Property Law 
Journal 108. 
131 Ibid 109. 
132 Ibid 119. 
133 (1883) LR 2 SC 15 (NZ). 
Linking the Publications to the Research Questions and the Methodologies Adopted 
36 
 
C separate parcels of land. By mistake, B received the title to land intended for C and 
C received that which was intended for B. In an action by B to rectify the mistake, the 
courts held that as C had not been fraudulent in the acquisition of its interest and 
without privity existing between B and C, the continued possession of C was not 
improper, and equity could not be used to undermine the land title that was 
registered.134 The primacy of the register was paramount, even though intuitively one 
might have thought that this would have founded a cause of action in mistake to 
correct. Illustrations that are more modern seem to allow the doctrine of mistake to 
override the photo created from the image on the register; with this undermining the 
public trust and reliance that one can have in looking at the mirror. For example, in 
Lukacs v Wood135 the intent of the vendors was to transfer three vacant parcels of land 
to the defendant. There was a misdescription in the contract that saw the defendant 
receive title to two vacant blocks of land, plus a third title, on which was built an 
apartment dwelling. It was some two years post-settlement that the mistake was 
realised. The vendors sought to correct the mistake, and the defendant responded that 
indefeasibility of title allowed him to retain title to the land on which the apartments 
stood. The Supreme Court of South Australia held in favour of the vendors.136 There 
was a mistake in the conveyancing process, a total failure of consideration and this 
rendered the contract void. The court made orders that reflected the original intent of 
the parties. Consider also Tutt v Doyle.137 Because of a mistake in the transfer process, 
Tutt received a block of land larger than what was intended. He was aware that a 
mistake had been made. The New South Wales Court of Appeal saw the question quite 
simply — was it unconscionable for one party to take advantage of another’s 
mistake.138 The answer was yes. In terms of the coherence of the Torrens system, 
Chambers suggested that this case did no damage to the goals of title by registration.139 
As the person had notice of the mistake, even if this was constructive notice, 
restitutionary relief could be had.140 My view was that the answer was not as clear as 
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this. Title by registration was intended to wipe the slate clean, to purge past errors and 
to provide certainty and simplicity around land ownership. This is not possible if the 
register is not the mirror we seek, and while slavish adherence to this concept can lead 
to unfair and unjust outcomes, we should be mindful of the words of Hepburn:  
The ambiguous and pejorative nature of equity does not fit easily into a statutory 
structure centred [on] the guarantee of land title upon registration. Indefeasibility 
of title upon registration necessitates a level of certainty and determination [that] 
is, in many ways, directly oppositional to the approach taken by the equitable 
principles of fairness.141 
These cases can be contrasted with Tanzone Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp.142 The 
original agreement between the lessors and the tenant contained a rent review clause 
which had an unintended and undesired effect. Essentially, the review clause would 
see rent escalating significantly beyond what was the original intent of the parties. 
Normally rectification would have been available. What complicated this matter was 
that the original lessor had subsequently sold to a new owner who, upon registration 
of his interest, sought to rely upon the terms of the registered lease agreement and the 
indefeasibility that this would provide. Despite his knowledge that the lease agreement 
did not reflect the true intent of the parties, the equity of rectification was no longer 
available.143 The extent to which these decisions need to be accommodated within a 
title by registration framework draws differing responses. For example, Chambers 
argues that to exclude restitution type claims from the doctrine of indefeasibility places 
significant pressure on the courts and the common law to expand the fraud exception 
to indefeasibility in such a way that coherence can only be maintained artificially.144 
Hughson, Neave and O’Connor, though not specifically considering restitution in its 
modern form, look towards the in personam exception and suggest that this must by 
necessity be restricted under a title by registration system to those scenarios where 
the registered proprietor has acted in such a way that their personal conduct 
undermines the true state of affairs.145 My view is in line with that of Brooking JA in 
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Russo v Bendigo Bank and Reichman.146 His Honour noted the need to be careful 
about applying the dishonesty rules as laid down in the Courts of Equity given that one 
of the foundational reasons Sir Robert Torrens introduced indefeasibility of title was to 
‘overcome the use of sophisticated equitable principles to hold up and defeat claims to 
title.’147 Accordingly, I favour caution in allowing either an extended view of statutory 
fraud or an expanded role for in personam as a means to promote outcomes that 
undermine the principles of title by registration, and thereby destroy the coherence of 
concept and of principle that should be sought. 
2.5 Returning to the Link between Unregistered Interests and Caveats 
In 2010, I returned to explore the role of caveats in protecting the equitable or the 
unregistered interest. 148  By 2010, it was clear that doctrinally, the caveat was 
increasing in practical importance as the mechanism to support the unregistered or 
unregistrable interest, with the matter coming to a head in the critically important 
decision of the High Court in the previously mentioned Black v Garnock.149 
[W]ith an appreciation that equitable interests have prospered, rather than fallen 
into disuse, the time for Equity and Torrens to find some form of homology had 
arrived. Perhaps Black v Garnock is the beginning of this, the failure to caveat 
arguably now elevated to the stature of professional negligence… With caveats 
for the most part, operating as the singular mechanism to warn of the presence 
of an unregistered interest, the line of authority, suggesting that the function of 
the caveat is only to protect the interest holder, must now come into question. 
Contemporary thinking may well see the purpose of a caveat as a means to 
prevent dealing with the land by the registered proprietor in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the rights of the caveator.150 
In this case, which divided the opinions of the judges sitting in the superior courts, 
Black had obtained a judgement against the registered proprietor. The registered 
proprietor then entered into a contract to sell the land to Garnock for $1 million. On the 
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day of settlement, solicitors for Garnock searched title only to find encumbrances 
known to them. Some 20 minutes later they received a phone call from Black’s 
solicitors indicating that they intended to prevent the sale going ahead. Some two hours 
later, Black’s solicitors lodged a writ of execution on the title. Settlement took place 
later in the day, but Garnock was subsequently unable to register title, given the 
existence of the writ of execution. The issue before the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal and subsequently the High Court, was whether the equitable interest created 
first in time, pursuant to the contract of sale between Garnock and the registered 
proprietor, prevailed over the later interest, the writ of execution lodged with notice and 
knowledge of Garnock’s interest. Both courts were divided by a slim majority. The 
minority in the New South Wales Court of Appeal and the majority in the High Court 
were clear that the registered interest prevailed. Callinan J expressed the view that 
caveats should be given a renewed primacy in protecting the unregistered interest, 
with this allowing the title to act as a mirror of the estates and interests that affect that 
parcel of land. Simply put, if Garnock had caveated their equitable interest established 
by the estate contract, the registration of the writ of execution would have been 
impeded; instead, they faced an inability to recover some or all of the value of their 
purchase. Justice Callinan, in addressing the failure to caveat, and whether it would 
be subversive of title by registration to mandate that caveating occur, commented:  
What is much more likely to be subversive of the whole of the scheme of the 
Torrens system is that a person interested in, or entitled to deal with, land, who 
has not acted fraudulently, might suddenly and unexpectedly be saddled with, or 
postponed to, an equitable estate or interest in land which could have been, but 
was not, made the subject of protection by prompt lodgement of an instrument or 
the filing of a caveat pending lodgement.151 
2.6 Connecting the Earlier Work to the move to Electronic Conveyancing 
My earlier work on the nature of equitable and unregistered interests has been 
complemented by more recent work with two articles co-authored in The Conveyancer 
and Property Lawyer (with myself as primary author), 152  which seek to support a 
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doctrinally coherent view of the Torrens system, specifically as we engage with 
electronic conveyancing. While this issue has been a recent focus, my work from as 
early as 1999 supported a move towards e-conveyancing and to exploring the 
convenience offered for the sale of equities, and applying that to the sale of land. In 
quoting Birrell, I noted that: 
The ghosts of the last century remain in [the] continued requirement of signed 
and witnessed paper instruments. The electronic conveyancing of the next 
century must address this issue. The answer may be found in an expanded 
concept of agency in which agents are authorised to complete the transaction on 
behalf of the parties. Perhaps authorised classes of customers should be 
responsible for updating the register. This solution would require a combining of 
the present separate roles of settlement and registration. The paperless 
transaction system of the Australian Stock Exchange may point the way.153 
My reasoning for this begins from a view that immediate indefeasibility should be 
accepted as the key principle that supports the element of the mirror of title, and what 
my contemporary series of articles does is question how sustainable the system will 
look if identity fraud became a major concern, and is somehow facilitated by electronic 
conveyancing. This problem was highlighted by Matthews who considers it ‘laughably 
simple’154 the way frauds can occur in the Torrens system of land registration. If this 
view is correct, is the system sustainable if those frauds are easier to perpetrate in an 
electronic environment and did the paper-based system provide a measure of 
protection? In this context, it should be noted that estimates of fraud vary greatly, with 
some suggesting that the rate is no more than one mortgage fraud every 133,000 
transactions and one title fraud per 350,000 dealings,155 whereas others suggest that 
in Victoria in 2007, fraud was present in one in every 19,000 transactions.156  
The intended move to an electronic business environment for conveyancing 
represents the most significant change in industry practices over the last 150 
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years… The most significant change from the ... paper-based conveyancing 
instruments… is the shift from transacting parties signing the instruments 
necessary to effect changes in each jurisdiction’s … register, to an appointed 
agent signing on the transacting party’s behalf. The signing, by a legal or 
conveyancing practice or practitioner, on the transacting party’s behalf will 
necessarily require the transacting party’s identity to be verified.157 
My research methodology for the earlier articles was largely based on the analysis of 
the existing primary material, and reviewing that against the aims of title by registration. 
The more recent articles158 went further than this, and looked beyond the primary 
sources to identify the key ingredients needed to establish a secure, trusted and 
accepted land registration system — ideas, which while applicable to title by 
registration are equally apposite to a deeds registration system. My focus became 
broader and in seeking to establish coherence sought support from the aims of land 
registration systems generally, and not just the jurisprudence of title by registration. 
The first of these articles159 opens by noting how verification of the identity of the parties 
to a land transaction not only stands as an obstacle to abuse but can greatly progress 
in establishing  the public trust and security needed in the context of land transactions. 
In establishing a taxonomy of how identity fraud in land transactions is perpetrated it 
was considered  that a failure to identify the appropriate safeguards will only undermine 
a system that has a huge input into the gross domestic product of the Australian 
economy. Land is a driver of economic activity, and commonly used as a tool by the 
government to achieve growth in consumer and investor spending through policy 
measures such as first home buyers schemes, negative gearing, the exception of the 
family home from many of the social security tests, and encouragement of the 
residential building sector. This article, in addition to the doctrinal analysis needed to 
establish the taxonomy associated with frauds, also introduced economic thinking into 
the justification of the response that was given. The economics required us to consider, 
in cases of identity theft or forged credentials, who should bear that loss; the 
homeowner, the financial institution, or the government?  
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In addressing this, the methodology asked how loss should be spread, how could it be 
reduced and where should it be imposed? Our critique of these three elements 
established that in the majority of instances, the mortgagee should have the 
responsibility for verifying identity and for minimising the risk of loss. 160  For the 
individual consumer, identity theft and loss of land will be devastating; for the 
mortgagee and key stakeholder such as a conveyancing agent, less so. The reason 
for this is that the fee simple title-holder is not merely losing an asset of a certain 
financial value, but potentially their home as well. The mortgagee interest, by contrast, 
can be compensated by financial measures alone and a bank will more likely have the 
opportunity and resources to exercise enforcement mechanisms against wrongdoers. 
Whereas Frazer v Walker161 saw no difference between the individual purchaser and 
the mortgagee in terms of the indefeasibility provisions of the legislation under 
examination, for many in the community, first preference should be given to financially 
compensating the party whose interest can most easily be met by an assurance fund 
payout (and this is the mortagee). Some suggest that the party with fewer resources, 
presumably the landowner, will value the land more highly and distributive fairness 
would suggest that this party is given the opportunity to retain the land before the more 
financially advantaged entity.162 Given this evaluation, we then asked precisely what 
burdens should be imposed on the mortgagee, and what steps Parliament should take 
in mandating obligations on financial institutions to ensure the coherence, consistency, 
and public trust of title by registration. 
Connected to the thesis of this article is a requirement that [the] certifier or the 
subscriber under the national electronic conveyancing protocols undertake and 
maintain adequate records of client identification with this mandated by land 
registry offices. The goals of this are obvious: 
• ensuring the public has confidence in the system; 
• maintenance of the integrity of the land registration system; 
• achieving highest practical and functional accuracy within the 
Register; 
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• ensuring that the electronic system is efficient, viable, attractive 
and cost-effective when compared with paper processes; and 
• being cost neutral in terms of potential liability upon the assurance 
funds.163 
These specific points reflected my body of work over the last two decades and the 
value of this work is evident in the discussions and evolution of the electronic 
conveyancing protocols. If the Torrens system is to be coherent it must recognise the 
popular land interests held by the community; it must have the trust of the public, and 
the register must give an accurate reflection of the interests that pertain to that parcel 
of land. If we can answer yes to those questions, then the answer to my overarching 
research question is that the law as interpreted, and as supported by legislative 
principles, does achieve consistency and coherence with the ideas that bind title by 
registration. My view was that the changes that we have seen in Australia through 
recent legislative initiatives to impose greater obligations to verify identity on 
mortgagees, (such as the New South Wales Real Property and Conveyancing 
Legislation Amendment Act 2009, the Queensland provisions (ss 11A and 11B of the 
Land Title Act 1994), the Victorian changes (ss 87A and 87B of the Transfer of Land 
Act 1958) and the South Australian section (s 273A of the Real Property Act 1886)), 
have enhanced the operation and public confidence in the system. In addition, 
improved security measures within certificates of titles where those remain in hard 
copy, such as watermarks, holographic images, and embedded codes, all serve to 
broker public confidence and reduce the incidence of fraud. When these elements are 
put together, and attached to a rigorous verification of identity standard contained 
within the Model Participation Rules of the National Conveyancing protocols 
(discussed below), we can see that the coherence of the Torrens system can be 
maintained despite the opportunities for fraud possible within an electronic 
environment. 
The second of these articles in The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer begins by 
examining how a modern land fraud may be constructed. For example, the Perrin fraud 
involved the husband forging his wife’s signature on mortgages in respect of property 
owned by the wife. In June 2008, the Commonwealth bank had lent Mathew Perrin 
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some $10 million, with this loan later increased by another $3.5 million. When default 
occurred, the bank sought to recover under the relevant documents. Mrs Perrin denied 
ever signing the mortgages, alleging that her signature was forged. What enabled this 
fraud to occur is that the Commonwealth Bank at no stage directly spoke to or dealt 
with Mrs Perrin. The security documents including the mortgages were left with her 
then husband and there had been no contact between the bank and Mrs Perrin. The 
bank ultimately accepted that Mrs Perrin was not liable164 as it had failed to comply with 
its obligation to verify identity. Having not done this, the bank could not rely on the 
indefeasibility given to it by the act of registration.  
The second scenario involved the theft of identity and perhaps is more concerning in 
an era of electronic conveyancing and a global marketplace. A Mr Mildenhall was the 
registered owner of two unencumbered investment properties in Western Australia. 
While Mildenhall was overseas, one of his investment properties was sold without his 
knowledge. He only found out about this when the neighbour to one of the properties 
rang him and told him that it had been sold. It appeared that the fraud had been 
perpetrated by unknown individuals intercepting Mildenhall’s mail, and then with the 
knowledge gained from this interception, falsifying a number of documents including 
the authority to sell the property. A real estate agency was then duped to put the 
property on the market, with the property subsequently sold and the proceeds then 
transferred to a bank in China, from which they disappeared. The verification of the 
identity of Mr Mildenhall was similarly forged. When this matter gained notoriety in 
Western Australia, a number of other similar identity thefts and sale of properties 
became public knowledge, with the modus operandi extending outside of Western 
Australia.165 Given this contemporary potential for identity theft, email interception, and 
computer hacking, a coherent land administration system must serve the public 
interest and meet community expectation, and in doing this the system must be trusted. 
How we achieve this lies in the application of a stronger identity verification standard 
imposed on those who gain the benefit of title by registration. Title by registration 
provides a framework and an incentive for registration, and imposes more onerous 
obligations on key stakeholders within the conveyancing process, such as mortgagees 
                                                          
164 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Perrin [2011] QSC 274. 
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and conveyancing agents. ‘If one is to receive the advantages of the register title 
system, the corresponding obligations to share the burden should be imposed.’166 
[T]he authors first recommendation is that identity verification requirements 
should have at its core a requirement for face-to-face identity verification. The 
history of dealings and past relationships between customers should not, under 
any circumstances obviate the need to have independent face-to-face verification 
of what is occurring. [Where] face-to-face verification is not physically possible … 
simple measures to counteract this inability are available as highlighted by recent 
changes to witnessing requirements.167 
The importance of these points and the value of my work are evidenced by the 
legislative changes noted above, and the Model Operating Rules and the Model 
Participation Rules 168  for the electronic conveyancing system 169  incorporating strict 
verification of identity requirements. For example, schedule eight of the Participation 
Rules imports measures in excess of the well-known 100-point identity check required 
to open a bank account. A subscriber to the system must verify the identity of each 
client that the subscriber intends to represent. Unlike opening a bank account, a face-
to-face interview is required with the subscriber needing to be satisfied that the person 
before them and the photographic ID that must accompany this interview represent the 
same person. The subscribers, such as solicitors, are required to have the visual skills 
to determine that the shape of the nose, eyes, mouth and cheekbones match the 
person shown in the photograph.170 The Participation Rules establish a hierarchical 
level of document production with it necessary to show that the previous and better 
level is unavailable before proceeding to the next and weaker construct. For example, 
category one is the starting point and requires an Australian passport plus an 
Australian driver’s licence or proof of age card plus a change of name or marriage 
certificate if necessary. Category two, for the person who does not drive, requires a 
passport, plus birth or citizenship certificate, plus Medicare or Centrelink details, and 
                                                          
166 Low and Griggs, above n 86, 378. For a discussion of the role that the existence of a paper based certificate of 
title can act as an obstacle to fraud, see Celia Hammond, ‘The Abolition of the Duplicate Certificate of Title and 
its Potential Effect on Fraudulent Claims Over Torrens Land’ (2000) 8 Australian Property Law Journal 115.  
167 Low and Griggs, above n 86, 377. 
168 See, Australian Registrars’ National Electronic Conveyancing Council (ARNECC) (2016) 
<www.arnecc.gov.au>. 
169 See Property Exchange Australia <www.pexa.com.au>. 
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change of name information if required. Category three, for the person without a 
passport, provides that the person must show an Australian driver’s licence or proof of 
age card plus birth certificate plus Medicare or Centrelink card, plus change of name 
or marriage certificate if necessary. For the Australian citizen without photo ID, 
category four requires that the subscriber uses an Identifier Declaration to verify 
identity. This requires that both the person being identified and the identity declarant 
be present together for a face-to-face interview. The declarant must be an adult, have  
known the person being verified for at least 12 months, not be  a relative nor a party to 
the transaction, and in a category of occupation such as Bank Manager, Community 
Leader, Legal Practitioner, Doctor, Public Servant or Police Officer. Category four 
cannot be used for verification of identity in a foreign country, which mandates the use 
of the first three categories, with verification required by an Australian Consular Officer, 
or Australian Diplomatic Officer, or where the person being verified is a member of the 
Australian Defence Force, a Competent Officer.171 
Recently, in the New Zealand Law Review, 172  I, along with my co-authors, have 
expanded on this concept of verification of identity as one of the key proof requirements 
for any sustainable land registration system. We argued that in addition to verification 
of identity there was a need to connect that verified identity to the ownership of the 
land, and then to ensure that the owner of that land has the entitlement to deal with 
that land. In gaining the trust of the community and in securing the operation of the 
Torrens system, our concerns were that the focus of the policy makers was too 
narrowly drawn towards verification of identity, with the consequential risk that 
insufficient attention was being paid to whether that person had the right to deal with 
that particular parcel of land. 
2.7 Has Electronic Conveyancing made Immediate Indefeasibility Vulnerable? 
The strands of indefeasibility, legislative evolution, and case law development were all 
brought together in 2011 when I, as the primary author, asked the question as to 
whether immediate indefeasibility was under threat.173 Against a backdrop of rising 
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fraud, with some 21% of fraud found to involve mortgages,174 and legislative and case 
law intrusions into the doctrine, 175  I, along with my co-author, started with the 
recognition that the principle of indefeasibility was to form the bedrock of title by 
registration. With research methodology tracing the case law developments and 
distilling the context in which those matters occurred; reflecting on the previously 
mentioned legislative impositions; and isolating the reasons for law reform proposals 
(such as that in New Zealand where it has been suggested that immediate 
indefeasibility be qualified by judicial discretion to override in matters of manifest 
injustice) 176  we concluded that these measures do not weaken immediate 
indefeasibility. What these measures provide is a set of safeguards that operate in the 
contemporary environment of global deregulation. If anything, what they conclusively 
show is the need for the Australian federation to work cooperatively and collectively to 
achieve one legislative code for the Torrens system, a matter that would neatly align 
with the introduction of national protocols for the conveyancing agents and the financial 
institutions operating under PEXA. Our view was that security systems within title by 
registration, particularly in an electronic environment needed to encompass three 
aspects: 
i) Something you have (such as a certificate of title); 
ii) Something you know (such as a PIN); and 
iii) Something you are (biometric capabilities).177 
My research into the doctrinal coherence of title by registration continues to have 
contemporary relevance and makes an original and unique contribution to shaping the 
thinking around this system of land registration. Specifically, this has occurred in my 
endorsement and promotion of indefeasibility as the principle by which we can meet 
the requirements of a certain, stable, and trusted land system. The idea of a mirror and 
the importance of the register coheres with the principle of indefeasibility. As electronic 
                                                          
174 Paul Watkins, Fraud in Conveyancing, (Paper presented at the Institute of Conveyancers, 2007 National 
Conference, March 2007) quoting from Russel G Smith, ‘Serious Fraud in Australia and New Zealand’ 
(Research and Public Policy Series No. 48, Australian Institute of Criminology and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2003) cited in New Zealand Law Commission, A New Land Transfer Act (June 2010) n 33. 
175 Low and Griggs, above n 49, 224. 
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conveyancing, at least in process, begins to embed, the next decade will provide the 
jurisprudence that surrounds this practice. In theory, the jurisprudence should not have 
to alter, but in operational terms, it is likely that new problems will emerge, perhaps 
demanding new solutions. The consequences that flow from my work in developing 
new insights into the connection and coherence between the substantive legal 
principles and the core ideals of the Torrens system has, I suggest, made an enduring 
and original contribution to the doctrinal knowledge in this area. Evidence of this can 
be seen in the citation of my work in a number of leading journals178 monographs, 
(some published internationally) 179  and law reform papers (both domestic and 
abroad).180 
What I have suggested is that provided we keep in mind the goals of a successful land 
registration system (that it provide for the majority of tenurial interests, that in its use it 
be trusted, and that there be security regarding the interests held), and we connect 
these goals with the elements of the mirror, curtain and indemnity, then electronic 
conveyancing can move us closer to the ideas and principles that underpin the utopian 
ideal of Sir Robert Torrens.181 Allied to this idea is my most recent work that has sought 
to explore how indefeasibility, which presently provides no guarantee of land 
boundaries, could be extended to give that guarantee.182 The surveying profession is 
currently transitioning to a digital datum where GPS/GNSS technology is used to 
provide accurate coordinates of the boundaries of land.183 If the title to land was to 
incorporate a plan of the dimensions of land, and commonly there is a descriptive plan 
                                                          
178 Such as Hang Wu, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror: A framework of the in personam exception to indefeasibility’ 
(2008) 32(2) Melbourne University Law Review 672; Fiona Burns, ‘Adverse Possession and Title by Registration 
Systems in Australia and England’ (2011) 35(3) Melbourne University Law Review 773; Lyria Bennett Moses 
and Brendan Edgeworth, ‘Taking it Personally: Ebb and Flow in the Torren’s System’s In Personam Exception 
to Indefeasibility’ (2013) 35(1) Sydney Law Review 107. 
179 Arruñada, above n 34, 251, 269; David Cowan, Lorna Fox O’Mahony and Neil Cobb, Great Debates in Land 
Law (Palgrove MacMillan, 2016) 130, fn 83; Martin Dixon (ed), Modern Studies in Property Law (Bloomsburg, 
2009) vol 5, 43, fn 31; James Alm, Patricia Annez, Arbind Modi, Stamp Duties in Indian States (the World Bank, 
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180 New Zealand Law Commission, Review of the Land Transfer Act 1952, Issues Paper No 10 (2008); Tasmanian 
Law Reform Institute, The Law of Easements in Tasmania, Final Report No 12 (2010); Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Easements and Covenants, Final Report No 22 (2010). 
181 With this succinctly summarised as removing the ‘dependent nature of [land] titles’, Torrens, above n 6, 8. 
182 Lynden Griggs, ‘Developing the Ultimate Cadastre – Indefeasibility and Boundaries’ (2016) 5 Property Law 
Review 149. 
183 For the future directions of surveying and its wish to align itself with the substantive principles of land law, see 
the work of the Intergovernmental Committee on Surveying and Mapping, which in producing Cadastre 2034: 
<http://www.icsm.gov.au/cadastral/Cadastre2034.pdf> establishes a vision for the interconnectedness of 
surveying and law and a timeline for completion of that vision. Importantly (at 6), they speak of the need for a 
cadastral system that is fully integrated with the broader legal and social interests in land. 
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attached, and legislation was altered so that misdescription of boundaries was no 
longer an exception to indefeasibility, then the concept of indefeasibility could be used 
to support the land boundaries as shown on the certificate of title, provided those 
boundaries would, in the vast majority of instances, be accurate. In essence, 
indefeasibility can serve as the legal tool to provide enhanced stability and certainty 
around land ownership. In this sense, the development would respond to the concerns 
of the community who would, one suspects, be surprised that while land systems 
guarantee the estate or interest that one has, it does not guarantee the physical 
boundaries.  
My work to achieve doctrinal coherence is also reflected in my original research 
undertaken for the textbook, Principles of Property Law,184 and my recent contributions 
to the new edition of Australian Real Property Law and Australian Property Law, Cases 
and Materials.185 In both texts I was required to structure the doctrinal learning in such 
a way as to make it digestible and accessible to the reader (my work for Principles was 
original for the two relevant Torrens chapters (indefeasibility, and priorities), whereas 
for Australian Real Property Law, I am updating the work of previous authors (including 
the key Torrens chapters). The Principles text, which was for the student market, 
required me to distil and synthesise the relevant principles in a way that was 
manageable and bite sized for the contemporary student. In addition, I was required to 
apply the doctrinal learning in such a way as to make it applicable to problem-solving 
scenarios and to explain how the elements of title by registration coherently fit into a 
secure and trusted land registration system. Australian Real Property Law, which has 
both a student and practitioner market, and which comprehensively sets out the 
legislation and applicable case law for the Australian states and territories, requires 
extensive updating for each edition, and, specifically for the 2015 edition, significant 
amendments in light of the move to electronic conveyancing and the changes to 
legislation that this necessitated.  
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2.8 Possessory Interests and Title by Registration 
While doctrinal analysis is ultimately about what the law is, it does highlight the 
inconsistencies within the law and exposes areas where clarity is needed. In one 
sense, legal scholarship could always be described as law reform. It seeks to advance 
or progress the law and ensure that it is better suited to the circumstances and context 
in which it sits. As a specific subset of doctrinal coherence, I have consistently argued 
that the presence of possessory-based doctrines has no role in a contemporary 
Torrens system and that the law should be altered to reflect this. For example, in a 
1999 article in the Adelaide Law Review186 I suggested that possessory titles have no 
role given the key ingredient of indefeasibility is obtained through registration, rather 
than through possession. ‘[In] an age of electronic conveyancing, with the greater role 
and increased capabilities of the register, should not possessory titles be rendered 
obsolete? The initial response to these questions is yes.’187  
A coherent system must adhere to its underlying foundation — registration, rather than 
possession, embodies the core. As I noted, ‘[t]he criticisms of the adverse possession 
rule, its basis in a different historical context, its inconsistency with the notion of [title 
by registration], and the injustice it can produce, all amount to a persuasive argument 
that it should be abandoned.’ 188  There is no doubt, however, and this was 
demonstrated by the Tasmanian Law Reform Commission report of 1995,189 that for 
many of the key participants in the conveyancing process, most notably surveyors and 
conveyancing agents, possessory based doctrines provided a remedial device to 
quickly and easily remedy minor boundary disputes or encroachments. For example, 
in my home jurisdiction of Tasmania, and following the Supreme Court decision in 
Woodward v Hazell190 there was a view taken that the principle of adverse possession 
should remain, but that there had to be a significant tightening and a statutory basis 
given to adverse possession. Today, the practical obstacles make it close to 
impossible to claim adverse possession in Tasmania, and there has not been a 
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successful contested adverse possession claim since the legislation was enacted.191 
As the new millennium dawned, my view192 was clear: 
In the 140 or so years since its introduction, the concept of possessory title (so 
very important to the English notion of seisin) has continued to play a part in 
weakening, or modifying, the principles of title by registration devised by Sir 
Robert Torrens. As we approach the new century, it is timely to reflect on those 
ideals of reliability, simplicity, low cost, speed and suitability and how the 
technology of today can finally fulfil the promise or expectation of 140 years ago. 
To this end, possessory titles have no role to play. To allow them to remain only 
retains the conceptual confusion between a land system based on possession 
and one based on registration. … Electronic conveyancing raises the potential 
importance of the register, to a level not presently seen. Critically, the substantive 
law behind this development must reflect the expectations of the general 
community at the start of the 21st century. … In contemporary Australian society, 
adverse possession should be relegated to historical irrelevance.193 
It is a topic to which I return some five years later,194 though rather than look at the 
creation of land interests by way of possession; I considered the doctrine of 
abandonment. Could easements could lose their recognition through non-use despite 
their continued presence on the register? My strong view was that abandonment of 
easements through the absence of use should not be allowed if the register is clear 
that the incorporeal hereditament remains on title. In exploring the recent decisions in 
this area, I also asked why the courts should think it relevant to consider the interests 
of predecessors in title in determining whether abandonment has occurred, given that 
coherence of title by registration is built on the idea that with each new transaction, a 
                                                          
191 See Part IXB Land Titles Act 1980. One particular troublesome aspect of the legislation is that the payment of 
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new title is issued. In support of this argument, I relied upon an interdisciplinary 
analysis involving economics, consumer paradigms, and finally a view that the dynamic 
security195 associated with title by registration should be endorsed.196 In writing on this 
issue, it was noted197 that in New South Wales, Western Australia, and Tasmania, 20 
years non-use would amount to proof that the easement has been abandoned. In 
Victoria, by contrast, 30 years non-use is required. Despite only temporal differences 
existing between the jurisdictions, very different approaches were evident between, for 
example, Victoria and New South Wales. In Victoria, it has been held that the easement 
remains enforceable while it remains on the certificate of title. In this jurisdiction, what 
amounts to common law abandonment will not suffice to counter the conclusive 
evidence given by the title. In New South Wales the contrary position was reached, 
indefeasibility will cede to the common law recognition that the easement has been 
abandoned. After an examination of the case law of these two jurisdictions, and then 
a consideration of the issue against the goals of title by registration, my view was that 
the purchaser of a dominant tenement with an easement noted on the title should be 
able to rely on that easement whilst it remains on the register. 
The significance of this work is evident as the article was the impetus for a major law 
reform report on the topic of easements by the Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, where 
I was co-author of the Final Report.198 This report recommended, amongst other things, 
that the common law requirements for the abandonment of easements should be 
codified, that educational material concerning abandonment of easements be 
produced, and that successive non-use by the owners of the dominant tenement be a 
factor in considering whether the easement has been abandoned. To date, the 
government has not legislated to take up these recommendations, though possessory 
and prescriptive interests remain exclusively within the domain of legislation in 
Tasmania,199 and are extraordinarily difficult to establish. As Burns200 notes, success 
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under the Tasmania legislation is slim at best given that if the servient owner objects, 
the application is brought to an end unless there is serious hardship, and in the 
absence of publicly accessible information as to what this means (presumably no other 
alternative), a person seeking to claim a prescriptive easement is unlikely to succeed.  
Returning to the issue of adverse possession, I then considered whether a human 
rights prism would weaken my strongly held views about the relevance of possessory 
titles within Torrens. At its heart, this issue raises the question of whether to allow 
possessory titles to override a registered title, without compensation, involves a breach 
of the human right not to have property taken without compensation. Given the 
emerging human rights discourse in Australia, it is an issue that is likely to play out 
over the next decade. ‘[W]ith indefeasibility achieving either logical or perhaps 
legendary status within our Torrens register, and its foundation directly oppositional to 
possessory interests, how does the jurisprudence find that elusive balance?’201  
The impetus for this discussion was the decision of the House of Lords in the United 
Kingdom and the decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors. 202  The personal 
representatives of Graham claimed to be entitled to 25 hectares of registered land 
owned by the corporate plaintiff Pye. With there being no doubt that Graham had used 
the land without permission of the registered owner, the House of Lords, ‘without 
enthusiasm’203 found in favour of the applicant; the land was to pass to the trespasser 
without compensation payable to the registered owner. Given that the land was 
potentially worth up to £10 million, unsurprisingly Pye then took the state to the 
European Court of Human Rights, arguing that the legislation that permitted adverse 
possession to exist was in breach of its rights not to have its property taken without 
compensation. In the Chamber judgement, the majority of the European Court saw the 
matter as one of exceptional severity and Pye succeeded. Acquisition of property 
without compensation could only be permitted in exceptional circumstances, and as 
the law had been subsequently changed post this case, proof existed that the law of 
                                                          
201 Lynden Griggs, ‘Possession, Indefeasibility and Human Rights’ (2008) 8 Queensland University of Technology 
Law Journal 286, 298. 
202 [2002] 3 WLR 221 (House of Lords); [2005] EGLR 1 (Chamber Judgement, European Court of Human Rights); 
[2007] All ER (D) 177 (Grand Chamber, European Court of Human Rights). 
203 [2002] 3 WLR 221, [2]. 
Linking the Publications to the Research Questions and the Methodologies Adopted 
54 
 
adverse possession was unfair.204 This did not end the matter however. The state then 
appealed to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. In a 10:7 
decision, the state’s appeal was upheld. The statutory provisions surrounding adverse 
possession that ultimately eliminated the title of Pye were not intended to deprive paper 
owners of title, but merely to regulate questions of title. This was not a question of 
deprivation. It was a question of control of use. ‘Even in the case of registered land, it 
was open to the legislature to attach greater weight to the fact of possession rather 
than the act of registration.’205 
I was critical of this use of human rights as a means to undermine title by registration. 
While it may be correct to say that ownership cannot be understood without reference 
to possession, it is also important to reflect that title by registration was designed to 
revolutionise the substantive principles of land law; it was a transformative change and 
not merely evolutionary. Title by registration brought us the concept of a non-derivative 
title reflected by the mirror and supported by the principle of indefeasibility. In addition, 
while there is no doubt that the resonance of possession is substantial: ‘It speaks to 
third parties, the market, to the world, as to the state of affairs … Its hold on the 
individual and collective psyche of Australian society is significant’,206 this should not 
be determinative.  
[The] questions raised here will not be answered by mechanical formula, the 
application of economic theory, or by resort to historical reference. It is not about 
“protection or redistribution; it is the protection of whom and the distribution of 
what.” It is this which must be answered, and with land being in “defined and 
limited supply”, the answer that should be given, is a strong preference for the 
precepts, ideals and values provided within and by, the Torrens system of land 
registration.207  
2.9 A Discourse into Interdisciplinary Analysis 
As noted, I have sought to cement my arguments around the coherence of the Torrens 
system through the learning of other disciplines, particularly economics and to a lesser 
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extent, consumerism. My conversation with economics and land registration began in 
2001208 and in so doing, I followed the lead of Sir Robert Torrens in using economics 
as a basis on which to support land registration. He stated with language that resonates 
with the economic idea that property should be put to its highest value use: 
If, by the operation of law, these defects could be cured, or the capitalist be 
assured against deprivation of the wealth expended upon the land, the vacant 
blocks which now disfigure the rising streets would immediately become available 
as building sites, and the wealth of the community be increased by the value 
restored to them as such.209 
In 2001, I argued that by engaging dynamic security with liability-based rules, title by 
registration was demonstrably superior to other forms of registration of land ownership. 
My analysis began from the premise that scarce resources should be put to their 
highest value use, and in moving items to their highest value use, the market, if 
operating effectively, will allocate resources in a way that will see a surplus produced 
beyond what would otherwise occur. This is particularly important in the context of title 
by registration that relies on a publicly funded register as well as public servants directly 
supported by the taxpayer. In looking at this in the digital context, I was seeking to 
answer whether economics supported the transformation from a system based on 
registration of deeds to creation of title by registration. The argument I make is that 
with the conveyancing costs associated with the transfer of general law land 
significantly higher than a corresponding transfer of Torrens land, we are justified in 
destroying the formal property rights that would otherwise exist at common law, and 
replace these property rights with rules for the allocation of liability and compensation.  
Summarising this analysis, the transaction or bargaining costs with general law 
are so high (because of the need to undertake a set-period search to establish a 
good root of title) that the solution in Torrens to protect the registered owner and 
to compensate the innocent party who has lost their formal legal interest in the 
land…sees us adopting a liability based solution to this conundrum, rather than 
a property-based model. That is to say, we accept that the property interest is not 
paramount, that the right of the formal legal owner can be infringed, but that it is 
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ultimately cheaper to allow that infringement and pay compensation (ie, accept 
the liability), rather than enforce the proprietary rights of the formal legal owner.210 
In this same paper, I also recommended that additional safeguards be placed into 
electronic conveyancing, with options noted such as the digital signature, the 
importance of which can now be seen with security features now prevalent in the 
thinking of those enacting the national electronic conveyancing protocols.211 My work 
to enhance the coherence of the title by registration system continues unabated and 
the one remaining overarching goal would be a national land register, a national 
Torrens code, combined with a national surveying code. At present what we have are 
state registers, state legislation, and state surveying codes. ‘We are living in an 
environment of national markets and mutual recognition, yet we still operate eight 
varieties of the Torrens system. Australia is one country; we need one datum, one 
survey code, and one Land Register.’212 
In 2002, I again used economics to query whether the assurance fund, a key 
component of title by registration (at least in Australia),213 should be retained or whether 
individually we should be required to take out private title insurance when we are 
purchasing land. With the introduction of title insurance in Australia214 and the rise of 
capped conveyancing insurance in New Zealand,215 it is a topic of greater significance 
today. My methodology was to examine the initial reasons for the introduction of the 
assurance fund and then to examine the imposition of costs for the community as a 
whole as between a state-funded assurance model and private title insurance. 
Whereas Whalan considered that the fund may have been introduced as a 
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‘corresponding counterpart to indefeasible title’216 other research suggests that it was 
to provide administrators with a shield from liability and to overcome legal hostility to 
the introduction of title by registration conveyancing,217 something that would ultimately 
see solicitors lose their monopoly position.  
Whatever may be the reasons for the assurance fund, in identifying the criteria against 
which of the two options (privately funded title insurance or an assurance fund) could 
be judged, the framework utilised was to ask three questions: 218 (i) what is the role of 
the market; (ii) who can most easily avoid the loss, and (iii) what is the low cost 
administrative option. In addressing these points, I was of the view that the assurance 
fund still provides a lower cost solution to the funding of the guarantee than the 
utilisation of private title insurance. ‘Arguably Australia’s best [intellectual] export, the 
Torrens system, still maintains its relevance in contemporary Australia. Importantly 
also, it can be explained and justified by a multitude of research methodologies — in 
this instance, economics/law.’219 
Given the availability today of title insurance in Australia and New Zealand,220 with this 
product providing purchasers of land an insurance hedge against many of the risks 
associated with ownership of property,221 an examination of the relationship between it 
and assurance funds is both necessary and opportune. This work222 has not questioned 
the viability of the assurance fund, but whether the marketing by title insurances 
companies, the zeal by which registrars protect the assurance fund, the difficulties in 
accessing the fund in a number of so-called last resort jurisdictions,223 and the removal 
of the fund from liability where a person has contributed to the problem or where a 
conveyancing agent has appropriate indemnity insurance,224 will promote financially 
strapped governments to absolve themselves from primary liability and seek to 
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promote a culture of self-reliance and self-insurance. If our primary consideration is the 
mortgage epidemic of today, it’s worth noting however, that one of the prompts for Sir 
Robert Torrens was the land fraud of the mid-19th century.225 
In undertaking this doctrinal analysis, consideration was directed to the decision of 
Pedulla v Panetta.226 Pedulla sought compensation of $3.8 million from the assurance 
fund for the loss of title to her land; land which had been fraudulently transferred by 
her brother, his partner, and a solicitor who was the former partner of the brother’s 
current partner. What was intriguing about this decision was the manner in which the 
Registrar sought to argue that the compensation should be less, or the responsibility 
of another. First, there was the submission that the market value of the land, sold to 
innocent purchasers by the criminal activities of the brother was not $3.8 million. 
Second, it was suggested that Pedulla may have been responsible through omission 
for what had happened, and finally, given that a solicitor assisted the fraud, it was 
thought that this person’s professional indemnity cover would apply, rather than the 
state-based assurance fund. All three grounds were rejected. The market value of the 
land was the price paid by the purchasers and Pedulla had no reason to believe that 
her brother would engage in the conduct that he did. The third ground relating to the 
solicitor’s cover was worthy of closer examination: 
In examining all the facts, and most notably the solicitor’s previous relationship 
with the wife of the brother, the procuring of the relevant documents by false 
statements and his implausible excuses in court all lead to a view that it was 
unlikely that the loss was compensable under the professional indemnity policy, 
a view subsequently accepted in litigation between the Registrar-General and 
[the professional indemnity insurer].227 
The analysis undertaken in this article also identified that the result would have been 
no different if conveyance had occurred under the national electronic conveyancing 
protocols. Our conclusion was to wonder, particularly given that legal costs recoverable 
from the assurance fund were in excess of $329,000, whether title insurance would 
have provided a simpler and less stressful mechanism to recover the loss occasioned 
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upon Pedulla. ‘Perhaps the lesson to be learnt after all, is that given the one-off lifetime 
cover provided by title insurance, it is the market [that will respond to the problems] 
identified by Sir Robert Torrens some 160 years ago.’228 
In seeking to promote my arguments in respect of how the coherence of title by 
registration can be enhanced, and to connect and support this legal doctrinal analysis 
with the work of other disciplines, I also undertook interdisciplinary analysis in 
considering the previously mentioned issue of abandonment of easements and the 
correctness of the title.229 I suggested that both traditional economics and behavioural 
economics supported the conclusion that the primacy of the register should be 
paramount. Scarce resources were to be allocated to their highest value use, and this 
was only possible if the entitlement one was to receive was guaranteed. Transaction 
and information costs leading to a strict interpretation of Torrens — ‘the mirror of the 
Register forever polished and the curtain never drawn [back].’ 230  The loss averse 
nature of consumers also supported this analysis.231  
Finally, consumer law and the intervention/empowerment paradigm of that discipline 
was used to support a view that immediate indefeasibility was sustainable, appropriate, 
and in line with ideas and principles that underlie title by registration.232  
 
2.10 Legal Coherency within Land Law and with other Areas of Law 
Finally, and while not necessarily specific to title by registration, I recently queried the 
role of negligence in imposing a duty on the servient owner of an easement towards 
the dominant owner.233 Undertaking a doctrinal examination of the cases within tort law 
and within land law, I was critical of the role that tort law would play in intervening in 
this area. Reflecting on my overarching research question of coherence, I asked 
whether the use of tort would lead to a loss of coherence given that land law, and its 
centuries of common law thinking, had struck a balance between the rights of the 
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dominant and servient owners. To now invoke tort law as a mechanism to overcome 
perceived problems, rather than seek to develop the principles of land law, was both 
unnecessary, unwarranted, and not justifiable. Coherence within land registration 
demands certainty and stability. 
Alongside these previously mentioned peer-reviewed feature articles, I have also 
published shorter articles or case notes,234 which are true to my argument about the 
need for coherence within our doctrinal understanding of title by registration. The first, 
published in 2003, suggested that the Queensland Court of Appeal in Tara Shire 
Council v Garner, Arcape and Martin235 made an error in allowing knowing receipt 
liability (ie where fiduciary property is received by someone with knowledge of the 
breach of the fiduciary obligations)236 to override the operation of title by registration. In 
this case, the defendants, the Garners, had become the registered proprietors of land 
on which was situated a motel, restaurant, newsagency, petrol station and water bore. 
The water bore was to be the subject of the dispute. The water bore was critical to the 
water supplies for the Tara Shire Council and for this reason, the Council had made 
an offer to purchase that part of the land on which the bore was located. This required 
the land be subdivided and when this was supposedly done the Council parted with 
$65,000 for the purchase of the parcel on which the water bore was located. The 
Garners subsequently entered into a contract with Arcape whereby Arcape was to 
purchase the motel restaurant, newsagency and petrol station. For reasons that were 
not clear, when Arcape became the registered proprietor of land their title also 
indicated ownership of the land on which the water bore was located. The issue was 
reasonably straightforward. Arcape submitted that it had an indefeasible title upon 
registration and that even if it had notice of the unregistered interest, it was not bound 
by this knowledge. In reply, the Council argued that this was an appropriate matter for 
in personam to apply. More specifically, the Council submitted that Arcape had 
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knowingly received trust property in a manner that was inconsistent with the rights of 
the Council, and because of this, the property was held in trust for the Council.237  
In a split decision in the Queensland Court of Appeal, the arguments of the Council 
were accepted. According to the majority, indefeasibility, even though it was at the core 
of the Torrens system was not an absolute principle. If an equity arises by the conduct 
of the registered proprietor, such as by the retention of trust property, then this is 
sufficient to support the claim of the Council. In the minority, Davies JA considered that 
while indefeasibility would be subject to a claim in personam, the recognition of any 
equity in this instant matter would conflict with the fundamental principle that a person 
taking possession of the Torrens land was not to be weakened by notice, actual or 
constructive.238 It was the decision of the minority judgement that I preferred, and the 
significance of my work was seen some years later when the High Court in Farah v 
Say-Dee239 appeared to have corrected the error made by the majority in Tara Shire 
Council.  
In Farah v Say-Dee (the facts of which are set out above at [2.3]), the High Court 
described it as a grave error for the New South Wales Court of Appeal to have held 
that a constructive trust based on unjust enrichment should have been imposed on the 
wife and daughters of the man behind Farah Constructions. There was nothing to show 
that the mother and daughters had ‘consciousness of those elements which make 
participation transgress ordinary standards of honest behaviour.’240 Importantly, in the 
context of land law and the principle of indefeasibility, the High Court indicated that 
while they had routinely provided the constructive trust remedy where the land was 
registered, this had no application where the defendant was not the primary 
wrongdoer. These authorities could not be applied where the allegation is merely that 
a person has notice of the interest or the fraud.241 The impact of this article in the 
practising legal community is illustrated by its citation by the New Zealand Supreme 
Court.242 
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The third article243 considered the effect that overriding legislation could have on title 
by registration. While this area has been significantly less litigated than the other 
exceptions to indefeasibility, the point has been made that the greatest threat to the 
operation and effectiveness of title by registration may well be where later legislation, 
either explicitly or implicitly, overrides the operation of indefeasibility.244 In the High 
Court decision in Hillpalm v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd, 245  Torrens title property was 
subdivided into two lots, lot one and lot two. The subdivision was approved subject to 
the condition that an access over lot two was to be constructed for the benefit of lot 
one. Subsequently, lot two was further subdivided, and for reasons that were 
unexplained through the curial process, the certificates of title that were benefited and 
burdened by the proposed right-of-way did not include any notation or reference to the 
planned carriageway. In 1998, Heaven’s Door bought lot one, and later that year 
Hillpalm purchased the relevant part of lot two. The question before the Court was: 
with no carriageway constructed nor appearing on the certificates of title could 
Heaven’s Door insist upon the creation of a right of way in its favour?246 Of the nine 
judges that heard this matter, six were in favour of Heaven’s Door and the construction 
of the right of way. Ultimately, however, the three judges that formed the majority in 
the High Court were decisive. The lower courts and the minority judges in the High 
Court decided in favour of Heaven’s Door on the basis that the consent to the 
subdivision by the Council created a right in rem they could be relied upon by all later 
transferees of the lot, irrespective of what was on the title. This right had been 
established by legislation enacted later than the Torrens legislation and this later 
legislation overrode indefeasibility. The majority of the High Court directly addressed 
this point, but ultimately felt the matter did not have to be resolved — the consent to 
the subdivision did not create a right in rem, merely a personal right, but if an in rem 
right had been created, ‘there would have been a real and lively question about how 
the two statutory schemes … were to be reconciled’.247 As only a personal right had 
been created at the time of the subdivision, Heaven’s Door could not insist upon the 
creation of the carriageway. The majority of the High Court, while sidestepping the 
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coherence argument, did, I contend, give indefeasibility primacy and connect this with 
the mirror that the title was to represent. 248  The Court of Appeal decision, if left 
unchanged, would have imposed very significant requirements on conveyancing 
agents to search council records and determine the extent to which conditions of earlier 
planning requirements had been met.249 The dependent nature of land titles that Sir 
Robert Torrens was so keen to rid from within our system of land administration would 
have been reinvoked, if the decisions of the lower courts had stood.  
The final article examined the High Court decision in Westfield Management v 
Perpetual Trustee Company.250 This case was about the right of a dominant tenement 
to use the easement to gain access to adjoining properties, with these adjoining 
properties not the subject of the benefit of the original easement. While focussing 
somewhat on the interpretation of the easement in question, the High Court was 
required to consider the extent to which extrinsic materials (that is material not on the 
register) could be used in interpreting the original easement.  
Whereas the lower courts had engaged in detailed consideration and discussion 
of the use of extrinsic material to aid in the construction of the easement, the High 
Court was far blunter in its analysis. Their Honours considered that such an 
examination disguised the more fundamental matter. The Torrens system of title 
registration, its bedrock of indefeasibility and its publicly available register all lead 
to the conclusion that materials and matter available to third parties and not 
disclosed on the title could not be used in the discovering [of] what was intended 
by the original parties to the creation of the easement.251 
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In summary, throughout this chapter I sought to demonstrate how my publications over 
the past 17 years have sought to promote the doctrinal coherence of the title by 
registration system that operates in Australia. But this was not done in isolation. It was 
undertaken to show how title by registration, (particularly that which we know as 
Torrens) can enhance the certainty and stability surrounding land registration. With 
unwavering support for immediate indefeasibility, my articles illustrate that as we 
evolve from paper-based to electronic conveyancing; we are able, with coherence, to 
soften the harshness of the application of this legal principle to achieve fair outcomes 
individually, but also collectively within the system. My view was that legislatures and 
the judiciary need to be cognisant of what we are trying to achieve with title by 
registration, and work to ensure that what we mean by legal coherence, ‘can play a 
creative role in the curial [and legislative] development of the law.’ 252 The role 
undertaken by me as an academic, with a particular focus on the role of unregistered 
interests, possessory interests, interdisciplinary analysis, and perhaps most 
importantly, the substantive principle of indefeasibility, has been to answer the 
fundamental dilemma facing land law. This problem looks at the conflict between two 
parties, both of whom are innocent of any wrongdoing, and determine how to resolve 
this predicament within a coherent principled framework.  By consideration of the 
tenets of the curtain, mirror and indemnity and the proof elements contained within a 
well-functioning land administration system,  I have been able to link the publications  
that I have had published with the doctrinal research methodology  adopted.  These 
points connect with the following chapter as I demonstrate how my work, and the 
knowledge created from this, have advanced understanding in the area of title by 
registration.
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Chapter 3: How the Research Question(s) contributed to the Advancement of 
Knowledge 
Sir Robert Torrens’ distaste for English land law and for the Court of Equity is well 
known: 
Twenty-two years have now elapsed since my attention was painfully drawn to 
the grievous injury and injustice inflicted under the English Law of Real Property 
by the misery and ruin which fell upon a relation and dear friend who was drawn 
into the maelstrom of the Court of Chancery, and I then resolved someday to 
strike a blow at that iniquitous institution.253 
We can now ask with close to 170 years of jurisprudence associated with title by 
registration whether the creator himself would be pleased with what he introduced. I 
would suggest that overall he would. My title for this PhD by Published Work raised the 
question of whether we had seen a revolution or an evolution through the introduction 
and subsequent doctrinal learning of the Torrens system, or title by registration. My 
answer is both. The Torrens system radically changed the landscape and this 
development cannot be underestimated. Again, using the words of Torrens himself, 
the changes brought about by its introduction are clear:  
In order to bring land under this simple and efficacious law, a preliminary step 
must be to cut off the necessity for retrospective investigation of title. By this the 
grand source of insecurity, of costliness, of intricacy, and of delay, is removed. 
Indefeasibility of title is a necessary corollary to this step, and from this again 
follows the necessity of providing a fund whence compensation in money may be 
secured to the rightful heirs and others who through the operation of the law may 
be barred from recovering the land itself. By transferring the liability from the land 
to the person of the individual deriving advantage from the error, with the right to 
claim compensation from a guaranteed Assurance Fund, failing the personal 
security, this object is effected in the manner most consistent with individual rights 
and with principles of public expediency. For there is scarcely any appreciable 
hardship in compelling the acceptance of pecuniary compensation to the full 
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value of the land; whilst grievous injury is inflicted by that law which in restoring 
to a rightful heir his inheritance, bestows upon him therewith the capital of 
innocent parties invested thereon, to an amount, it may be, far in excess of the 
value of the land itself.254 
Perhaps these words mask the dramatic nature of what occurred. A transfer that was 
previously void at common law, now upon registration would pass, what ultimately 
became to be, an immediately indefeasible title. This applied even if the purchaser or 
the registered owner had notice of some other interest that was attached to the land. 
Title by registration is the model of a positive system of land registration. What 
registration does is validate the interests, subject to a relatively small number of 
exceptions. Perhaps the reason why it has occupied my thoughts for so long is that 
this positive system, as O’Connor describes it, creates a bi-jural inaccuracy.255 Positive 
systems necessarily encompass the common law rules of land law, together with the 
legislation establishing title by registration. The Torrens system, or title by registration 
does not operate as a codification of the rules relating to land law to the exclusion of 
normal common law principles. This is where the problem occurs. At common law, the 
void transaction is ineffective to pass title. The response of the Torrens legislation is 
different: upon registration, the interest, provided the person has registered without 
fraud, will be validated and conclusive proof of its attachment to that parcel of land. 
Despite this problem, three key benefits are perceived to result from title by registration. 
First, the register will operate as a mirror and will enable a person searching to find out 
all the significant facts relevant to that title; second, the dependent nature of land titles 
evident within the general law no longer applies — the searcher need not undertake 
an historical examination. Finally, where the register operates to disadvantage a 
person who would otherwise take or retain an interest by way of common law 
principles, they will be compensated by the state. If these three benefits are realised, 
then the criteria for a successful land administration system will be met. We will have: 
• security of tenure for the holders of land interests (through the validation of a 
transaction leading to title granted by the act of registration); 
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• recognition of the significant land rights that affect the majority of the population 
(through indefeasibility extending to the usual land interests); and 
• public trust within the operation of the system (through the mirror, reliance on 
the register, and compensation available when things go awry). 
The value of my work, evidenced by the research collated in this PhD by Published 
Work, is its consistently and strongly held view of the benefits of the vision of Sir Robert 
Torrens for title by registration. As we engage with new processes, my work will 
continue to guide and influence the development of the common law principles to 
achieve a more coherent Torrens system, and fairer outcomes for individual parties. 
The integrity of the register (which I think we have largely achieved) will inevitably lead 
to the integrity of title by registration. The unfairness in individual outcomes that we 
see today will be reduced through the measures associated with verification of identity, 
the connection of this individual to the land, and the identification of the person who 
has the right to deal with the land. In effect, the embedded security measures now 
being adopted are reflective of my work. I suggest what I have achieved over the last 
18 years is to elucidate and influence the evolutionary nature of our understanding of 
Torrens’ jurisprudence in Australia, with my work cited internationally in Europe, Asia 
and North America.256  
My answer to the research question is that, for the most part, the approach of the 
courts, particularly the High Court, and the legislature, has been consistent with the 
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principles that led to the introduction of the Torrens system of land registration. Where 
courts or legislation have sought to ameliorate the harsh consequences that can result 
from the adoption of immediate indefeasibility, either through in personam, the 
acceptance of possessory interests, broad notions of what is fraud, restitutionary 
principles, or increased obligations on stakeholders within the conveyancing process, 
then it is hoped this modification or weakening has been tested against the ideals of 
the curtain, mirror and the indemnity. In some instances, those incursions cannot be 
justified. For others, such as increased obligations on stakeholders to verify identify, 
they can be seen as consistent with what Sir Robert Torrens was trying to achieve.  
As the learning of electronic conveyancing takes hold, the evolution of the Torrens 
system will continue and from the impetus of national protocols for electronic 
conveyancing, the possibility of a substantive national Torrens Code. My work, by 
combining elements of a doctrinal study, the relationship of possessory interests, and 
interdisciplinary research, has argued, consistently and regularly, in favour of title by 
registration and there is no reason why in this country we should have eight models 
flowing from three common elements. My research methodology was, for the most 
part, doctrinal, with this requiring at its heart the identification of what the law is by a 
close examination of the relevant cases and applicable legislation alongside 
consideration of the existing secondary sources. Where the inevitable inconsistencies 
occur in the federation that is Australia, I then sought to clarify the law in light of the 
criteria by which we judge land registration systems. What this research shows is that 
in those key areas of recognition of unregistered interests, the use of the exceptions 
to indefeasibility, and the role of possessory interests within Torrens, we struggle with 
the maintenance of coherence. The adoption by some overseas jurisdictions of 
deferred indefeasibility, the continued recognition of possessory interests (even though 
severely circumscribed in Tasmania), and an expanded understanding of in personam 
through the use of restitutionary doctrines has, on occasions, threatened to undermine 
the coherence and consistency that I am seeking. 
Most recently, and with the advent of electronic conveyancing, a move designed to be 
neutral in terms of the substantive law, the importance of my work is that it has 
articulated some concerns around the continued operation of the system unless the 
appropriate security measures are put in place. While our policy makers and regulatory 
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bodies have identified verification of identity as a key to ensuring that land registration 
by Torrens continues without significant change, the move from interested parties 
signing and attesting documents on their own behalf (a security measure in itself) to 
one where agents do this on behalf of the individual is the most significant change to 
conveyancing since the introduction of title by registration. This move will represent 
new opportunities for fraud, and create dangers and a possible lack of confidence in 
the system, hence the need for consideration of how we connect the verified identity 
to the ownership of the land, and furthermore, how we can be assured that there is no 
competing interest such as a mortgagee with the right to control use of that land. 
Arguably, this may create a challenge to the coherence of Torrens through an 
expanded definition of what is fraud, or as happens in Ontario257 and Malaysia, 258 
through the acceptance of deferred indefeasibility. The digital environment has the 
potential to realise fully the benefits of Torrens — a title which reflects all, or nearly all 
interests pertaining to that parcel of land, and an opportunity to ensure that the mirror 
is reflecting with high resolution and precision. It is my view that the introduction of 
national electronic conveyancing practice presents the most significant opportunity for 
the development of a national Torrens code,259 the advantages of which were noted by 
Sir Garfield Barwick long ago in the 1971 seminal authority of Breskvar v Wall.260  
The breadth and depth of my work evidence the unique and scholarly contribution that 
I have made and disseminated amongst my peers and the wider community. My work 
has made an original contribution to the scholarship of the Torrens system of land 
registration, and through doctrinal analysis and economics/law and consumer law 
frameworks, I have succeeded in showing that consistency and coherence within title 
by registration land systems is ever evolving. Torrens’ distaste for equitable interests 
and the Court of Chancery was not shared by the legal profession, who arguably saw 
this as a means to mollify the grand law reform that was title by registration. I have 
consistently argued that our language should refer to the registered and unregistered, 
rather than legal or equitable, and while this battle has not been won, recent moves by 
                                                          
257 CIBC Mortgages v Computershare [2015] ONSC 543. 
258 Mohd Nasir bin Moidu v Lee Swen Kim [2011] 7 MLJ 606, 613. 
259 See the discussion of the advantages of a national Torrens Code at Law Council of Australia, above n 156. 
However, I appreciate the political realities make the likelihood of this occurring somewhat remote. 
260 (1971) 126 CLR 376, 386. 
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the High Court to heighten the importance of the caveat do lead down that path, and 
implicitly recognise the value of my work.261  
Similarly, as for possessory interests, their place continues, although with some 
jurisdictional differences, in a more constrained manner — a direction that my 
publications have consistently argued. The opposition to possessory interests existing 
outside of the title evident by legislative moves to limit their operation, with this seen, 
for example, in Tasmania and the United Kingdom.262 I also argue that consistent with 
the coherence of Torrens, a narrow reading of in personam, and restitutionary claims 
are necessary. For the moment, I would suggest my view is consistent with the High 
Court, though this will remain a constant battlefield while immediate indefeasibility 
results in, on occasions, significant individual injustice. Finally, my work on electronic 
conveyancing, which began some 15 years ago, foreshadowed the imminent 
development of digitisation of the conveyancing process and the need for appropriate 
security measures to be put in place. Today we are heeding that warning though time 
will only tell if we have done enough to ensure that security is maintained, that the 
majority of land interests utilised are accepted onto the register, and that public trust in 
the system of title by registration is upheld. This is, after all, probably the most 
important criterion. If public trust is lost, the move to make changes will be irresistible. 
That could see a loss of coherence, something to which I will continue to rally against 
as it will undermine the alignment between concept and interpretation that I believe is 
critical to preserve. To remove that link will move our understanding of the substantive 
law of title by registration into a realm where more nebulous, opaque and subjective 
notions of fairness will become dominant. Land is too valuable a resource, and too 
critical to the community, to have the land administration system undermined through 
an appeal to an argument that the outcome is unfair in a very small number of 
instances. Stability and certainty within the framework of title by registration will work 
to ensure that the system meets the expectations of the community, and where loss of 
title is only ‘sporadic, rare and unpredictable’, 263  the entire system should not be 
amended to fill a perceived notion of what is right in an individual case. This work 
continues to this day with my current and ongoing research examining the use of 
                                                          
261 eg, Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438. 
262 In Tasmania, see Part IXB Land Titles Act 1980. In the United Kingdom, see Schedule 6 Land Registration Act 
2002. 
263 Cooper, above n 12, 130. 
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blockchains264 as a mechanism to embed superior safety and security into the land 
administration system and how this technology (which are the software protocols 
behind Bitcoins) can achieve a better, more stable, more certain, and ultimately fairer 
Torrens system.265 
3.1 Conclusion 
My research question investigated to what extent the judicial and legislative 
developments concerning title by registration have achieved doctrinal coherence with 
the ideas that underlie a title by registration (or Torrens) system of land registration.  
 
Research Findings 
Broadly speaking the findings of my research suggest that immediate indefeasibility 
remains the substantive principle of choice when compared with deferred 
indefeasibility. While deferred indefeasibility will often be intuitively appealing, 
preferring as it often does the aggrieved homeowner vis-à-vis the financial institution, 
when this debate is examined from a perspective of what we are trying to achieve with 
Torrens title, immediate indefeasibility is to be preferred. Importantly though, my more 
recent work on the three proof elements and the move to electronic conveyancing 
suggest that there are ways in which the opportunity for fraud and the loss of title of 
the innocent homeowner can be minimised, without undermining the coherence of title 
by registration.   
In line with this view of indefeasibility, I have also submitted that possessory interests 
have no role to play when seeking coherence in a title by registration system. Once it 
is accepted, and in my view it is indisputable, that the registration of title is the 
                                                          
264 ‘A blockchain is a technical component of a distributed ledger, and refers to the chain of transactions that reside 
within the ledger. Transactions are grouped into “blocks”, and as they are verified, a new “block” is added to the 
chain of previous transactions. The ledger is updated – instantaneously, permanently and irrevocably for all 
users to reflect the new status of the ledger with the additional block. The blockchain is therefore an accurate 
record of the history of the entire ledger.’ Allens-Linklater, Blockchain Reaction, June 2016, 4, accessible at 
<https://www.allens.com.au/data/blockchain/index.htm> 
265 For discussion in the context of land administration, see Aanchal Anand, Mathew McKibbin and Frank Pichel, 
‘Colored Coins, Bitcoin, Blockchain and Land Administration’ (Presentation to Scaling up Responsible Land 
Governance, Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, Washington DC, 14-18 March 2016); 
Dobhal and Regan, above n 21; Michael Mainelli and Mike Smith, ‘Sharing ledgers for sharing economies: an 
exploration of mutual distributed ledgers (aka blockchain technology) (2015) 3(3) Journal of Financial 
Perspectives 1. 
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mechanism by which the interest in land is created, then interests that emanate from 
acts outside of the register should have no influence except in limited circumstances. 
While possessory interests remain as theoretically available, in some jurisdictions, 
notably my own in Tasmania, and the United Kingdom - the possibility of success is 
remote.  
My research has also suggested that, as the practical importance of unregistered 
interests remains, the caveat should be given an enhanced role in protecting these 
types of interests. Recent decisions such as Black v Garnock266 support such a move, 
allowing the register to move closer to becoming the mirror that it was intended to be.  
Finally, my most recent work looking at the effect of electronic conveyancing on these 
substantive points has been to highlight how, when examining what we are trying to 
achieve with a title by registration system, we should keep in mind the three proof 
elements of identity verification, connection with the land and control of the right to 
deal. When this is done and linked with security protocols in respect of the certificate 
of title, and access to the electronic workspace, then the goals of a successful land 
administration system and the principles that drove Sir Robert Torrens can be met. 
 
Areas of Further Research 
When considered globally, the most active area for consideration appears to be the 
role that blockchains and their use in distributed registers (ie where there is no central 
registry, or where the central registry has a more limited role) will play in achieving the 
security protocols that can reduce, if not eliminate, some of the fraud that currently 
bedevils the Torrens system. While blockchains appear to be of significant advantage 
in a jurisdiction where the country’s land records are poorly kept; have been destroyed 
deliberately or by natural disaster; or where the government registry is corruptible or 
inadequately resourced, the news that Sweden267 and the Republic of Georgia268 are 
investigating the use of blockchain technology in its land administration centre 
demonstrates its application to mature and well-resourced land registries. Specifically 
this technology has the potential to reduce the types of fraud that occasionally appear 
                                                          
266 (2007) 230 CLR 438. 
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in title by registration jurisdictions (particularly double-dealing in the one parcel of land), 
and by creating additional layers of security, limit opportunities for wide-scale fraud. As 
to how this distributed ledger technology will cater for the fragmented nature of land 
interests held in the individual parcel remains under active consideration.  
My work will also continue to examine how indefeasibility will evolve as legislatures, 
such as New Zealand, examine ways to better balance fairness in an individual 
transaction with the collective goals of Torrens, with this jurisdiction proposing that 
immediate indefeasibility be subject to a test of ‘manifest injustice’, with title overturned 
if this appeal to fairness is established.269 While my initial view on this proposal sees it 
as creating a category of discretionary indefeasibility, research continues on the extent 
to which this undermines the curtain, mirror and the indemnity. 
Outside of these very significant changes, ongoing research will continue to place 
parameters about the role of in personam, and the further evolution of possessory 
interests (particularly as human rights jurisprudence becomes more significant), and 
the future function of caveats, with trends indicating a likely expansion and a more 
important role. 
 
A Final Reflection 
It is suggested that the body of my work, encompassing peer-reviewed publications, 
books chapters for students, research monographs for practitioners and academics, 
conference presentations, and contributions to law reform proposals, as well as citation 
in superior courts has made a significant and original contribution to the jurisprudence 
on title by registration. My work has been deliberated upon and cited by many, and as 
previously noted270 has challenged others to consider alternate views, or advance 
policy reform. My work, through the secondary sources forming part of this PhD by 
Published Work, and the allied additional material to which I have contributed, has 
been part of the conversation that has led to legislative change (eg adverse 
possession/possessory easements/security measures), or promoted or encouraged a 
view of the Torrens system differently than what currently exists. It is work that is 
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ongoing with the advent of electronic conveyancing. It will continue to see me 
submitting that one of the most significant intellectual exports of this country should 
continue to provide a secure, trusted, and relatively inexpensive method of achieving 
a safe and efficient form of land administration. Through the research methodology of 
doctrinal research, the peer-reviewed publication process and subsequent 
dissemination, I have generated ‘original knowledge and understanding to make a 
substantial contribution to a discipline or area of professional practice.’271 In so doing, I 
have ‘[developed, adapted and implemented] research methodologies to extend and 
redefine existing knowledge,’272 and evidenced that I have ‘autonomy, authoritative 
judgement, adaptability and responsibility’273 as a scholar in the field of the Torrens 
System of land registration. My work has not always been agreed upon, but I would 
suggest there is no doubt that I have made an original and significant contribution to 
the literature on the Torrens system of land registration. 
 
                                                          
271 Wording adopted from the AQF level 10 Criteria: see, Australian Qualifications Framework Council, Australian 
Qualifications Framework (Australian Government, 2nd ed, 2013) 64. 
272 Ibid. 
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TORRENS TITLE - ARISE THE 
REGISTERED AND UNREGISTERED, 
BEFALL THE LEGAL AND EQUITABLE 
'[Tlhe continued advantage of ident~fyingprinciples as legal or equitable must 
be open to question." 
'[Llawyers will cease to enquire whether a given rule be a rule of equity or 
rule of common law.'2 
Property Law is consistently faced with the dilemma of competing claims to real prop- 
erty by people who can be designated as innocent parties. As noted by Hughson et a1 
[tlhere are two main ways of resolving such conflicts. One approach is to pro- 
tect the holder of an interest by preventing the transferor from passing a title 
which he or she lacks .... The alternative approach, typified by systems of regis- 
tration of title, is to protect innocent purchasers of interests, regardless of 
whether or not the transferor has a good title.3 
In this context consider the facts of Gibbs v Messer.' A solicitor forged the signature of a 
client to an instrument that transferred land to a fictitious person. The solicitor purport- 
ing to act for this fictitious person obtained a loan on the security of a mortgage to one 
McIntyre. In this case, should the innocent client of the solicitor or the mortgagee later 
prevail? The contest was between two innocent parties. Whilst the Privy Council held 
that the mortgage should be removed from the register, a decision which may not apply 
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Tasmania. The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for 
herhis incisive comments. The usual caveat applies. 
I LBC, Laws of Australia, vol 28 (as at 29 July 1999) 28 Real Property, '28.1 Principles of Real Property' 
[ lol l .  
Frederic Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd ed, 1947) 20. 
' Mary-Anne Hughson, Marcia Neave and Pamela O'Connor, 'Reflections on the Mirror of Title: Resolving 
the Conflict between Purchasers and Prior Interest Holders' (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 460, 
461. 
[I8911 AC 248. 
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today,' the critical aspect to note is that whatever result, an innocent party would have 
been deprived of an interest in land. 
The solution in the case of registered or Torrens title land has been to protect, in the 
main, the innocent purchasers of title. This has permitted a conveyancing system which 
is relatively inexpensive, quick, and for the most part, accurate, to flourish. The philoso- 
phy behind this system is the provision of a conclusive title, a registration process that 
the state guarantees as a mirror of the title.6 Purchasers simply need inquire as to regis- 
tration and to ascertain what that contains: 
The registration scheme must be so comprehensive as to provide procedures 
for handling every kind of interest possible ... It must be possible to register any 
legitimate interest or claim, so that the moving question is whether the claim is 
or is not registered. If the claim is properly registered, it is effective; if it is not 
registered, it is ineffective.' (emphasis added) 
Under a registration system, then, the question of entitlement has been subjugated in 
many cases to the issue of whether the interest is legal and registrable, or legal but not 
registrable, equitable (possibly registrable, possibly not), a mere equity coupled with or 
without a proprietary right, or a personal equity. This paper will argue, by way of appeal 
to history, case law and academic support, that the law of property should be prepared to 
dispense with a determination of priorities by the nature of the interest, and instead turn 
to a system whereby Parliament mandates the registration of certain interests, the avail- 
ability of caveating for those interests that cannot be registered and for priority to be 
resolved by the date of registration or lodgment of the caveat. In this respect the policy 
of the law must be to encourage the registration of interests, to have a title which truly 
mirrors the interests attaching to the land to determine priority, not by a system of pri- 
ority rules introduced to deal with a division of interests into law or equity, but by the 
first to register their interest. To this extent, the paper does not attempt the more ambi- 
tious argument that legal and equitable interests should be abolished completely, rather it 
seeks to advance the submission that the general law priority rules, based as they are on 
the division between law and equity, should be substituted by a system of priority by 
caveating.' 
There is no doubt that the goal of Sir Robert Torrens (as the architect of the land regis- 
tration system which bears his name) was to protect the purchaser and to override the 
interests of those holding what traditionally would be considered equitable interests. 
Given the acceptance of immediate indefeasibility in Australia - see Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376. 
The case has been restricted by subsequent authority - see for example Garofano v Reliance Finance Corpo- 
ration Lid (1992) 5 BPR 11,941; Wicklow Enterprises Pty Ltd v Doysal Pty Ltd(1987) 45 SASR 247. 
AS noted by Dent Bostick, 'Land Title Registration: An English Solution to an American Problem' (1987) 63 
Indiana Law Journal 55, 60-61 '[tlhe ideal system substitutes registration for any inquiry into actual or 
constructive notice of facts about ownership ... the registration system will function so that one registration card, 
clearly and simply arranged, will minor exactly the state of a title at any given moment.' 
' Ihid 61. 
' The argument that legal and equitable interests should be abolished completely is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Issues that would be raised by this question include the creation of interests (if we abolish the distinction 
between law and equity - what reference is there to say that an interest exists). Similarly, at present, the 
remedies available can depend on whether the interest is categorised as legal or equitable. 
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These were to be regarded as mere contracts.' Indeed the influence of the Court of Chan- 
cery on land titles was a point of criticism by Torrens.Io Today there is a range of equi- 
table interests recognised by the courts in relation to land transactions - but it is this very 
range and the continued renaissance of equity in Australia1' that demands a reconsider- 
ation of the manner in which we resolve disputes between innocent parties in relation to 
land. As stated extra-judicially by Sir Anthony Mason,I2 equity 'has extended beyond old 
boundaries into new territory where no Lord Chancellor's foot has previously left its 
imprint.'13 It is this very extension of equity that has brought the ideas of fairness and 
good conscience (the foundations of equity jurisdiction) so sharply into conflict with the 
processes of Torrens title. The Torrens form of land transfer necessitates a level of 
certainty and 'determination which is, in many ways, directly oppositional to the ap- 
proach taken by equitable principles of fairness.'14 
The purpose of this article is to outline the equitable interests that can be raised in rela- 
tion to land, to question whether the division between law and equity need be maintained 
in a post Judicature Act world (particularly in the case of Torrens title land) and to 
consider the historical, academic and case law basis for dispensing with the division 
between legal and equitable and to substitute a demarcation between registered and 
unregistered, specifically in the case of priority disputes. The disputes that arise from the 
present division between law and equity will be discussed to illustrate the advantages of 
dispensing with the current regime. 
This article will be structured in the following manner. After a brief review of the cur- 
rent state of equitable interests available, part 111 outlines the historical derivation of 
equitable jurisdiction which is then followed by a consideration of the consequence of 
separation between law and equity - the priority rules. This will be followed by a critical 
analysis of the continuing relevance of the division between law and equity (and the 
division within equity itself). I will conclude with a plea for a radical rethinking of the 
concepts of law and equity for priority disputes by calling for a revised division between 
registered and unregistered interests.I5 
Hughson, Neave and O'Connor, above n 3,461. 
lo See the comments by Les McCrimmon, 'Protection of Equitable Interests Under the Torrens System: 
Polishing the Mirror of Title' (1994) 20 Monash Law Review 300,301. 
" See the comments by Hughson, Neave and O'Connor, above n 3,462. 
I *  Anthony Mason, 'The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law World' 
(1 994) 1 I0 Law Quarterly Review 238. 
l 3  Ibid. 
l 4  Samantha Hepburn, 'Concepts of Equity and Indefeasibility in the Torrens System of Land Registration' 
(1995) 3 Australian Property Law Journal 41. 
l 5  As pointed out by Edward Sykes and Sally Walker, The Law of Securities (5" ed, 1993) 452 there are certain 
interests which although legal in nature at general law cannot be registered on a Torrens title register - im- 
plicitly providing support for the idea that the division between law and equity, for purposes of resolving 
priority disputes. need not necessarily be maintained. See generally W N Harrison, 'Indefeasibility of Torrens 
Title' (1952) University of Queensland Law Journal 206. 
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The principal equitable interest is that of the beneficiary under a trust. This form of 
relationship results where ownership of the property is divided between the trustee 
(holding the legal interest) and the beneficiary (holding the equitable interest). An ex- 
press trust is occasioned by the legal owner intentionally conferring a benefit upon 
another, thus dividing the ownership of the property.16 By contrast, a resulting trust is 
implied in circumstances where the law accepts that the legal owner is not to enjoy the 
beneficial interest in the property. For example, this may arise where an individual 
purchases property, but has the property registered in the name of another. The circum- 
stances may indicate that this is not a gift to the latter person, but an intent for that indi- 
vidual to hold the legal interest for the benefit of the purchaser." A constructive trust is 
imposed without regard to the intent of the parties, but in line with what the court views 
as conscionable conduct.ls 
Contracts for the sale of land also impose an equitable interest on the putative pur- 
chaser.19 Thus, in some circumstances, the property is at the risk of the purchaser from 
the date of signing the contract and before settlement. Equity has also recognised inter- 
ests such as informal leases? the agreement for a lease,2' interests arising from the 
doctrine of part pe r f~rmance ,~~  informal mortgages," the equity of redemption2' and 
restrictive  covenant^.^^ Equity also recognised a category of interests somewhat less than 
the equitable interest - equities arising out of proprietary estoppelz6 and ancillary equities 
which permit the holder to complain of misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence and 
mi~take.~'  
Arguably what we have failed to achieve or recognise in Australia is that with the en- 
actment of a wholly new system brought on by the Torrens legislation, the division 
" For a discussion of the origins and nature of a trust see DKLR Holding Co Pty Ltd (No 2) v Commissioner of 
Stamp Duties [I9801 1 NSWLR 51l('DKLR Holding'). As for the formalities for the creation of an express 
trust over land see Adrian Bradbrook, Susan MacCallurn and Anthony Moore, Australian Properly Law Cases 
and Materials (1996) [4.5]. 
See House v Caffyn [I9221 VLR 67; Wirth v Wirth (1956) 98 CLR 228; Carkeek v Tate-Jones [1971] VR 
691. 
l 8  See Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; Muschinski v Dodds (1986) 60 ALJR 52, 64-66 
(Deane J). 
l9 See Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499. 
20 See Chan v Cresdon Pty Ltd (1989) 168 CLR 242. 
'' See Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch D 9. 
22 See Francis v Francis [I9521 VLR 321; Thwaites v Ryan [I9841 VR 65; Australia and New Zealand Bank- 
ing Group Ltd v Widin (1991) 102 ALR 289. 
'' See Stubbs v Slater I19101 1 Ch 632. 
24 See Knightsbridge Estates Trust Ltd v Byrne [I9391 1 Ch 441; Noakes & Co Ltd v Rice [I9021 AC 24. 
25 See Tulkv Moxhay [I8481 2 Ph 774; 41 ER 1143. 
" See Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365. 
27 See Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 265; Barclays Bank plc v O'Brien 
[I9941 1 AC 180; Blacklocks v JB Developments (GodalmingJ Ltd [1982] Ch 183; Swanston Mortgage Ply 
Ltd v Trepan Investments Pty Ltd [I9941 1 VR 672. 
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between law and equity should have been abandoned for priority disputes. As stated by 
Duncan and Willmott 
[tlhe enactment of the Torrens system legislation throughout the several colo- 
nies of Australia, as they then were, should have presaged a change in attitude 
for lawyers dealing with interests under the new statutes. However, for some 
time, the ghosts of the old system continued to haunt the interpretation of the 
new Torrens statutes." 
111 HISTORICAL BASIS FOR EQUITY' 
The equitable jurisdiction arose out of the inadequacies of the common law," and in 
relation to land the inadequacies in the systems of tenure and estates. The common law 
proscribed an individual from passing an estate in land by way of will;" identity of the 
owner was critical to the imposition of feudal dues;32 and there were strict requirements 
for the passing of an interest in land." In response to these restrictions the Chancellor, on 
behalf of the King, and in the exercise of the residual power of the Monarch, heard 
complaints that could not be dealt with at common law: 
The Chancellor's jurisdiction was confined to situations where the common 
law could not act because, for example, there was no recognised writ the plain- 
tiff could use for the type of damage the plaintiff had suffered. Equity did not 
attempt to destroy the rules of common law but only to affect the way in which 
they operated.34 
In the context of land law the critical development was the instigation of the 'use' to 
overcome the problems of the common law restrictions on land ownership, imposition 
and transferability and it was the acceptance by the Court of Chancery of this arrange- 
ment)' that led to the creation and acceptance of the equitable interest. From this initial 
development the courts of equity have continued to expand and develop the range of 
equitable interests. Further, equity had the capacity to permit the creation of interests 
unattainable at common law. The creation of the estate contract and the mortgagor's 
equity of redemption are early examples of equity being used in such a fashion. A more 
William Duncan and Lindy Willmott, Mortgages Law in Australia (2nd ed, 1996) 2. See also the comments 
of Cockle CJ in Trust and Agency Co v Markwell (No 2) (1874) 4 QSCR 50, 52 where his Honour indicated 
that the 'old system' in relation to mortgages was no longer operative. 
29 For a discussion of the basis for equitable jurisdiction, and in particular, the origins and nature of the trust 
see DKLR Holding [I9801 1 NSWLR 51 1 .  
30 As stated by Bradbrook, MacCallum and Moore, above n 16, [4.1] 'the development of the equitable interest 
in land law began primarily as a result of the many fetters the common law placed on the holders of freehold 
estates.' 
3 '  LBC, above n 1, [73]. 
32 See the Statute of Mortmain 1279. 
33 Edward Bum, Modern Law ofRealProperty (14' ed, 1988), 40. 
34 LBC, above n 1 ,  [76]. 
35 Of course, the King instigated the passage of the Statute of Uses I535 to protect his revenue. Ultimately the 
change in social conditions and the decline of the doctrines of tenures and estates led to the acceptance of the 
use upon a use in Tyrrel's Case (1557) 2 Dyer 155a; 73 ER 336. 
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recent example is that of the restrictive covenant - an interest in land that is purely equi- 
table.'" 
Notwithstanding this, in the context of priority disputes concerning title to land by 
registration, what is the relevance and importance of the division of interests between 
law and equity? Whilst it is critically important to remember that the development of the 
Torrens system of land registration was a later development than the initial musings of 
equity, systems of land registration have dated from 3000 BC.37 Given this, the oppor- 
tunity to rethink the role of Torrens title, its method of recordation of interests and the 
resolution of competing disputes is important. In this sense, what is being suggested here 
is more in the way of a reclamation of historical beginnings and an opportunity to cor- 
rect those facets which were not considered at the time of the initial systems of land 
regi~tration.'~ 
After the establishment by the Court of Chancery of equitable interests, the problems 
created by the division between common law and equity became all too apparent. The 
common law courts of Common Pleas,.Exchequer and Queens Bench heard matters 
arising out of common law; equity was confined to its own jurisdiction and to remedying 
those perceived defects of the common law. In terms of land law, this development saw 
the creation of different interests, their enforcement by different measures and their 
termination in different circumstances.'' The difficulties that this caused led to the unifi- 
cation of the principles of common law and equity by the Judicature Acts 1873 (UK).40 
After this, courts were invested with both equitable and legal jurisdiction, claims from 
either base could be brought in the one matter, and remedies from either jurisdiction 
could be sought. Whilst the procedure was fused, it is generally accepted that the princi- 
ples were not." Accordingly, disputes between legal and equitable interests, and between 
equitable interests and mere equities, were destined to plague Property Law. However, 
in this post-Judicature Act world and in recognition of a system of title by registration,"' 
maintaining any division between law and equity for the determination of priority dis- 
putes has no place. Support for this can be sought from this very system of priority rules 
currently in force, as these are applied to resolve disputes between interests of the nature 
of legal, equitable and mere equities. It is therefore necessary to turn to a brief discus- 
sion of the priority rules. 
36 See LBC, above n 1, [84]. 
37 See the historical discussion in Timothy Hanstad, 'Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing 
Countries' (1998) The American University International Law Review 647,647-649. 
38 Not surprisingly given that the division between law and equity was not yet apparent. 
39 See the comments by Joycey Tooher and Bryan Dwyer, Introduction to Property Law (3'* ed, 1997) 41. 
40 This was accepted in most Australian States shortly thereafter (eg. in Victoria in 1883 - the one exception to 
this was New South Wales, which did not unify until 1973). 
41 For a discussion of what is known as the fusion fallacy see Fiona Bums, 'The 'Fusion Fallacy' Revisited' 
(1993) 5 Bond Law Review 152. 
42 It can be noted that both the Judicature Acts and the system of Torrens title date from a sifhilar time. The 
original Judicature Act dates from 1873, the original Torrens titles Act, the Real Property Act (SA) from 1857- 
1858. 
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The consequence of the retention and classification of interests as legal, equitable, a 
mere equity, a personal equity or an equity coupled with a proprietary interest is that the 
courts were required to develop a system of resolution of disputes. At the outset, it is 
important to note that there was recognition that a system of registration, where priority 
is determined by the date of registration, was perceived to be advantageous over reliance 
upon pure common law principles. In Australia, all States now have legislation that 
provides for the registration of instruments affecting common law or 'old title' land.43 In 
New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, and Victoria priority is accorded by date of 
registration." In South Australia, the legislation does not expressly provide priority to 
the first registered, though the first registered in all probability will obtain pr i~r i ty .~ '  In
Western Australia, priority is accorded to those first registered, but in respect of those 
unregistered instruments - they shall be invalid against any purchaser in good faith and 
for valuable c~nsidera t ion.~~ 
These registration procedures dovetail into the common law principles of priority dis- 
putes. The very fact of the existence of a multitude of common law principles adopted in 
relation to disputes surrounding old title land - principles such as priority between legal 
interests determined by the date they came into ~peration;~'  an equitable interest created 
in first in time will override the later equitable interest provided the merits are 
that an equitable interest will prevail over an earlier mere equity provided the equitable 
interest is obtained for value and without notice;49 that an earlier legal interest will pre- 
vail over a later equitable interest;" and that a later legal interest will prevail over an 
earlier equitable interest if acquired for value, in good faith and without notice of the 
earlier equitable interesti' - is evidence enough of the need to rethink the manner in 
which the competing claims of two 'innocent' parties are considered. These principles, 
43 Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW); Property Law Act 1974 (Qld); Registration of Deeds Act 1935 (SA); 
Registration of Deeds Act 1935 (Tas); Property Law Act 1958 (Vic); Registration of Deeds Act 1856 (WA). 
44 Conijeyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 184G; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 246; Registration of Deeds Act 1935 
(Tas) s 9; Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) s 6. 
45 On this see Sykes and Walker, above n 15,414. 
46 See Registration of Deeds Act 1856 (WA) s 3. 
47 Application of the principles that nemo dat quod non habet: a person cannot convey an interest which they 
do not have. 
" Heid v Reliance Finance Corporation Pty Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 326 ('Heid'); Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De 
GF & J 208; 45 ER 1164; Rice v Rice (1853) 2 Drewry 73; 61 ER 646; Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639. All 
property law practitioners would be aware that the maxim has many permutations and combinations - for 
example is it a principle of first or last resort? See Henry Long, 'Finding the Better Equity: the Maxim Qui 
Prior Est Tempore Potior Est Jure and the Modern Law Relating to Equitable Priorities' (1996) 3 Deakin Law 
Review 147; A J Oakley, 'Judicial Discretion in Priorities of Equitable Interests' (1996) 112 Law Quarterly 
Review 215. Similarly there are many exceptions, eg. beneficiaries under trusts - Shropshire Union Railways 
and Canal Co v The Queen (1875) LR 7 HL 496. 
49 Latec Investments Ltdv Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (In Liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265. 
50 In accordance with the maxim 'where the equities (the merits of the case) are equal the law prevails'. Many 
exceptions apply to this maxim: see Northern Counties of England Fire Insurance Co v Whipp (1884) 26 Ch D 
482; Barry v Heider (1914) 19 CLR 197; Walker v Linom [I9071 2 Ch 104; Perry Herrick v Altwood (1857) 2 
De G & J 21; 44 ER 895. 
" Pzlcher v Rawlins (1872) LR 7 Ch App 259. See also the doctrine of tabula in naufragio - Wortley v Birk- 
head (1754) 2 Ves Sen 571; 28 ER 364; Blackwoodv London Chartered BankofAustralia (1874) LR 5 PC 92. 
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devised to resolve disputes in 'old system' title have largely been extrapolated for use in 
relation to Torrens land, though modified with the particular practices relevant under 
that system - in particular the concept of caveating.j2 Given this background to the cre- 
ation and resolution of disputes between legal and equitable interests, the next part of the 
article will examine the continuing relevance of legal and equitable interests within the 
Torrens system of land registration. 
v THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE 
INTERESTS IN TORRENS YSTEM LAND 
Torrens felt that prior to registration, interests under contracts should not be classified as 
property rights. He 
seems to have given little consideration to the situation of holders of unregis- 
trable interests, though it would have been consistent with his general philoso- 
phy to regard such interests as enforceable only inter partes .... The  
development of equitable remedies this century has widened the class of un- 
registeredlunregistrable interests. This raises the question as to whether and to 
what extent provision should be made for the recognition and protection of 
such interests within the Torrens ~ystem. '~ 
I would argue that given the primacy ofithe register in Torrens title lands4 and the im- 
portance of indefeasibility, (an idea very much at the core of what Torrens was propos- 
ing), that the question very much at the epicentre is what interests canlshould be 
registered and of those remaining, which should be protected by caveat. In this discus- 
sion, two aspects must be noted at the outset. First, the purchaser is obtaining title by 
registration, the conferring of ownership results from the procedures of the system; 
second, the system has the opportunity to accord priority by virtue of the date of regis- 
tration. In essence registration will permit what the lay person would describe as owner- 
ship to those interests which Parliament dictates should have that 'title'; whilst the 
caveating provisions can operate to afford priority to those interests worthy of protection 
in this manner. Flowing from this would be the recognition that, for priority purposes, 
interests need not be categorised as legal or equitable (and in this context it is important 
to note that it is impossible to categorise all equitable rights as mere equities or equitable 
52 Some of the better known decisions in this area include: Heid (1983) 154 CLR 326; Butler v Fairclough 
(1917) 23 CLR 78; Person-to-Person Financial Services Pty Lid v Sharari [I9841 1 NSWLR 745; Jacobs v 
Platt Nominees Pty Ltd [I9901 VR 146; J & H Just (Holdings) Pty Lid v Bank of New South Wales (1971) 125 
CLR 546; AVCO Financial Services Ltd v Fishman [1993] 1 VR 90; IAC (Finance) Pty Ltd v Courtenay 
(1963) 110 CLR 550. See also Hughson, Neave and O'Connor, above n 3. 
'' Hughson, Neave and O'Connor, above n 3,462-3. 
54 On this point see the judgment of Banvick CJ in Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 385-6 where his 
Honour states 'the Torrens System of registered title ... is not a system of registration of title but a system of title 
by registration. That which the certificate of title describes is not the title which the registered proprietor 
formerly had, or which but for registration would have had. The title it certifies is not historical or derivative. It 
is the title which registration itself has vested in the proprietor.' 
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interests for all intents and purposes);55 similarly the nexus between the common law 
'old system' title and Torrens title would be ended. On this aspect, it can be noted that 
there are interests that, although considered legal under the general law system of title, 
would be unregistrable on the title of Torrens land.j6 Along these lines, the Victorian 
Law Reform Commission5' and the Alberta Law Reform Institutes"ave both suggested 
that a system of registration and prioritisation of interests can be accommodated within 
the Torrens system. As stated by the Victorian body 
[claveats should determine priority. Lodgment of a caveat before another per- 
son lodges a caveat or seeks registration should give priority to the [earlier] 
caveator. Failure to lodge a caveat before another person registers or protects 
their interest should postpone the interests9 
Indeed, in a number of jurisdictions the principle that lodging of the caveat determines 
priority is well e~tabl ished.~~ 
The issue, however, is not finalised by the adopting of a provision that caveats should 
determine priority. The process must go further and recognise that in the case of Torrens 
title land the continuing relevance of a distinction between legal and equitable interests 
for determining property disputes cannot be maintained. As indicated some legal inter- 
ests cannot be registered:' similarly equitable interests cannot be precisely categorised:' 
the myriad of priority rules and the numerous exceptions; for these reasons alone this 
distinction between law and equity could be abandoned. However, it is also appreciated 
that to abandon the distinction between law and equity for the resolution of priority 
disputes will need to be justified. Accordingly the next part of this article will consider 
the case law, academic and historical justification for an abandonment of this division. 
55 See the comments by David Wright, 'The Continued Relevance of Divisions in Equitable Interests to Real 
Property' (1995) 3 Australian Property Law Journal 163, 168. Wright questions the continuing relevance of 
the division between equitable interests, mere equities and personal equities. 
56 As stated by Sykes and Walker, above n 15, 452 'there are certain interests, which, without being expressly 
excepted or mentioned, fall outside the scheme of the Act in the sense that, although under the general law they 
would be legal in character, they are incapable of being placed on the register.' Examples provided include 
certain types of implied easements, certain types of interests created by will and short term tenancies. Ques- 
tions have also surrounded the position of volunteers: see King v Sinai1 [I9581 VR 273; Bogdanovic v Koteff 
(1988) 12 NSWLR 472; Medical Benejts Fund of Australia Ltd v Fisher [I9841 1 Qd R 606; State Bank of 
New South Wales v Berowra Waters Holdings Pty Lid (1986) 4 NSWLR 398. Hughson, Neave and O'Connor, 
above n 3, 469 also provide a list of legal and equitable interests that are incapable of registration. These 
include builders' charges, equitable charges, interests under a constructive trust, vendors' liens, purchasers' 
liens and the right of a registered proprietor to caveat against his or her own title. 
'' Victorian Law Reform Commission, Priorities, Report No 22 (1989) ('Priorities'). 
58 Alberta Law Reform Institute, Proposals for a Land Recording and Registration Act for Alberta, Report No 
69 (1993). 
59 Prrorities, above n 57, [25]. 
60 See the comments by Hughson, Neave and O'Connor, above n 3, 488. Reference there is made to a number 
of Canadian provinces and to Singapore. 
See the comments by Sykes and Walker, above n 15,452. Also Hughson, Neave and O'Connor, above n 3, 
469. 
62 See the comments by Wright, above n 55. 
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To do this will finally accord weight to the view of Maitland that 'lawyers will cease to 
inquire whether a given rule be a rule of equity or.. .common law.'6' 
VI JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ABANDONMENT OF THE DIVISION 
BETWEEN LAW AND EQUITY 
A Case Law Justification 
The difficulties in the application of the categories of legal and equitable interests has 
been recognised by the High Court: 
there is no neat equation between legal and equitable interests on the one hand 
and unregistered instruments on the other. An instrument of transfer is not ef- 
fectual of itself to vest in the transferee either a legal or equitable estate in the 
land.64 
Similarly, in the context of priority disputes, the Court has recognised the conceptual 
confusion in determining the basis on which relief is provided." Some judges have 
proceeded along the line of estoppel," others have preferred an examination for the 
better equity? whereas Murphy J. has considered that provided there is a causal link 
between the conduct of the first interest holder and the loss suffered by the second party 
then the second party will prevail - in essence a form of strict liability."" 
This lack of consistency in what is or is not a legal or equitable interest, and the failure 
to have a common theoretical basis presents an opportunity to rethink this area anew. 
That is, it is time to recognise the real focus of the Torrens system - that its aim is to 
present a mirror of the title and provide recognition to those interests deemed worthy of 
registration. Other interests can be 'protected' by a method of caveating. To adopt this 
rule would allow the search, not for the better equity, nor for the representation relied 
upon to someone's detriment, but to focus on who registered or lodged his or her caveat 
63 Maitland, above n 2. 
" Corin v Pallon (1990) 169 CLR 541,588 (Toohey J). 
65 See the judgment of the High Court in Heid (1983) 154 CLR 326, 339-40 (Mason and Deane JJ) that 'the 
theoretical basis for granting priority, in such circumstances, to the later interest has been the subject of debate. 
Some have found the basis in the doctrine of estoppel; others have identified a more general principle that a 
preference should be given to what is the better equity on an examination of the circumstances, especially the 
conduct of the owner of the first equity.' 
" See the judgment of Gibbs CJ, with whom Wilson J agreed, in Heid(1983) 154 CLR 326,335. 
'' Mason and Deane JJ in Heid (1983) 154 CLR 326,341. 
6"ee Heid (1983) 154 CLR 326,346. 
69 It would also have the advantage of lessening litigation over disputes in this area. For example, the issue of 
priorities has been considered in a large number of cases. For a sample of some of the more recent see: Bacon 
v O'Dea (1989) 88 ALR 486; Depsun Pty Ltd v Tahore Holdings Pty Ltd [I9901 5 BPR 11, 314; Classic 
Heights Pty Ltd v Black Hole Enterprises Pty Ltd [I9941 V ConvR 154-506; Crampton v French [I9951 V 
ConvR 154-529; George Biztole Corporation Pty Ltd [I9951 V ConvR 154-159; Avco Financial Services Ltd v 
Whzte [I9771 VR 561; Chiodo v Murphy [I9951 V ConvR754-531; Troncone v Aliperti [I9941 6 BPR 13,291. 
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Whilst the case law obviously does not provide explicit support for disregarding legal or 
equitab'le interests, what it does provide is implicit recognition of the unsatisfactory state 
of the present authorities. If the theoretical basis is shaky, the rationale for the manner in 
which present matters are considered must be seriously re-examined and questioned. 
B Academic Justification 
The principal academic support for the argument that is being tendered centres on the 
idea of the use of the caveat procedure as a means to resolve priority disputes. The 
disputes surrounding priorities have been described as 'plagued by anomalous rules and 
by exceptions to them,'70 as an area where the judiciary has been left to resolve the 
guiding policy for themsel~es,~'  where there is an urgent need for uniform principles 
relating to caveats and the effect of failure to lodge them,72 and which 'will often involve 
two innocent third parties, for whom the time-based rules of priorities can have an arbi- 
trary ~peration.'~' 
The ethos reflected in these comments is that the present system has failed to deliver the 
promise ascribed to it by Sir Robert Torrens.'" better system will deliver both registra- 
tion (and thus in the layperson's eyes, ownership) and priority for the myriad of interests 
that can attach or be associated with land.7s Thus, in the context of priority disputes, we 
must divorce the idea of separate bodies of law and equity and search for the interests 
that should be registered and those which should be protected by caveats. In doing this, 
it is imperative that consideration of legal and an equitable interests form no part of our 
thinking. To do this will only lead a retreat back into the morass of the competitive 
pressures between legal and equitable interests and their clas~ification.~~ 
C Historical Justification 
Law and Equity were developed from two separate court systems. Without wishing to 
enter an argument surrounding the fusion debate7' it is reasonable to suggest that the 
Judicature Acts were designed, for all courts, to combine the features evident in the 
common law and the equitable courts. The Torrens system, which predated the Judica- 
ture Acts, was designed as a conveyancing system which 
70 Tooher and Dwyer, above n 39,56. 
" Hughson, Neave and O'Connor, above n 3,495. 
72 Marcia Neave, 'Towards a Uniform Torrens System: Principles and Pragmatism' (1993) 1 Austrahan 
Proper& Law Journal 1 14, 128. 
73 T D Castle, 'Caveats and Priorities: the Mere Failure to Caveat' (1994) 68 Australian Law Journal 143, 146. 
On this issue also see McCrimmon, above n 10,301. 
74 See Robert Torrens, The South Australian System of Conveyancing by Regisiratzon of Title (1859). He 
wanted to have land transacted as quickly as dealings in merchandise or cattle. 
75 On this see generally McCrimmon, above n 10. 
76 As to what should be registered or protected by caveating is a question beyond the scope of  this paper. For a 
discussion of how the number of interests affecting land was reduced in England see Bostick, above n 6. 
77 On this topic see Bums, above n 41. 
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was more reliable and efficient and less expensive than that provided by the 
general law or by the general law as modified by the registration of deeds 
legislation. The originators of the Torrens system believed that the defects of 
the older system sprang from two major causes: its reliance upon chains of title 
deeds and the operation of the doctrine of notice. Accordingly, the Torrens 
System substituted a register book for the chain of title deeds and, in favour of 
persons who registered their interests, it abolished the doctrine of notice." 
In the context of resolving priorities, if one is to take the features of a combined legal 
system resulting from the Judicature Acts and mix that with a new conveyancing system 
which was intended to be very different from its predecessors, the end result is surely a 
system of registration, not of legal or equitable, but simply of interests. By continuing 
this separation between legal and equitable through to priority disputes, we have allowed 
the goal of a cheap, safe and quick conveyancing system to be adultered by historical 
divisions between law, equity, personal equities, mere equities, and equities coupled 
with a proprietary interests - divisions which are not consistent and need not be main- 
tair~ed.'~ 
D Practical Aspects 
As a final point of justification for abandoning the division, computerisation of land title 
systems can allow the lodgment and immediate registration of interests created. This will 
permit the registration and recording system to operate more effectively and, interest- 
ingly, more in line with the objectives that Sir Robert Torrens envisaged in the 1860's." 
Indeed a move to electronic conveyancing would necessitate in many respects the 
bringing about of many of the reforms suggested here." 
VII CONCLUSION 
Since Torrens did not foresee the continuing vitality of equitable interests, his 
scheme gave little thought to how to reconcile the principle of the conclusive 
register with the need to protect holders of unregistered interests. In conse- 
quence, judges have been left to resolve the conflict and to determine the 
guiding policy for themselves. 82 
A new land registration policy should be adopted to resolve priority disputes. The policy 
should be the abandonment of the distinction between legal and equitable interests (at 
78 Tooher and Dwyer, above n 39,66. 
79 See generally Wright, above n 55. On the issue of personal equities and the Torrens system see Snowlong 
Pty Ltd v Choe (1991) 23 NSWLR 198; Cottee Dairy Products Pty Ltdv Minad Pty Ltd [I9971 8 BPR 15,611. 
80 Though as noted recently in Imperial Bros Pty Lid v Ronim Pty Ltd [I9991 Q ConvR 60,211 there are some 
dangers with an electronic conveyancing system when the computer system fails; noted by A Stickley, 'Unreli- 
able Computers and Conveyancing: the Implications' (1999) 19 The Queensland Lawyer 173. 
A point implicitly recognised in the United Kingdom: see United Kingdom, Land Registration for the 
Twenty-First Century (Cmnd 4027, 1998) 250 ('Land Registration'). 
Hughson, Neave and O'Connor, above n 3,495. 
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least for the purposes of registered land) and to provide two forms of interests, registered 
and unregistered. Priority would be determined by the date of registration, or in the case 
of unregistered interests, by the date of caveating. This is supported by the recent report 
into Land Registration in the United K i n g d ~ m . ~ ~  However it will only occur through 
legislative reform. 
Much has been written about the aimsn4 of the Torrens system,s5 but for our purposes we 
must consider what principles should now dominate current conveyancing practice. 
These can be identified as follows: 
1. The title must be accurate, so that any purchaser can discover all facts that relate to 
the title and which may impinge upon the quality of title. In essence, there must be a 
mirror of title. However, in seeing this mirror we must ensure that the potential of 
the Torrens system is not undermined by the restrictions of past practices. 
2. The conveyancing practice must be convenient and inexpensive, so that the trade in 
land can be easily completed - it should be no more complex than trade in securities 
on the Stock Market." 
3. An individual relying on a title should not be affected by any defects in the vendor's 
title and should not be required to search beyond the title. 
4. The system must provide for compensation for those innocent parties affected by its 
operation. 
In essence these principles are the same as those that prompted Sir Robert Torrens to 
devise the land registration system that bears his name. However, in the renaissance of 
equity we have seen an undermining of the objectives and policies of a system of title by 
registration. By recognising that the case law justification for the present resolution of 
priority disputes is unclear, that the academic view is that the caveating system can 
provide the rules to resolve contestability between unregistered interests, that the histori- 
cal focus of the Judicature Acts was to provide for fusion of law and equity and finally, 
that computerisation permits the immediate lodgement and recording and registration of 
registered or unregistered interests, it can be seen that the time is ripe for an overhaul of 
the system. As we approach the millennium it is time to dispense with the notions of 
what is a legal or equitable interest in priority disputes, and provide instead for two 
categories of registered and unregistered (the latter being protected by caveat) and to 
81 Land Registration, above n 81.  This report considered that it is inevitable that there will be a system of 
electronic conveyancing introduced and flowing from this, it will not be possible to make transfers of land or 
to create rights in or over land except by registering them. 
84 See Neave, above n 72; Susan IvfacCallum, 'Uniformity of  Torrens Legislation' (1993) 1 Australian Prop- 
erty Law Journal 135. 
85 On this topic see Hanstad, above n 37. 
Xh Which can be completed electro~ically through the CHESS (Clearing House Electronic Sub-register System) 
though it is arguable that the checks necessary to ensure good 'title' to land are more detailed. In relation to 
land it may be necessary to undertbke searches of the relevant council, mines department, bankruptcy records, 
corporate registers as well as the titles department, requisitions issued and finally, clarification of unregistered 
interests. 
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resolve these issues by the date of registration or recording. If this is to occur the con- 
veyancing practice introduced with promise and hope will finally hlfil its role. 
ARTICLES
"'Lynden Griggs
POSSESSORY TITLES IN A SYSTEM OF TITLE BY
REGISTRATION
INTRODUCTION
[O]ne might be tempted to suggest abandonment of theconcept of adverse
possession as one of the relics of the past which seem to abound in Irish
real propelty law - as a product of an age of violence and self help that has
outlived its usefulness and has no place in a modern legal system. l
I N Australia, the law of adverse possession2 has undergone considerable scrutiny inrecent years.3 It is not surprising, given the federal nature of the Australian politicallandscape, that this interest has been spawned by different stimuli. In Tasmania, this
* LLB (Hons), LLM; Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Tasmania.
1 J Wylie, 'Adverse Possession: An Ailing Concept?' (1965) 16 Northern Ireland Legal
Quarterly 467,489. .
2 The purpose of this article is not to examine what is meant by adverse possession_ For an
excellent summary of this see Anthony Moore, 'Adverse Possession' in The Lavvs of
Australia ch 28: 16, ch 3. The current limitation statutes are as follows: Limitation Act
1969 (NSW); Limitation ofActions Act 1958 (Vic); Limitation ofActions Act 1974 (Qld);
Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA); Limitarion Act 1935 (WA); Limitation Act 1974
eras); Limitation Act 1985 (ACT).
3 Note that in 1966 the UK Law Refonn Commission (Report No 14, Cmnd 3100, 1966)
recommended that the principles of acquisition of easements and profits bc equated with
the principles of adverse possession. This call for rdonn was also picked up by David
Jackson, 'The Legal Effects of the Passing of Time' (1970) 7 Melbourne University Law
Review 407,407 and 449.
Copyrfght or fulf Text rests with the original owner and/ except as. permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 1 copying this copyright materialis prohibited wiU~out U,e per mis.siorl of U1e owner Or
agent Or by way of a licence fIOm Copyright Agency Limited. fo, informabon about such licences, contact tile Copy,i,ll't Agency Limited on (Oll 939~7600 (ph) or (02) 93947601 :fax)
158 GRIGGS - POSSESSORY TITLES ill A SYSTEM OF TITLES BY REGISTRATION
interest was initially brought about by the decision in Woodward v Hazelz.4 The Supreme
Court decision led to a government-initiated Law Reform Commission Report on adverse
possessions and proposed amending legislation.6 By contrast, in Vicwria, the problems
associated with the regularising of boundaries led to proposed amending legislalion.7
Unrelated to these Australiill1 developmentsS was the United Kingdom report on Land
Registration9, which included a detailed chapter on adverse possessionlo and moves to
automate the conveyancing system.!l These developments must be considered against the
backdrop of a land conveyancing system that is based upon the impOliance of theregisler,
and not principles of possession. In addition, the move towards full electronic
conveyancing has highlighted the importance of substantive principles that recognise and
correlate with the Iechnology available, a technology that will emphasise the importance of
the register and not a chain of title.!2 The purpose of this paper is to outline the
developments nmed in relation to adverse possession, to contrast the law reforms suggested
in this area and to consider the possible introduction of electronic conveyancing and what
it will (or should) mean for possessor)' claims.
4 Unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, Underwood J, 17 March 1994.
5 Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania, Report on Adverse Possession and Other
Possessory Claims to Land (1995) 73.
6 Land Titles Amendment (Revision and Law Reform) Bill 1998 (Tas). It should be nDIed
that at (he time of writing (be present Labor Government had DDI decided its policy in
relation to this Bill, the Bin having been prepared under the auspices of the previous
Liberal Government.
7 See Carlo Furletti and Douglas Trapnell, 'Adverse Possession of Torrens Land; Realigning
the Boundary' (1999) 73(3) Law Instirure Journal 76.
8 It can be noted that there was also a recent Supreme Court of Tasmania decision on
prescriptive easemeills (Wilson v Cwnpbell, unreported, Supreme COUrt of Tasmania,
Underwood J, 29 October 1997), a topic allied in many ways to adverse possession.
Indeed the Land Titles Amendment (Revision and Law Reform) Bill 1998 would in many
ways treat a claim on adverse possession in the same way as a claim for a prescriptive
easement.
9 UK Law Commission, Land Registrarion for the Twenty-First CentuIJ': A Consultative
Document (Law Com No 254, Cm 4027, 1998). .
10 Ibid Part X.
11 See Andrew Lang, 'Computerised Land Title and Land Information' (l983j 1 Journal of
Lmv and Information Science 230. Queensland has also dispensed with the need for a
paper version of the certificate of title: see their Land Title Act 1994 ss 42-5.
12 For a general discussion of the principles behind the Torrens system, see l'vlarcia Neavc,
'Towards a Uniform Torrens System: Principles and Pragmatism' (1993) 1 Australian
Property Lmv Journal 114.
(1999) 21 Add LR 157-175
PRACTICAL SKETCHES OF ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIMS
1Yoodward v Hazell13
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The Woodward family acquired a fann of 658 acres in 1958. At this time, Calvert owned
the adjoining property. On the western edge of the property was an irregularly shaped 37
acres. Part of this 37 acres was the subject of the court action. Calvert was given
pennission by the Woodwards to clear the block and use it for grazing. After this, 23 of
the 37 acres were sold, leaving 14 acres physically separate from the rest of the Woodward
estate. Calvert then erected fences around the 14 acres so as to suggest that this was part of
his estate. In 1975, the plaimiff, a member of the "Voodward family, acquired the
Woodward land. Calvert's land was sold to the Hazell family trust which later passed [Q
Wesley Hazell, the defendant. In 1982, Wesley Hazell took up residence on what was
previously the Calvert property. \Voodward did not discuss the ownership of the 14 acres
with Hazell, nor did Woodward ever utilise the property for farming purposes. He
occasionally entered the land for shooting expeditions. 'iVoodward received an offer from
a third party to purchase the land; this was declined, but Woodward did offer to sell the
land to Hazel!. Hazell offered $4000 to purchase the 14 acres and this was declined. 14
After this Hazell claimed adverse possession of the land and applied to the Recorder of
Titles based on exclusive uninterrupted possession of the 14 acres for the required 12-year
period. Y.,roodward then lodged a caveat and commenced proceedings to recover the
disputed land.
His Honour Mr Justice Underwood considered that the overwhelming inference from the
evidence was that the 14 acres had always been treated as if it were part of the Calvert's
estate, and had been used by Hazell to the exclusion of all others, His Honour did however
comment that:
One cannot escape some feeling of sympathy for the plaintiff in the
position in which he found himself Ignorant of the law of adverse
possession, he believed that the land was his in accordance with the
certificate of title and available for him to sell when the time was ripe. I
think it fair to observe that IvIessrs D and W HazelI may also have
experienced some sympathy for the plaimiff for prior to proceedings being
commenced they offered the plaintiff some money for the land 'as we need
to get on well together' but that offer, considerably less than the offer the
plaintiff had been made by another, was not accepted. 15
13 Unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, 17 March 1994.
14 Interestingly, the English Court of Appeal in Edginton v Clark [1964] 1 QB 367, 376 held
that an offer to purchase by an adverse possessor amounts to an acknowledgment of the
better title of the true owner.
15 Unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, 1711arch 1994,4,
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Other adverse possession scenarios that have been highlighted include the follO\ving: 16
a) The fom1er owner of Block A fences sh01t of his boundary to avoid the problems of a
nearby creek. The mvner of the adjoining block dumps his refuse over The fence, there
being no fence on Block B. Block A is sold and new owner wishes to fence in the proper
location. The owner of Block B claims the land up to the old fence based on adverse
possession.
b) A block of land was the subject of an original 1870 grant to a person with no living
descendants. A squatter who is claiming the land under adverse possession presently
occupies it. The matter is complicated by the alleged sale of the land by the neighbour
who had occasionally entered upon the land. There is a current legal dispute between the
squatter and the purported purchaser of the land.
c) A survey of Block A is carried out with the intent of constructing three units on the site.
The survey reveals that the fence line is out by some 8-18 inches in favour of the adjoining
block. Council approval has been obtained based on the survey infOlTI1ation. In reliance
on the survey, TWO units have been built on Block A, one of which is subject to an
agreement IQ sell. The owner of Block B has put in an adverse possession claim. This has
halted sale of the unit and the legal dispute has placed A in a difficult financial position.
\Vhat these examples demonstrate is that whilst a claim based on adverse possession may
be the exception rather than the rule l7 it still forms part of the rich tapestry of land
doctrines relevant to property law today.1s But if we allow it to remain part of thar rich
tapestry does this result in conceptllal confusion, given that the Torrens system of land
holding is one of title by registration, or are the historical reasons for possessory titles still
as valid today as they previously were?
16 Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania, above n 5,21.
17 However, evidence before the Commission indicated that there were more than 100
applications received each year: ibid 23. Recent discussion with thc relevant officers in
Tasmania indicated that the number had dropped to 37 for the 1998 calendar year. In
Victoria, there were 198 applications in the 1996-97 financial year, with a further 115
between 1 July 1997 and 28 February 1998. See Furletti and Trapnell, above n 7, 78-9.
18 Indeed, in one of the submissions to the Commission, the practical importance of
conveyancing was noted when it \vas alleged that as -many as one in twenty Hobart
properties have problems with their boundaries and the ability to regularise ,hem \vas an
essential part of practical conveyancing: Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania, above n
5,22.
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Tt-lE HISTORIC.t..L DEVELOPJvlENT OF TI-lE PRH\CIPLES RELEVilliT TO ADVERSE
POSSESSION
Discussion of the principles of squatting and adverse possession can be traced to the Code
of Hammurabi of 2250 BC.19 Section 44 stated: 'If a man rent an unreclaimed field for
three years to develop it, and neglect it and do not develop the field, in the fourth year he
shall break up the field wiLh hoes, he shall ho\',' and harrow it and he shall return it IQ the
owner of the field and shall measure out ten GUR of grain per ren GAN.'
Similarly, the Roman Empire did not permit the landowner to waste land. An individual
,vas only pemlitted as much land as they could use themselves;2o in an agrarian-based
economy land was not to be under-miIised.
In comparison to these jurisdictions, the English developments are of more recem origin.
They were first introduced following the decline of the feudal system.
The system of feudalism eventually decayed within two hundred years of
its introduction by the Nonnans. In the fourteenth century, the rural
middle class began to develop, and an economy based upon \vages and not
upon rendering services caused the death of feudalism and the birth of
strong individual property rights in real property.21
Alongside this rise of individual property rights came the notion of free alienability of
land.22 The common law courts, in response to the need to avoid 'civil disorder' ,23
focused on possession of land and chattels as the genesis of court jurisdiction. Indeed,
early cases demonstrated that the lmv would protect the possessor against the person
dispossessed even if it had occurred wrongfully and the dispossession had only occurred
four days previously!24 Gradually title became more important although title depended on
what was known as seisin.25 To be the holder of seisin an individual had to be in
possession of the freehold estate in the land - an equitable or leasehold interest was
i
I
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Noted i,n Brian Gardiner, 'Squaners' Rights and Adverse Possession: A Search for
Equitable Application of Propeny Laws' (1997) 8 Indiana International and Compararive
LwI' Review 119, 123.
Ibid 124.
Ibid 126.
As recognised in the Statute oj Quia Emptores 1290.
See Marcia Neave, Chris Rossiter & Margaret Stone, SClckTille and Neave: Property Lmv
Cases and Materials Wh ed, 1999) 62.
Ibid 92.
For a discussion of what is meant bv seisin see a series of anicles bv Frederic :Maitland:
'The Seisin of Chattels' (1885) 1 Law Quarterly Revinv 324; 'Th~ Mystery of Seisin'
(1886) 2 Law Quarterly Review 481; 'The Beatitude of Seisin' (1888) 4 LwI' Quarterly
Review 24 and 286. "
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insufficient.26 \Vhoever had the earlier and better seisin \vas entitled to priority, and
possession \vas an important characteristic of seisin. The original English legislation
sought to make title more certain by pemliIling action to recover land if the owner was able
to show seisin at the time of the King's last voyage to Nomlandy.27 Later legislation set
the limitation dates at the time of Henry Ill's first trip to Gascony,:28 and then the
coronation of Richard I,29 The laIler limitation 'date' (3 September 1189) operated for
some 265 years. Subsequent Acts then defined the limitation period by reference to time
limits; in the first instance this was set at 3 score years. 30 Legislation up to this poim in
time did not extinguish title, however; rather it prevented the person dispossessed from
succeeding in an action for ejectment. It was the Statute of Limirations 1623 which
introduced the principle that, if a person had been in possession of land for a certain period,
the owner was not only barred from bringing the action, but also title was transferred to the
adverse possessor. This legislation, which had the purpose of 'avoiding of suits' and
'quieting of man's estates', provided a 'framework for decreasing the often high
transaction costs associated with land disputes, and provided for greater economic
development based on the new certainty of title' .31 This sixty-year period was then
shortened to t\venty years32 and subsequently to twelve years.33 These later nineteenth
century developments \vere ultimately enacted into Australian jurisdictions.34 Today, in
Australia the limitation period is either 12 or 15 years.35
Given this historical development, and if one considers that the original purpose of this
type of legislation was to provide for greater economic development and to prevent the
high cost of land disputes, can we say today that there are the same contemporary
justifications as we approach the twenty-first century? Or, as noted:
If in fact the original purpose of the rule of adverse possession was to
quieten disputes, the relative lawlessness of 17th century England is surely
not. comparable to [Australian] social circumstances at the outset of the
26 See Sandra Petersson, 'Something for Nothing: The Law of Adverse Possession in Alberta'
(1992) 30 Alberta Law Review 1291, 1296.
27 As noted in the Tasmanian Law Reform Commission paper, above n 5,16.
28 28 October 1216, as indicated in the Stature ofMerton 123621 Hen 1II, c 8.
29 3 September 1189, as indicated in the Starure ofWestminster 112753 Edw I, c 39.
30 Act ofLimitation lvith Proviso 1540.
31 Gardiner, aboven 19,127.
32 Real Property Limitarion Acr 1833.
33 Real Property Limitation Act 1874,
34 The modern legislation is Limitation Act 1969 (NSW); Limitation of Actions Act 1958
(Vie); Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld); Limitation of Anions Act 1936 (SA);
Limitation Act 1935 (WA); Limirarion Aa 1974 (Tas); Limitarion Act 1985 (ACT).
35 The period of limitation in Victoria and Somh Australia being 15 years, and Queensland,
Western Australia, Tasmania and New South \Vales, "12 years. On adverse possession, see
Land Titles A.ct 1994 (QLD) s 185(1)(d); Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 251, 80a-80i;
Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vie) s 42(2)(b); Transfer of Land Act 1893 (VvA) s 68; Real
Property Act 1900 (NS\V) Pt VIA.
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21st century. As expressed the present simation is completely
wrong and unfair; adverse possession ... is out of touch with the realitv of
the late 20th century'. 36 •
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What then are the justifications for the doctrine of adverse possession? These will be
briefly consideredP
A Adverse Possession ProTeers Against Stale Claims
The purpose of the limitation statues is so that people do nO( 'sleep' on their rights, so that
there is some finality to the potential of the litigation process.3 8 To this end it must always
be remembered that adverse possession operates further than mere denial of a claim: it
positively effects a change in ownership. 'A squatWf does in the end get a title by his
possession and the indirect operation of the [Limitation] An and he can convey a fee
simple.' 39
B Adverse Possession Provides a Remedy Where the True Owner has Disappeared
If there were no doctrine of adverse possession, there would be no mechanism to
'regularise' ownership if the person holding title could not be located or had disappeared.
Without adverse possession, the propeny may become unmarketable.4D
C Adverse Possession AssisTS in Those Siruarions H'here There are 'Off the Register'
Dealings
In these situations the register will nO( reflect the actuality if there is a transaction which,
possibly because of the desiry to avoid stamp duty, is conducted without due formalities.41
36
37
38
39
40
41
Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania, above n 5, 25.
More detailed consideration of this aspect can be found in David Irving, 'Should the Law
Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?' (1994) 2 Ausrralian Properry
Law Journal 112; Gardiner, above n 19; Martin Dockray, '\Vh}' do we Need Adverse
Possession?' [1985] The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 272; Michael Goodman,
'Adverse Possession of Land: Morality and :Motive' (1970) 33 Alodern Law Revielv 281.
See the comments by the UK Law Commission, above n 9,204.
Fairweather v St Marylebone Properry Co Lrd [1963] AC 510, 535.
UK Law Commission. above n 9, 205.
See the comment in Tasmanian Law Reform Commissioner, above n 5, 23: 'NO[
infrequently in this State, people agree to se]] land, and money is paid, without the legal
formalities being evidenced in writing and smmp dury and Other taxes being paid. These
informal sales (or "pub sales") can be regularised by an application under the rule of
adverse possession.'
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D Adverse Possession can be Used to Prevent Hardship
Hardship may result to the adverse possessor where they have, for example, 'innocently'
mistaken their boundaries and made significant improvements to the land over a period of
time. While proprietary eswppel may provide some remedy, this will not always be the
case.42 Indeed the regularising of boundaries has been seen as a critical factor in favour of
the retention of adverse possession.43
E Adverse Possession is Just an Example ofPossessOl),-Based Titles
As previously noted, historically title to land is relative and dependent upon possession.
Adverse possession therefore is just an example of the concept of possession and its
importance to realTy.44
These justifications can be met Wilh varied responses: Ihat the law is unjust and operates to
favour the dishonest;45 that today Australia has a different social environment to England
of the late eighteenth century and the principles are no longer valid;46 that the innocent
purchaser of land is at risk of losing their interest to an adverse possessor; 47 and, I would
submit most importantly, that the doctrine of a title based upon possession is contrary w
the policy, direction and the very soul of a system of land ownership based upon title by
regis[radon.48
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASl\1.ANIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION49
The Tasmanian Law Reform Commission concluded that the rule of adverse possession
needed to be clarified and restricted so that fail" dealings in land could be promoted and
42 See the comments by the UK Law Commission, above n 9,205.
43 Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania, above n 5, 22: 'The rule of adverse possession
allows inaccurate property descriptions to eventually be cured by the passage of time....
This argument was highlighted and supported by many senior legal practitioners
experienced in property maUers who submilied that the rule should be retained because of
its usefulness in resolving problems with boundaries.'
44 'Property rights are relative, and rarely absolute. An owner of land may be challenged in
relarion to the possession of his or her land if another person can prove better title against
the true owner. In this respect adverse possession is not an anomaly within property law
bur an extreme example of the general principle that the title held by an owner of land is
relative to the claims of others.' Ibid 23.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid 25.
47 Ibid 24.
48 Ibid 25; 'Registration is the key to ownership under the Torrens system, which has
removed the importance of possession as the basis for title to land.'
49 The proposed legislation substantially followed the recommendations of the Law Reform
Committee. See Land Titles Amendment (Revision and Law Reform) Bill 1998 (Tas).
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injustice prevented.5o The Commission's recOlmnendarions would also assisr in ensuring
the supremacy of the register. \Vhi1st the doctrine of adverse possession would be retained,
it would be limited so that the bona fide purchaser for value is prorecred against any
adverse possession claim that accrues before the purchaser acquires title to the land.5l
Crown and council land would be made exempt from any claim.52 The period of
limitation would be extended to fifteen years53 and notice of any claim \vould be published
as widely as possible.54 It was also recommended that the evidence required to establish
any claim should be particularised55 and that, instead of requiring a costly Supreme Court
hearing to resolve the matter, the Recorder of Titles be authorised to conduct a 'hearing'
into an adverse possession claim.56
The essential tenets of the Tasmanian recommendations were: first, an attempt IQ greatly
restrict the operation of the rule; second, to protect purchasers in good faith; and third, to
permit the Recorder to undertake the investigation.
THE RECOlvfMENDATIONS OF THE UK LA\V COMMISSION
The English body focused more closely on the relationship of adverse possession to a
system of registered title, and always kept the development of electronic conveyancing in
mind. To tllis end, the principles underpinning its ideas were that:
• adverse possession should not of itself bar the title of a registered proprietor;
• only the closure of that proprietor's title on the register would have that effect; and
• the principles governing adverse possession would be clarified and strengthened
considerably in favour of the,dispossessed o\vner.57
A person seeking adverse possession vI'Ou1d undertake the following steps. First, an
applicant with ten years adverse possession could seek to be registered as a proprietor.
Relevant people would then be informed of the application. If any of the relevant people,
including the registered proprietor, failed to object within two months, the applicant would
·,l
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50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania, above n 5, 31.
Ibid 32.
Ibid. In South Australia, rhe period of limitation against the Crown appears to be 60 years:
South Australian Co v City of Porr Adelaide [1914J SALR 16. In NSW, the period of
limitation is 30 years: Limiration Act 1969 (NSW) s 27; in Victoria, Queensland and VlA
there can be no adverse possession against rhe Crown: Limitation Acts ss 7, 32; s 6; 5 36
respectively.
Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania, above n 5, 33.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
UK Law Commission, above n 9, 230.
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be registered. If however the registered proprietor objected, the application would be
dismissed unless the proprietor were estopped by his or her conduct from objecIing to the
registration, the applicant had some independent right to be registered as proprietor or the
applicant had entered into adverse possession under a mistaken belief, reasonably held, as
to their rights.58
If the applicant raised any of these matters, the registrar would make a final adjudicmion.
If the adverse possessor established that they had a mistaken belief as to their rights, a
belief reasonably held, the registrar would be entitled to make an order that was equitable
between the parties. This could include the payment of compensation, or the granting of
appropriate easements or covenants.59
Further provisions provided that, if the application of the adverse possessor was rejected
and they remained in possession for a further twO years, they could then re-apply to be
registered.60 If the registrar \vas smisfied of this further t\vo-year holding the adverse
possessor would be registered as proprietor and close the title of the existing registered
proprietor. 61 The onus in this situation is placed on the existing registered proprietor to act
to recover possession after being notified of the claim.
Underpinning the justification for the changed laws is the idea that, conceptually,
possessory titles have no place in a system of ritle by registration.
The main weakness of the present law is that the principles which
determine whether a registered proprietor will lose his or her tide by
adverse possession were developed for a possession-based system of title
and not one founded on registration. If a system of registered title is to be
effective, those who register their titles should be able to rely upon the fact
of registration to protect their ownership except where there are
compelling reasons to the contrary. All that should be required of them is
to keep the RegistlJ' informed of their address for service.62
To this end, the proposed reforms in England more strongly emphasise the register and its
importance; a title based on adverse possession would only take effect upon registration
and would have no effect whilst still only a possessory title.63 The second critical aspect is
that the reforms suggest compensation or the provision of easements and covenants to
58 Ibid 230-1.
59 Ibid 231.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ihid 206 (emphasis added).
63 The committee did not address the possibility of bequeathing the possessory title or, for
example, of protecting the propeny by taking action based on the possessory tide against
trespassers. Certainly, the tenor of the report is that no interest was obtained until
registration.
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provide a more equitable solution to the dispute between the adverse possessor and the
registered propriemr.64
ELECTRONIC Co~\rEYANCll'm ..'u"1D THE TORRENS SYSTEkI
\Vhat are the goals that we seek to achieve in a conveyancing system? Five could (and
have) been identified.65 These are that the system must be reliable, accurate, low cost,
quick and suitable to society at that time. Indeed these requirements are as relevant today
as they were in the time of Sir Robeli Torrens. 66 The very advent of the technology in no
way lessens these requirements or policy imperatives; indeed it presents the very
opportunity to ensure that they are met. Using a typical, simple transaction as a template,
an outline of the common conveyance is provided. This will provide a framework from
which the use of electronic conveyancing can be discussed67
A property is offered for sale, by either auction or private treaty. The purchaser then
makes an offer by way of signing the standard form contract of sale, or, as in NSW, an
exchange of contracts will occur. This offer is then put to the vendor, \vho may agree, thus
finalising the matter, or may make a counter offer. This continues until both parties have
agreed on the terms of the contract. A copy of the contract is then forwarded to the
solicitors of the vendor and purchaser. The solicitors for the purchaser then lodge a
priority notice, settlement notice or caveat, depending on the jurisdiction.68 This provides
some measure of protection for thatpanicular transaction. The solicitors for the purchaser
then undertake a raft of searches. This may include the following: a title search, inquiries
of the mines department, possible searches of bankruptcy and corporate affairs records,
council inquiries, queries sent to the electricity authorities, requisitions sent LO the vendor,
inspection of the property (usually undertaken by the purchaser), and possibly a survey of
the property. The memorandum of transfer is then executed, monies obtained and the
matter proceeds to settlemellI, often with a check of the title undertaken JUSt before
settlement. Generally, the mortgagee will attend to registration post-settlement.
Two particular problems evident in this system are: first, there is a delay between the
signing of the contract69 and settlement; and second, there is a gap between settlement and
registration.
64 UK Law Commission, above n 9, 231.
65 See Sandra Biuell, John Barry, Denis Hall and John Parker, 'Is the Torrens System
Suitable for the 21st Century?' (Paper delivered to 1995 New Zealand-Australia Cadastral
Conference, '2010: A Vision').
66 See Robert Tonens, A Handy Book on the Real Property Act ofSouth Australia (undated).
67 For a more detailed analysis of what occurs, see Neave, Rossiter and Stone, above n 23,
424-9.
68 In Tasmania it will be a priority notice; in Queensland, a settlemem notice; in the other
jurisdictions, a caveat.
69 There is also the critical problem that purchasers rarely obtain legal advice prior to signing
the contract 111is particular issue and the problems it brings are beyond the province of
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These delays significamly increase risk. There is no doubt that the longer a transaction
remains unsettled the greater the riskJo Fmiher, the existence of paper copies of the folio
of the register (ie the certificate of title) leaves open the potential for abuse, for loss or for
theft. There is no doubt that if the time between transaction and registration was
eliminated or reduced (the so-ca1led 'registration gap')71 the potential for error or default
would be minimised. Similarly, if the certificate of titles were eliminated the potential for
loss or fraud would be reduced.
The ghosts of the last century remain in [the] continued requirement of
signed and witnessed paper instruments. The electronic conveyancing of
the next century must address this issue. The answer may be found in an
expanded concept of agency in which agents are authorised to complete
the transaction on behalf of the parties. Perhaps authorised classes of
customers should be responsible for updating the Register. This solution
would require a combining of the present separate roles of settlement and
registration. The paperless transaction system of the Australian Stock
Exch<mge may point the way,72
The other difficulty in this period of the 'registration gap' is that the interests created
operate in equity. As we have seen, many of the disputes governing priorities revolve
around equitable disputes. 73 Indeed the opposition of Sir Robert Torrens to equitable
interests was well known; he considered that interests should not pass until registration,
and that before this it was a matter of mere personal contract.
Instruments when executed are merely personal contracts between the
parties, upon which action for damages may be raised, but they do not bind
the land. The entry on the folium of the Register alone passes the
property, creates the charge or lesser estate, discharges, or transfers itJ4
The advamage that electronic conveyancing can offer is that, in an ideal conveyancing
system, execution, registration and settlement could occur in one instant How can this be
this paper. See Diane Skapinker, 'A Different Perspective on Defects in Title and Quality'
(1994) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 231 ; Eilcen Webb, 'Has CaveatEmptor Become
Vendor, Lessor and Agent Emptor: Silence. s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and
Real Propeny Transactions' (1995) 3 Australian Property Lenv Joumall22.
70 By analogy, it should be noted thm the Stock Exchange has of course adopted an electronic
system of transfer, settlement being required within three days of the transaction occuning.
71 See VI( Law Commission. above n 9, 251.
72 BirreU et aI, above n 65, 3.
73 Just some of the wel1 known High Court or Privy Council cases arc Breskvar v Wail (1971)
126 CLR 376; Held]l Reliance Finance Corporation Pt)' Lrd (1983) 154 CLR 326; Abi?ail
v Lapin [1934J AC 491; J & H JUST (Holdings) Pty Lld v Bank ofNnv South l1'ales (1971)
125 CLR 546.
74 Torrens; above n 66, 8.
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done?75 First, and ideally, all searches would be undertaken before entering the contract.
Now this is too inconvenient, costly and time-consuming to achieve. However, if all
searches relating to land could be accessed from the one termimi.l for a small or nominal
fee, purchasers would be more likely to undertake these searches before entering the
contract,76 This would permit the contract to be unconditional,77 though of course it is
recognised that in many cases the purchase of a house will have the conditions precedent of
the sale of one's own house and/or the obtaining of finance. Upon these conditions being
met, the settlement and registration could proceed simultaneously, carried out by
recognised or accredited professionals wim access to the register. Even if the contract
were not unconditional, it 'might well prove to be possible to ensure that both the exchange
of the parts of the contract and its registration Viere effected electronically and would be
simultaneous' .78
[The] eventual goal is to eliminate so far as possible the present three-
stage process by which a document is executed, lodged with the Registry
and then registered. The only way to achieve this is to provide that the
transaction should be executed electronically by registration. Thus any
transfer would be completed by registering it, and any right that it was
intended to create over registered land would not be created until it was
registered. This is only possible with an electronic system,79
The advantages that this system would bring are obvious. Conveyances would be quicker
and cheaper.so The problem of the registration gap would be eliminatedS! and disputes
governing equitable interests would be minimised.s2 An electronic system would also
make a National Land Register system possible with the cost savings that that would
allow.S3
The future vision: a'national datum, a national surveying code, a national
land Register, and national land registration legislation. The results: a
seamless surveying system, a common Torrens system, and possible cost
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
Readers would appreciate that the comments here can only be speculative at best.
Of course, the purchaser having undertaken the searches before entering the contract would
alleviate many disputes concerning defects in title. On this topic, see the articles cited
above n·69.
Many jurisdictions are nOw moving towards a fully automated land information system.
See the comments by Neave, Rossiter & Stone, above n 23, 424.
UK Law Commission. above n 9, 254.
Ibid253.
Ibid256.
Ibid.
Indeed if the electronic system is accompanied by paperlcss transactions many of the
priority disputes should nO longer occur.
On this topic see Susan MacCallum, 'Uniformity of Torrens Legislation' (1993) 1
Australian Property Law Joumal135.
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savings. The cunent reality: state datums, state surveying codes, stare land
Registers, and state land registration legislation. The results: conflicts
between surveying systems, competition between the states to be the best,
fragmented land Registers and high nmning costs to operate. We are
living in an environment of national markets and mutual recognition yet
we still operate eight varieties of thc Torrens system. Australia is one
country, we need one datum, one survey code and one land Register.84
Obviously, an electronic system should also allow for much quicker conveyancing. The
various professionals involved in land registration, such as legal practitioners, real estate
agents and surveyors could be required to be linked into a central database. Similarly,
those entities which impact upon the title to land, such as the mines depanment, councils,
corporate affairs bodies and utility authOlities could all access a database linked to a central
mainframe. The checks and searches should be able to be carried out far more quickly,
and, as previously indicated, in an ideal system completed before entry into any contract. 8S
Having espoused the possibilities of an electronic system, what are the concems? First, it
must be secure. 86 There would need to be some system which would accredit or recognise
those with access and exclude the unauthorised. Some fonn of encryption technique or
digital signatures may be required.87 The system would also need to be accurate. 88 To
this end, appropriate software would need to be developed. There would also need to be
back-up systems or available and experienced personnel to deal with any system failure.
All readers are no doubt aware of the dangers caused by computer error or failure, and in
the commercial setting this obviously needs to be minimised.89
To these factors I would add that the system must be quick. We are all frustrated by the
inability of computer software to respond as quickly as we would like. The appropriate
funding must be provided and maintained [Q ensure that electronic conveyancing in a
Torrens system succeeds.
Electronic conveyancing has the potential to succeed. Importantly, in many ways, the
principles of Sir Robert Torrens of a 'cheap, simple, expeditious and accurate system of
transfer of land' ,90 are more readily and easily accommodated in this time of electronic
transmission than, I suspect, 140 years ago.
84 Birrell et aI, above n 65, 5.
85 See the commems by Binell et at ibid.
86 DK Law Commission, above n 9, 256-7.
87 Sce Adrian McCullagh, Peter Little and William Caelli, 'Electronic Signatures: Understand
the Past to Develop the Fumrc' (1998) 21 University ofNew South Wales Law Jouma1452;
Pmrick Fair, 'Gatekeeper: Setting Australia's Standard for OnEne Security' (1998) 1
Internet Law Bullerin 1.
88 UK Law Commission, above n 9, 257.
89 Ibid.
90 Tonens, above n 66, 11, quoting Lord Brougham.
Electronic conveyancing,92 as indicated, has the potential to support the foundations of a
land system where the register is a mirror of the title. Off-site lodgement and searches will
allow individuals accuracy and a speed hitherto unknown. Similarly the lack of paper
represents an opportunity for security not presently apparent. The security, stability and
accuracy of the register are even more critical and more available today than ever before.
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In the approaching century we can expect to see the on line electronic
lodgement of all plans and land transfer instmments, remote computer title
searches, ... a system less prone to fraudulent activity through the removal
of the duplicate title, national surveying codes and a number of ocher
changes. The Torrens system must undergo refonns to keep pace with
changes in society.9!
Birrell et aI, above n 65, 6.
Ontario has enacted legislation governing electronic lodgement: sce Land Regisrration
Reform Act 1990. The Act sets the framework for what must be resolved before electronic
lodgment and searching can be made. For example s 29 states:
The Director may
(a) approve the electronic format for electronic documents submitted under the
Land Titles Act or the Registl)1 Act and approve the manner of their completion;
(b) establish rules, procedures and guidelines respecting the delivery of electronic
documents by direct electronic transmission and require that electronic documents
be delivered by direct electronic transmission;
(c) authorize persQns or classes of persons to submit documents in an electronic
format and establish conditions and requirements for becoming an authorized
person;
(d) authorize persons or classes of persons to deliver electronic documents by
direct electronic transmission and establish conditions and requirements for
becoming an authorized person;
(e) establish the manner in which persons who are authorized to deliver
documents by direct electronic transmission shall access the electronic land
registration database and the manner in which authorization shall be assigned for
that. purpose;
(f) establish the manner in which supporting evidence shall be included in an
electronic document submitted ... and approve the electronic format for the
supporting evidence;
(g) provide for the information to be included in an electronic document;
(h) provide for the locations in which electronic records may be maintained;
(i) provide for the location form in which the electronic records may be accessed
and the time and manner in which they may be accessed;
(j) establish rules, procedures and guidelines governing searches of electronic
records;
(k) authorize persons or classes of persons to search the electronic records and
establish conditions and requirements for becoming an autborized person.
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The Torrens system must operate so that the expectations of the corIlinuniIy are met.93 To
this end the community would agree with the dictates of Sir Robert Ton·ens that the system
must be cheap, reliable, secure and quick. It is submitted that this can only be achieved by
the recognition of the primacy and impOli:mce of the register and by the encouragement by
the stare of the importance of the register. Indeed, it is in the interests of the state to have
an aCCUraIe register, given the compensation provisions of the Torrens legislaIion.94 The
predominant system of conveyancing is one of title by registration, not registration of
title. 95 Given this, it is important that \'I'e free the system of historical notions of seisin and
possessory title. Accordingly, the 'application of the principles of adverse possession to
regisIered land [must be] technically sound and coherent, and ... free from Ihe faults that
mar the present law' ,96
THE CONCEPT OF ADVERSE POSSESSION IN A SYSTEM OF TORRENS-BASED
ELECTRONIC CONVEYANCING.
The first question that must be addressed is whether there is any place at all for possessory-
based titles, such as adverse possession (and, for that matter, prescriptive easements).97
Would it be simpler and more conceptually sound just to disallow claims based upon
possession? Furthermore, in an age of electronic conveyancing, with the greater role and
increased capabilities of the register, should not possessory titles be rendered obsolete?
The initial response to these questions is yes. The criticisms of the adverse possession rule,
its basis in a different historical context, its inconsistency with the notion of the Torrens
system, and the unjustness it can produce, all amount to a persuasive argument that it
should be abandoned. However, it has been demonstrated that there is a
clear division of opinion between, on the one hand, members of the public
who expressed the view that the rule of adverse possession should be
abolished, and, on the other hand, many solicitors, ... some surveyors and
members of the public who expressed the view that the rule should
continue to apply,98
i
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93
94
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97
98
See the comments by Joycey Tooher, 'Jubilant Jamie and the Elephant Egg: Acquisilion of
Title by Finding' (1998) 6 Ausrralian Property Law Journal 117, 137: 'Legal principles
work more effectively where they reflect the expectations of the parties and approximate an
outcome that the parties themselves might have agreed had they contractualise.d their
arrangement beforehand.'
For example, in Tasmania see Land Titles Aa 1980 ss 150-9.
To paraphrase Barwick Cl in Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 385.
UK Law Commission, above n 9, 221.
It should be noted that under the Land Titles Amendment (Revision and La\'.' Reform) Bill
1998 (Tas) the law relating to prescriptive casements would largely be assimilated with that
of adverse possession.
Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania, above n 5, 26.
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One initial approach could be to ensure that the compensation provisions are amended so
that it is made clear that the Assurance Fund will compensate for inconect boundaries, As
Birrell et al ask:
Thirdly, we should aim towards a national land database and uniform Torrens legislation.
Again this would lower cost, and, given that the States and Territories differ markedly in
their approach to adverse possession, provide consistency to this vexed area, This
Secondly, the advent of electronic conveyancing will permit the abolition of paper titles. 107
This should go some way towards protecting against fraud, and will further the aims of the
Torrens system, by providing an incentive to check the register, thus increasing the
importance of judicial recognition of reliance on it. 108
Ibid 22.
Limitarion Act 1985 s 5.
Real Property Act s 251.
Land Titles Act s 71(2),
Limitation Act 1975 s 12.
Land Registration Reform Act 1984.
On this topic see generally National Trustees Co v Hassett [1907J VLR 404; Dempster v
Richardson (1930) 44 CLR 576,
Birrell et aI, above n 65, 3,
It must of course be recognised that at any point in time the certificate of title and the folio
of the register may not correlate. For example caveats may have been lodged against title,
but do not appear on the cenificate. A search of the register is the only way 1:0 achieve
with certainty an apposite level of knowledge of what is on the title.
Contrast Abigail v Lapin [1934J AC 491; [1934J All ER 720.108
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Do the State guarantee and the associated Assurance Fund cover incidents
such as incorrect or inaccurate boundaries? This topic could be debated
well into the time when GPS takes over and coordinates are everything
and still it would not be resolved, The extent of the State guarantee in
relation to incorrect boundaries has not been tesred in the Victorian
courts,LOS For a topic that we plaee sueh an enormOUS importance on, we
know very little about it This is a major issue facing the Torrens system
as the 21st century approaehes}06
Given this division of opinion, and no doubt the view of legal practitioners and surveyors
is influenced strongly by the need to regularise boundaries,99 are there any alternatives to
adverse possession, that would allow the doctrine to be modified or abolished (as has
occurred in the ACT,100 the Northern Territory,lOl Saskatche\van,102 British Columbia 103
and Ontario104) but still provide an equitable solution to the problem of incorrect
boundaries? What alternatives would ensure consistency so that recognition of the tme
nature of the Tonens system can be fully realised: that of a system of title by registration
and not registration of possessory titles?
,
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consistency would be assisted by the abolition of the doctrine or altermions in line with
those proposed in the United Kingdom, proposals that also deal with the category of cases
involving 'off the register' dealings in which considerable hardship would be imposed if
the possessory title was not recognised.
If it is accepted that the Torrens system is based on registration, non-acceptance of any
possessory-based title must be one of the starting points for an understanding of this
legislation and its purposes. Having done this, and moving inexorably towards electronic
conveyancing, as a society we increase the recognition and importance of the register. If
the law is the 'product of compromise'109 then the approach to adverse possession
undet1aken by the UK Law Commission is to be preferred to that of the reforms suggested
elsewhere. The English Commission worked from a principle of primacy of the register
and then developed adverse possession to fit within this concept, rather than looking at
how adverse possession may fit within a system of title by registration. Similarly, the
advent and development of electronic conveyancing was at the forefront of the English
Commission's report. 110
The acquisition of title by adverse possession 'is inconsistent with the basic philosophy of
the Torrens system, in that it permits the acquisition of rights not recorded in rhe Register
and gives such rights priority over the existing title as recorded in the Regisrer' . III This
inconsistency is highlighted further by electronic conveyancing and the advantages that it
can bring. We should not weaken indefeasibility further by adding another exception.112
CONCLUSION
The dominant system of land titles in Australia is that of the Torrens sysrem. In many
respects, it bears no relationship to the general law, or to the old system of title that
preceded it. In the 140 or so years since its introduction, the concept of possessory title (so
very imponant to the English notion of seisin) has continued to play a part in weakening,
or modifying, the principles of title by registration devised by Sir Robert Torrens. As we
approach the new century, it is timely to reflect on those ideals of reliability, simplicity,
low cost, speed and suitabilityl13 and how the technology of today can finally fulfil the
promise or expectarion of 140 years ago. To this end, possessory titles have no role to
play. To allow them to remain only retains the conceptual confusion between a land
system based on possession and one based On registration. Adverse possession, essentially
an unjust doctrine which on occasions militates against hardship, is inappropriate in its
potential to undermine the workings of the Torrens system, Electronic conveyancing raises
109 Irving, abovc n 37, 117.
110 As indicated by its ritle, Land Registration for the Twenty-First Cermu)'. In particular see
Part XI of the report.
111 RA Woodman and Peter Butt, 'Possessory Title and the Torrens System in New South
Wales' (1980) 54 Australian Lmv lmmral79, 79.
112 Contrast the comments by Irving, above n 37, 112.
113 Birrel1 et aI, above n 65, 1.
(1999) 21 Add LR 157-175 175
":,;
."j
.:,;
i
: :.
i
···1
:",,)
i
,.:.:,:':;
the potential and importance of the register to a level not presently seen. Critically, the
substantive law behind this development must reflect the expectations of the general
community at the start of the twenty-first century. These expectations were not met by the
result of Woodward v Hazell.!14 They reflect the ideal that the person named on the folio
of the register, the individual paying the rates and taxes, should be entitled to assert title.
To the extent that the doctrine of adverse possession militates those cases of hardship
dealing with boundary disputes and 'off the register' dealings it can be supported.
However, and in conclusion, with the advent of electronic conveyancing and the potential
it brings, reform to the law of adverse possession is paramount and, to this end, the
suggestions of the UK Law Commission are to be supported. In contemporary Australian
society, adverse possession should be relegated to historical irrelevance.
114 Unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, 17 March 1994.
(1999) 21 Adel LR 157-175
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substantive law behind this development must reflect the expectations of the general
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result of Woodward v Hazell." 4 They reflect the ideal that the person named on the folio
of the register, the individual paying the rates and taxes, should be entitled to assert title.
To the extent that the doctrine of adverse possession militates those cases of hardship
dealing with boundary disputes and 'off the register' dealings it can be supported.
However, and in conclusion, with the advent of electronic conveyancing and the potential
it brings, reform to the law of adverse possession is paramount and, to this end, the
suggestions of the UK Law Commission are to be supported. In contemporary Australian
society, adverse possession should be relegated to historical irrelevance.
114 Unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, 17 March 1994.
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In Personam, Garcia v NAB and the 
Torrens System – Are They 
Reconcilable? 
 
Lynden Griggs* 
 
 
A recent article in the Australian Law Journal raised the following issue. “[A] final 
question remains. It is not of principle, but of policy: Would the allowance of some or 
all claims within the law of unjust enrichment in relation to registered title undermine 
the objectives of the Torrens system? This final question is undoubtedly the most 
important.”1  This article is an attempt to explore this issue by an examination of a 
hypothetical, based loosely on the facts of Garcia v NAB2  - and how that case would 
have been resolved if the argument had been put that the title of the mortgagee was 
indefeasible because of the operation of the Torrens system.3 This paper thus explores 
the relationship between the concept of indefeasibility of title; the very foundation of 
Torrens, and how the use of the in personam exception to indefeasibility (with an 
extension to claims in unjust enrichment) may undermine the central tenets of a land 
registration system that on the whole, has been extraordinarily successful.4 The 
importance of this lies in the fact that if unjust enrichment type claims are not ‘subject 
to’ the indefeasibility provisions, then the in personam exception, which for so many 
years had been restricted following the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in 
Mercantile Mutual v. Gosper5 may in fact have a reach that is undesirable within the 
context of claims that relate to Torrens land.  
Accordingly, Part 1 of this paper will examine the policy goals of the Torrens system, 
Part 2, the decision in Garcia v NAB with Part 3 bringing these disparate threads 
together. 
 
                                                           
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Tasmania. Thanks to the comments of anonymous referee. 
The usual caveat applies. 
1  J Moore, ‘Equity, restitution and in personam claims under the Torrens system: Part Two’ (1999) 
73 ALJ 712 at 715. This article followed an earlier piece by the same author, J Moore, ‘Equity, 
restitution and in personam claims under the Torrens system’ (1998) 72 ALJ 258. 
2  (1998) 72 ALJR 1243. It is unclear from the case whether the land in question was Torrens land. 
3  See R Chambers, ‘Indefeasible Title as a Bar to a Claim for Restitution’ [1998] Restitution Law 
Review 126 where he examines the technical issues associated with the relationship between 
indefeasibility and the concept of unjust enrichment. This paper concentrates more on the policy 
issue as outlined. 
4  See Whalan, ‘Immediate Success of Registration of Title to Land in Australasia and Early Failures 
in England’ (1967) 2 NZULR 416. 
5  (1991) 25 NSWLR 32. 
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The Goals of Torrens 
 
The starting point for analysis of the Torrens system can be provided by the man who 
gave his name6 to the reforms that have reshaped land registration in Australia in the 
last 150 years. The design of the system was to  
 
give security and simplicity to all dealings with land by providing that the 
title shall depend upon registration, that all interests shall be capable of 
appearing or being protected upon the face of the registry, and that a 
registered title or interest shall never be affected by any claim or charge 
which is not registered.7  
 
As the oft-repeated statement of the High Court in Breskvar v Wall8 says: “[it is] not a 
system of registration of title but a system of title by registration”.9 Title is not historical 
or derivative, in essence each transfer of land involves surrender back to the Crown and 
a fresh grant from the State10 - because of this surrender and reissue philosophy, there is 
no necessity to search the antecedents to the title.11 The title of the registered proprietor 
was to be indefeasible, subject only to such estates, or interests that are noted on the 
Register – in a number of jurisdictions this very concept of indefeasibility being 
statutorily delineated.12 What the concept of indefeasibility does is provide for the 
underlying ideals of the “curtain and mirror” principle of land registration. The curtain 
being represented by the Register – nothing behind the Register (or the curtain) would 
effect the title of the registered proprietor. Further, the mirror13 (again the Register) 
would accurately and precisely reflect the estates and interests that were appurtenant to 
the title of the land. Each title is, if you like, independent of what has gone on 
previously. To reflect the importance of the register and to provide compensation to 
those who suffer loss, an assurance fund was to be established to benefit those who have 
been deprived.14 Allied to the “curtain and mirror” was the express recognition that 
                                                           
6  There is considerable controversy as to whom the authorship of the Torrens system should actually 
be attributed. For a discussion of this see P Moerlin Fox, ‘The Story behind the Torrens system’ 
(1950) 23 ALJ 489; Robinson, Transfer of Land in Victoria, Law Book Co Melbourne 1979 at ch 
1. 
7  Opening Statement in the Report of the Real Property Law Commission in November 1861 (SA): 
Parl Paper No 192 (1861). Sir Robert Torrens was one of the Commissioners. For a discussion of 
the history behind the legislation, see D Pike, ‘Introduction of the Real Property Act in South 
Australia’ (1960) 1 Adel LR 169. 
8  (1971) 46 ALJR 68. 
9  Breskvar v Wall (1971) 46 ALJR 68 at 70 per Barwick CJ.  
10  R R Torrens, The South Australian System of Conveyancing by Registration of Title, Adelaide 
Register and General Observer Printing Offices 1859 at 9. 
11  In most States the period of prior searching required for General Law or old system title land is 30 
years: Conveyancing Ordinance 1951 (ACT); Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 53; Property Law 
Act 1974 (Qld) s 237; Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas) s 35 (20 years); Property 
Law Act 1958 (Vic) s 44; Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s 22. 
12  Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) ss 38, 169, 170; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 10, 69; Land Titles Act 
1980  (Tas) s 40.  
13  See L McCrimmon, ‘Protection of Equitable Interests under the Torrens System: Polishing the 
Mirror of Title’ (1994) 20 Mon LR 300.  
14  Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) ss 109-111; Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) ss 126-127; Land 
Title Act (1994) (Qld) s 189; Real Property Act (1886) (SA) ss 203-211; Transfer of Land Act 
1983 (WA) ss 201, 205; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas); ss 152-153; Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) ss 
145-6.  
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notice of prior interests was irrelevant and that knowledge of prior interests was not to 
be imputed as fraud.15  
 
This change was dramatic. Previously, right to pass title to land had traditionally been 
subject to proof of ownership.16 Further, there would be interests, which though not 
evident in the title documentation, would bind the purchaser, because either they were 
enforceable by the court of equity, or the purchaser was deemed to have notice of them. 
To further the aims of the “curtain and mirror”, Torrens argued that no interest in land 
should be created or accepted prior to registration – the title as represented by the 
Register was to be paramount.  
 
Instruments when executed are merely personal contracts between the 
parties, upon which action for damages may be raised, but they do not bind 
the land. The entry on the folium of the Register alone passes the property, 
creates the charge or lesser estate, discharges, or transfers it.17 
 
Arguably this omission to take account of unregistered interests (though conversely, one 
suspects that Torrens would not have regarded it as an omission, given that he 
considered that unregistered interests were only to operate between the parties) has led 
to the obscuring of some of the important and critical policy objectives of the system.18 
In a contemporary environment, where the importance and significance of equity 
jurisprudence is not to be underestimated, the Torrens system has had to adapt to the 
complexity of interests that attach to modern land holdings and to provide some form of 
mechanism for their recognition and protection.19 
 
Despite these policy aims of indefeasibility of title, the paramountcy of the register, and 
the inconsequential relevance of knowledge of earlier interests, the courts have 
consistently held that this does not permit the registered proprietor to decline to enforce 
contracts that he or she has entered into.20 Furthermore, the judiciary has consistently 
accepted that they retain the residual discretion to recognise the personal equity and 
give effect to it. 
                                                           
15  See the following provisions: Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 43; Real Property Act 1900 
(NSW) s 43; Land Title Act (1994) (Qld) s 184; Real Property Act (1886) (SA) s 186-7; Transfer 
of Land Act 1983 (WA) s 134; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas); s 41; Real Property Act (NT) s 
71A/71B; Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 59.  
16  See the discussion by S Robinson, ‘Claims in Personam in the Torrens System: Some General 
Principles’ (1993) 67 ALJ 355 at 355.  
17  R Torrens, A Handy Book on the Real Property Act of South Australia, (1862) at 8.  
18  See the comments by M Hughson, M Neave & P O’Connor, ‘Reflections on the Mirror of Title: 
Resolving the Conflict between Purchasers and Prior Interest Holders’ (1997) 21 MULR 460 at 
462. 
19  The High Court in Barry v Heider (1914 19 CLR 197; 21 ALR 93 accepting that interests prior to 
registration do operate in equity. The caveat system provides for the necessary protection of 
unregistered interests. See the following provisions: Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) ss 89-91; 
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) ss 74F-74R; Land Title Act (1994) (Qld) s 121-131; Real Property 
Act (1886) (SA) s 191; Transfer of Land Act 1983 (WA) ss 136K-142; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas); 
ss 133-138; Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) ss 104-108. 
20  See for example Maddison v McCarthy (1865) 2 WW and aB(Eq) 151; Robinson v Keith (1870) 1 
VR(Eq) 11; and recently Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd v Gosper (1991) 25 NSWLR 
32 – though of course, strictly speaking, “Implementation of this goal [the idea that transactions 
giving rise to equitable interests only resulted in a contractual interests, rather than proprietory 
interests] would have required abandonment of the principle that a specifically enforceable 
contract passes an equitable interest in land” M Hughson, supra n 18 at 461. 
Vol 1 No 1 QUTLJJ  In Personam, Garcia v NAB and the Torrens System 
79 
 
Registration… confers upon the registered proprietor a title to the interest in 
respect of which he is registered which is… immune from adverse claims, 
other than those specifically excepted… this principle in no way denies the 
right of the plaintiff to bring against the registered proprietor a claim in 
personam, founded in law or in equity, for such relief as  court in personam 
may grant.21  
 
As asked at the outset, can we now add a further subset of in personam claims, today 
based on unjust enrichment – and would the allowance of these types of claims 
undermine the aforesaid objectives of the Torrens legislation – in essence the concept of 
the “curtain and mirror”. Chambers22 thinks not. What this article proposes to examine 
is whether from a policy perspective, this is correct. Will the allowance of the policy 
motivated relief23 that was evident in Garcia v NAB undermine the Torrens system and 
its critical imperatives.  
 
Indefeasibility is “designed to protect a transferee from defects in the title of the 
transferor, not to free him from interests which he has burdened his own title”.24 But 
beyond this, what are the limits or the content of the in personam exception, can they be 
stated so that some conclusion can be drawn as to whether the type of unjust enrichment 
claim evident in Garcia should be admissible against the title of Torrens land. At the 
outset, there is no doubt that the limits of the in personam exception have not been 
clearly defined.25 In determining the high or low-water mark26 of the content of the in 
personam exception, recourse must be had to the decision of the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal in Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd v Gosper.27  
 
Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd v Gosper 
 
Mrs Gosper was the sole registered proprietor of land. At the time of purchase, it was 
mortgaged to the extent of $205,000. Subsequently Mrs Gosper’s husband varied the 
mortgage so that the total sum secured rose to some $550,000. Mrs Gosper’s signature 
was forged to the relevant documentation. Upon the death of Mr Gosper, the fraud was 
discovered. Mrs Gosper argued that she was entitled to have the mortgage discharged 
upon repayment of the original sum, whereas Mercantile Mutual argued that as its 
interest was registered, its title was indefeasible and the property secured the larger 
amount. 
 
                                                           
21  Frazer v Walker [1967] NZLR 1069 (PC) at 1078. This principle can be seen as early as 1927 in 
Tataurangi Tairuakena v  Mua Carr [1927] NZLR 688.  
22  Chambers, supra n 3 at 134 considers not: “A primary objective of the Torrens system is the 
avoidance of the expense, difficulty, and delay of investigating and proving the validity of a 
vendor’s title. The inclusion of claims for restitution of unjust enrichment in the category of ‘in 
personam exceptions’ does not conflict with this objective.” 
23  As described by J Moore (1999) supra n 1 at 714. 
24  Bahr v Nicolay (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604 at 653.  
25  C McDonald, L McCrimmon, A Wallace & M Stephenson, Real Property Law in Queensland, 
LBC Information Services Sydney 1998 at 335: “In 1969 one commentator noted that, ‘it is 
evident that the limits of the registered proprietor from adverse claims in personam have not been 
clearly defined.’ This observation applies with equal force today.”   
26  As described by D Skapinker, ‘Equitable interests, mere equities, ‘personal’ equities and ‘personal 
equities’ – distinctions with a difference’ (1994) 68 ALJ  593 at 596. 
27  (1991) 25 NSWLR 32. 
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The reasoning of the New South Wales Court of Appeal was that the forged instrument 
could be set aside where there was an enforceable personal equity against Mercantile 
Mutual – ie where in personam could apply. In the case, it was held that the personal 
equity arose against the appellants because of their use of the certificate of title without 
the consent or authority of the registered proprietor.  
 
But the company had no authority to produce or otherwise use the certificate 
of title for such a purpose. It had, of course, no implied authority as 
mortgagee under the (valid) existing mortgage standing in its name. And no 
authority was in fact given for the purpose by Mrs Gosper… Therefore what 
Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd did in this regard was done 
without any authority. 
 
The proper conclusion is, in my opinion that the company used the 
certificate of title in breach of its obligations to Mrs Gosper and that its use 
of it in that way was a necessary step in securing the registration of the 
forged variation of mortgage.28 
 
Thus it was the use of the certificate without the authority that gave rise to the personal 
equity. There was no requirement or necessity that the company had used the 
documents negligently or without proper care.29 Further, Mahoney J considered that it 
was possible that the personal equity could arise, not merely from the acts of the 
registered proprietor, but from the acts of some other person.30 The following criticism 
can be made of this case. 
 
Given that registration confers indefeasibility, that the mortgagee had no 
knowledge of the fraud, and that production of the certificate of title was an 
essential – albeit mechanical – requirement for registration, the personal 
equities principle should not be used in a case like the present to cut back 
the benefits of indefeasibility. If [the husband] had stolen the certificate of 
title from [his wife] and given it to the mortgagee for registration of the 
variation, there would have been no argument for a personal equity, even 
though it had been used without [the wife’s] authority. The fact that the 
mortgagee already had possession of the certificate of title should not – in 
the absence of fraud, or knowledge of fraud, on its part – give rise to a 
personal equity. Any other result undermines the confidence in the Torrens 
register.31 
 
It is this conundrum that is at the heart of the issue in this paper. Should a personal 
equity arise in circumstances of what is ultimately policy motivated relief - where to 
allow the claim cuts back the operation of the Torrens legislation. That is, if the acts of 
the registered interest holder do not involve any misrepresentation, there is no misuse of 
power, no improper attempt to rely on legal rights and no knowledge of wrongdoing32 – 
                                                           
28  Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd v Gosper (1991) 25 NSWLR 32 at 48.  
29  Ibid.  
30  Ibid at 46. 
31  P Butt, ‘Indefeasibility and Sleights of Hand’ (1992) 66 ALJ 596 at 597. 
32  To borrow the wording of Hayne J of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Vassos v State Bank of 
South Australia (1992) V ConvR 54-443 at 65,180-65,181. 
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should the goals of the Torrens system override the principles which permit a remedy 
being granted to an aggrieved individual.  
 
Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd33 
 
In 1979, Mrs Garcia and her then husband executed a mortgage over their home. 
Ultimately, the National Australia Bank Ltd succeeded to the rights in respect of this 
mortgage. This mortgage, although initially for a loan of $5,000 secured all moneys 
which the mortgagors might subsequently owe the mortgagee, including moneys owing 
under any guarantee that they might give. Between 1985 and 1987, the appellant signed 
a number of guarantees in favour of the National Australia Bank – the guarantees 
related to business activities controlled by her husband. In September of 1988, Mrs 
Garcia and her husband separated. She requested to the respondents that they keep the 
bank account within limits. Subsequently, the parties were divorced and Mrs Garcia 
sought a declaration that the guarantees that she had given were of no force or effect and 
void. Not surprisingly, the National Australia Bank Ltd sought to enforce them.  
 
The trial judge34 held that no moneys were owing under the mortgage. To this effect, 
(and despite the fact that she presented herself as a capable and presentable 
professional) he relied upon the rule in Yerkey v Jones.35 Under this rule, a married 
woman was entitled to a presumption that the credit provider knows that she is under 
the undue influence of her husband, or is unaware of the nature and effect of the 
guarantee. If this presumption is not rebutted – the guarantee will be set aside. 
Furthermore, the trial judge held that Mrs Garcia was not entitled to relief under the 
principles of Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio,36 since the National 
Australia Bank Ltd did not have notice of any unconscionability by the husband. 
 
The appeal by the National Australia Bank Ltd to the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal was successful.37 The principle in Yerkey v Jones was no longer to be applied in 
New South Wales.38 Similarly, as relief under the Amadio principle was unavailable, the 
plaintiff was unsuccessful. Special leave to appeal to the High Court was granted, 
principally on the challenge to its previous decision of Yerkey v Jones.  
 
All judges of the High Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff, Mrs Garcia, was 
entitled to her declaration that the mortgage was not enforceable. The majority of the 
High Court and Callinan J considered that the rule in Yerkey v Jones was still applicable 
within Australia today. The fact that a surety does not understand the nature and effect 
of a transaction; that the surety obtained no gain from the contract; that the lender 
understands that the wife may repose trust and confidence in her husband, and that the 
lender has not explained the transaction or to ensure that she received independent 
advice, led to a conclusion that it was unconscionable for the creditor to rely on the 
guarantee.39 
 
                                                           
33  (1998) 72 ALJR 1243. 
34  Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1993) 5 BPR 11,996. 
35  (1939) 63 CLR 649.  
36  (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
37  (1996) 39 NSWLR 577. 
38  Ibid at 598. 
39  (1998) 72 ALJR 1243 at para 33. 
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This paper does not propose to analyse this judgment.40  Rather, to put the hypothetical 
– assuming that the land was registered under the Torrens system, would the result have 
been different if the National Australia Bank Ltd had submitted that its mortgage was 
indefeasible because of the operation of that system of land registration.41 In this 
context it is important to note that the conduct of the National Australia Bank could 
hardly have been described as fraudulent – given that this connotes something akin to 
personal dishonesty or moral turpitude,42 or actual fraud, not what could be called 
constructive or equitable fraud.43 As stated by the High Court in Bank of South 
Australia v Ferguson:44 
 
Not all species of fraud which attract equitable remedies will amount to 
fraud in the statutory sense. The distinction may be illustrated as follows. In 
some circumstances, equity subjects the interest of a purchaser of 
unregistered land to an antecedent interest of which the purchaser has 
notice. However, in respect of land to which the [Torrens legislation] 
applies, registration of a transfer is not fraudulent in the statutory sense 
required to qualify the operation of the doctrine of indefeasibility, merely 
because the transferee knows that registration will defeat an antecedent 
unregistered interest of which the transferee has notice. 
 
This is supported by the notice provisions of the legislation, which provides that a 
registered proprietor shall not be affected by notice, direct or constructive of any trust or 
unregistered interest, any rule of law or equity to the contrary, and that knowledge that 
any such trust or unregistered interest is in existence shall not of itself be imputed as 
fraud.45 
 
Therefore, assuming that the National Australia Bank Ltd had notice of a interest held 
by Mrs Garcia, was there sufficient to found a personal equity, such that a claim in 
personam could be established. Is the arguable unconscionability of the bank in Garcia 
sufficient46 to raise the equity. Consider what Moore has to say: “A vague and 
amorphous concept such as unconscionability would, if sufficient on its own to defeat a 
registered interest in land, drive a horse and buggy through the Torrens system. That is 
precisely the reason why the courts have insisted that the personal equity must be 
                                                           
40  See T Cockburn, ‘Yerkey v. Jones: The Phoenix’s New Clothes’ (1998) 9 Journal of Banking and 
Finance Law and Practice 308; A Hanak, ‘The wife’s special equity survives the High Court’ 
(1998) 6 Insolvency Law Journal 202; S Hii, ‘From Yerkey to Garcia: 60 years on and Still as 
Confused as Ever!’ (1999) APLJ Lexis 3.  
41  Interestingly the majority of the High Court in Garcia refused to follow the English House of 
Lords decision in Barclays Bank v O’Brien (a decision which was accepted and modified by Kirby 
J in Garcia). As raised by P Milne, ‘Lenders, co-owners and solicitors’ (1999) 149 New Law 
Journal 168 at 168, “It is not apparent from the reports whether O’Brien involved registered or 
unregistered land. In any event, the approach set out in the case was clearly intended for general 
application. But the doctrine of notice does not operate in the context of registered land.” 
42  Wicks v Bennett (1921) 30 CLR 80 at 91. 
43  Assets Co v Mere Roihi [1905] AC 176 at 210. 
44  (1998) 151 ALR 729 at 732. 
45  Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 59; Real Property Act (NT) ss 72, 186, 187; Land Title Act 1994 
(Qld) s 184; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 72, 186, 187; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 41; 
Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 43; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 134; Real Property Act 
1900 (NSW) ss 43, 43A. 
46  Remembering of course that the trial judge had decided that there was no unconscionability: 
Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1993) 5 BPR 11,996. 
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founded upon a recognised legal or equitable cause of action”.47 In the context of 
restitution Birks considers that the multiplication of suits in this area derives from 
identifying the precise basis of the relief.48 The relief in Garcia was granted on the basis 
that National Australia Bank was unconscientiousness in retaining  the benefit of the 
guarantee, rather than unconscionability in the acquisition of the interest.49 “But that 
kind of unconscientiousness ex post is itself fictitious… It does not tell us in an honest 
and straightforward way why we are sure that the lending bank ought to give up its 
security.”50  
 
Nevertheless, the High Court has, on at least three known occasions, imposed a 
constructive trust in respect of unconscionable conduct that occurred in relation to 
Torrens land – these three cases being the seminal authorities of Muschinski v Dodds,51 
Baumgartner v Baumgartner52 and Bahr v Nicolay (No. 2).53 But the one fundamental 
difference between these cases and the hypothetical under consideration is that, in those 
cases, the registered proprietors themselves acted unconscionably. Given this it would 
have been unfair to allow the registered proprietor to rely on indefeasibility to defeat the 
claim of the plaintiff.54 However, it is a significant step from allowing a claim by a 
plaintiff in circumstances where the defendant has acted unconscionably, to a situation 
where the there is a general jurisdiction to intervene in circumstances of 
unconscionability.55 
 
Two recent cases, Pyramid Building Society (in liq) v Scorpion Hotels Pty Ltd56 and 
Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd57 have suggested that necessary 
limitations within judicial interpretation must be adopted to ensure the sanctity of the 
Torrens system. The facts of these two cases shared an underlying similarity. In 
Pyramid Building Society, five individuals used their redundancy monies to form a 
company, Scorpion Hotels, to purchase a guesthouse. One of the five caused the 
guesthouse to be mortgaged to the Pyramid Building Society. The other members were 
not aware of the mortgage to Pyramid – the document being executed by the individual 
and his wife, the wife having no authority to undertake this transaction. The mortgage 
was registered under the Torrens system. Whilst the trial judge found the mortgage 
unenforceable,58 the Victorian Court of Appeal held that the mortgage was valid and 
enforceable. The reasoning of the Court of Appeal was that Pyramid’s mortgage would 
have been indefeasible unless it had been guilty of fraud and that constructive notice of 
the fraud of the individual was not statutory fraud within the meaning of the Torrens 
legislation. Further, no personal equity could be raised against Scorpion.59 Chambers60 
                                                           
47  Moore (1998), supra n 1 at 260: though of course that it should be noted that he reconsidered some 
aspects of his view in a later piece: Moore (1999), supra n 1. 
48  P Birks, ‘The Law of Restitution at the End of an Epoch’ (1999) 28 UWA Law Review 13 at 27. 
49  Ibid at 28. 
50  Ibid at 29. 
51  (1985) 160 CLR 583. 
52  (1987) 164 CLR 137. 
53  (1988) 164 CLR 604. 
54  See the comments by Moore (1998), supra n 1 at 265. 
55  Ibid. 
56  [1998] 1 VR 188. 
57  [1998] 3 VR 133. 
58  (1996) 136 ALR 166 (TJ); [1998] 1 VR 188 (CA). 
59  [1998] 1 VR 188 at 196. 
60  Supra n 3. 
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considers that to follow this case would prove a “difficult road”61 and that the exclusion 
of “rights generated by unjust enrichment would require a highly artificial and 
unsatisfactory barrier. It would also mean uprooting several well established 
principles”.62 The response to this is that to allow these claims as an in personam 
exception involves an uprooting of the foundation principles of the Torrens system of 
land registration, and this, given the success of the Torrens system, must surely be 
undesirable. 
 
In the Macquarie Bank case, the factual matrix was basically indistinguishable – the 
affixing of the company seal had been made by people who were not directors of the 
company. In this case and in Pyramid, the solicitors for the mortgagee did not check the 
signatures of the purported directors against the company search. The Victorian Court 
of Appeal in Macquarie accepted that even though the bank had the means of checking 
the attestation clause on the mortgage documentation with the information about the 
directors – there was no obligation to make this comparison. As commented by Tadgell 
J63 
 
If the doctrine of constructive notice was held to apply generally to the 
ordering of priorities under the Torrens system it would, in effect, introduce 
into the scheme of title by registration the notion of priority determinable by 
reference to the doctrine of the bona fide purchaser for value without notice, 
a doctrine at odds with the Torrens system. 
 
The significance of these two cases in the context of the present discussion is the 
important reaffirmation of the principles and policies that underlie the Torrens system. 
In both cases the mortgagee had registered their documentation – there was no 
obligation to make inquiries which could easily have established the fraud.64 The in 
personam exception (and thus the raising of the personal equity) was to be limited by 
known legal or equitable causes of action. In support of this the court cited cases such as 
Grgic v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd65 and Garafano v Reliance 
Finance Corporation Ltd.66 
 
Accordingly, can it be said that the policy motivated relief67 accorded to Mrs Garcia – 
an example of the rising importance of restitution, amounts to a known cause of action 
that is sufficient to raise an equity against the registered proprietor.68 In an analogous 
context, it has recently been reiterated that indefeasibility of title can be used to override 
a right to rectify a transaction. In Tanzone Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp69 the 
                                                           
61  Ibid at 132. 
62  Ibid. 
63  [1998] 3 VR 133 at 152. 
64  As to whether wilful blindness would constitute a finding of fraud, Tadgell J didn’t decide. At 
[1998] 1 VR 133 at 146 his Honour had this to say: “I understand the expression to connote more 
than a failure to see or look: the adjective is to be given its due value. The compound expression 
connotes a concealment deliberately and by pretence, from oneself – a dissembling or 
dissimulation. In other words wilful blindness connotes a form of designed or calculated 
ignorance, of which none on the part of the appellant or its agents is proved.” 
65  (1994) 33 NSWLR 202. 
66  (1992) NSW ConvR 55-640. 
67  As described by Moore (1999) supra n 1 at 714. 
68  Birks, supra n 48 at 29 recognises that in many cases, the resolution of a dispute between a 
domestic borrower and a business lender involves a case of policy-motivated restitution. 
69  (1999) NSW ConvR 55-908.  
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original agreement between the lessor and lessee contained a rent review clause – which 
neither party appreciated would result in the amount of the rent escalating greatly over 
the term of the lease. The agreement did not reflect the true intent of the parties and 
rectification would normally have been available. However the lessor had sold to a 
purchaser who had obtained title by registration. The purchaser was fully aware that the 
agreement between the original lessor and lessee did not reflect the true intent of the 
parties. Despite this, registration granted the purchaser indefeasibility and thus the 
equity of rectification was extinguished.70 Also consider the New Zealand decision of 
Davies v Laughton.71 The Laughtons had provided a second mortgage over their 
property to assist their son – who was purchasing the importing business of the 
appellants. The respondents signed the mortgage, prepared by the solicitor of the son. 
At a subsequent date, the solicitor for Laughton’s son altered the mortgage (at the 
request of solicitors for Davies) with the result that the mortgage was collateral to a 
first, not a second, debenture. The mortgage was registered. The appellants sought the 
discharge of an interim injunction preventing them from selling the home. The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal held that Davies was unable to rely on indefeasibility of title to 
defeat any claim by the Laughtons that the mortgage had been registered without their 
consent. “In short, equity’s protection over sureties defeated the registered mortgage.”72 
 
The conscience of a mortgagee who, unbeknown to the mortgagor, alters the 
terms of the debtor's obligations which the mortgage is to secure, must be 
pricked as assuredly as if the alteration were made after settlement… A 
hapless guarantor who has been exploited in this way is just as entitled to 
the protection of a Court of Equity as one whose liability has been altered 
following settlement or registration.73 
 
Bringing the strands of indefeasibility and policy motivated relief together 
 
It seems to their Lordships that the learned judges… have been too much 
swayed by the doctrines of English equity, and not paid sufficient attention 
to the fact that they are here dealing with a totally different land law, namely 
a system of registration of title contained in a codifying enactment.74 
 
There is no doubt that the imposition of equitable doctrines seriously inroads into the 
concepts  that underlie the Torrens System. But what balance is to be achieved? Few of 
us would argue that indefeasibility of title should not be used to defeat a claim, where 
the registered proprietor has not only notice of an interest, but has given an express 
                                                           
70  See the brief note on this case: P Butt, ‘Rectification thwarted by indefeasibility’ (2000) 74 ALJ 
280 where he notes that the different wording of the Victorian legislation may have led to a 
different result: Section 42 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 excluding from the doctrine of 
indefeasibility, the “interest of a tenant in possession of the land.” 
71  [1997] 3 NZLR 705 (CA). 
72  E Toomey, ‘Certainty of title in the Torrens System – Shifting Sands as the Millennium 
Approaches’ Paper delivered to 1999 Real Property Law Teachers Conference – The Flinders 
University Law School, 30 September 1999 – 2 October 1999.  
73  [1997] 3 NZLR 705 at 714-715 per Thomas J.  
74  Haji Abdul Rahman v. Mahomed Hassan [1917] AC 209 at 216 per Lord Dunedin (Privy Council). 
S Hepburn, ‘Concepts of Equity and Indefeasibility in the Torrens System of Land Registration’ 
(1995) APLJ Lexis 8 at 1 also states: “The ambiguous and pejorative nature of equity does not fit 
easily into a statutory structure centred around the guarantee of land title upon registration. 
Indefeasibility of title upon registration necessitates a level of certainty and determination which 
is, in many ways, directly oppositional to the approach taken by equitable principles of fairness.” 
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assurance that the interest would be recognised and protected. Nevertheless, the balance 
needs to be made between the certainty, security, and simplicity of the Torrens system 
on one hand and the fairness and discretionary nature of equitable jurisdiction on the 
other. Whilst most would accept the result in Bahr v Nicolay (No. 2);75 many more of us 
question76 the reasoning of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Mercantile Mutual 
v Gosper.77  
 
Consider now the decision of Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd.78 Had the bank 
acted unconscionably? Certainly the High Court considered so. Support for its 
conclusion that the conduct of the National Australia Bank was unconscionable (even 
though the trial judge thought otherwise) lay in analogies to the recognised jurisdiction 
of the court to set aside gifts made by a mistaken donor,79 the ability to provide relief to 
a surety where some particular fact is not made known, 80 and where the creditor has not 
disclosed some material features of the transaction.81 Having said this however, 
“[d]espite the attempt by the majority in Garcia to justify the decision in terms of 
unconscionable conduct on the part of the bank, the better view is that unconscionability 
cannot explain the result in Garcia itself”.82 If this is correct, and I would suggest that it 
is,83 then any restitutionary claim which policy dictates should be successful will give 
rise to a personal equity that can potentially infringe the operation of the Torrens 
system. Is this desirable?84 Does the allowance of this type of claim permit the 
flexibility and discretion that is needed within a land registration system that demands 
certainty and stability? Are we eating away at the crumbling foundations of Torrens, or 
providing the flexibility within the building itself so that it can meet the changes 
resonating through society? Is the “justifiable aim of controlling a species of 
transaction… achieved by damaging and diluting established doctrines”?85 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is no doubt that the Torrens system, as a form of land registration, has been an 
unqualified success in Australia.86 It has introduced a conveyancing system which is 
reliable, simple, cheap, speedy and suited to the social needs of the community.87 
Further, and specifically in respect of claims made in personam, it could be argued that 
it preserves the concepts of contract and equity,88 but as Deane J states:  
 
                                                           
75  (1988) 164 CLR 604. 
76  See for example P Butt, ‘Indefeasibility and Sleights of Hand’ (1992) 66 ALJ 596. 
77  (1991) 25 NSWLR 32. 
78  (1998) 72 ALJR 1243. 
79  Ibid at para 35. 
80  Ibid at para 37. 
81  Ibid at para 36.  
82  Moore (1999), supra n 1 at 714 quoting from Gardner, ‘Wives Guarantees of their Husbands’ 
Debts’ (1999) 115 LQR 1 at 3-4. 
83  See R Baxendale [1999] 21 Sydney Law Review 313 at 319-320.  
84  See S Hepburn, supra n 74 at 8. 
85  [1997] All ER Rev 385 at 394. 
86  Whalan, supra n 4. 
87  M A Neave, C J Rossiter & M A Stone, Sackville and Neave Property Law Cases and Materials, 
6th edn Butterworths 1999 at 418. 
88  As noted by J G Tooher, ‘Muddying the Torrens Waters with the Chancellor’s Foot? Bahr v 
Nicolay’ (1993) 1 APLJ at 1.  
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Long before Lord Seldon’s anachronism identifying the Chancellor’s foot as 
the measure of Chancery relief, undefined notions of ‘justice’ and what was 
‘fair’ had given way in the law of equity to the rule of ordered principle 
which is of the essence of any coherent system of rational law. The mere 
fact that it would be unjust or unfair in a situation of discord for the owner 
of a legal estate to assert ownership against another provides, of itself, no 
mandate for a judicial declaration that ownership in whole or in part lies, in 
equity, in that other.89 
 
This ideal must be met – notions of what is fair or just must give way to the rule of 
ordered principle. To this end, the fundamental tenet of indefeasibility of title represents 
this rule. It is only from this genesis that the modifications and qualifications to the 
principle should be articulated and justified. To do otherwise leaves the imprint of the 
Chancellor’s foot on recognised doctrines and fundamental tenets of Property Law. If, 
contrary to the statements of the High Court in Garcia, it is accepted that the basis of 
the result in that case was not unconscionability but, policy-motivated relief, the end 
result for the Torrens system of land registration is that this policy-motivated 
restitutionary relief90 affords a recognised cause of action that supports the personal 
equity necessary for an in personam claim. 
 
Is this acceptable? Only, I would suggest, if the circumstances of the case are explained 
as a modification or qualification to the fundamental tenet of indefeasibility. These 
circumstances must be articulated and justified as an anomalous exception to the critical 
imperatives of the Torrens system. To do otherwise leaves the law without any broad 
unifying principle and with the consequential practical difficulty of providing adequate 
and clear advice to subsequent clients. 
 
A better system of land registration for Australian conditions than the Torrens system 
has not been devised. Its fundamental doctrines need be reinforced not qualified. Any 
analysis of a case involving Torrens land should start from the fundamental precepts of 
indefeasibility of title and the irrelevancy of notice – if these are to be waived, the 
justification for this action must be established. In doing this, the courts need to 
articulate the reasons for the departure, but importantly, also indicate that it is an 
isolated departure from the ‘house of Torrens’ and its foundations. 
 
                                                           
89  Muschinkski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583 at 616. 
90  Birks supra n 48 at 30 describes the problems encountered in Garcia as “incredibly difficult” and 
there is a need to avoid “pseudo-solutions and, in particular, not to go in for distorting or 
denaturing particular unjust factors.”  
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‘The Tectonic Plate of Equity —
establishing a fault line in our Torrens
landscape’
Lynden Griggs*
The decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Tara Shire Council v Garner,
Arcape & Martin [2002] QCA 232.
Introduction
Sir Robert Torrens considered that equitable interests should have no role to
play in the administration of Torrens land. They were to be regarded as mere
contracts1 — any function that the Court of Chancery was to have in the
regulation of conveyancing transactions was to be diminished, if not
eliminated.2 To this end, the recent decision of the Queensland Court of
Appeal in Tara Shire Council v Garner, Arcape and Martin3 demonstrates
that, in one respect, the vision of Sir Robert has been not been fulfilled. This
case, as Atkinson J noted: brought ‘into sharp relief the great tectonic plates
of law and equity as they grind against each other and struggle to settle into
a stable position in the substratum of Australia’s legal landscape’.4
Unfortunately in my view, (and I suspect Sir Robert may share the same
opinion), a majority of the Queensland Court of Appeal considered that
notions of inherent fairness and justice could not be undermined by the larger
picture of stability and certainty that is promoted by the notion of
indefeasibility.5 While the intent of the scheme was to:
. . . give security and simplicity to all dealings with land by providing that the title
shall depend upon registration, that all interests shall be capable of appearing or
being protected upon the face of the registry, and that a registered title or interest
shall never be affected by any claim or charge which is not registered . . .6
a decision such as Tara Shire Council (the council) indicates that we are
significant way from achieving this goal. The importance of this judgment,
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Tasmania.
1 M Hughson, M Neave and P O’Connor, ‘Reflections on the Mirror of title: Resolving the
Conflict between Purchasers and Prior Interest Holders’ (1997) 21 Melbourne University
Law Review 460 at 461.
2 See the comments by L A McCrimmon, ‘Protection of Equitable Interests under the Torrens
System: Polishing the Mirror of Title’ (1994) 20 Monash Law Review 300 at 301.
3 [2002] QCA 232.
4 Above n 3 at para 80.
5 Of course, indefeasibility being a central plank of Torrens — it being expressly provided for
in a number of Torrens statutes — see Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), ss 38, 169, 170; Real
Property Act 1886 (SA), ss 10, 69; Land Titles Act (Tas), s 40.
6 Opening Statement in the Report of the Real Property Law Commission in November 1861
(SA): Parl Paper No 192 (1861). Sir Robert Torrens was one of the Commissioners. For a
discussion of the history behind the legislation, see D Pike, ‘Introduction of the Real
Property Act in South Australia’ (1960) 1 Adel LR 169.
1
and the consequential need for this discussion lies in the majority’s acceptance
of the overarching reach of equitable interests. In doing so Atkinson J and
McMurdo P have disagreed with the majority view of the Victorian Court of
Appeal in Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd.7 Once again,
our Federal system of jurisprudence has led to divergences between State
courts — the impetus for a national system of land regulation must surely
grow.
Facts of Tara Shire Council v Garner, Arcape and
Martin8
In January 1987, the Garners became the registered proprietors of land on
which was situated a motel, restaurant, newsagency, petrol station and a water
bore. It was this water bore that was to become the object of the dispute.9 In
August 1987, the council made an offer to purchase that part of the land on
which the water bore was located. This required that the land be subdivided.
The relevant subdivisional plans were completed and in March 1988, the
council paid $65,000 for the purchase of the land on which the water bore was
situated. The Garners allege that they signed and delivered a memorandum of
transfer over this land — this was denied by the council. This factual dispute
was not resolved, however the end result was that the Garners remained the
registered proprietor of the land over which the water bore was located, as
well as the land on which the motel was situated. In November 1989, the
Garners entered into a contract with Arcape whereby Arcape was to purchase
the motel, licensed restaurant, newsagency, and petrol station. In February
1990, Arcape became the registered proprietor of the land on which the motel
and associated development was constructed, as well as the water bore. The
Garners allege that they had informed the real estate agents for Arcape that the
sale did not include the water bore or the land on which it was situated. The
council requested that Arcape transfer the land on which the bore was located
— this was refused. In 1998, the council commenced an action seeking the
sum of $65,000 from the Garners as equitable compensation for breach of
trust — it being alleged that that the Garners held the land as bare trustee for
the council. In January 2002, the council brought an application to have
Arcape joined as a second defendant. Arcape submitted that it obtained an
indefeasible title upon registration and that a registered proprietor is not
affected by actual or constructive notice of an unregistered interest. By
contrast, the council argued that this was an appropriate case for the
in-personam exception to indefeasibility to apply. It was put forward that the
council had a legal or equitable right of action against another (ie, the
in-personam action) — and in this case, the equitable right of action against
Arcape arose from the principles of Barnes v Addy.10 In its application to the
facts, it was submitted that Arcape had knowingly received and retained trust
7 [1998] 3 VR 133.
8 These are largely paraphrased from the judgement of Atkinson J, above n 3 at paras 38–47.
9 The council’s interest in the water bore stemmed from the fact that it supplied the water for
the township of Moonie.
10 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244.
2 (2003) 10 Australian Property Law Journal
property in a manner that was inconsistent with the rights of a beneficiary, and
because of this, held that property on constructive trust for the council.
The 2:1 majority decision accepted the submission of council — Arcape
could be joined as a defendant. Indefeasibility was no barrier to a successful
Barnes v Addy claim.
The reasoning of the majority — Atkinson J (with
whom McMurdo P largely agreed)
His honour began by noting11 that well-known phrase from Breskvar v Wall12
that the Torrens system was a system of title by registration, not registration
of title. Accordingly, indefeasibility was at the core of the Torrens system.
However, this was not an absolute principle — if there was an equity that
arose from the conduct of the registered proprietor, then that equity would be
sufficient to override the conduct of Arcape. In other words, indefeasibility
could be impeached by the conduct of the present registered proprietor.13 In
this case, the council argued that when they paid the Garners, (and the transfer,
for whatever reason was not registered); the legal result was that the Garners
became a bare trustee for the council. As Arcape was informed, through their
real estate agent that the land belonged to the council, Arcape was in receipt
of trust property. It was therefore bound to give effect to that trust, in
accordance with the principles from Barnes v Addy. Quoting from this case,14
Atkinson J stated:
[S]trangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the
agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps of
which a Court of Equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become
chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge
in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees. (Emphasis added by
Atkinson J).
His honour then went on to discuss the confusion that surrounds the degree of
knowledge that must be had for this principle to be invoked. One line of cases
suggesting that the recipient (ie, Arcape) must act with a ‘want of probity’,
whereas other cases suggest that there is no element of dishonesty.15 After a
brief discussion of the Australia cases that have applied these principles,16 his
honour concluded that equity would hold liable a stranger who takes trust
property with knowledge that it is trust property — no element of dishonesty
was required.17 The next aspect for consideration was the degree of
11 Above n 3 at para 49.
12 (1971) 126 CLR 376 at 385–6.
13 Above n 3 at para 52.
14 Above n 3 at para 54.
15 See above n 3 at para 59.
16 Above n 3 at paras 60–3.
17 Above n 3 at para 63. The explanation that dishonesty is not being an element rests on the
explanation that the principle is restitutionary based aimed at avoiding unjust enrichment.
Above n 3 at para 61 — quoting Koorootang Nominees Ltd v ANZ Banking Group [1998]
3 VR 16; National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu [2001] NSWSC 32; S Gardner, ‘Knowing
Assistance and Knowing Receipt: Taking Stock’ (1996) 112 LQR 56.
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knowledge that was required. He began his analysis by outlining the five
categories of knowledge that are summarised in Baden Societe Generale:18
(i) actual knowledge;
(ii) wilfully shutting one’s eyes to the obvious;
(iii) wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest
and reasonable person would make;
(iv) knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an
honest and reasonable person;
(v) knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and
reasonable person on inquiry.
The fifth category largely aligning itself with a negligence standard, whereas
the first three categories all containing an element of subjective dishonesty, the
fourth group capturing ‘the defendant who is subjectively honest, or claims to
be, but whose failure to recognise impropriety is egregious’.19 Knowledge
within these first four categories would suffice to establish liability under the
Barnes v Addy principle. Importantly, even if Arcape could not be held liable
under ordinary equitable principles, the Queensland legislation which
provided an exception for indefeasibility for an ‘equity arising from the act of
the registered proprietor’,20 established a sufficient basis to hold that the act of
registration effected with knowledge that the transfer is in breach of trust
(within the first four categories outlined) gave rise to an exception to
indefeasibility. Atkinson J considered that by fixing the standard of knowledge
no lower than the fourth Baden category, the appropriate balance is achieved
between trust principles and the operation of the Torrens legislation.21
The argument of Arcape was along strict real property guidelines.22 Under
the principles of Torrens, the interest of a registered proprietor cannot be
defeated by notice of an existing interest — knowledge (whatever category
you may refer to) is simply insufficient to unseat indefeasibility. Second, it
was suggested that the arguments of council, if accepted, would undermine the
certainty of the register and the Torrens system of title registration. These
arguments were simply not accepted by his honour. The exception that he was
creating was limited by the knowledge that the property was trust property and
that its receipt was in breach of trust. Given these strictures, the appropriate
balance in the circumstances of this case was to accord greater prominence to
equity than to Torrens.
McMurdo P was largely in agreement with Atkinson J, noting that the
council’s claim was at least not so untenable that it could not succeed.23
The minority — Davies JA
His honour considered that while the indefeasibility principle was subject to
a claim in-personam, the recognition and enforcement of that equity could not
conflict with the fundamental principle that a person taking a transfer of
18 [1992] 4 All ER 161.
19 Above n 3 at para 65.
20 The statutory equivalent of the in personam rule — s 185(1) Land Title Act 1994.
21 Above n 3 at para 76.
22 Above n 3 at paras 80–9.
23 Above n 3 at para 6.
4 (2003) 10 Australian Property Law Journal
Torrens land would not be weakened by notice, actual or constructive of any
interest.24 He states25 (a statement worth repeating in detail):
There is no authority, binding or persuasive, for the proposition that the interest
of a purchaser of land who becomes registered as owner with knowledge that the
transfer to it was in breach of trust by the vendor, let alone that of such a purchaser
who becomes registered after the making of no more than an unsubstantiated
assertion that an unregistered person is the owner of part of the land, is defeasible.
Nor is there any basis in principle, for the purpose of the application of s 185(1)(a),
for distinguishing an assertion of equitable ownership in an unregistered person
from an assertion in such person of some lesser equitable interest. If it were
otherwise, the fundamental proposition that the interest of a registered proprietary is
not affected by his or her prior knowledge of unregistered interests would need to be
modified to accommodate different results depending on the nature of the prior
unregistered interest.
In essence, dishonesty was essential — mere knowledge of any trust or
unregistered interest would not undermine indefeasibility, the underpinning of
Torrens was to remain secure.
Conclusion
The law on the knowing receipt principles of Barnes v Addy has grown into
a ‘fearful complexity’, or as Megarry VC more mundanely described it, into
something of a ‘muddle’.26 Normally, the same cannot be said of
indefeasibility. The principle, simply stated, is easy to understood and stands
as a bedrock of Torrens title — a registered proprietor is subject only to such
estates and interests as are noted on the Register. Exceptions are narrow,
well-confined and justified, these include the vulnerability of the registered
proprietor as to their own fraudulent conduct (interpreted so as to require
personal dishonesty)27 and the in-personam exclusion (as interpreted by the
High Court in Bahr v Nicolay). To further make indefeasibility subject to the
nebulous grounds of Barnes v Addy is undesirable and unwarranted. The
property landscape of Australia must have the fault line created by Tara Shire
Council v Garner, Arcape and Martin fixed, otherwise the tectonic plate of
equity will render the foundation of Torrens unstable and unclear. Exceptions
must not only be articulated, they must be justified — the onus rests on those
weakening indefeasibility to justify this intervention — Tara Shire Council
failing to convincingly make this argument.
24 In this context his honour quoted from Bahr v Nicolay [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 604.
25 Above n 3 at para 33.
26 C E P Haynes, ‘The Stranger as Constructive Trustee — Recent Developments in Knowing
Assistance and Knowing Receipt Liability’, in W D Duncan (Ed), Commercial and Property
Law, Federation Press, Queensland, 1991, p 72 at 73 (citations deleted).
27 See generally: Yew v Port Sweetenham Rubber Co [1913] AC 491; Bahr v Nicolay (No 2)
(1988) 62 ALJR 268; 78 ALR 1; 164 CLR 604 ; Russo v Bendigo Bank and Reichman
[1999] VSCA 108; Bank of South Australia v Ferguson (1998) 192 CLR 248.
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Indefeasibility and mistake — the
utilitarianism of Torrens
Lynden Griggs*
In Lukacs v Wood ((1978) 19 SASR 520) and Tutt v Doyle ((1997) 42
NSWLR 10) it was accepted that rectification could form the basis of a
personal equity sufficient to establish an in personam claim. However, there
are a number of cases (Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Ltd v Fisher
[1984] 1 Qd R 606; State Bank of New South Wales v Berowra Waters
Holdings Pty Ltd [1986] 4 NSWLR 398 and Tanzone Pty Ltd v Westpac
Banking Corp (1999) 9 BPR 17,287; NSW ConvR 55-908) where the
plaintiffs were no less deserving of protection, but indefeasibility prevailed
over any possible equity. This article examines these cases and finds that
there is no convincing reason for the differences. What this reiterates is that
while the Torrens system of land registration will operate for the benefit of
most, in some instances innocent people will suffer. This reinforcing the
utilitarian focus of title by registration.
Introduction
All property law scholars recognise that indefeasibility is at the core of the
Torrens system. Indefeasibility of title is a recognition of the fundamental
concept that title is neither historical nor derivative, and that the interest of the
registered proprietor is paramount.1 Well-understood, well-recognised, any
challenge to it must be treated with scepticism and caution. As noted by
Owen J in Conlan v Registrar of Titles:2 ‘[I]t must be given the utmost respect
and should be applied according to its tenor.’ The attainment of indefeasibility
to be achieved by applying the twin pillars of the ‘curtain’ and the ‘mirror’.
The curtain principle provides that the Register is the sole source of information;
claims to equitable interests which lie beyond the curtain are of no concern. The
mirror principle provides that the Register reflects accurately and completely the
status of the title.3
However, just how indefeasible is this indefeasible title? Never recognised
as an absolute concept,4 fraud has been, and still is, the principal exception to
the paramountcy of indefeasibility — the narrow and limited interpretation of
this reinforcing, rather than derogating from the status of indefeasibility. Not
all species of fraud would attract intervention — it would only be in the most
egregious examples of personal dishonesty where the courts would intervene.5
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Tasmania.
1 As noted in Conlan v Registrar of Titles [2001] WASC 201 at [159]; BC200104400, quoting
from the High Court decision in Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376 at 386; [1972] ALR
205.
2 [2001] WASC 201 at [196]; BC200104400.
3 R Atherton, ‘Donees, Devisees and Torrens Title: The Problem of the Volunteer under the
Real Property Acts’, (1998) 4 Aust J Leg Hist 121 at 123.
4 As noted by Atherton, above n 3 at 125.
5 Standard examples that indicate this include Wicks v Bennett (1921) 30 CLR 80; 28 ALR 30;
1
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Other statutory exceptions that have subsequently been developed, are largely
of limited application.6 Notwithstanding the primacy of fraud as the principal
exception, it is in personam that has the potential to significantly and severely
restrict the operation of indefeasibility. The application of this potentially
undermining the theoretical basis of Torrens — that each new registered
proprietor hold directly from the Crown — ‘through a process of surrender of
title and a new grant from the Crown, thereby achieving the independence of
title that Torrens saw as the key to his reform’.7 In personam rendering the
registered proprietor liable to the personal equities held by another, these
personal equities hiding behind the curtain and not reflected in the mirror. The
purpose of this paper is not to examine the full parameters of this exception,
for which much has been written,8 but to isolate and address one specific
aspect — that being the position of the registered proprietor where land has
been mistakenly transferred to them. Is this person entitled to claim an
indefeasible title, or does the mistake in the conveyancing process render them
liable to the equity of rectification? An old example of this scenario illustrated
by the New Zealand Supreme Court decision of Jonas v Jonas.9 In this case,
A agreed to sell to B and C separate parcels of land. By an innocent mistake,
B received what C should have done, whereas C received what B should have
obtained. B brought an action to require C to execute the relevant transfers to
rectify the mistake. The court held that as C had not been fraudulent in the
acquisition of its interest, and that the retention of possession was not
fraudulent, the equitable jurisdiction of the court could not be invoked to seek
relief. Would the same result follow today? Do we allow the windfall benefit
to be retained, in the interests of preserving the integrity of the Torrens system,
or can we somehow limit any exception to definable rules so that integrity is
maintained, while at the same time achieving a result that would seem to be
fair and just. As recently stated in the context of an investment scheme which
went awry:10
In my view there is some (admittedly limited) scope within the recognised
exceptions [to indefeasibility] to import notions of fairness. But as the fact situation
of the case demonstrates, totally innocent people are going to be hurt by the
resolution of the legal issues and their application to the disaster that others have
foisted on them. There is no way that the questions raised by this case can be
answered without some of the investors, through no fault of their own, being unable
to recover all or some of the money they have invested. Accordingly, to use general
notions of fairness as a means of implying further exceptions into the statutory
scheme is apt to raise as many questions as it will answer. (emphasis supplied)
Assets Co v Mere Roihi [1905] AC 176; Macquarie Bank v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd
[1998] 3 VR 133; [1997] V Conv R 54–572; see also E Toomey, ‘Certainty of Title in the
Torrens System: Shifting Sands’, (2000) 4 FJLR 235 at 236–9.
6 These exceptions providing for situations of competition certificates of title; where there is
a misdescription in the land; where there are omitted easements; protection for short
tenancies; adverse possession and liability for rates and taxes: see A Bradbrook,
S MacCallum and A Moore, Australian Real Property Law, LawBook Co, Sydney, 2002, at
131–46 for a discussion of these exceptions.
7 R Atherton, above n 3 at 123.
8 See the list of articles cited at Bradbrook, MacCallum and Moore, above n 6 at 150, fn 287.
9 (1883) LR 2 SC 15 (NZ).
10 Conlan v Registrar of Titles (2001) WASC 201 at [194]; BC200104400 per Owen J.
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This paper addresses this issue — how, in the context of mistake, do we
minimise the number of innocent people deleteriously affected by the
operation of Torrens. The balance to be sought articulated by Winneke P:11
It is, I concede, logically attractive to argue that legitimate equitable claims should
not be emasculated by setting the threshold level of conduct . . . too high; on the
other hand it is, in my view, an argument of equally compelling force that the
threshold should not be set so low as to defeat the concept of indefeasibility which
is entrenched in and central to the Torrens system of registration of interests in
land . . .
What are the requirements of an in personam claim?
The oft-quoted starting point is the decision of the Privy Council, on appeal
from New Zealand, of Frazer v Walker.12 The principle of indefeasibility in no
way ‘denies the right of the plaintiff to bring against a registered proprietor a
claim in personam, founded in law or equity, for such relief as a court acting
in personam may grant’.13 However, what is less known is that the statement
of the Judicial Committee in this case only confirmed and reiterated what had
previously been accepted.14 It is a principle recognised by Australia’s highest
court in Barry v Heider,15 indefeasibility not destroying the ‘fundamental
doctrines by which courts of equity have enforced, as against registered
proprietors, conscientious obligations entered into by them’.16
Despite the obviously flexible nature of the in personam interest, the cases
have established the following guidelines:
• A legal or equitable interest must exist, which would ordinarily be
enforceable against the registered proprietor;17
• The conduct leading to the in personam claim can arise before, or
after registration;18
• In personam cannot be used to undermine the fundamental precepts
of the Torrens system.19
Furthermore, as pointed out by Anderson and Steytler JJ in LHK Nominees
Pty Ltd v Kenworthy (as administrator of the Estate of Lionel Kenworthy)20 in
personam does not supply a blank canvas on which a plaintiff can establish
11 Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133 at 136; [1997] V Conv
R 54–572.
12 [1967] 1 AC 569; 2 WLR 411; 1 All ER 649.
13 [1967] 1 AC 569 at 585; 2 WLR 411; 1 All ER 649.
14 For example, Maddison v McCarthy (1865) 2 WW & a’B (Eq) 151; Cuthbertson v Swan
(1877) 11 SALR 102; Sempill v Jarvis (1867) 6 SCR (NSW) Eq 68.
15 (1914) 19 CLR 197; 21 ALR 93.
16 (1914) 19 CLR 197 at 213; 21 ALR 93 per Isaacs J.
17 Grgic v Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1994) 33 NSWLR 202; Macquarie
Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133; [1997] V Conv R 54-572;
Pyramid Building Society (in liq) v Scorpion Hotels Pty Ltd [1998] 1 VR 188.
18 Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604; 78 ALR 1; 62 ALJR 268; Bank of South
Australia Ltd v Ferguson (1998) 192 CLR 248; 151 ALR 729; 72 ALJR 551.
19 Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604 at 613 (per Mason CJ and Dawson J) at 637–8
(per Wilson and Toohey JJ) at 652–3 (per Brennan J); 78 ALR 1; 62 ALJR 268.
20 [2002] WASCA 291; BC200206314.
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any claim.21 ‘In short, unconscionability is a necessary, but not sufficient,
criterion.’22 Accordingly, what is required to establish an in personam claim
based on an equity for rectification — the rectification arising from mistake.
The following cases indicating a range of responses.
Lukacs v Wood23
In this case, the plaintiff had been the registered proprietor of four adjoining
lots. Three of the lots were vacant, residential flats occupied the fourth. The
intent of the plaintiff was to transfer the three vacant parcels of land to the
defendant. However, due to a misdescription in the contract the defendant was
the recipient of two vacant blocks, plus the land occupied by the residential
dwellings. This mistake was perpetuated in the conveyancing process and was
not discovered until some 2 years after the transaction. The plaintiff was
prepared to transfer the vacant lot to the defendant in exchange for a
reconveyance of the land on which the units were built. The defendant’s
response was blunt — indefeasibility of title permitted him to retain the land
on which the flats were erected.24
[The defendant] says nevertheless that his title as registered proprietor is absolute
and indefeasible; that a Court of Equity has no power to order rescission of the
contract after conveyance; and neither has it the power to order rectification and
restitutio ad integrum in the absence of fraud (which is not alleged) or a total failure
of consideration . . . [t]he fact that by any ordinary notions of justice it is wholly
inequitable to allow the defendant in consequence of a mutual mistake, to retain the
benefit of a bargain which he did not make, and for which he has paid but a fraction
of its true worth, is said to be immaterial.25
The plaintiff’s rejoinder to this was that it would be unconscionable for the
defendant to retain the title to that land, what had occurred amounted to a total
failure of consideration, and that the court had the power to intervene.26
The Supreme Court of South Australia found in favour of the plaintiff.
Quoting from the High Court in Svanosio v McNamara27 a substantial error
occurred in the contracting process, there was in practical terms a total failure
of consideration, and the effect of this common mistake was to make the
contract void, or at least voidable.28 The court ordering that the plaintiff
transfer to the defendant the vacant block in exchange for a retransfer of the
parcel of land on which the residential dwellings were built.
While this decision represents what most would see as an equitable and fair
solution, to rely on the lack of consideration as a basis for determination is,
with respect, misguided. The contract referred to volume and folio number of
the parcel of land containing the residential flats — the purchaser received
precisely what the contract stated.
21 [2002] WASCA 291; BC200206314 at [216].
22 J P Moore, ‘Equity, Restitution and in personam claims under the Torrens system’, (1998) 72
ALJ 258 at 260.
23 (1978) 19 SASR 520.
24 (1978) 19 SASR 520 at 521–2.
25 (1978) 19 SASR 520 at 525, 529.
26 (1978) 19 SASR 520 at 522.
27 (1956) 96 CLR 186; [1956] ALR 961.
28 (1978) 19 SASR 520 at 529.
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Tutt v Doyle29
The respondents were selling land to the appellant. There was a mistake, not
in the contract, but in the effect of the transfer that saw Tutt receive a block
of land larger than what was intended. Tutt was aware that a mistake had been
made. The New South Wales Court of Appeal saw the issue in simple terms:
‘is it unconscionable for one party knowingly to take advantage of another
party’s mistake?’30 In answering this question in the affirmative, the court
applied the reasoning of the High Court in Taylor v Johnson31 that equity can
grant relief where there has been a mistake, where the court is of the opinion
that it would be unconscientious for the party to take advantage of that
situation.32 Tutt, in seeking to rely on indefeasibility was acting
unconscionably.
Chambers33 considers that this case is an example of restitutionary-based
relief. The constructive notice of the plaintiff’s interest was sufficient to
establish the restitutionary interest, which Doyle could enforce against Tutt.
He saw no conflict between the goals of Torrens and the desire to achieve
justice.
The principles governing claims for restitution of unjust enrichment, modified to
accommodate the Torrens system, can provide the needed balance between the
plaintiff’s restitution interest and the defendant’s security interest. A defendant who
acquires a registered interest in Torrens land from a plaintiff, with notice of the facts
giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim for restitution of that interest (that is notice that the
interest is an unjust enrichment at the plaintiff’s expense), should not be protected
from that claim by the principle of indefeasibility.34
In slightly different language, Seddon and Ellinghaus35 summarise how
unconscionability forms the basis of mistake:
In unilateral mistake cases [Tutt v Doyle] the element of unconscionability is
provided by one party knowing that the other is mistaken. In common mistake cases
[Lukacs v Wood], it is suggested that the element of unconscionability is provided by
one party taking advantage of a mistake when it is clear that the fair and just solution
is to undo the transaction.36
Whatever the language, the basis is clear. Indefeasibility cannot be asserted
as an overarching criterion where it would be unconscionable, or perhaps in
a different idiom — where the registered proprietor would be unjustly
enriched, to rely on her or his security of title. The difficulty with the bland
acceptance of this noted by Hepburn: ‘The ambiguous and pejorative nature
of equity does not fit easily into a statutory structure centred around the
guarantee of land title upon registration. Indefeasibility of title upon
29 (1997) 42 NSWLR 10.
30 (1997) 42 NSWLR 10 at 12.
31 (1983) 151 CLR 422; 45 ALR 265.
32 (1997) 42 NSWLR 10 at 14.
33 R Chambers, ‘Indefeasible Title as a Bar to a Claim for Restitution’, [1998] Restitution Law
Review 126.
34 Chambers, above n 33 at 134.
35 N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract, 8th ed,
Butterworths, Sydney, 2002.
36 Seddon and Ellinghaus, above n 35 at 614.
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registration necessitates a level of certainty and determination which is, in
many ways, directly oppositional to the approach taken by the equitable
principles of fairness.’37 In addition to this principled resistance to
unconscionability forming the basis of an in personam exception, the
following three cases demonstrate the application of a different approach, and
a result diametrically opposed to that which occurred in Lukacs v Wood and
Tutt v Doyle. They also point out the artificiality of relying on the contractual
doctrine of mistake as the foundation for the establishing of an in personam
claim. The following plaintiffs in no way any less deserving of the court’s
remedial protection than Messrs Lukacs and Doyle, the defendants receiving
an ‘unjustified windfall benefit’?38
Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Ltd v Fisher39
Fisher purchased land that had previously been held by three proprietors as
tenants in common. Each tenant in common held an original certificate of title.
When Fisher purchased the land, the Deputy Registrar of Titles issued one
new certificate, in place of the three previous certificates. In the course of this
changeover, a clerical error saw the new certificate of title failing to mention
the lease agreement made with the plaintiffs. The lease agreement was for an
initial term of 3 years, with an option to renew for three consecutive terms of
3 years each. Medical Benefits Fund had exercised one option, but when it
sought to exercise the second option, Fisher sought to rely on indefeasibility
of title to argue that she was not bound by the agreement between the previous
registered proprietors and the plaintiff. There was uncontradicted evidence
that Fisher knew of the lease agreement.40
In holding in favour of Fisher, the Queensland Court considered that there
was no personal equity that could be raised against her. She had not been
guilty of fraud, and true to the Torrens system, mere notice of an unregistered
interest was not to be imputed as fraud.41 Accordingly, despite the simple error
which had seen the lease removed from the title, and the knowledge by
Mrs Fisher of this lease agreement, no personal equity could be raised — the
distinguishing feature between this case, and Lukacs v Wood and Tutt v Doyle,
is that the Fisher and the Medical Benefits Fund of Australia had never been
in any contractual relationship. Accordingly, no equity of rectification based
on contractual mistake could be raised.
State Bank of New South Wales v Berowra Waters
Holdings Pty Ltd42
In this case, the decision in MBF v Fisher was extended. The facts were that
the mortgagee had mistakenly discharged a mortgage from a property. In
37 S Hepburn, ‘Concepts of Equity and Indefeasibility in the Torrens Systems of Land
Registration’, (1995) 3 APLJ 41.
38 J Tooher and B Dwyer, Introduction to Property Law, 4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths,
Sydney, 2002, at 80.
39 [1984] 1 Qd R 606.
40 [1984] 1 Qd R 606 at 610.
41 [1984] 1 Qd R 606 at 610.
42 [1986] 4 NSWLR 398.
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seeking to have it reinstated, they argued that there existed a personal equity
arising against the mortgagor that the mortgage should not be discharged
unless the debt had been paid.43 This was doubted by Needham J, with his
honour simply concluding that: ‘But [even] assuming the existence of a
personal equity against the second defendant arising out of the mortgage and
its discharge, the reasons given in Frazer v Walker show that no action on a
personal equity . . . may be maintained.’44 Thus, even though there was a
mistake made, and in this case, the parties were in a contractual relationship,
no remedy was available — indefeasibility prevailed. It is submitted that this
decision would be strongly reargued if the same facts presented themselves
again.
Tanzone Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp45
A similar result, though the parties were not in a contractual relationship, was
also reached in Tanzone Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp. The original
agreement between the lessor and lessee contained a rent review clause —
which neither party appreciated would result in the amount of the rent
escalating greatly over the term of the lease. The agreement did not reflect the
true intent of the parties and rectification would normally have been available.
However, the lessor had sold to a purchaser who had obtained title by
registration. The purchaser was fully aware that the agreement between the
original lessor and lessee did not reflect the true intent of the parties. Despite
this, registration granted the purchaser indefeasibility and thus the equity of
rectification was extinguished.46 As was noted by the Windeyer J: ‘. . . while
notice [of the equity of rectification] itself cannot lead to a right in personam,
notice together with an agreement to be bound by the interest can amount to
unconscionable conduct justifying relief.’47 Notwithstanding this, on the facts
of this case, unconscionability was not established.
Reflection on the cases
In summary, apart from the contractual basis of in personam, the cases give no
clear indication as to why the plaintiffs in Lukacs v Wood and Tutt v Doyle
were able to succeed, yet their equivalent in Medical Benefits Fund v Fisher;
State Bank of New South Wales v Berowra Waters and Tanzone Pty Ltd
v Westpac Banking Corp were not. The essential facts of each case were no
different — the operation of indefeasibility has seen one individual lose an
interest in the land as a result of a mistake. In one series of cases, the plaintiffs
have been able to invoke their personal equity. By contrast, with the latter
43 [1986] 4 NSWLR 398 at 403.
44 [1986] 4 NSWLR 398 at 403.
45 (1999) 9 BPR 17,287; NSW ConvR 55-908.
46 See the brief note on this case: P Butt, ‘Rectification thwarted by indefeasibility’, (2000)
74 ALJ 280 where he notes that the different wording of the Victorian legislation may have
led to a different result: Section 42 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 excluding from the
doctrine of indefeasibility, the “interest of a tenant in possession of the land.”
47 (1999) 9 BPR 17,287; NSW ConvR 55-908 at [52]. The case was appealed to the New South
Wales Court of Appeal where the court adopted a different method of analysis — in that
forum the dispute centred on the interpretation of the contract, rather than a case of
rectification: Westpac Banking Corp v Tanzone (2000) 9 BPR 17,521.
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three cases, no remedy was available. To have a distinction simply on the
relationship between the parties ignores an appreciation of the need to
articulate how the in personam interest can form a coherent and discrete
exception to the paramountcy of indefeasibility.
From this case law confusion and academic debate, can any solution be
found which will provide a theoretical underpinning to the principles of
Torrens, but at the same time achieve the necessary balance between the big
picture of indefeasibility and the justice of an appropriate result when two
parties are in direct dispute. Unconscionability of itself cannot provide the
answer. As noted by Birks48 in the context of a discussion of Garcia v National
Australia Bank49 ‘. . . unconscientiousness [in the retention of a benefit] ex
post is itself fictitious . . . It does not tell us in honest and straightforward way
why we are sure that that the [recipient] ought to give up its [benefit].’50 What
we must attempt to do is to provide a solution that reinforces the foundations
of Torrens, while providing the requisite flexibility to control a set of
transactions where a common or unilateral mistake has led to what may be
perceived as an unjustified advantage. ‘Can a rule of law which assists the
[former registered proprietor] be sufficiently contained and limited so as to
remove any risk that lawyers and even courts are tempted into the “enchanted
forest”.’51 Or are we to simply accept that the objectives of a system of title
by registration will result in a set of isolated cases where people will be
sacrificed to the utilitarian focus of that system.
The available solutions
Any mooted solution has to balance two matters; first, the paramountcy of
indefeasibility with second, the need to achieve a fair and equitable result.
Three possibilities come to mind, the first of which represents either a radical,
or discrete (depending on one’s perspective) of the in personam exception, the
other two outside of that arena:
(1) Restitutionary based relief;
(2) Deferred indefeasibility in situations of mistake;
(3) Statutory personal liability imposed on the windfall recipient.
Restitutionary-based relief
Chambers argues forcefully that:
The application of common law principles to a Torrens system requires some
adjustment. The registration of title in the name of the defendant, without the
consent of the plaintiff, creates a valid legal title, even though a purported
conveyance on that basis would be void at common law. This means that many
situations, which could be dealt with at common law through the passive
preservation of the plaintiff’s pre-existing interest, will have to be handled in a
48 P Birks, ‘The Law of Restitution at the end of an Epoch’, (1999) 28 University of Western
Australia Law Review 13.
49 (1998) 194 CLR 395; 155 ALR 614; 72 ALJR 1243.
50 Birks, above n 48 at 27.
51 To borrow a phrase from R J Sutton, ‘What Should be Done for Mistaken Improvers’, in
P D Finn (ed) Essays on Equity, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1990, 241 at 245.
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Torrens system as restitution of unjust enrichment . . . The right to recover [the]
property arises on (or after) the transfer because the defendant has received an
enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff which the law considers unjust and
reversible.52
Specifically, in this instance, he submits that restitution based on a vitiation
of the plaintiff’s intent to benefit the defendant (that is a mistake) does not
require any wrongful conduct by the defendant.53 In his opinion, that view of
the in personam exception is altogether too narrow, and ignores those rights
which can result from no action of the registered proprietor — noting the
examples of the creation of an express trust by the transfer of property in trust,
or the creation of the resulting trust through the purchase of property in the
name of another.54 Taking an expansionary view of restitution in its
application to immediate indefeasibility, he considers that excluding unjust
enrichment claims from in personam will place intolerable pressure to extend
the fraud exception to indefeasibility, or alternately, necessitating the
characterisation of the conduct by the defendant in the mistake as dishonest —
this distorting the underlying principles of unjust enrichment.55 ‘If the
defendant knew or ought to have known that the plaintiff was operating under
mistake, duress, undue influence, or in ignorance of the transaction itself, the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining restitution of the unjust enrichment can prevail
over the defendant’s interest in the security of his or her receipt, without
undermining the objectives of the Torrens system.’56
The view of Chambers is persuasively made, but it is contrary to established
authority,57 as well as the well-recognised limitation that in personam claims
should be limited to conduct from the registered proprietor. Hughson, Neave
and O’Connor58 submit:
In personam relied under the Torrens system should be confined to actions arising
from transactions entered into by the registered proprietor . . . and obligations
imposed upon him or her by reason of personal conduct . . . To confine the exception
in this way serves to reassure all purchasers that their title will not be defeasible
unless they act in breach of a personal obligation. At the same time it allows for
equitable intervention to prevent registered proprietors making unconscientious use
of title to escape their legitimate obligations.59
It is respectfully submitted that this latter view is correct. Restitutionary
52 Chambers, above n 33 at 128–9.
53 Chambers, above n 33 at 129.
54 Chambers, above n 33 at 131.
55 Chambers, above n 33 at 133. It can also be noted that applying dishonesty to the concept
of indefeasibility is arguably equally inappropriate. As noted by Brooking JA in Russo v
Bendigo Bank and Reichman [1999] 3 VR 376 at [41]: ‘One should be careful about
applying rules as to dishonesty laid down for the purpose of the rules of equity, for one may
remember that one of the principal reasons Sir Robert Torrens had for introducing the
concept of indefeasibility of title was to overcome the sophisticated use of equitable
principles to hold up and defeat claims to title.’
56 Chambers, above n 33 at 134.
57 Such as Grgic v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1994) 33 NSWLR 202 at 222–3; Pyramid
Building Society v Scorpion Hotels Ltd [1998] 1 VR 188.
58 M Hughson, M Neave and P O’Connor, ‘Reflections on the Mirror of Title: Resolving the
Conflict Between Purchasers and Prior Interest Holders’, (1997) 21 Melb U L Rev 460.
59 Hughson, Neave and O’Connor, above n 58 at 492.
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principles of unjust enrichment need to give way, (when in conflict) to the
principle of immediate indefeasibility and the limited application of in
personam. ‘Broad spectrum’60 claims that arise from the invalidity of the
transaction, not from the conduct of the registered proprietor, should not form
part of the in personam exception. Interpreting in personam in this way is not
to impose an artificial, legalistic and technical barrier, rather it is to confine in
personam within narrow parameters and serves to reinforce the theory of
indefeasibility — that each dealing in land involves a surrender back to, and
then a reissue from the Crown. This rendering otiose any need to look behind
the curtain. The fictitious nature of unconscionability61 in retention of the legal
interest can at best only serve as the basis for policy motivated restitution, and
in this instance, the policies and principles of Torrens need to prevail —
otherwise the ‘justifiable aim of controlling a species of transaction is
achieved by damaging and diluting established doctrine.’62
Deferred indefeasibility
All readers would be aware that recognised theory of indefeasibility accepted
in Australia and New Zealand is that of immediate indefeasibility.63 The fact
that the indefeasibility is obtained through the registration of a void or
voidable instrument is irrelevant. By contrast, under the deferred theory of
indefeasibility, indefeasibility is postponed to one further transaction. For
example, if A transfers to B under a void dealing, and B registers, immediate
indefeasibility provides B with a valid title, whereas under deferred
indefeasibility, a valid title would only exist once B transfers to C. In the
instant matter under consideration, deferred indefeasibility would have the
advantage of deferring good title to a transferee from the beneficiary of the
mistake. Immediate indefeasibility would be one removed from the problem
dealing. The disadvantage with adopting this is that once introduced,
arguments will no doubt be made that it should be extended to additional
scenarios. While it may cliche´ to say it, to allow deferred indefeasibility to
operate in one limited circumstance would allow its operation to undermine
the foundation and bedrock of Torrens — that of immediate indefeasibility.
Statutory personal liability imposed on the windfall
recipient
A third solution to the dilemma presented is derived from the genesis of
Torrens. This is to create a statutory based personal liability on the registered
proprietor when they have been the recipient of a windfall benefit from the
operation of indefeasibility. This would give the registered proprietor the
option of agreeing to a correction of the register to reflect what should be the
true state of affairs, or alternatively to compensate the person who has been
deprived through operation of indefeasibility. It would balance the economic
60 To borrow the language of Hughson, Neave and O’Connor, above n 58 at 491.
61 As described by Birks, above n 48 at 28.
62 Birks and Swadling, ‘Restitution’, [1997] All ER Rev 385 at 394.
63 Frazer v Walker [1967] 1 AC 569; 2 WLR 411; 1 All ER 649; Breskvar v Wall (1971)
126 CLR 376; [1972] ALR 205.
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imperatives of the Torrens system which sees land as any other form of
property — this dictating that efficiency and reduced transaction costs must be
given due weight; against the fairness of ensuring that an individual does not
unreasonably benefit from the operation of the system. It would allow the
larger picture of Torrens to be balanced against the smaller, but nonetheless
important exigency that the law, if it is too remain credible, must seek to
achieve results, which the public would legitimately expect. Atherton, in her
examination of the position of volunteers64 noted that the original Torrens
statutes had a provision which provided that volunteer would obtain an
indefeasible title — but that he or she may still be liable for a damages claim.
Under these provisions indefeasibility of title needed to be distinguished from
questions of personal liability. The nature of the personal liability was left rather
vague. It was described in s 120 of the 1860 Act as a right to prosecute an
‘action-at-law’ for ‘damages’. Torrens was not a lawyer and his thinking, so far as
it was expressed, appeared to be in a language which sought to get away from
anything to do with Chancery courts and principles of equity. He differentiated
questions relating to the title from questions of compensation. This was expressed in
his terms as ‘damages’ — a personal compensation to substitute for the loss of title
to the land to which the person may otherwise be entitled. But it is not damages in
the sense of common law damages, but more akin to equitable compensation.65
(emphasis included)
In applying this to the instant matter, while the registered proprietor may be
entitled to security and convenience of an indefeasible title, they would still be
liable to compensate for their windfall benefit to the person deprived, it being
inequitable for the assurance fund and thus the state to be liable, when the
registered proprietor has obtained something to which, arguably, they do not
deserve. Paramountcy would still be given to indefeasibility, thus recognising
the need for immediate indefeasibility to be applied strictly according to its
meaning; the sole question would simply be one of compensation, and in
particular, whom should pay. Equitable compensation66 serving not as a cause
of action, but as a remedial checkpoint so that appropriate restoration can be
made. In essence, the statute would operate as the basis for intervention,
equitable compensation the parameters of the award; indefeasibility separated
from the issue of compensation. By this separation, the true nature of Torrens
can be protected, while still allowing the courts to deliberate on how a fair
result between two warring parties can be achieved. For example in State
Bank of New South Wales v Berowra Waters Holdings Pty Ltd, it would allow
indefeasibility to remain — the mortgage could not be reinstated to the
register, but it would require that restoration be given to the party who has had
their interest diminished from the person who has been enriched. Similarly in
MBF v Fisher, the economic benefit given to Fisher by the removal of the
interest of MBF would be restored to the plaintiff. Moreover, in Tanzone Pty
Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp, the new purchaser would be liable to
compensate the lessee for the unjustifiable benefit that they have received.
64 R Atherton, above n 3.
65 R Atherton, above n 3 at 146.
66 This able to reflect aspects such as conscience, fairness, hardship and other equitable
features: Day v Mead [1987] 2 NZLR 443 at 462.
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Finally, in Lukacs v Wood and Tutt v Doyle, immediate indefeasibility would
still prevail, but the successful defendants would have to make appropriate
restoration for the benefit they have received.
Conclusion
Certainty of title, the mirror and the curtain all stand at the forefront of the
Torrens system of land registration. It is a system that has stood the test of
time, adapted to the contemporary economic climate of certainty and
commercial convenience, and has provided in the vast majority of transactions
a simpler and cheaper method of land transacting. However, in the examples
highlighted the registered proprietor was able to enjoy a windfall benefit
because of a mistake — such mistake having to be subjugated to the principles
of indefeasibility. As noted by Tooher and Dwyer:67
[T]he rules concerning mistake need to be clarified to ensure that a person
deprived of an interest in land through a mistake of the Registrar does enjoy rights
in personam against a registered proprietor who has not given consideration for the
benefit derived from the mistake.
This raised the definitive policy question is to what extent indefeasibility
should be ameliorated to achieve a more just and fair result. It is submitted
that indefeasibility stands as the defining mark of the Torrens system, and its
application at the zenith, immediate indefeasibility, is too fundamental a tenet
to be weakened by allowing extensions to the in personam doctrine.
Nevertheless, clear guidelines need to be drawn so that in cases of genuine
mistake, some fair and equitable remedy is imposed. In personam arguably
cannot supply this — its ambit is defined by the conduct of the registered
proprietor; (and in many of these instances, the conduct of the registered
proprietor has not been egregious, simply lucky), and for this reason
restitutionary relief based on a concept of unjust enrichment would embody
Torrens with a termite like cancer to its woodwork. Further, to open the
avenue to deferred indefeasibility would simply be to present an option that
would indubitably be explored and articulated beyond its set confines — the
Pandora’s box of land registration left ajar. Indefeasibility should not be
diminished or weakened; rather solutions, which lie outside of this system,
must be examined. One such potential solution is to provide a statutory based
action, allowing for the remedy of a equitable compensation, (after all, the
desire for a solution comes from an instinctive belief that something is
untoward in the result). However, the solution has no contemporary presence
and no apparent modern equivalent. The result is simply that while the
principles of Torrens serves the needs of society, at the end of the day,
innocent individuals will suffer.68 Not appreciated by those affected, the only
solace is that their sufferance serves the utilitarian focus of the Torrens system.
67 Tooher and Dwyer, above n 38 at 96.
68 It was a deliberate decision not to extend the coverage of the paper into the application of
the assurance fund to people injuriously affected. To do so would obfuscate the fundamental
issue that some individuals are obtaining a windfall benefit at the expense of another.
Furthermore, to simply suggest that the assurance fund, and thus the State, should
compensate when another has benefited appears inherently unfair. Finally, as many readers
would know, the assurance fund, in many jurisdictions, is difficult to access.
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Case Notes
Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd
Lynden Griggs*
Real Property cases rarely make it to the High Court. If for no other reason,
the decision of Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 59
demands close attention. At its heart, the case concerned the interaction of
Torrens legislation, with the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
1979 (NSW). In this case, the certificate of title to the servient and dominant
tenements made no mention of a ‘proposed right of way’. However, was the
servient tenement bound to give effect to this interest, as it knew about it,
and was mentioned on the deposited plans relevant to the sub-division? In
holding that the servient tenement was not bound, the High Court (by a 3:2
majority) has reversed the decisions of the Land and Environment Court and
the unanimous holding of the New South Wales Court of Appeal.
Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 59; BC200408154
Introduction
As every practitioner, student, and academic of Real Property Law knows, the
title to land provided by the Torrens system is neither historical nor derivative
— it is a system of title by registration. This point, paraphrased from the
seminal decision of Breskvar v Wall,1 was recently repeated in the High Court
decision of Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd.2 Accordingly, if
nothing else was added to the broad reach of this statement, the conclusion
would follow that if no interest is noted on the title of the registered proprietor,
then that person would not be bound by any extraneous interest. This is the
very essence of indefeasibility.3 It is reinforced by the notion that a person is
not affected by notice of an unregistered interest.4 Of course, the desire and the
need of the law to do justice between individual parties necessitates that there
must be some give or qualification to such a broad principle, and many
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Tasmania.
1 (1971) 126 CLR 376 at 385. ‘The Torrens system of registered title . . . is not a system of
registration of title but a system of title by registration. That which the certificate of title
describes is not the title which the registered proprietor formerly had, or which but for
registration would have had. The title it certifies is not historical or derivative. It is the title
which registration itself has vested in the proprietor. Quoted in Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s
Door Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 59 at [52].
2 Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 59.
3 Reinforced in the legislation of all jurisdictions. Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 42;
Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 42; Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 38; Real Property Act
1886 (SA) ss 69–70; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 68; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 40;
Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 58(1); Land Title Act (NT) s 39.
4 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 43; Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 43; Land Title Act
1994 (Qld) s 184; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 186–187; Transfer of Land Act 1893
(WA) s 134; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 41; Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 59; Land Title
Act (NT) s 188.
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abound. The Torrens legislation throughout Australia provides many examples
of statutory exceptions,5 with the common law notion of in personam
becoming of increasing relevance.6 However, it has been stated that the
greatest threat to the operation and effectiveness of the Torrens system is the
capacity of later statutes to override the operation of indefeasibility.7
The recent High Court decision of Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty
Ltd raises this complex issue, with interestingly, a majority of the High Court
(McHugh ACJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ, (Kirby J and Callinan J dissenting))
reversing the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal in New South Wales8
and a single instance decision of Sheahan J in the New South Wales Land and
Environment Court.9 Perhaps showing the vagaries of the law, of the nine
judges who heard this matter, six decided in favour of Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd,
but it is of course the three in the High Court majority that will form the focus
of attention — their decision arguably a narrow interpretation of the
potentially overriding statute and implicitly supporting the paramountcy of
indefeasibility.
Facts
The facts of this case are uncomplicated and can be chronologically
represented as follows:
• In 1977–1978, a Torrens title property was subdivided into two lots,
Lot 1 and Lot 2;
• Council approval for this subdivision was subject to compliance with
the following condition (for the benefit of Lot 1 over Lot 2):
– Provision of a constructed right of carriageway from [Lot 2]
. . . The track shall be at least 2.5 metres wide and constructed
with 150mm consolidated thickness of gravel.
• In 1978, Council gave final approval to the registered subdivision
(Deposited Plan 601049) — This plan indicated that there was a
‘proposed right of way 10 wide’.10 This was to provide access to Lot
1 through Lot 2.
• The two certificates of title issued for Lots 1 & 2 referred to the
proposed right-of-way, even though no easement had been created.
• In 1981, Lot 2 was further subdivided (the new deposited plan was
given the identifier 1003396), with each of the plans of subdivision
5 Of which fraud is the major exception: Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 42; Transfer of
Land Act 1958 (Vic) ss 42, 44; Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 184; Real Property Act 1886
(SA) s 69I; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 68; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 40; Land
Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 58; Land Title Act (NT) s 188.
6 Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604 is the major Australian statement of this. Amore
recent and controversial application is Tara Shire Council v Garner [2002] QCA 232; cf
LHK Nominees Pty Ltd v Kenworthy [2002] WASCA 291. See also P Butt, ‘Indefeasibility
and Knowing Receipt of Trust Property’ (2002) 76 ALJ 606.
7 See P O’Connor, ‘Exceptions to Indefeasibility of Title’ (1994) 19 MULR 649 at 651.
8 (2002) 55 NSWLR 446.
9 (2001) 116 LGERA 138.
10 It should be noted that it was presumed to be 10 m, though no unit of measurement was
given in the plans.
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showing a ‘proposed right of way 10 wide’. The subject matter of the
litigation became Lot 529 in Deposited Plan 1003396 (part of the
original Lot 2 on plan 601049).
• From 1990, for reasons that were unexplained, the certificates of title
benefited and burdened by the proposed right-of-way did not include
any notation to it — though there was some ‘cryptic reference to a
deposited plan by number which did contain that information’.11
• In early 1998, Heaven’s Door purchased Lot 1.
• In late 1998, Hillpalm purchased Lot 529 of plan 1003396 (part of
the original Lot 2).
• [2004]: Could Heaven’s Door insist upon the creation of a
right-of-way in its favour?
McHugh ACJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ
The first claim made by the respondent was that the appellant was in breach
of condition of a development consent. This was to be understood by reference
to the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (the EPAA).
Section 4 of the EPAA defined ‘development’ as follows:
(a) the use of the land, and
(b) the subdivision of land, and
(c) the erection of a building, and
(d) the carrying out of work, and
(e) the demolition of buildings all work, and
(f) any other act, matter or thing referred to in s 26 that is controlled by
an environmental planning instrument,
but does not include any development of a class or description prescribed by
the regulations for the purposes of this definition.
Section 76A(1) then provided:
If an environmental planning instrument provides a specified development may
not be carried out except with development consent, a person must not carry the
development out on the land to which the provision applies unless:
(a) such a consent has been obtained and is in force, and
(b) the development is carried out in accordance with the consent and the
instrument.
It followed from these provisions that if, by an environmental planning
instrument, (it was conceded that this existed in this case) that permission was
given to subdivide land, then such subdivision must occur in accordance with
the consent given. According to the respondent, and accepted by the lower
courts, this permission required the construction of a right-of-way.
The majority in the High Court did not accept this. As they note: ‘The more
fundamental point made by the appellant was that, even if the correspondence
which passed between the surveyor and the Council,12 or the depiction of a
11 [2004] HCA 59 at [111].
12 For example in a 1978 letter from the Council to the applicant undertaking the subdivision,
it was stated that: ‘This acceptance is conditional upon the rural/residential estate
development proceeding. Consequently your client company shall be required to declare by
statutory document as a condition of subdivision that a right of carriageway over the existing
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‘proposed right of way 10 wide’ on the plan of subdivision did constitute a
condition to which the Council approved the subdivision, that condition was
not enforceable against the appellant’.13
The reasoning of the majority rested on a narrow interpretation of the
relevant legislation. Section 123 of the EPAA provided that:
Any person may bring proceedings in the court for an order to remedy or restraint
a breach of this Act, whether or not any right of that person has been or may be
infringed by or as a consequence of that breach.
Furthermore, s 122(a)(i) of this same legislation indicated that a breach of the
Act includes ‘a contravention of or failure to comply with the [the Act]. By
s 122(b)(iii), a reference to the legislation includes ‘a consent granted under
[the Act], including a condition subject to which a consent is granted’.
In the view of the New SouthWales Court of Appeal, two reasons supported
the position of Heaven’s Door — both of which were rejected by the High
Court. The first basis was known as the ‘objective contravention’ point; the
second, the right in rem argument.
Objective Contravention
On the first point, the High Court first addressed the following comments
made by Hodgson JA in the New South Wales Court of Appeal:
If the development in question is a subdivision, then the later owner of the
subdivided land or of a subdivided part of it may not be guilty of any breach of the
[EPAA], but nevertheless, so long as the land remains subdivided in accordance with
the development consent without a condition of that consent being fulfilled, there is
objectively speaking a continuing contravention of the condition; and s 123 of the
[EPAA] then gives power to the Land and Environment Court to order the
rectification of the contravention by such person as is able to do so, again
irrespective of what appears on the title of the land. (emphasis supplied by High
Court).14
This reasoning was rejected by the High Court.15 An order pursuant to s 123
of the [EPAA] directed to a person who was not in breach of the Act would
neither remedy nor restrain any breach. Recognising that this could be seen as
an unduly narrow interpretation of s 123, the High Court majority added:16
To read s 123 in this way does not lead to any artificial, let alone absurd, result;
it does not strip s 123 of utility. In the common case where the relevant development
of the land is a particular permitted use of the land, any person who uses the land
in some other way carries out a development of the land (by using it in that other
way), contrary to the consent that was given. It matters not whether the user of the
land was the applicant for consent . . . But in the present case the relevant
development was not the use of the land; the relevant development was the
subdivision.
track shall be created in favour of the proposed rural lot if the new roads are not dedicated
within two years of the date of this letter.’ Quoted at [2004] HCA 59 at [20].
13 [2004] HCA 59 at [39].
14 [2004] HCA 59 at [46]; quoting from (2002) 55 NSWLR 446 at 449 [19].
15 [2004] HCA 59 at [48].
16 [2004] HCA 59 at [49].
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In essence, it was the reading of the provisions that was necessary to
determine the rights of the parties. Given that, in this instance the appellant
and the respondent were successors in title to the original parties, the EPAA
could not be used to enlarge the personal rights, unless a right in rem could be
established in respect of the land. It is this point to which the High Court then
turned.
Right in Rem
In the New South Wales Court of Appeal a right in rem was established.
Meagher JA (Handley JA agreeing) commenting that: ‘[T[he Council’s
consent to the subdivision operates to create a right in rem, so that it may be
relied on (inter alia) by all later transferees of any lot. This has been decided
by a long series of cases at both a State and Federal level.17 It has also been
decided that the transferee from time to time of any lot which has the apparent
benefit of any condition may enforce that condition.’ Given this in rem right,
the right established by the EPAA took precedence over the principle of
indefeasibility established within Torrens legislation — the EPAA was the
later enactment.18
The direct conflict that such a position would take with Torrens legislation
was addressed by the High Court:
If the Council’s consent to the subdivision operates to create a right in rem that
may be relied upon by any later transferee of any lot in the subdivision, that would
present a fundamental question about how the creation of such a right would be
consistent with the effective operation of a system of Torrens title. In particular, the
existence of such a right would be inconsistent with [the notion of indefeasibility]
. . .
If the consent to the subdivision did create a right in rem, that would be a right
or interest in the land not shown on the Computer Folio Certificate. There would
then be a real and lively question about how the two statutory schemes (the scheme
under the EPAA and the Torrens system for which the Real Property Act provides)
were to be reconciled, and questions of implied repeal or amendment might arise.19
In the instant matter, the right seeking to be enforced by the respondent was
to have a right of way created. It was not to have the register rectified.20
Accordingly, the respondent could only assert a personal right, and the only
provision cited in support of that was s 123 of the EPAA. For the reasons
given earlier, s 123 did not support such a right.21
17 No cases were cited by his honour in support of this proposition. However, as Radan notes,
in the Land and Environment Court cases were cited in support, though ‘it is far from clear
that they support the proposition that the council’s consent created an in rem right’. P Radan,
‘Indefeasibility and Overriding Statutes’ (2003) Law Society Journal (July issue) 66 at 67.
18 Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 446 at 449.
19 [2004] HCA 59 at [51–53].
20 [2004] HCA 59 at [53].
21 [2004] HCA 59 at [55].
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Kirby J (in dissent)
The focus of his honour’s judgement was on the broader policy rationale of
ensuring ‘social justice’,22 between the parties, rather than merely
administering justice ‘inter partes’. This forms the central distinction between
this judgment and the majority. The majority considered that the finding of any
right in the respondent, (personal or in rem) had to be located in the statutory
provisions, and these alone.23 There was no basis for this in the legislation. By
contrast to this, Kirby J was only prepared to examine the legislation in light
of the overarching policy of land management legislation. In a quote worthy
of repeating in detail, the reason for this was as follows:
The reason for the breadth of this principle lies in essential purpose of planning
law to land management and use. That purpose is to ensure, relevantly, that the basic
purposes necessary to that task are observed and conditions essential to a modern
interdependent society observed. Apart from the considerations already mentioned,
one has only to think of societies that do not protect the environment and land-based
infrastructure, but permit developments to occur without observance of overall
planning control and environmental protection. It is because of the chaos that can
ensue in such circumstances that the ultimate focus of planning regulation law is the
land itself. It is not, as such, merely their ephemeral ownership or possession of the
land.
Were it otherwise, planning law could easily be circumvented by changes of
ownership and possession immediately following the imposition of conditions upon
proposed development of the land. This is a reason why it is a fundamental mistake
to read [the legislation] strictly, so as to confine their application to those who owned
or possess the subject land at the time applicable conditions were imposed. Yet that
is what the majority do in this appeal.24
Given the philosophical foundation that land management legislation must be
interpreted with the broader focus of public policy in mind, a wider
interpretation of s 122 of the EPAA easily followed. Section 122 of the EPAA
indicates that a breach includes ‘a contravention of or failure to comply with
. . . a condition subject to which a consent is granted’. Accordingly, even
though the appellant may not have contravened the condition, it had failed to
comply with this condition. Kirby J added: ‘There are, with respect, dangers
in posing the question solely as to whether a party is “in breach of the Act”.
This is not an accurate paraphrase of the EPAA when the extended definition
of “breach” is taken into account. Here the “breach” was a “failure to
comply”.’25
Furthermore, and accepting that any diminution of Torrens legislation was
not something to be taken lightly,26 his honour considered that there was no
need to treat the EPAA as ‘repealing or amending the RPA pro tanto’.27 In the
circumstances of this case, the Acts merely operated sequentially. The title of
22 [2004] HCA 59 at [72].
23 [2004] HCA 59 at [50].
24 [2004] HCA 59 at [73–74].
25 [2004] HCA 59 at [86].
26 [2004] HCA 59 at [97].
27 [2004] HCA 59 at [102].
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the appellant was indeed clear, until the order was made by the Land and
Environment Court.28
Callinan J (in dissent)
The judgment of Callinan J supported the interpretation of the EPAA given by
Kirby J. In essence, that legislation does not confine a remedy to an action
against a person who has been directly been in breach of the Act — a breach
also includes a failure to comply. Hillpalm had failed to comply with the
condition requiring the creation of a right of way. Furthermore, his honour
concluded with some pertinent observations.
This litigation should never have occurred and possibly never would have, had the
Council been diligent in enforcing its conditions, and perhaps if the Registrar
General had not, so far as the evidence goes, inexplicably allow the explicit and
detailed reference to the proposed right of way formally appearing there, to drop off
the folio in the Register for the appellant’s land. It might not even have happened
had there been no such creature as the proposed right-of-way . . . a somewhat
anomalous interest, serving no necessary purpose, at best barely compatible with the
intent of the RPA, and seemingly unique to New South Wales.29
Implications of the decision
The Court of Appeal decision, if it had been left unturned would have imposed
very significant obligations on conveyancers. They would be required to
search Council records and determine if all the conditions creating the
subdivision had been met.30 In many respects the search techniques would
have mirrored those that were required when undertaking a conveyance of
general law or old system title land. The ‘certainty, efficiency and speed in
settlements for purchasers, vendors and others interested in dealings in land
being able to rely on the face of the register’31 would have been substantially
lost. Because of this reason, the majority decision is to be welcomed.
The very basis of the Torrens title is that one need not look behind the
curtain, and can rely on the reflection given by the mirror to ascertain the true
state of the title.32 Any requirement that requires conveyancers to search
beyond the register will only increase conveyancing costs for consumers, lead
to delayed settlements and uncertainty in the application of the law.
Unfortunately, the judges in our highest Court did not see it necessary to
examine in detail the extent of the overriding legislation exception to
indefeasibility,33 a matter which is still of considerable debate.34 However, by
28 [2004] HCA 59 at [102].
29 [2004] HCA 59 at [130].
30 See the comments by Radan, above n 17 at 67.
31 [2004] HCA 59 at [97].
32 On this topic, see M Hughson, M Neave and P O’Connor, ‘Reflections on the Mirror of Title:
Resolving the Conflict between Purchasers and Prior Interest Holders’ (1997) 21 Melbourne
University Law Review 460.
33 See cases such as South-Eastern Drainage Board case (1939) 62 CLR 603; Horvath
v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] 1 VR 643; Pratten v Warringah Shire Council
[1969] 2 NSWLR 161.
34 For example in Quach v Marrickville Municipal Council (1990) 22 NSWLR 55 at 61, doubt
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implication, their narrow reading of the EPAA demonstrates an affinity with
the principles of indefeasibility and the requirement, that should later
legislation qualify the principle of indefeasibility that this be expressly
articulated. As Callinan J noted, provided that the people responsible for
drafting legislation keep the ‘elementary truth in mind’ that planning and real
property legislation should complement each other, then disputes of this
nature should not occur.35 Furthermore, this case tells us of the dangers of an
electronic register, with the notation to a proposed right of way replaced by a
reference to a deposited plan. The compliance obligation of Councils to ensure
that all the conditions attaching to a subdivision are met is also self-evident.
On reading this case, the primary conclusion that one comes to is that this was
litigation that need never have occurred. It is this lesson that the stakeholders
involved with the administration of the Torrens system need to heed.
was cast on the correctness of the decision of the New South Wales Court in Pratten
v Warringah Shire Council [1969] 2 NSWLR 161. Pratten was decided on the basis that
there existed a discrete class of interests applicable to statutory interests which override
indefeasibility. O’Connor also questions this on the basis that the correct approach is to ask
whether the provision is in conflict with the Torrens legislation, and determine the effect of
this by examining its text and purpose. O’Connor, above n 7 at 668.
35 [2004] HCA 59 at [110].
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The common law abandonment of
easements on Torrens land — Can it be
done, and, if so, should the intent of
predecessors in title be taken into
account?
Lynden Griggs*
A number of recent decisions have highlighted the question of whether a
common law abandonment of easements can occur in respect of Torrens
title land in circumstances where the title to the dominant tenement makes
express reference to the easement. Though not having to resolve this
question, as abandonment was in fact found not to occur, the courts
pondered the difficult question of whether abandonment can be permitted,
and perhaps more critically, whether it was only the acts of the current
registered proprietor that could be taken into account, or whether the
conduct and intent of previous owners should also be considered. The
argument that will be made that common law abandonment should not be
permitted, and if it is (by legislative direction), then only the conduct and
intent of the current registered proprietor should be considered. Support for
this reasoning will be found in an examination of what the goals of Torrens
are, as well as consideration of economics, both neoclassical and
behavioural.
Introduction
Recent decisions on the abandonment of easements have raised, but not
answered, the question as to whether an easement over Torrens land can be
abandoned pursuant to common law principles. Related to this is perhaps the
more fundamental question — the extent to which the acts of previous
registered proprietors can be considered as part of the evidence of
abandonment.1 If we do recognise that common law abandonment can occur
even though the certificate of title of the dominant owner stills identifies an
easement appurtenant to the land, are the fundamental principles that underlie
Torrens (the curtain, mirror and indemnity and with it immediate
indefeasibility of title)2 being substantially and significantly undermined. With
these questions in mind, the purpose of this article is to answer these queries
from first principles. What are the goals and objectives of the Torrens system,
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania <Lynden.Griggs@utas.edu.au>.
1 This question was first raised by P Butt, ‘Abandonment of Easement’ (2005) 79 ALJ 331
at 332 with reference to the NSW Court of Appeal decision of Ashoil Holdings Pty Ltd v
Fassoulas (2005) NSW ConvR 56-125.
2 It is of course recognised that debate still occasionally rages as to whether immediate or
deferred indefeasibility should apply. For example, argument still surrounds whether
volunteers should be entitled to indefeasibility: cf Valoutin v Furst (1998) 154 ALR 119 with
Conlan v Registrar of Titles (2001) 24 WAR 299. See P Radan, ‘Volunteers and
Indefeasibility’ (1999) 7 APLJ 197.
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and should we allow the title of the dominant tenement to be impeached by
common law notions and by the acts of those before the current registered
proprietor. Accordingly, Part 1 of this article will consider the principles of
common law abandonment with Part 2 examining these principles in their
contemporary application to Torrens cases. Part 3 will comment on the goals
of the Torrens system, with Part 4 outlining the reasons why common law
abandonment should not be permitted, and in those jurisdictions where
arguably this is expressly permitted by the legislation that the acts of the
previous registered proprietors should not be permitted to be taken into
account. Support for these conclusions will be found in the aims of title by
registration, neoclassical and behavioural economics.
Part 1: The principles of common law abandonment
To demonstrate abandonment, the owner of the dominant tenement is required
to exhibit an unequivocal intent to abandon.3 There must be a ‘fixed intention
never at any time thereafter to assert the right himself or to transmit it to
anyone else’.4 This will be a question of fact,5 with the onus of proof resting
with the individual seeking to assert that abandonment has occurred.6 Part
abandonment of an easement can occur,7 and, as intention is required, lack of
knowledge of the easement by the dominant tenement will mean that the
easement has not been abandoned.8 Once abandoned, the easement cannot be
revived.9 It has also been argued that reliance by the servient owner on the
abandonment by the dominant owner must also exist, or that abandonment is
far more likely to succeed if there is reliance by the servient owner on the
intent of the dominant owner to abandon.10 It has never been easy to establish.
Sovereign rule is the key ingredient of proprietary interests, an individual is
entitled to retain an interest even though they do not utilise it to the full.
Arbitrary spoliation of a proprietary interest is not to occur unless there is
cause.11 Thus, for example, non-use for 175 years was, in the individual
circumstances before the court insufficient to show abandonment,12 nor was
3 Wolfe v Freijahs Holdings Pty ltd [1988] VR 1017; McIntyre v Porter [1983] 2 VR 439; Re
Eddowes [1991] 2 Qd R 381.
4 Tehidy Minerals Ltd v Norman [1971] 2 QB 528 at 553 per Buckley LJ; [1971] 2 All ER
475.
5 Treweeke v 36 Wolseley Road Pty Ltd (1973) 128 CLR 274: 1 ALR 104.
6 Corinne Court (Owners of) 290 Stirling Street Perth Strata Plan 12821 v Shean Pty Ltd
(2000) 23 WAR 1 at 23–4.
7 Proprietor Strata Plan No 9968 v Proprietors Strata Plan No 11173 [1979] 2 NSWLR 605.
8 Couche v Adams [200] NSWSC 27; Shelmerdine v Ringen Pty Ltd [1993] 1 VR 315.
9 Yip v Frolich (2003) 86 SASR 162 at [58].
10 C J Davis, ‘Abandonment of an Easement: Is it a Question of Intention only’ [1995] The
Conveyancer 291. The author argues that a loss of an easement should only occur if it would
otherwise be unconscionable and, for this to happen, there must be reliance by the servient
owner, from which an estoppel can be raised. As an example see Swan v Sinclair [1924] 1
Ch 254.
11 Wilson v Anderson (2002) 213 CLR 401; 190 ALR 313 at [140].
12 Benn v Hardinge (1992) 66 P & CR 246 (this was explained by the fact that throughout the
period the dominant tenement and the predecessors had enjoyed an alternative means of
access. For a recent Australian case where non-use for 40 years was held insufficient to
constitute abandonment, see Long v Michie [2003] NSWSC 233 (unreported, 7 April 2003,
BC200301490) (easement not used by dominant tenement from 1941 to the 1980s).
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suspension of use.13 However, if an individual acquires other proprietary
rights because of non-use, then abandonment may be easier to trace,14 and the
longer that an easement has not been used, the more likely that it will be
abandoned.15 While a pre´cis of the law can textualise the difficulties, the High
Court decision in Treweeke v 36 Wolseley Road Pty Ltd16 provides a more
stark illustration of the difficulties facing anyone seeking to meet the burden
of proving that an easement has been abandoned. The High Court held that
abandonment had not occurred despite the easement becoming impassable
because of an impenetrable bamboo clump, the building of a swimming pool,
the construction of a fence and the non-use in its entirety for some 40 years.
Despite these difficulties, modern development and perhaps a loss of
community have seen abandonment cases proliferate in relatively recent
years. The next Part examines these authorities, but begins with consideration
of the relevant legislation.
Part 2: Application to the common law principles of
abandonment to recent Torrens cases
The legislation
In a number of jurisdictions (New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia
and Tasmania), the Torrens legislation provides that easements that have been
abandoned can be removed from title by the Recorder of Titles.17 Non-use for
a specified period (20 years in New South Wales, Western Australia and
Tasmania and 30 years in Victoria)18 will amount to proof that there has been
abandonment. Despite this similarity between these jurisdictions, fundamental
and opposing views remain. For example, in Victoria, it has been held that an
easement remains enforceable while it is on the certificate of title — acts
amounting to common law abandonment will not suffice to prevent the
conclusive evidence proffered by the title applying.19 By contrast, in New
South Wales, the converse is true — the indefeasibility provided by title will
give way to the common law recognition that the easement has been
abandoned by the dominant tenement. This reasoning in New South Wales is
13 Sunset Properties Pty Ltd v Johnston (1975) 3 BPR 9185 (suspension of use on Sundays).
14 See Moore v Rawson (1824) 3 B & C 332; 107 ER 756 (easement of light abandoned where
wall demolished which contained the windows, and servient owner had constructed a new
building which he would not have been able to do if the easement had remained in
existence).
15 Treweeke v 36 Wolseley Road Pty Ltd (1973) 128 CLR 274 at 288; 1 ALR 104:
I think that the longer [non-use] continues the more readily will the conclusion be
reached that the person entitled to the benefit of the easement may be deemed to have
abandoned it, unless of course there is proof of facts or circumstances which provide a
satisfactory explanation for the non-user and which negative any intention of
abandonment.
See also McIntyre v Porter [1983] 2 VR 439.
16 (1973) 128 CLR 274: 1 ALR 104.
17 See, eg, Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 49; Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) ss 73–73A;
Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 229A; Land Titles Act (Tas) s 108(2).
18 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 49(2); Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 229A; Land
Titles Act 1980 s 108(3) and Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 73(3).
19 Riley v Penttila [1974] VR 547 at 574; (1974) 30 LGRA 79 at 106.
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based on the identified legislative intent behind s 89 of the Conveyancing Act
1919. This section provides, and is replicated in Queensland, Western
Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory,20 that:
(1) Where land is subject to an easement or a profit a prendre or to a restriction or
an obligation arising under covenant or otherwise as to the user thereof, the Court
may from time to time, on the application of any person interested in the land, by
order modify or wholly or partially extinguish the easement, profit a prendre,
restriction or obligation upon being satisfied: . . .
(b) that the persons of the age of eighteen years or upwards and of full capacity
for the time being . . . by their acts or omissions may reasonably be
considered to have abandoned the easement . . .
As noted by Walsh J in Treweeke in commenting on the interpretation of
this section:
The [second] proposition is that even where the dominant land and the servient land
are registered under the Real Property Act and notifications of the existence of the
easement appear on the certificates of title relating to both parcels of land, the
easement may become liable to be extinguished and may cease to be enforceable by
the person for the time being registered as proprietor of the dominant tenement . . .
The second of them must be accepted because of the express provision contained in
the [legislation] . . . The provision clearly contemplates that orders will be made
which affect rights which were vested in the registered proprietor, according to the
state of the register, at and after the time when he acquired his title to the dominant
tenement. It is, of course, the function of the court to give effect to the intention
which it finds to be expressed in the provision, notwithstanding that it may operate
as a limitation upon the conclusiveness of the register, which is conferred, as to
matters of title, subject to specified exceptions, by the provisions of the
[legislation].21
Despite the apparent clarity in this legislation to allow common law principles
to override the effect of the Register, the legislation fails the address that more
fundamental point — is it only the conduct and intent of the current registered
proprietor that is relevant, or is it possible to consider the acts of previous
registered proprietors.
In the remaining States and Territories (South Australia and the Australian
Capital Territory), the law is presumably following the Victorian authority —
the certificate of title will be conclusive evidence of the state of the title,
therefore the easement remains enforceable until removed.22
These legislative differences, (despite highlighting the need for a national
approach to land registration) leave open for analysis the issue at first
principles — should common law abandonment apply in a system where the
title is neither historical nor derivative, and if the answer to that is yes, should
20 NSW: Conveyancing Act 1919 s 89; Qld: Property Law Act 1974 s 181; WA: Transfer of
Land Act 1893 s 129C; Tas: Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 s 84C and the NT:
Law of Property Act s 177.
21 Treweeke v 36 Wolseley Road Pty Ltd (1973) 128 CLR 274 at 285 per Walsh J (emphasis
added); 1 ALR 104.
22 For example, s 73 of the Victorian Transfer of Land Act 1958 s 73 states that:
‘(1) A registered proprietor may make application in an appropriate approved form to the
Registrar for the deletion from the Register of any easement in whole or in part where I has
been abandoned or extinguished.’ Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 64, 90B; Land Titles Act
1925 (ACT) s 103E.
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the subjective mental state of a predecessor in title to the dominant owner be
part of the formal equation in deciding that the intent to abandon does in fact
exist. Contrast the following comments (the first emanating from New South
Wales, the second from Victoria):
I am bound to hold that, in considering whether an easement should be held to
have been abandoned, where a notification of that easement appears on both
certificates of title, I must have regard to the acts of omissions of registered
proprietors who were predecessors in title of the present registered proprietor.23
Each [Riley v Penttila andWebster v Strong], however, provided further and more
direct support for the conclusion I have reached [that the easement had not been
abandoned]. Each stands for the proposition that an easement notified on the
certificate of title remains enforceable by the proprietor of the dominant tenement
even though at common law it would be taken to have been abandoned.24
Given this diversity of opinion, the next section of this article considers the
recent cases where this issue has arisen. What they will illustrate is twofold:
• A confirmation that abandonment at common law is extraordinarily
difficult to establish; and,
• That the judiciary has considered, but not answered the question
under discussion — with this leading to the need for the present
analysis.
The New South Wales cases
The first case to consider is Ashoil Holdings Pty Ltd v Fassoulas.25 The
appellant sought to extinguish an easement over its land. The respondents
were the registered proprietors of the dominant tenement and had become so
in 1995. The easement was created in 1920 and remained on both titles. The
right of way concerned adjoining properties that fronted onto the main road
and ran down the boundary between the properties. Originally provided to
allow access to the rear of the properties, it had remained largely unused.
From 1935, alternative access to the rear had been established and
furthermore, from at least 1966, if not earlier, a paling fence had blocked
access to the right of way, with this replaced subsequently by gates.
Furthermore, in the 1970s, a development proposal by the then owner of the
benefited land would have seen the right of way extinguished — however this
development did not proceed. The court held that these facts were insufficient
to constitute abandonment. Taking into account all matters, there was
inadequate evidence to establish that a firm intent existed on the part of the
dominant tenement’s predecessors to abandon title. Evidence of non-use due
to the paling fence or the gates did not meet the requisite standard. Similarly,
the development proposal having been abandoned provided no support for
intent to abandon. Furthermore, while the alternative access may have seen
non-use of the original right of way, this did not transmit into verification of
23 Proprietors Strata Plan No 9,968 v Proprietors Strata Plan No 11,173 [1979] 2 NSWLR
605 at 616 (emphasis added).
24 Wolfe v Freijahs’ Holdings Pty Ltd [1988] VR 1017 at 1025 (emphasis added).
25 (2005) NSW ConvR 56-125.
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intent to abandon.26 Because of these findings of fact, it was not necessary to
consider the deeper questions of the relationship between indefeasibility and
the paramountcy of the register with the common law notion of abandonment.
As Handley JA succinctly asked, while leaving it open for resolution:
Where both tenements are under common law title the court, in considering the
question of abandonment, can have regard to the acts and omissions of the persons
who owned the dominant tenement since the easement was created. It is not clear
that the position is the same when the titles are under the [Torrens legislation] . . .
[The question is also open] when the dominant tenement is under the [Torrens
legislation, whether it is necessary] to establish that the current registered proprietor,
as one of the persons for the time being entitled, has also abandoned the easement.27
In 2006, these views of Handley JA were acknowledged in the Supreme
Court of New South Wales decision of Walker v Bridgewood,28 but again, not
answered. The right of way granted in 1899 conferred the right on the servient
owners to be able to pass and repass along the right of way delineated in the
plan with or without horses, carts, carriageways or wagons laden or unladen.
The century passed since this grant had seen little use of the right of way, but
this was found not to constitute abandonment. No firm and fixed intent to
abandon was in evidence.29 In commenting on the instant debate, Gzell J
considered that it is open to question whether, in respect of Torrens land, that
it is necessary to show that the current registered proprietor has demonstrated
intent to abandon.30
The Victorian cases
In Riley v Penttila,31 a subdivision plan was prepared whereby the blocks
backed onto a common area known as ‘Outlook Park Reserve’. The developer,
himself retaining ownership of the Reserve granted the right to the transferees
to use and enjoy the reserve ‘for the purposes of recreation or a garden or a
park’. Alongside one of the blocks, various owners of the land had fenced off
part of the reserve, with this originally being used as a tennis court, but then
later as a garden. Within this garden, shrubs, trees, a water reticulation system,
two lampposts, clothes hoists had all, at various times been planted or
constructed. At the time of the litigation the defendants proposed to build a
swimming pool in the disputed area. The plaintiffs, 18 adjoining landowners,
sought to challenge this. In deciding in favour of the plaintiffs, the Victorian
Supreme Court accepted that a valid easement had been created, that at no
stage had it been abandoned, and furthermore, that a claim for adverse
possession could not succeed.
26 For a similar case, see Maher v Bayview Golf Club Ltd (2004) 12 BPR 22,457 where the
court found no evidence of abandonment, despite the dominant tenement never obtaining the
keys to allow access through the gate which blocked the right of way and which was locked
of an evening. The servient tenement sought to argue that there had been part abandonment,
but this was not accepted by the court. There had never been any fixed intent demonstrated
by the dominant tenement never at any time to use to the easement outside of daylight hours.
27 (2005) NSW ConvR 56-125 at [4]–[5].
28 [2006] NSWSC 149 (unreported, 29 March 2006, BC200601993).
29 However, the court did hold that the easement had become obsolete.
30 [2006] NSWSC 149 (unreported, 29 March 2006, BC200601993) at [103]–[104].
31 [1974] VR 547; (1974) 30 LGRA 79.
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Critically the court’s reasoning on abandonment was based on two grounds.
The traditional ground of lack of intention was emphasised;32 however, the
Victorian Supreme Court was also prepared to accept that indefeasibility
attached to an easement validly registered on title. In coming to this
conclusion, Gillard J followed Webster v Strong33 in holding that the system
of land registration known as Torrens (and in doing so quoted directly from
Breskvar v Wall)34 resulted in the certificate as conclusive evidence of the state
of affairs. Therefore, the easement as noted on the title remained an
encumbrance until removed pursuant to the relevant statutory provisions:
Until this is done by the Registrar, then, in my opinion, no abandonment in fact will
affect the conclusive evidence to be found in the certificate of title that the person
named thereon is the owner of the estate in the dominant tenement to which the
easement is stated therein to be appurtenant.35
This Victorian decision was followed some 12 years later by Tadgell J in
Wolfe v Freijahs Holdings Pty Ltd.36 Wolfe sought to remove a registered
easement of carriageway over her land. In doing this, she relied on s 73 of the
Transfer of Land Act 1958 which permitted her to make an application to the
Registrar requesting that an easement be removed where that easement has
been abandoned or extinguished. Subsection 3 provides that:
Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Registrar that any such easement has not
been used or enjoyed for a period of not less than thirty years, such proof shall
constitute sufficient evidence that such easement has been abandoned.
The company successfully argued that it was entitled to rely on its title to
defeat any claim by Wolfe that the easement had been abandoned. The court
accepted that to reach such a conclusion did not deny s 73 of an effective
operation. This procedural,37 evidentiary38 provision was merely designed to
allow the servient proprietor to make an application based on 30 years non-use
in order to make a case for abandonment. The easement, as it is on title will
remain enforceable until it is removed:
abandonment by the registered proprietor of a dominant tenement or by his
predecessors in title will not deprive him of the right to rely on the registered
easement unless and until it is removed from the Register Book pursuant to s 73
. . .39
This latter point has also been more recently accepted by the Victorian
Court of Appeal in Shelmerdine v Ringen Pty Ltd40 where it was accepted that
s 73 does not require the Registrar to determine that an easement has been
abandoned despite the passage of the 30 year period where there is evidence
which would support the view that at common law, the easement would not
have been abandoned.
32 Ibid, at VR 570; LGRA 103.
33 [1926] VLR 509.
34 (1971) 126 CLR 376; 46 ALJR 68.
35 [1974] VR 547 at 574; (1974) 30 LGRA 79 at 107.
36 [1988] VR 1017.
37 Ibid, at 1023.
38 Ibid, at 1024.
39 Ibid, at 1025.
40 [1993] 1 VR 315 at 339.
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A South Australian case
In Yip v Frolich,41 the plaintiff was the owner of the dominant tenement with
the servient tenement immediately to the south of this. Yip conducted a
restaurant on the dominant tenement. On both certificates of title, an easement
was noted which allowed for:
. . . full free and unrestricted right and liberty of entry egress and regress from time
to time . . . and also full free and unrestricted right and liberty . . . to break the
surface [and] dig open up and use the said lands marked Easement for the purpose
of laying down, fixing, taking up, repairing, relaying and renewing pipes therein and
of using and maintaining such pipes.42
The plaintiff claimed that this easement allowed him to have a right of way
over the servient tenement as well as a right to undertake drainage works on
the land. The defendant did not dispute that there was a drainage easement, but
considered that that there was no general right of way, and that in any event,
the easement had been abandoned. Besanko J concluded that as a matter of
construction, the easement conferred only a drainage easement and that there
was no general right of way. Significantly however for present purposes, his
Honour considered that the easement remains enforceable so long as it
remains on title, even though it may have been abandoned at common law:
‘The Court has no power to order the extinguishment of a registered easement
on Torrens Title land.’43 Nevertheless, his Honour did make some
observations on the question of where the intent to abandon can be found:
An initial question arises as to whose conduct and intention [to abandon] is to be
considered in the case of a registered easement under Torrens title land. It is well
established by authority that it is the proprietor’s conduct and intention which must
be considered and not that of, for example, his tenants . . . However, is it the present
proprietor’s conduct and intention only, or does it include the conduct and intention
of previous registered proprietors . . . In my opinion, there is much to be said for the
view that each time a transfer of the dominant land takes place, there is, by virtue
of such transfer, evidence of an intention by the proprietor of the dominant land not
to abandon the easement because the easement is registered on the title. I noted that
Needham J appears to have decided the contrary in Proprietors of Strata Plan No
9968 and Anor v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 11173 and Ors [[1979] 2 NSWLR
605] at 614–16, although it is important to remember that the case [was decided in
a particular statutory context]. In view of my other conclusions it is not necessary
for me to decide this diffıcult point . . .44
Overview on the cases and the legislation
The legislation and case authority portrays an issue incoherently answered on
a national basis and unresolved by present authority. Victoria, South Australia,
41 (2003) 86 SASR 162 (judgment of Besanko J). The matter did go on appeal (2004) 89 SASR
467 — however this court was not required to consider the issue of abandonment, this aspect
of Besanko J’s judgment was not appealed: see (2004) 89 SASR 467 at [4]. In this article,
the decision of the trial Judge will be examined. It can be noted that the Appellate Court
dismissed the appeal — as a matter of construction they, as did the trial Judge, ruled that the
easement was only a drainage easement.
42 See (2003) 86 SASR 162 at [4], where the easement is set out in full.
43 Ibid, at [80].
44 Ibid, at [57] (emphasis supplied).
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and possibly the Australian Capital Territory, by reason of their legislation and
interpretation favour a view that an easement noted on title remains valid
irrespective of any common law abandonment. The support for this flowing
directly from the conclusiveness of the Torrens title. By contrast, the
remaining jurisdictions may well allow for the easement to be considered
abandoned even though it remains on title — though the facts to support this
will be extraordinarily onerous to establish. However, in all jurisdictions, the
question is still open as to whether it is only the intent of the current dominant
tenement that can be considered, or whether, (as at common law), the intent
of the predecessors in title can also be considered. Should it be the former, the
circumstances in which abandonment will be possible in respect of Torrens
land will be extraordinarily small.
Part 3: The goals of Torrens
As noted above, the cases are jurisdiction specific. Therefore, to answer this
from first principles, it is necessary to consider the objectives of the Torrens
system, with this best understood by an analysis of land registration systems
prior to the introduction of Torrens.
Land registration systems prior to Torrens
Fundamentally, land title systems have one primary goal — that of ensuring
economic efficient transfer of land. How best to manage and facilitate this has
long been a goal of society, with early attempts dating back to the fifteenth and
sixteenth century and the time of Henry VIII and later, Queen Anne.45 In a
contemporary context, not only does the transfer of land serve and meet the
basic human need for shelter, but its assignability is a valuable commercial
commodity. Society therefore has a key interest in ensuring that this can be
done securely and with a minimum cost. The first method of conveyancing
land was known as the feoffment and livery of seisin. This involved the
grantor (the feoffer) giving a sod of the soil to the recipient (feoffee), with this
person then left in possession. This method was eventually supplanted by a
process whereby the purchaser was required to check each and every
document associated with the land from the time of the Crown grant until the
time or purchase. Accordingly, at common law, and prior to the introduction
of statute based registration systems, conveyancing depended upon ensuring
that each disposition since the original Crown grant had been properly
recorded, and if need be extinguished (such as a mortgage). However, this did
not prevent any number of errors creeping into the process, with such mistakes
largely undiscoverable. This could include, for example:
• The deliberate removal of a document, leading to an interest being
undiscoverable and unknown until post settlement;
• The capacity of the vendor to sell the property to two individuals,
with the latter usually having no recourse other than a personal action
against the vendor;46
45 H W B Mackay, ‘Registration of Title to Real Estate’ (1897) 11 Harvard L Rev 301.
46 Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) 7 Ch App 259; Boyce v Beckman (1890) 11 LR(NSW) 139.
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• The arcane language used in many documents, the true effect of
which would be difficult to establish with this necessitating the use of
paid conveyancing professionals; and
• Finally, and most critically for present purposes, the search of the
documents would not necessarily disclose interests that would be
obtained by means other than documentary evidence — such as
possessory interests (eg, prescriptive easements, oral tenancies,47
equitable easements).48
Because of these problems, statutory incursions were many and varied.
First, the period required to search back was reduced, generally to 30 years.49
The next step was more dramatic. Legislatures established the system of
registration of title, with the party first to register to be given priority,50 though
it did not operate to cure the defects that may have existed in the title prior to
registration.51 In addition, a person registering with notice was still bound by
that interest.52 It was these latter points that ultimately would lead to the
Torrens system — the need to correct the errors of the past, and to reduce the
cost of transacting. As noted in the original preamble to the Torrens statute of
South Australia (Real Property Act 1858), the ‘inhabitants of the Province of
South Australia are subjected to losses, heavy costs, and much perplexity, by
reason that the laws relating to the transfer and encumbrance of freehold and
other interests in land are complex, cumbrous, and unsuited to the
requirements of the said inhabitants’. Accordingly, the Torrens system was
created, with its notion of indefeasibility, with this meaning that the certificate
of title would be seen as conclusive evidence ‘that the person named . . . as the
proprietor of or having any estate or interest in . . . the land therein described
is seised or possessed of such estate and interest’.53 This was supported by the
statutory recognition that the registered proprietor would only be subject to
such estates or interests as indicated on the certificate of title.54 In addition, the
registered proprietor would not be affected by notice of an interest not on the
47 White v Neaylon (1886) 11 App Cas 171.
48 Darbyshire v Darbyshire (1905) 2 CLR 787.
49 Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 53; Property LawAct 1974 (Qld) s 237; Property LawAct
1958 (Vic) s 44; Sale of Land Act 1970 (WA) s 22; Conveyancing and Law of Property Act
1884 (Tas) s 35 (20 year time limit). In South Australia, the period required to search back
would be the common law equivalent of 60 years — though this is largely irrelevant, as that
jurisdiction has virtually completed the transition of all titles to Torrens title.
50 Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) Pt XXIII; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) ss 241–249;
Registration of Deeds Act 1935 (SA); Registration of Deeds Act 1935 (Tas); Property Law
Act 1958 (Vic) Pt I; Registration of Deeds Act 1856 (WA).
51 Re Cooper (1881) 20 Ch D 611.
52 Sydney & Suburban Mutual Permanent Building Society & Land Investment Assoc v Lyons
[1894] AC 260.
53 See Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 52; Land Title Act 2000 (NT) s 47; Land Title Act 1994
(Qld) s 46; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 80; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 39; Transfer of
Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 41; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 63; Real Property Act 1900
(NSW) s 40.
54 See Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 58; Land Title Act 2000 (NT) s 188; Land Title Act 1994
(Qld) s 184; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 69; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 40; Transfer of
Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 42; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 68; Real Property Act 1900
(NSW) s 42.
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title.55 The change was therefore complete and dramatic. Not only was the
purchaser of land no longer required to make comprehensive historical
searches, but also the knowledge that they may have of other interests was no
barrier to accepting a clear and unencumbered interest. Title was by
registration, rather than registration of title.56 Not only was the process of
conveyancing altered, but the substantive law.
What is the Torrens system
The Torrens system is a positive system, one where the register is conclusive
evidence of the state of the title. It does not merely indicate ownership,
registration grants ownership. It is the act of registration which provides the
indefeasibility and which clears the defects that may have been evident prior
to this act. By contrast, a negative system, such as that operable under the
Registration of Deeds legislation merely operated to adduce evidence of
ownership.57 In effect, Torrens cured the defects — the fact that registration
came about because of a void or voidable instrument was irrelevant. Provided
the party registering does not come within a number of exceptions (most
notably fraud or in personam), then the Register will operate to validate what
would, at common law, have been an ineffectual transaction. Three elements
operate to bring about this positivism:
• The concept of the mirror58 — that is the title reflects precisely what
interests affect that parcel of land, with each disposition operating as
a surrender and reissue by the Crown,59 (historical malfeasance was
therefore irrelevant)60;
• The curtain — that nothing behind the Register would enervate the
interests reflected from the mirror; and
• For those adversely affected by the function of this system,
compensation would be payable through a State guarantee.61
These principles were however, never absolute.62 A raft of exception was
55 See Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 59; Land Title Act 2000 (NT) s 188; Land Title Act 1994
(Qld) s 184; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 72, 186–187; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 41;
Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 43; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 134; Real Property
Act 1900 (NSW) ss 43/43A.
56 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376 at 385; 46 ALJR 68 at 70.
57 See P E Norman, Photogrammetry and the Cadastral Survey, Paul E Norman International
Training Centre Series A No 33, Delft, The Netherlands, 1965, cited by P O’Connor,
‘Registration of Invalid Dispositions: Who Gets the Property’ in E Cooke (Ed), Modern
Studies in Property Law: Vol III, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005,
pp 46, 57.
58 L McCrimmon, ‘Protection of Equitable Interests under the Torrens System: Polishing the
Mirror of Title’ (1994) 20 MonLR 300.
59 R R Torrens, The South Australian System of Conveyancing by Registration of Title,
Adelaide, Register and General Observer Printing Offices, 1859, p 9.
60 The title is neither historical nor derivative: Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376 at 386; 46
ALJR 68 at 70.
61 Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) ss 109–111: Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) ss 126–127;
Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 189; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 203–211; Transfer of Land
Act 1893 (WA) ss 201–205; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) ss 152–153; Land Titles Act 1925
(ACT) ss 145–146; Land Title Act 2000 (NT) ss 192–196.
62 R Atherton, ‘Donees, Devisee and Torrens Title: The Problem of the Volunteer under the
Real Property Acts’ (1998) 4 Aust J Leg Hist 121 at 125.
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statutorily delineated (such as fraud, misdescription, unregistered leases,
omitted easements, adverse possession and conflicting titles), with this also
impacted by overriding legislation, claims accepted at common law (such as
in personam),63 and the capacity of the Registrar to correct the Register in
stated circumstances.64 Each exception potentially operating to undermine the
effectiveness of the Register and seriously influencing the independence of the
Register from the mistakes of history. The question raised in this article is can,
and more importantly, should a further basis for exception be made — that of
abandoned easements at common law, or should we treat indefeasibility with
‘the utmost respect and [apply it] according to its tenor’?65 If property law is
‘nothing but a basis of expectation’,66 then how should the law respond to
meet the expectations of the community in this area? Does the security
operative on indefeasibility of title operate with such certainty, clarity and
hard-edged application that it invariably leads to unfairness?67 On the other
hand, does it provide the crystalline certainty required of an asset so
fundamental to human existence that without it, the competition that
invariably exists for the scarce resource would result in anarchy and chaos?As
Rose notes:
Economic thinkers have been telling us for at least two centuries that the more
important a given kind of thing becomes for us, the more likely we are to have these
hard-edged rules to manage it. We draw these ever-sharper lines around our
entitlements so that we know who has what, and so that we can trade instead of
getting into the confusions and disputes that would only escalate as the goods in
question became scarcer and more highly valued.68
For this reason, and while there is no doubt that the security provided by
indefeasibility of title suscitates a largely efficient allocation of resources, with
the facility to identify relevant stakeholders easily and the consequential
capacity to delineate their entitlements with meticulousness and assurance, the
question remains whether this ex-ante homogeneity leads to such unfairness
and harshness that it must yield. The laws answer was an unequivocal yes —
63 For an overview, see B Edgeworth, C Rossiter and M Stone, Sackville and Neave Property
Law Cases and Materials, 7th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004, at [5.71]ff.
64 Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 14; Land Title Act 2000 (NT) s 17; Land Title Act 1994 (Qld)
s 15; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 220; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) ss 139, 140 and 142;
Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 103; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 188; Real
Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 12.
65 Owen J in Conlan v Register of Titles (2001) 24 WAR 299 at [196].
66 C Rose, ‘Crystals and Mud in Property Law’ (1988) 40 Stanford L Rev 577 at 577, quoting
J Bentham, Theory of Legislation, Principles of the Civil Code, Pt 1 Ch 8 p 68 (Baxi (Ed),
Hildreth translation, 1975).
67 As noted in the context of a property based investment scheme:
In my view there is some (admittedly limited) scope within the recognised exceptions [to
indefeasibility] to import notions of fairness. But as the fact situation of the case
demonstrates, totally innocent people are going to be hurt by the resolution of the legal
issues and their application to the disaster that others have foisted on them. There is no
way that the questions raised by this case can be answered without some of the investors,
through no fault of their own, being unable to recover all or some of the money they have
invested. Accordingly, to use general notions of fairness as a means if implying further
exceptions into the statutory scheme is apt to raise as many questions as it will answer.
Conlan v Register of Titles (2001) 24 WAR 299 at [194].
68 Rose, above n 66, at 577–8.
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in certain instances the sharp distinct edge of indefeasibility had to yield.
Examples quickly multiplied. The woman whose husband had fraudulently
increased the mortgage by an unauthorised use of the certificate of title could
prevail over the innocent mortgagee,69 and the individual who discovered two
years after sale that a mistake had led to a block of units being transferred,
rather than a vacant block, was entitled to rectification.70 An option to renew
a lease, mistakenly included in the registered lease could also be removed, the
lessee’s conduct amounting to sharp practice.71 Knowledge of a breach of trust
could also suffice to upset the conclusiveness established by the register.72 The
doctrine of notice, though abandoned by the Torrens system prescript that
notice was not to be imputed as fraud,73 was still able to play a role,74 and
finally, the road to ephemeral redemption was complete, in personam could be
established to find a prescriptive easement where there was no evidence that
the servient owner had in any way acted unconscionably or had acquiesced in
the creation of the easement.75 The guiding hand of fairness and conscionable
conduct was to soften the sharpness of Torrens’ idealistic and acutely distinct
aims.76 The crystalline formation of hard-edged property doctrines had given
way to the mud of conscionability and justice inter-partes.77 The issue that will
be examined in the next section is the extent to which these ideals should be
extended to encompass allowing the common law abandonment of easements
to override the indefeasibility established by the register, and allied to this,
should the intent of predecessors in title be imputed or attached to the intent
of the current registered proprietor of the dominant tenement.
Part 4: Aligning the goals of Torrens with common
law abandonment of easements
In a modern market-driven economy, the starting point for analysis must be
economics. This discipline instructs us to recognise that scarce resources need
to be allocated to the highest value use and that this can only be done if one
is guaranteed with certainty the extent of their entitlement. Transaction and
information costs would then be lower,78 with this translating to a strict
interpretation of Torrens — the mirror of the Register forever polished and the
69 Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance v Gosper (1991) 25 NSWLR 32.
70 Lukacs v Wood (1978) 19 SASR 520.
71 Majestic Homes Pty Ltd v Wise [1978] Qd R 225.
72 Tara Shire Council v Garner [2003] 1 Qd R 556; cf LHK Nominees Pty Ltd v Kenworthy
(2002) 26 WAR 517; Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133.
73 See Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 59; Land Title Act 2000 (NT) s 188; Land Title Act 1994
(Qld) s 184; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 72, 186–187; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 41;
Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 43; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 134; Real Property
Act 1900 (NSW) ss 43/43A.
74 Moffett v Dillon [1999] 2 VR 480 (this dispute was treated as one between competing
equities).
75 Golding v Tanner (1991) 56 SASR 482; cf Williams v State Transit Authority of New South
Wales (2004) 60 NSWLR 286; 11 BPR 21,517 where the NSW Court of Appeal expressed
considerable unease with the decision in Golding. See (2004) 60 NSWLR 286; 11 BPR
21,517 at [116]–[136].
76 See, generally, J McConvill, ‘Equity in the Torrens System’ (2000) 8 APLJ Lexis 7.
77 To borrow the language used by Rose, above 66.
78 C Holderness, ‘A Legal Foundation for Exchange’ (1985) 14 Jnl of Legal Studies 321.
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curtain never drawn. The potential purchaser of Torrens land able to rely on
the information provided by the register, secure in the knowledge that this is
backed by a State guarantee. Accordingly, this would instruct us to find that
the current registered proprietor of a dominant tenement cannot lose the
benefit of an easement through the notions of common law principles. In
addition, the conduct and intent of previous registered proprietors could, under
no circumstances, bind or affect the current title holder. Information would not
be asymmetric and no deadweight or economic loss would result. Transaction
costs would be low and commercial certainty enhanced. In addition, it is now
recognised that certainty of property law has a direct relationship with the
prosperity of its citizens. ‘Laws that ensure the security and transferability of
property establish the framework of incentives that enable the creation of new
wealth from existing assets.’79 This is not only supported by the notion that a
conveyancing system should protect the reasonable expectations of those who
purchase in good faith — the concept of dynamic security,80 with this
dovetailing with the economic beliefs that a lowering of transaction costs
through the creation of more certain rules assists the efficient allocation of
resources. Importantly, however, nothing is lost even if static security (the idea
that preference is given to existing owners) is preferred. Under this scenario,
the gain in dynamic security, (through indefeasibility of title) is not
counterbalanced by any loss in static security — indeed by the recognition that
the easement as noted on the dominant tenement is still valid, with this
clarified by purchase, both static and dynamic security are enhanced.81 Further
economic support for suggesting that common law principles need to give way
to indefeasibility can also be found in the study of Miceli82 who found that the
Torrens system will lead to higher property values ceteris paribus than other
forms of land registration.
Behavioural economics also indirectly supports the idea that common law
principles of abandonment should not apply to an easement registered on the
dominant tenement. Studies indicate that if consumers are given the
opportunity of losing $50, or of relinquishing a gain of the same amount, the
individual will choose to relinquish the gain.83 Applying this to the instant
matter, if the decision is that easement has been abandoned, the purchaser of
the dominant tenement will feel this loss more significantly, than the gain
obtained by the servient tenement — who has seen the removal of the right of
the dominant tenement to use that easement. In other words, people are loss
averse. They will see the loss of something as greater than the utility
associated with gaining that item.84 ‘Because a loss is felt more sharply than
79 P O’Connor, ‘Registration of Title in England and Australia: A Theoretical and Comparative
Analysis’ in E Cooke (Ed),Modern Studies in Property Law: Vol II, Hart Publishing, Oxford
Portland Oregon, 2003, p 84.
80 See the discussion of the difference between dynamic and static security in O’Connor, above
n 79, at 85–6.
81 This may be contrasted with other types of transactions. See O’Connor, above n 57, at 60.
82 T J Miceli, ‘Title Systems and Land Values’ (2002) 45 Jnl of Law and Economics 565 .
83 See, generally, D Kahneman, J L Knetsch and R H Thaler, ‘Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’ (1990) 98 Jnl of Political Economy 1325.
84 A Tversky and D Kahneman, ‘Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference dependant
model’ (1991) 106 Quarterly Jnl of Economics 1039. See also O’Connor, above n 57, at 62
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a forgone gain, there is extra reason to be solicitous about protecting buyers
against nondisclosure . . ..’85
Finally, neoclassical economics has recognised for many years that
information and its non-disclosure can create risks of market failure where
individuals are unable to distinguish between high quality and low quality
items.86 Thus a potential purchaser of premises, having viewed the certificate
of title and seeing the existence of an easement may suffer a surprise
post-purchase when an application is made by the servient tenement to have
the easement removed with an argument that at common law (and taking into
account the interests of previous registered proprietors), the easement has
been abandoned. Given that this is not what the purchaser bargained for, if
widespread, the market may well become dysfunctional or, perhaps more
realistically, see significantly higher transaction costs incurred in the process
of search and settlement.
If left at this the answer would be obvious, common law principles should
not intervene. The allocations between the parties would be fixed ex-ante, and
prevent an amoral grab for amorphous interests. In effect, the rules are certain.
However, the law, and particularly when it intersects with economics, is never
that clear. As noted by Rose: ‘hard-edged crystal doctrines systematically
abandon people to the wiles of the bad and the mean-spirited’.87 For this
reason, the law will seek to intervene in appropriate private inter-partes
disputes, while at the same time promoting this as an exception to the notion
of indefeasibility. Thus in personam, overriding legislation, statutory
incursions to indefeasibility, and possessory rights (such as adverse
possession)88 are all seen as exceptions, justified by statutory fiat (such as
fraud), or by reference to the recognition that a registered proprietor cannot
use the indefeasibility granted by title to forestall the meeting of their personal
obligations (such as an obligation to sell the property). In the instant matter
some analogy and lessons can be drawn from adverse possession, where the
acts of successive adverse possessors can be added together to meet the
requirements of the legislation.89 By contrast, (that other use based land
interest) the prescriptive easement, based as it is on the fiction of the lost
modern grant, has been held in the South Australian Supreme Court decision
of Golding v Tanner90 to be claimable against the current registered proprietor
but only where that individual was in possession of the servient tenement
throughout the entire period of use. The registered proprietor could then be
required to execute the appropriate documents to record the easements.
85 M A Eisenberg, ‘Disclosure in Contract Law’ (2003) 91 Calif L Rev 1645 at 1676.
86 First recognised by GAkerlof, ‘The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism’ (1970) 84 Quarterly Jnl of Economics 488.
87 Rose, above n 66, at 592.
88 Though the position is not uniform throughout Australia, with some jurisdictions not
allowing for claims to be made by way of adverse possession. See Transfer of Land Act
1958 (Vic) s 42; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 68; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 138U;
Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 69; Land Title Act 2000 (NT) s 198; Real Property Act 1900
(NSW) Pt 6A; Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 99; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 251.
89 Mulcahy v Curramore Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 464; Salter v Clarke (1904) 4 SR(NSW)
280.
90 Goldberg v Tanner (1991) 56 SASR 482; relying in part on Australian Hi-Fi Pty Ltd v Gehl
[1979] 2 NSWLR 618 and the provisions of the SA legislation: Real Property Act 1886 s 84.
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However, the purchaser would not be bound by the acts of her or his
predecessor. This acceptance that prescriptive easements could be obtained in
respect of Torrens land was however questioned and significantly confined in
the NSW Court of Appeal decision in Williams v State Transit Authority
(NSW).91 The court in this case rejected any notion that the doctrine of lost
modern grant could extend to the Torrens System. It was to ‘pile fiction upon
fiction to extend the doctrine of lost modern grant into the Torrens system
because . . . that system contemplates title at law as arising only upon
registration’.92 Significantly, the court also went on to make the following
strong pronouncements as to the policy basis of the Torrens System:93
The Torrens system has its own policies, including the basal concept of title by
registration. In any event, as I have endeavoured to show, the adaptation of the
doctrine as the basis of a novel personal right involves piling fiction upon fiction . . .
To reject the incorporation into the Torrens system of the limited version of the
doctrine of lost modern grant suggested by Golding is not to deny the effect of the
well-established authorities . . . Such incorporation would however stretch the
doctrine to breaking point, contradict the basal principles of title by registration and
displace long established authority in this State.94
Orthodox legal reasoning, combined with classical economics would
therefore support that abandonment of Torrens easements, even if those
jurisdictions, where it is possible, should only be available where the intent
necessary is that of the current registered proprietor. The highest judicial
support for this can also been seen in the obiter comments of Brennan J in the
High Court of Australia in Bahr v Nicolay (No 2)95 where his Honour
recognised that indefeasibility was designed to ‘protect a transferee from
defects in title of the transferor, not to free him from interests with which he
has burdened his own title’.
Applying these ideas to the issue of abandonment of easements on Torrens
land, the question that needs to be considered is whether the principles of
adverse possession (successive owners can be joined to satisfy the timeframe),
or prescriptive easements (where in obiter, the courts appear to recognise that
only the acts of the current registered proprietor is applicable) should apply.
If we are to depart from an economic view of certainty of title, the loss felt by
non-abandonment must be so disproportionate as to outweigh the negative
impact that an exception to indefeasibility would countenance. In effect, is the
91 (2004) 60 NSWLR 286; 11 BPR 21,517.
92 Ibid, at [129].
93 The decision in Williams has been subject to some criticism, see P Butt, ‘Easements by
Prescription; An Update’ (2005) 79 ALJ 605 at 606:
But in the absence of any transfer of ownership, the re would appear to be no threat to
the integrity of the Torrens system in requiring the owner of the servient land to grant an
easement to ‘lock in’ a prescriptive right acquired by 20 years’ use against that person.
‘Personal equities’ of this kind have long been recognised in the Torrens system. See also
B Edgeworth, ‘The fate of prescriptive easements under the NSW Torrens System’
(2004) Law Society Jnl (November) 66; M McGuire, ‘A New South Wales perspective
on implied and prescriptive easements and the rights in personam exception to
indefeasibility of title’ (2006) 2 APLJ 228. Leave to appeal the Williams decision to the
High Court was refused: [2005] HCA Trans 296 (per Gummow and Callinan JJ).
94 (2004) 60 NSWLR 286; 11 BPR 21,517 at [133]–[134].
95 (1988) 164 CLR 604 at 653; 78 ALR 1.
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result so dramatically unexpected that the law has no alternative other than to
step in and ameliorate the strictness of the rule. The intuitive response to this
is no. In addition it must be recognised that this system of title by registration
is dramatically different and not, in any way, founded on the common law
precepts of possessory title. It is, as noted in Williams, founded on the ‘basal
concept of title of registration’.96A similar view was expressed by Barrett J in
Carpenter v McGrath (in the context of implied easements) that:
The Register remains conclusive and, if it is altered by recognition of an instrument
brought into existence pursuant to an order of a court, the new form it thereby
assumes is likewise conclusive.97
Conclusion
The notion of one Torrens system is of course a myth. Amyriad of differences
exist between the Australian States and Territories, let alone, the differences
that would come out in a comparison with other overseas jurisdictions.
However, it is because of this very reason that those aspects that are generic
should be constantly reinforced, and if the opportunity arises to bring a
common understanding to a particular branch, then this occasion must be
seised. For the reasons noted above it is suggested that common law
abandonment of easements noted on the title should not be recognised, and
even if this is statutorily required by the terms of the legislation, that the
conduct and intent of previous registered proprietors should not be taken into
account. Support for this came from a number of sources. First, economics
and its appeal to the renitence of rules indicate that the lower transaction costs
associated with Torrens title, and the advantages that this gives to commercial
certainty, should prevail. Second, static and dynamic security and their appeal
to the interests of the prevailing owner and the assistance to the good faith
purchaser lend weight to the argument. Finally, work on consumer behaviour
highlights that an individual will feel the loss of something more than a
commensurate gain. For all of these reasons, the dominant tenement who
purchases title with an easement noted on that title should not be subject to
losing that interest based on the notion of common law abandonment. The
interest should remain effective until removed. Where the legislation appears
to provide a different course, the legislation should be limited by recognition
that it is only the intent of the current registered proprietor that should be taken
into account. It is only by doing this that justice is given to the fundamental
theoretical construct of Torrens — each disposition operates a reissue from the
Crown and that this provides for immediate indefeasibility. The weight of the
argument strongly favours that, in this situation, Torrens title should be given
its paramountcy.
96 Williams v State Transit Authority of New South Wales (2004) 60 NSWLR 286; 11 BPR
21,517 at [133].
97 (2005) 12 BPR 23,073 at [74]. On appeal from this decision McGrath v Campbell (2006)
NSW ConvR 56-159, the court also endorsed the idea that the indefeasibility provisions
should trump easements allegedly created by implication or prescription. However, it was
not necessary for the court to conclude this matter. See (2006) NSW ConvR 56-159 at [118].
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POSSESSION, INDEFEASIBILITY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
LYNDEN GRIGGS* 
 
 
 
 
 
The interaction of land based doctrines with human rights law has, to date, rarely 
attracted the interest of land lawyers. However, with the surge in human rights 
jurisprudence, and the European litigation of JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and 
Ors, it is becoming apparent that human rights may have a significant future role to 
play in real property law. This paper examines the potential for that conflict in three 
areas. Two of these areas represent archetypal possession of land doctrines (adverse 
possession and prescriptive easements), with the third, the ideological foundation stone 
of registration land systems, indefeasibility. The suggestion is made that any resolution 
between these established real property doctrines and human rights lies not so much in 
logic, but in the value judgments that the courts will make in balancing the economic 
imperatives of the Torrens system with the historical and traditional importance of 
possession to land ownership. In other words, how we define, determine and allocate 
realty interests in contemporary Australia. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Australia has recently seen a surge in the evolution of human rights jurisprudence. With 
Australia as the only common law country without some kind of national charter of 
human rights,1 individual States and Territories have assumed the leadership mantle of 
introducing this to our legal system. For example, Victoria has enacted the Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, with the Australian Capital Territory 
passing the Human Rights Act 2004.2 However, the Victorian legislation is the only Act 
which directly impacts on property; section 20 of this providing that ‘A person must not 
be deprived of his or her property other than in accordance with the law.’  
 
Initially, lawyers may have thought that human rights jurisprudence would have no 
impact on established land doctrines. 3  However, unquestioning faith in the non-
                                                 
*  Senior Lecturer, University of Tasmania. The author thanks the referees for their insightful 
comments. 
1  Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, A Charter of Rights for Tasmania, Issues Paper No 11 (2006) 4.1.1. 
The Federal Labor Government has also indicated that they place this matter under consideration. 
2  Tasmania has recommended the introduction of such a Charter, Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, A 
Charter of Rights for Tasmania, Report No 10 (2007) recommendation 16 was: ‘The right not to be 
deprived of property except on just terms.’ 
3  J Howell, ‘Land and Human Rights’ (1999) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 287, 287 notes: 
‘Historically, property lawyers would have tended to ignore any possible human rights aspects to 
their work. This is perhaps understandable, it seems axiomatic that anything as home grown as 
English land law could not be affected by foreign codes.’ See also: A Goymour, ‘Proprietary Claims 
Vol 8 No 2 (QUTLJJ)  Possession, Indefeasibility and Human Rights 
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applicability of this jurisprudence may ultimately be misguided. For this reason land 
lawyers will need to, for the moment at least, take a watching brief. A failure to do this 
may quickly see established property doctrines evaporate in the arguably muddy, 
amorphous and presumably just waters of human rights. Accordingly, the purpose of 
this paper is to consider the extent to which a broadly based human rights charter with a 
stated applicability to ownership of land would impact upon recognised doctrines of real 
property. For the purposes of this analysis three are considered particularly germane, the 
first two based on the archetypal property law doctrine, possession (adverse possession 
and prescriptive easements), with the third the foundation stone of land systems built on 
registration, indefeasibility. 
 
II ADVERSE POSSESSION 
 
Based on land’s historical recognition of possessory interests, and the idea that only one 
person can be seized (or possessed) of property at one time, 4  adverse possession 
provides judicial recognition for the trespasser – that individual who for a requisite 
period of time5 utilises land for their own use and excludes others, (including the true 
owner) from occupation. On one view it turns what would otherwise be a moral wrong 
into a legal right.6 By virtue of government fiat, the trespasser is entitled to extinguish 
the registered, or in the eyes of the community, the true owner’s interest in the land - the 
possessory right having met the judicially crafted criteria eliminating the interest of the 
registered owner.7 The rule operates to modify the sovereign principle that an individual 
can do what they like with their property. The operation and interaction of this land 
doctrine with human rights is highlighted by the recent European litigation of JA Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors,8 a decision that on a private law level ended its 
journey in the House of Lords, but which for Pye and the English Government 
continued to be litigated in Strasbourg and the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
and Human Rights – A Reservoir of Entitlement’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 696, 696. As 
noted there (at 696) is in quoting from R (on the application of Gangera) v Hounslow LBC [2003] 
HLR 68, [49] ‘the Convention might fundamentally transform our law as to the enforcement of 
property rights.’ 
4  JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2002] 3 WLR 221, [70]. 
5  Generally either 12 years (Limitations Act 1965 (NSW) s 27(2); Limitations of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) 
ss 13, 24; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) ss 18, 21; and Limitation Act 1935 (WA) ss 4, 30) or 15 years 
(Limitations of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 8; and Limitations of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 4). In the 
Australian Capital Territory (Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 69) and the Northern Territory (Land 
Title Act 2000 (NT) s 198) there is no limitation period for an action to recover land. 
6  Note the comments of L Fennell, ‘Efficient Trespass: The Case for Bad Faith Adverse Possession’ 
(2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037, 1055 who suggests that no legal doctrine can 
turn a moral wrong into a right. A number of policies are routinely given to provide support for 
adverse possession. These include that some limitation period is needed to give effect to the status 
quo, that land owners should not rest on their ownership rights, to protect possessors from stale 
claims, and finally, in the context of unregistered (or non-Torrens) land, to allow more efficient 
conveyancing. The seminal statement for these reasons was made by Sir Thomas Plumer MR in 
Marquis Cholmondeley v Lord Clinton (1820) 37 ER 527, 577. 
7  For a discussion of the literature and arguments for and against adverse possession, see Law Reform 
Commissioner of Tasmania, Report on Adverse Possession and other Possessory Claims to Land, 
Report No 73 (1995)  
8  [2002] 3 WLR 221; [2002] UKHL 30 (House of Lords); [2005] EGLR 1 (15 November 2005; 
European Court of Human Rights, Chamber judgment 10 judges sitting); [2007] All ER (D) 177 
(Grand Chamber Judgment, 17 judges sitting).  
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A JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors 
 
The personal representatives of Graham claimed an entitlement to 25 hectares of 
registered land owned by the corporate plaintiff Pye. In 1983, a commercial agreement 
was reached between the parties entitling Graham to use the disputed area to graze 
livestock. The agreement was to last for 11 months. The only method of access to the 
land was though a gate, for which Graham had a key. The agreement expired at the end 
of the 11 months,9 but the parties were unable to renegotiate a new agreement. Despite 
the lack of agreement, Graham and his family continued to use the land and from 
September 1984 the land was used without permission. In 1985, Graham did seek to 
contact the plaintiffs about an agreement. Pye, professional real estate developers, failed 
to respond. In 1997, Graham lodged cautions with the Land Registry claiming to be 
entitled to the land based on adverse possession. Pye sought to challenge those cautions, 
and when Graham died, his wife and estate lodged further cautions against the land. In 
1999, Pye began proceedings to seek possession of the disputed land. The facts 
indicated that from the period of 1984 to 1997, Graham had tilled the land, fertilised and 
limed it, and during that period had never vacated the land. The land was used primarily 
for grazing though in 1994 parts of the land became arable. In giving the leading 
judgment, Lord Browne-Wilkinson summarised the critical issue: ‘The question is 
simply whether the defendant squatter has dispossessed the paper owner by going into 
ordinary possession of the land for the requisite period without the consent of the 
owner.’10 According to the House of Lords any suggestion that possession depended on 
the intention of the true owner was ‘heretical and wrong.’11 Furthermore, it was not 
necessary to consider that there must be some form of ‘confrontational, knowing 
removal of the true owner from possession.’12 With these principles in mind, there was 
no question that Graham had possessed the land for the requisite time. His title could 
trump that of the registered owner. Ownership to land worth £10 000 000 (on the 
registered owner’s view), or £380 725 - £1 150 500 (according to the view of the United 
Kingdom government)13 was to pass to the trespasser without compensation payable to 
the plaintiff.14 
 
This conclusion was not to pass without critical comment by the House of Lords. It was 
arrived at ‘with no enthusiasm’,15 and was unfair, not ‘in the absence of compensation, 
although that is an important factor, but in the lack of safeguards against oversight or 
inadvertence on the part of the registered proprietor’.16  
 
 
                                                 
9  The agreement was constructed to avoid the Grahams obtaining security of tenure under the 
Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 (UK). 
10  JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2002] 3 WLR 221, [36] emphasis my own. 
11  Ibid [45]. Similar principles would seem to operate in Australia. See: Kierford Ridge Pty Ltd v Ward 
[2005] VSC 215, [126] where the Court adopted the principles stated in Powell v McFarlane (1979) 
38 P & CR 452. Powell v McFarlane was adopted by the JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and 
Ors [2002] 3 WLR 221, [31]. 
12  JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2002] 3 WLR 221, [38] (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
13  These figures were quoted in the European Court of Human Rights decision JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & 
Ors v Graham and Ors [2005] EGLR 1, [78]-[9].  
14  The developed value of the land was near £21 000 000. 
15  JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2002] 3 WLR 221, [2] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill), 
quoting from the Trial Judge Neuberger J, JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2000] Ch 
676, 709-10. 
16  JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2002] 3 WLR 221, [73] (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
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B The European Court of Human Rights – Chamber Judgment 
 
In the House of Lords, an argument based on human rights was not pursued – it was 
accepted that the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) did not have retrospective effect to a 
matter that arose prior to its introduction. 17  However two judges in the Court of 
Appeal18 did make passing reference. Mummery LJ framed the matter as involving the 
blocking, through limitation periods, of access to court, and not as a deprivation of 
property. Furthermore, the 12-year time limit was reasonable and did not impose an 
undue burden on any landowner.19 Therefore there was no breach of human rights. 
Similarly, Keene J characterised this as a question concerning limitation rights,20 and as 
these were not incompatible with the Convention, no breach had occurred. 
 
After the House of Lords decision, Pye took the matter to the European Court of Human 
Rights alleging that it had been deprived of its land in a way that was incompatible with 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1. This reads: 
 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided by law and by the general principles of international law. 
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 
 
Four arguments were presented by the government as reasons why the legislation did 
not breach human rights.  
 
First, adverse possession qualified or modified property rights at the time of acquisition. 
In other words, when Pye became the owner it was subject to the limitation periods and 
principles of adverse possession upon becoming registered. That is, every owner has the 
potential to lose land by way of adverse possession after they become the registered 
owner. Ownership is not subject to this condition as an added extra, the notion of land 
ownership includes this as an integral component. This was vehemently rejected by the 
majority of the Court (Pellonpää P, Bratza, Strážnická, and Pavlovschi JJ), who held the 
registered title was absolute and not subject to any limitation or restriction. ‘It was the 
operation of the [legislation] which brought to an end … the applicant’s title and not 
any inherent defect or limitation in that title.’21 The adverse possession legislation only 
became operative at the time when 12 years had passed (the period of limitation), not at 
the time of acquisition.22  
                                                 
17  Ibid [65]. The applicant was thus required to go to Strasbourg for a remedy. 
18  JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2001] Ch 804. 
19  Ibid [43]. 
20  Ibid [46]. Contrast the view of D Rook, Property Law and Human Rights (Blackstone Press, 2001) 
207: ‘[I]s the ability to commence court proceedings to recover property from a trespasser a 
fundamental characteristic of property ownership? If it is, the loss of the right to commence court 
action impinges upon the very nature of property ownership and cannot be artificially dissected from 
it and treated as separate from it.’ 
21  JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2005] EGLR 1, [50]. 
22  Ibid [52]: By contrast, the [English legislation] are in the view of the Court to be seen as ‘biting’ on 
the applicants’ property rights only at the point at which the Grahams had completed 12 years’ 
adverse possession of the applicants’ land and not as delimiting the right at the moment of its 
acquisition. As discussed by Goymour, above n 3, 712, the difficulty is in deciding whether the 
GRIGGS (2008) 
290 
Second, it was argued deprivation was not the result of government action; rather the 
loss was the consequence of Pye neglecting to monitor their land holdings. What was 
deprived was, (as the Court of Appeal in Pye had agreed), their right of access to court, 
not their property.23 Again, this failed to sway the European Court. The legislation alone 
acted to remove the applicants of their title and see that transferred to the Grahams – 
legislation for which the State was responsible.24  
 
The third argument was that the State, through its limitation provisions was controlling 
use, rather than removing the proprietary or possessory rights of Pye. This submission 
similarly held no weight – the fact that the land was transferred between individuals, 
rather than to the State, led to the conclusion that this was a deprivation, rather than a 
control.25  
 
Finally, on the question of proportionality, the majority in the European Court saw the 
result as one of exceptional severity to the applicant. Acquisition of property without 
compensation could only be permitted in exceptional circumstances. Given that the 
government of the United Kingdom had recognised the inadequacies of the law (through 
amendments in the Land Registration Act 2002), the conclusion was established that 
this upset the fair balance between the public interest and the individual’s enjoyment of 
their own possessions.26 
 
By contrast to the majority, the minority (Maruste, Garlicki, and Borrego JJ) saw the 
matter very differently. Disagreeing with the majority that ownership was absolute, and 
considering that the majority had been unreasonably swayed by the legislative changes 
and judicial statements that criticised the doctrine,27 they concluded that Pye should 
have been aware that their property ownership was subject to ‘restrictions, qualifications 
and limitations imposed by legal requirements.’28 
 
This view of the minority has seen academic support. For example, Jones considered 
that Article 1 of the First Protocol was not even engaged by the law of adverse 
possession. He suggests that a fundamental error was made by the Strasbourg Court on 
the basis that Article 1 protects what a person ‘has or has been led to legitimately expect 
that they are to have.’29 Ownership of land is always subject to adverse possession, yet 
the ‘applicant was wrongly allowed to depart Strasbourg entitled to precisely that, 
                                                                                                                                               
legislation operates to shift a proprietary entitlement, or whether the right is inherently limited from 
the start. 
23  JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2005] EGLR 1, [53]. 
24  Ibid [56]. 
25  Ibid[58]-[62]. 
26  Ibid [75]. However, as noted by RG Lee, ‘Less than Nine Points: Adverse Possession and the Right 
to Peaceful Enjoyment of Property’ [2006] Journal of Business Law 853, 858, the new English 
legislation still provides no right to compensation. As noted by the decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights, In the Case of Hellborg v Sweden (Application no 47473/99, [46]) (a decision which 
applied Pye), the Court examines whether the measure taken by the State was lawful, in the general 
interest and whether a ‘fair balance’ was struck between the demands of the public and the protection 
of the individual’s fundamental rights. 
27  JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2005] EGLR 1, [4] (Maruste, Garlicki and Borrego 
JJ). The matter should have been examined as if the legislative changes had not been made. 
28  Ibid [2] (Maruste, Garlicki and Borrego JJ). 
29  O Jones, ‘Down with the Squatters! The European Court of Human Rights and JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd 
v United Kingdom’ (2006) 25 Civil Justice Quarterly 404, 408. 
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ownership free from the risk of adverse possession.’30 It was the tenor of the minority 
judgments and the academic support for them that were adopted by the majority in the 
Grand Chamber Judgment. 
 
C The European Court of Human Rights - Grand Chamber Judgment 
 
The Court held, by a narrow majority of 10 votes to seven that there had been no 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1. Significantly the majority 31  held that the 
statutory provisions which had eliminated Pye’s title were not intended to deprive paper 
owners of their title, but to regulate questions of title.32 Unlike the majority in the earlier 
chamber hearing, who had concluded that, as the property was taken by a private litigant, 
the dispute was about deprivation, this Court considered that the failure of the State to 
recover the property for themselves necessarily led it to be a control of use, rather than a 
deprivation. The second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 was engaged, not the 
first.33 With this as its starting point, and with consideration given to the comparative 
position,34 the Grand Chamber considered that a fair balance had been struck within the 
legislation. Even in the case of registered land, it was open to the legislature to attach 
greater weight to the fact of possession rather than the act of registration.35 Furthermore, 
and whilst accepting that there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality36 
and that a fair balance must be struck, States are to enjoy a wide margin of appreciation, 
‘with regard both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the 
consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest for the purpose of 
achieving the object in question.’37  The applicant companies were also not denied 
procedural protection – the law on adverse possession should not have come as a 
surprise to them and, despite amendments tightening the operation of the principle, the 
facts of the case must be considered in light of the law as it stood at the time.38 
Limitation periods must also operate irrespective of the amount of the claim, the value 
of the land lost by Pye was of no consequence.39  
 
By contrast to the majority judgment, the minority dissenting opinion of Rozakis, 
Bratza, Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Gyulumyan and Šikuta JJ focussed far more on the 
operation of principles relevant to registered land than to the precepts of limitation. This, 
it is respectfully submitted, sits at the core of the differences between the majority and 
minority – to what extent should possessory based principles clothed within limitation 
be subsumed or superior to the tenets of land registration. In their Honour’s view, 
limitation had to be subjugated. Whilst they agreed that the matter stood to be dealt with 
under ‘control of use’, rather than ‘deprivation of possessions’, any resolution had to 
                                                 
30  Ibid 408. 
31  JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2007] All ER (D) 177, 1 (Costa, Zupančič, Lorenzen, 
Cabral Barreto, Butkevych, Baka, Zagrebelsky, Mularoni, Jaeger, Ziemele JJ). 
32  Ibid [66]. 
33  Ibid. For a case note on the Grand Chamber judgment, see: M Dixon, ‘Adverse Possession, Human 
Rights and Land Registration: and They all Lived Happily Every After?’ (2007) 71 Conveyancer 552. 
34  JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2007] All ER (D) 177, [72]. 
35  Ibid [74]. 
36  Ibid [75]. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid [81]. 
39  Ibid [84]. For a cogent criticism of the application of Article 1 (first or second paragraph) to adverse 
possession claims, see: O Jones, ‘Out with the Owners! The Eurasian Sequels to JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd 
v United Kingdom’ (2008) 27 Civil Justice Quarterly 260, 265-266.  
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recognise that the law of adverse possession could only be justified by factors over and 
above the law of limitation.40 In this instance, the fair balance required had not been met. 
They considered the contrast between the gravity of the interference and the justification 
for that interference was so significant that substantial injustice would result from 
allowing the principle of adverse possession to override the registered owner’s title. 
With registered land ownership depending on registration and not on possession, the 
traditional reasons to justify adverse possession lost much of their weight.41 Similarly, 
the lack of compensation, whilst not of itself making the loss of land disproportionate, 
‘[makes] the loss of beneficial ownership the more serious and required, in our view, 
particularly strong measures of protection of the registered owner’s property rights if a 
fair balance was to be preserved.’42 The legislative changes could also not be ignored – 
they were brought about, not as a natural evolution, but as a substantive legal change to 
what was seen as a principle variously described as leading to ‘draconian, unjust, 
illogical and disproportionate’ 43  results. The dissenting opinion of Loucaides and 
Kovler JJ was along similar lines, with their Honours considering that adverse 
possession shows disrespect for the rights and responsibilities of legitimate registered 
owners and can only serve to encourage the ‘illegal possession of property and the 
growth of squatting.’44 
 
III PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS 
 
Prescriptive easements operate to provide legal effect to the de-facto state of affairs 
brought about by possession.45 As with adverse possession, the doctrine has also been 
subject to significant criticism in three Australian States,46 and a majority of an English 
Law Reform Committee recommended the total abolition of prescriptive easements.47 
Unlike adverse possession, however, there is no harmony between the Australian States 
as to their applicability in a system of title by registration. In New South Wales, 
prescriptive easements are presumably not available because of the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Williams v State Transit Authority.48 In Queensland, prescriptive 
easements are also not possible.49 By contrast, in Victoria,50 Tasmania,51 and Western 
                                                 
40  JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd & Ors v Graham and Ors [2007] All ER (D) 177, [7] (of minority opinion). 
41  Ibid [11] (of minority opinion). 
42  Ibid [16] (of minority opinion). 
43  Ibid [21] (of minority opinion). 
44  Ibid [8] (of minority opinion of Loucaides and Kovler JJ). 
45  For a discussion of the differences between limitation and prescription, see: P Omar, ‘Limitation and 
Prescription in English Law: Arguments and Pressures for Reform’ (2006) Australian Property Law 
Journal Lexis 12, 18 -28 of online version.  
46  Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Easements and Covenants, Discussion Paper No 15 (1989); 
Law Reform Committee 1987); Law Reform Commission of Tasmania, Report and 
Recommendations for Reform of Fifteen Conveyancing Matters, Report No 36 (1984). 
47  Law Reform Committee, Fourteenth Report (Acquisition of Easements and Profits by Prescription) 
(Cmnd 3100) (1966) 11. Interestingly a recent review of the law of easements in the United Kingdom 
has not, as least as far as its consultation paper is concerned taken that view: see: The Law 
Commission, Easements, Covenants and Profits á Prendre, Consultation Paper No 186 (2008) 
<www.lawcom.gov.uk/easements.htm> at 10 April 2008.  
48  (2004) 60 NSWLR 286. Special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused [2005] HCA Trans 
296. See the criticism of this conclusion by P Butt, Land Law (LawBook Co, 5th ed, 2006) 781. 
49  Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 198A. See also: A Bradbrook and M Neave, Easements and 
Restrictive Covenants in Australia (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2000) 249-50. 
50  Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 42(2)(d). 
51  Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) pt IXB, div 2. 
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Australia,52 prescriptive easements can exist in respect of Torrens land. The matter is 
unresolved in the other jurisdictions. 53  This division within States as to the 
appropriateness of prescriptive easements not only reflects drafting differences between 
the States, but arguably the deeper issue of uncertainty as to the extent that possessory 
rights should influence Torrens title. If allowing title by adverse possession without 
compensation to the registered owner amounts to a breach of human rights, the same 
result could arguably apply to lesser proprietary rights. However, as was shown in 
Oxfordshire CC v Oxford City Council,54 (in the context of the Commons Registration 
Act 1965 and a claim for a village green) the owner of land still retains their title (unlike 
adverse possession) even though a possessory interest may be claimable against this title. 
Nevertheless, without any consistent basis for their inclusion,55 and cross-jurisdictional 
support for their abolition, a person’s title, which has been lessened by way of a 
prescriptive easement, would have a strong basis on which to allege a breach of human 
rights, (that is, that a deprivation of property has occurred). Support for this view can be 
found in the cases on abandonment of easements, with strong judicial authority that 
common law abandonment of an easement cannot occur until it has been removed from 
the title.56 The only possible retort is that property, in its current context is not so much 
about exclusion, but about access, and that every individual is entitled to the right of 
movement, subject to the mutual obligation of respect inherent in living alongside and 
with others. As noted by Sara:57 
 
Instinctively we feel that land, certainly open land, should not be restricted to its owners. 
If there is a lane leading to my property, I should be allowed to use it. If my drain runs 
under the land of another, he should not be allowed to block it. If I want to walk up 
Snowden or walk in the woods I should be allowed to do so. This is all part of the 
unspoken idea, enshrined in the common law from the beginning, that ownership of land 
is far from absolute. It is qualified by right to freedom of movement, the right or liberty of 
every person to make use of land providing that he does not harm others and the duty of 
the owner of the land to assert his ownership.58 
 
This idea that the stability, rigidity and certainty of property ownership is now being 
inflicted by public law notions of legitimate expectation, fairness and conscience is also 
recognised by Gray:59 
 
The language of ‘property’ begins to disclose a deep subtext of social ‘propriety’ in 
opposition to its once more common connotation of appetitive economic power…. The 
claims of civic property endorsed by the new equity comprise merely the assertion of 
latent human entitlements which have long been submerged by superficial allocations of 
formal title.60  
                                                 
52  Di Masi v Piromalli [1980] WAR 57. 
53  See generally: Bradbrook and Neave, above n 49, ch 11. 
54  [2006] 4 All ER 817. 
55  Various reasons have been suggested, including natural justice, acquiescence, the fiction of a lost 
grant, community convenience – see generally: C Sara, ‘Prescription – What is it for’ (2004) 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 13. 
56  Wolfe v Freijahs Holdings Pty Ltd [1988] VR 1017, applied in Bookville Pty Ltd v O’Loghlen [2007] 
V ConvR 54-734. The matter has also been raised but not answered in Ashoil Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Fassoulas [2005] NSWCA 80; Walker v Bridgewood [2006] NSWSC 149. Compare Proprietors of 
Strata Plan No 9968 and Anor v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 11173 and Ors [1979] 2 NSWLR 605. 
57  See Sara, above n 55. 
58  Ibid 17.  
59  K Gray, ‘Equitable Property’ (1994) 47 Current Legal Problems 157. 
60  Ibid 208. 
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It is this latter aspect that is critical to the topic under consideration. How in a system of 
title by registration, where not only is assertion of ownership established by registration, 
but the substantive requirements of ownership are met by registration, do we balance the 
competing possessory rights with the registered rights? Does the possessory right have 
to give way to the indefeasibility obtained by registration? There is a fundamental 
difference between registered and unregistered land. One depends for its formality on 
possession (unregistered land), with registration the sole criterion for title of registered, 
or Torrens land. On the other hand, should the inculcation of human rights on or over 
Torrens demand that indefeasibility ameliorate to broader community oriented notions – 
for example, the notion that property will cease to be solely concerned with enhancing 
individual welfare, but which implicitly contains a recognition that all ‘interests in land’ 
(with this meant in the wide sense of encompassing the concerns of stakeholders) lie 
interdependent upon each other? Will this recondite sense of property counter the view 
of Lord Wilberforce who argued that registered land systems, ‘intended as it was to 
provide a simple and understandable system for the protection of title to land should not 
be read down or glossed – to do so would destroy the usefulness of the Act … the Act 
itself providing a simple and effective protection for persons in the [unregistered interest 
holder’s position] – viz by registration.’61  
 
IV INDEFEASIBILITY 
 
As readers would be aware, the Torrens process of land registration is a positive, bijural 
system.62 It does not merely recognise rights, it creates them. A failure to register can 
bluntly result in a loss of entitlement, or at least priority.63 This conclusion is arguably 
compounded by the acceptance of immediate indefeasibility.64 As Howell notes,65 a 
right lost through failure to register may well be seen as an expropriation of a property 
interest without compensation, with this leading to a violation of the very Article 
discussed in Pye. With this comment made before Pye, the risk has, in no way been 
diminished by that decision. Whilst the response to this may be simple – the loss of the 
interest is as a consequence of what an individual failed to do, rather than any act of the 
State,66 it masks the far deeper question of how this will mesh with human rights 
considerations. In responding to this conflict between Torrens and human rights, the 
Scottish Law Commission’s discussion paper on land registration67 sought to balance 
any conflict by suggesting that any indemnity given to the purchaser of a void 
transaction should not be by way of indefeasible title (as presently occurs in Australia), 
but in monetary compensation. In doing so, they respond to the recognition that 
immediate indefeasibility can be an undeniably harsh and cruel doctrine,68 and when 
                                                 
61  Midland Trust v Green [1981] AC 513, 528. 
62  Positive in that it provides for the substantive right by the act of registration. Bijural in the way it 
imposes its own rules: See generally: E Cooke, ‘Land Registration: Void and Voidable Titles – A 
Discussion of the Scottish Law Commission’s Paper’ (2004) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 482.  
63  See generally: A Bradbrook, A MacCallum and A Moore, Australian Real Property Law (Thomson 
LawBook Co, 4th ed, 2002) ch 4. 
64  Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376. 
65  Howell, above n 3, 303. 
66  A clear example of that is Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green [1981] AC 513. 
67  Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Land Registration: Void and Voidable Titles (2004) 
<http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/dp125_land_reg.pdf> at 8 October 2008.  
68  Breskvar v White [1978] Qd R 187 illustrates how harsh it can be. In this case, the sequel to Breskvar 
v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, the claimants were statute barred from gaining compensation from the 
assurance fund, as they were outside the time limit. This conclusion was reached despite the 
claimants being unaware until the decision in Breskvar v Wall that their claims against the fraudulent 
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considered in isolation can be seen to bring about unacceptable results. The 
understanding of this highlights that the case for immediate indefeasibility depends 
largely on the value judgments associated with conflicting and competing policies.69 
 
In an attempt to ameliorate this harshness, the Scottish Law Reform Commission 
suggested an unusual solution in seeking to balance the extreme position offered by 
immediate indefeasibility. They recommended that the title of a good faith purchaser 
should be indefeasible, provided that the person from whom they have bought has been 
in possession for a prescribed period (possibly a year). As Cooke notes:70  
 
This is very strange and appears to run counter to the “mirror” principle of registration. 
However, the Commission points out, it avoids some human rights problems under the 
current law. It ensures that “A” [the original registered proprietor] cannot lose his land to 
D [D having purchased from C as a result of a void transaction, perhaps because of fraud 
attributed to B] without some equivalent of notification, because for the land to be out of 
his possession must put him on enquiry. 
 
V AN ANALYSIS IN THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT 
 
As noted by the High Court of Australia in Mabo v State of Queensland (No 2),71 it is 
‘far too late in the day to contemplate an allodial or other system of land ownership.’ 
Upon European settlement, the Crown acquired radical or ultimate title. The sovereign 
is the ‘universal occupant’.72 All land belongs to the Crown and every person73 holds of, 
or from the Crown.74  
 
Furthermore Brennan J, in Mabo v Queensland (No 2)75 commented that: ‘[the doctrine 
of tenure] cannot be overturned without fracturing the skeleton which gives our land 
law it shape and consistency.’76 Critically, however, what this doctrine informs us is that 
ownership was not protected; rather it was seisin77  or possession 78  which enjoyed 
                                                                                                                                               
parties would be of no utility. Another example where the result is seen to be harsh is Canadian 
Pacific Railway Co Ltd v Turta [1954] 3 DLR 1 – the Canadian Pacific Railway, by reason of 
register error, were deprived of $600 000 worth of petroleum rights. They too, were statute barred. 
69  See: W Taylor, ‘Scotching Frazer v Walker’ (1970) 44 Australian Law Journal 248, 251. 
70  E Cooke, ‘Land Registration: Void and Voidable Titles – A Discussion of the Scottish Law 
Commission’s Paper’ (2004) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 482, 490-1. 
71  (1992) 175 CLR 1, 47 (Brennan J). 
72  AG v Brown (1847) 2 SCR (NSW) App 30, 35. 
73  Native title aside. 
74  Of course, this system devolved from the Norman conquest, where William the Conqueror passed the 
following law: ‘We decree also that every freeman shall affirm by oath and compact that he will be 
loyal to King William both within and without England, that he will preserve with him his lands and 
honor with all fidelity and defend him against his enemies’ – see: Medieval Sourcebook - Laws of 
William of Conqueror, Fordham University <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/will1-
lawsb.html> at 9 October 2008. 
75  (1992) 175 CLR 1, 45. 
76  The doctrine has received vehement academic criticism. See for example: J Devereux and S Dorsett, 
‘Towards a Reconsideration of the Doctrines of Estates and Tenures’ (1996) 4 Australian Property 
Law Journal Lexis 6, 8-9, describing the doctrine as bizarre and inaccurate.  
77  For a discussion of what is meant by seisin see a series of articles by F W Maitland, ‘The Seisin of 
Chattels’ (1885) 1 Law Quarterly Review 324; ‘The Mystery of Seisin’ (1886) 2 Law Quarterly 
Review 481; ‘The Beatitude of Seisin’ (1888) 4 Law Quarterly Review 24. 
78  An example of which is: Allen v Roughley (1955) 94 CLR 98. 
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primacy. There was no law of ownership, merely a law of possession.79 Legal effect was 
to be given to the de-facto state of affairs. To do otherwise would amount to an 
injustice.80 However, this state of affairs was radically transformed in the 1850’s and 
continues to this day. Title is now based on registration and not on possession. This 
conflict between registration and possession was the very essence of the dispute in Pye. 
On the one side stood an individual claiming that legal recognition should be given to 
the state of affairs which if a third party physically viewing the land may perceive to be 
the actuality. On the other side, stood the registered owner, the individual, who for 
whatever reason, has not seen fit to remove the trespasser from its land, to not exercise 
their legal rights, but who suggested that ownership of land is not reliant on a ‘view 
from the street’, but on the basis of a properly conducted search of the formal records. 
In Pye v Graham, the House of Lords found in favour of the possessor, the initial 
chamber of the European Court of Rights identifying this by a bare majority as a breach 
of human rights, with this overturned by a close split decision of the Grand Chamber. 
Given this divergence, where does that leave the role of possessory interests, such as 
adverse possession and prescriptive easements in a Torrens system where ‘registration 
is not merely “a retrospective approbation of [title] as a derivative right”’.81  With 
Australia and New Zealand entrenching immediate indefeasibility,82 though this is far 
from uniform throughout Torrens jurisdictions83 is there some logic that can be drawn 
from the aims of title registration which would answer this conundrum. 
 
VI AIMS OF TITLE REGISTRATION 
 
A number of reasons can be advanced as to what title registration systems are designed 
to achieve. First, and with this reason paramount due to the contemporary market driven 
economy that is embedded within Western society, title registration systems improve 
economic efficiency.84 With transaction costs reduced85 and heightened certainty and 
                                                 
79  As stated by Cheshire and Burn: E H Burn, Cheshire and Burn’s Modern Law of Real Property 
(Butterworths, 15th ed, 1994) 27: it may be said without undue exaggeration that so far as land is 
concerned, there is in England no law of ownership, but only a law of possession. 
80  As noted by the English Law Reform Committee in its report on prescriptive easements, Law Reform 
Committee, Fourteenth Report, above n 47, 5, ‘the method by which English law gives legal 
recognition and effect to various kinds of de facto situations in which the relevant state of affairs has 
continued unchallenged for so long that to deny it legal recognition would, it is said, amount to 
injustice.’ 
81  WMC Gummow, ‘Equity in the Torrens System’ (Paper presented at the Taking Torrens into the 21st 
Century conference to mark the 50th Anniversary of the Land Transfer Act 1952, Faculty of Law, 
University of Auckland, 19-21 March 2003) 9, quoting from Windeyer J in Breskvar v Wall (1971) 
126 CLR 376, 400. 
82  Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376; Vassos v State Bank of South Australia (1993) 2 VR 316; 
Frazer v Walker [1967] NZLR 1069. 
83  Some argue for deferred or discretionary indefeasibility. See for example: J Mugambwa, 
‘Transportation of the Torrens System to Developing Countries: Uganda and Papua New Guinea’ 
(Paper presented at the Taking Torrens into the 21st Century conference to mark the 50th Anniversary 
of the Land Transfer Act 1952, Faculty of Law, University of Auckland, 19-21 March 2003). See 
also a discussion of the Canadian position, and reform proposals in respect of this; Joint Land Titles 
Committee, Renovating the Foundation: Proposals for a Model Land Recording and Registration 
Act for the Provinces and Territories of Canada (Edmonton, 1990). Ziff notes that in Canada, 
immediate indefeasibility is the rule: B Ziff, Principles of Property Law (Carswell, 3rd ed, 2000) 426. 
In the New Zealand context, see: E Toomey, ‘Fraud and Forgery in the 1990’s Can our Adherence to 
Frazer v Walker survive the Strain?’ (1994) 5 Canterbury Law Review 424. 
84  See: L Griggs, ‘Torrens Title in a Digital World’ (2001) 8(3) Murdoch University Electronic Journal 
of Law; L Griggs, ‘The Assurance Fund – Government Funded or Private’ (2002) 76 Alternative Law 
Journal 250. 
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stability in conveyancing, (at least in a transactional sense), land should move to the 
person who values it the most. By doing this, the welfare of society is enhanced.86 
However, this efficiency comes at a cost. ‘Formal legal rights’87 must be eliminated. In 
economic terms the transaction costs associated with alternatives (such as general law or 
old system title) are so high as to mandate the allocation of a liability based solution to 
ensure a more effective distribution of resources.88 To achieve this result the ‘legal 
status of … property [must] be kept relatively simple and transparent in order to avoid 
confusion to … multiple or successive interest holders.’89  
 
Second, and allied to the first, land ownership with attendant increased security of 
transaction leads to increased economic activity. 90  A normative expectation that 
investment in real estate will lead to a positive outcome generates not only labour and 
input into the land itself, but security allows for the elimination, or at the least the 
reduction of, ‘moral hazards and adverse selection in the credit market.’91 A dynamic, 
active land market is enhanced, if not created. The crystalline rules provide for certainty, 
stability and ease of transfer.92 
 
Third, the Torrens system, by its focus on the dynamic security of the transaction 
mobilises the resources associated with what would otherwise be a static asset. Land 
becomes the equivalent of cash, enabling its use to dramatically alter as circumstances 
warrant.93 The fundamental goal of efficiently transferring land is attained.94 A liability, 
rather than property based model is to be preferred95 - legislatures considering it cheaper 
to extinguish the formal legal title of the previously registered owner, in preference to 
compensating the new registered owner by way of money. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
85  JT Janczyk, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Land Title Systems for Transferring Real Property’ (1977) 
6 Journal of Legal Studies 213.  
86  JT Janczyk, ‘Land Title Systems, Scale of Operations, and Operating and Conversion Costs’ (1979) 
Journal of Legal Studies 569. In particular see 258, the summary. See also: Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, Report on Land Registration, Department of Justice (1971) 135-51. 
87  As noted by: CM Rose, ‘Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law (2000) 
Utah Law Review 1, 7-8. 
88  The terms emanating from the work of G Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, 
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089. 
89  Rose, above n 87, 7-8. 
90  It is of course recognised that there is increased dynamic security in the Torrens system, but this does 
arise at the expense of static security. In other words, the title is subject to an option. See: C M Rose, 
‘The Shadow of the Cathedral’ (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2175. 
91  JM Ngugi, ‘Re-examining the Role of Private Property in the Market Democracies: Problematic 
Ideological Issues Raised by Land Registration’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 
467, 498. 
92  C Rose, ‘Crystals and Mud in Property Law’ (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 577, 577-8. ‘Economic 
thinkers have been telling us for at least two centuries that the more important a given kind of thing 
becomes for us, the more likely we are to have these hard-edged rules to manage it. We draw these 
ever-sharper lines around our entitlements so that we know who has what, and so that we can trade 
instead of getting into the confusions and disputes that would only escalate as the goods in question 
became scarcer and more highly valued.’ 
93  See generally: Ngugi, above n 91, 498. 
94  Early attempts dating back to the 15th and 16th century and the time of Henry VIII and later, Queen 
Anne. HWB Mackay, ‘Registration of Title to Real Estate’ (1897) 11 Harvard Law Review 301. 
95  See: G Calabresi and A D Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089; L Kaplow and S Shavell, ‘Property Rules 
Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 713. 
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When combined with immediate indefeasibility, these predominantly economic aims 
provide a puzzle incapable of solution. With indefeasibility achieving either logical or 
perhaps legendary status within our Torrens register, 96  and its foundation directly 
oppositional to possessory interests, how does the jurisprudence find that elusive 
balance? Who is to be preferred, the majority or minority in the European Court in Pye? 
How are registration and possession to be weighted? The answer, it is submitted lies not 
so much in logic but in how we define what it means to have an interest in land. Is it 
simply about excluding others, or is there a wider sense, that proprietary interests 
include the right to exclude as well as the right not to be excluded from use or 
enjoyment.97 As Macpherson comments in the context of human rights as property 
rights:  
 
If we continue to take [property] in the modern narrow sense, the property right 
contradicts democratic human rights. If we take it in the broader sense, it does not 
contradict a democratic concept of human rights; indeed, it then may bring us back to 
something like the old concept of individual property in one’s life, liberty, and 
capacities.98 
 
It is only the modern consumer society, and its focus on allocative efficiency,99 that has 
seen the narrow construct of exclusionary property become paramount. Competition 
was to be the driving force, consumption measuring the wealth of the individual. The 
invisible hand of the market would lead to efficiency, and output within society 
maximised. The State as an institution existing only to provide the Rule of Law to settle 
disputes, and to assist in the process of voluntary cooperation. In the context of land 
registration systems, certainty, stability, speed and expense were the motivating 
agencies. The system designed to overcome the weaknesses articulated in the original 
preamble to the Torrens statute of South Australia (Real Property Act 1858) the: 
 
inhabitants of the Province of South Australia are subjected to losses, heavy costs, and 
much perplexity, by reason that the laws relating to the transfer and encumbrance of 
freehold and other interests in land are complex, cumbrous, and unsuited to the 
requirements of the said inhabitants. 
 
The blunt weapon of registration and indefeasibility married to bring out the 
marginalisation of possessory titles. In effect a narrow perception of what property or 
land is about. It was about exclusion with this defined by registration; the marketability 
of the land was not to be restricted by any sense of possession. By contrast a system 
which seeks to somehow balance registration and possession, endorses a notion of 
access in preference to exclusion.100 ‘[This] language of “property” … [it carries the] 
responsibility, of a trust to the larger community.’ 101  If looked at in this context, 
possessory interests by giving effect to the de-facto state and permitting access, 
arguably contribute to a notion of interdependence between the individual, the 
community, the society and the economic imperatives that may also underlie this. 
                                                 
96  A Mason, ‘Indefeasibility – Logic or Legend?’ (Paper presented at the Taking Torrens into the 21st 
Century conference to mark the 50th Anniversary of the Land Transfer Act 1952, Faculty of Law, 
University of Auckland, 19-21 March 2003). 
97  See generally: CB Macpherson, ‘Human Rights as Property Rights’ (1977) 24 Dissent 72. 
98  Ibid 74. 
99  See generally: Independent Committee of Inquiry, Parliament of Australia, Hilmer Report (1993). 
100  See generally: Gray, above n 59. 
101  Ibid 208. 
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Arguably, our notion of property ceases when fundamental human rights are 
infringed.102 
 
VII CONCLUSION 
 
Pollock and Maitland comment that: 
 
[I]n the history of our law there is no idea more cardinal that that of seisin. Even in the 
law of the present day it plays a part which must be studied by every lawyer; but in the 
past it was so important that the whole system of our land law was about seisin and its 
consequences.103 
 
Today, whilst ownership cannot properly be understood without reference to possession, 
the existence of the Torrens system, its central tenet of indefeasibility, and its effect on 
possessory interests, has arguably not truly been recognised. The continued 
acknowledgment of adverse possession and prescriptive easements illustrates the 
resonance of seisin, even though formal creation of legal rights is not made until 
registration. It is this very interaction that highlights the problems that real property 
lawyers may face if human rights jurisprudence becomes entrenched within our thinking. 
The importance of property, and in this specific context, land, cannot and should never 
be underestimated. It is the very core that establishes connection between species and 
the planet.104 
 
For this reason, the stability of land and land registration is critical. It is essential to our 
economic welfare, as a means of encouraging a productive workforce and, in the wider 
context of property, has been said to provide the foundation for democratic 
government.105 ‘That is why … Jeremy Bentham said, back around 1800, that in any 
conflict between equality and security of property, it is imperative that security prevail – 
even when the inequality is so striking as in the case of serfdom or slavery.’106 To assist 
in this means governments have routinely provided a means by which ownership of land 
is to be recorded and made as transparent as possible. The fragmentation of property 
interests inherited from the feudal system dependant on there being a way in which a 
potential purchaser is able to identify an owner of an interest with ease. ‘[The] 
imperatives of transparency sometimes demand the sacrifice of perfectly good formal 
claims.’107 Does this mean that possessory interests must yield, and that in this context, 
the utilitarian perspective insist that the registration system must impose itself on human 
rights by overriding possessory based interests?108 The difficulty with accepting this at 
                                                 
102  An example of which is slavery: ibid 211. 
103  F Pollock and FW Maitland, History of English Law before the Time of Edward I (Cambridge 
University Press, 1968) 29. 
104  As eloquently expressed by K Gray and S Gray, Elements of Land Law (Oxford University Press, 
2005) 1. ‘Land is elemental: it is where life begins and it is where life ends. Land provides the 
physical substratum for all human activity; it is the essential base of all social and commercial 
interaction. We spend scarcely a moment out of contact with terra firma and our very existence is 
constantly sustained and shaped by the natural and constructed world around us.’ 
105  Rose, above n 87, 4. 
106  Ibid. 
107  Ibid 8. 
108  The jurisprudence from Europe largely indicates that ‘human rights’ does concede its place to 
property law. See: D Hughes and M Davis, ‘Human Rights and the Triumph of Property: The 
Marginalisation of the European Convention on Human Rights in Housing Law’ (2006) Conveyancer 
and Property Lawyer. 526. 
GRIGGS (2008) 
300 
any level is that possession is about what is in fact occurring. It speaks to third parties, 
the market, to the world, as to the state of affairs. It reverberates the idea that possession 
is nine tenths of the law. Its hold on the individual and collective psyche of Australian 
society is significant. Nevertheless, any undermining of the legal formalism of 
registration will reverberate on economic markets, and on the faith in title based systems. 
Without tolerance and respect for the ownership rights of others, with these identified 
by a public registration system, the regime for land ownership that presently operates in 
Australia will soon fail. 109  For this reason, it is suggested that as human rights 
jurisprudence continues to expand, Torrens legislation needs to resolve the inherent 
tension that may arise between it and human rights. As we move inexorably to a 
national conveyancing system in terms of process, any harmonisation of the substantive 
law should address the dilemma posed by the interaction of possessory based principles 
to a system of title by registration. The type of litigation encapsulated in Pye seems little 
to do with advancing human rights, yet it directly attacks a system of land registration 
which has successfully served Australia for 160 years. In summary, the questions raised 
here will not be answered by mechanical formula, the application of economic theory, 
or by resort to historical reference. It is not about ‘protection or redistribution; it is the 
protection of whom, and the distribution of what.’110 It is this which must be answered, 
and with land being in ‘defined and limited supply’,111 the answer that should be given, 
is a strong preference for the precepts, ideals and values provided within and by, the 
Torrens system of land registration. 
 
 
                                                 
109  See generally: C Rose, ‘Property as the Keystone Right’ (1996) 71 Notre Dame Law Review 329. 
110  LS Underkuffler-Freund, ‘Takings and the Nature of Property’ (1996) 9 Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 161, 205. 
111  Linden Garden Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85, 107D (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson). 
In personam: Barnes v Addy and the High
Court’s deliberations in Farah
Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd
Lynden Griggs*
With High Court decisions on indefeasibility relatively rare, the judgment of
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd is likely to attract close
attention. With important pronouncements on the role of Barnes v Addy
(alongside strong criticism of the decision of the NSW Court of Appeal), it
critically closes state based differences as to the application of this case
within the context of the in personam exception. By so doing, it reinforces the
paramountcy of indefeasibility.
Introduction
There is no doubting the importance of land to the Australian psyche.
A significant portion of the population cherishes home ownership,1 and land
is not only the substratum of much of our collective wealth, but represents the
spiritual, economic and community link to our everyday existence. It is
physically and emotionally the foundation on which we build our lives. For
this reason, any differences that exist in the substantive law between states and
territories would intuitively be difficult to accept and require persuasive
justification. The side of the border on which the title resides should rarely
dictate the result of any dispute. For this reason, High Court deliberations in
the area of land law are to be welcomed, consolidating and clarifying the law
as well as resolving any significant differences between state jurisdictions. In
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd,2 the High Court has bluntly
rejected any application of knowing receipt or knowing assistance principles
from Barnes v Addy3 as a basis on which in personam can be used to
undermine indefeasibility. By so doing, they rejected the approach taken by
the Queensland Court of Appeal4 and adopted Victorian5 and Western
Australian6 appellate decisions. With this background in mind, this note will
examine the development of ‘knowing receipt or assistance’ in personam in
the state courts and then consider this aspect of the High Court’s judgment in
Farah Constructions.
What is in personam?
Routinely described as an exception to indefeasibility, it, perhaps more
accurately is simply an area where land doctrines do not operate. The essence
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania.
1 The 2006 census statistics indicate that 32.6% residences are fully owned, with another
32.2% being purchased. See <www.abs.gov.au> (accessed 29 June 2007).
2 (2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007] HCA 22; BC200703851.
3 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244.
4 Tara Shire Council v Garner [2003] 1 Qd R 556; [2002] QCA 232; BC200203548.
5 Macquarie Bank v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133.
6 LHK Nominees Pty Ltd v Kenworthy (2002) 26 WAR 517; [2002] WASCA 291;
BC200206314.
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of in personam is that the registered proprietor is not entitled to use the
ideology of immediate indefeasibility to deny personal obligations that he or
she has given. A simple illustration, taken from the seminal authority of
Frazer v Walker7 highlights its role:
• A vendor enters into a contract to sell land to a purchaser;
• After signing of the contract, but before settlement, the vendor has
indefeasibility of title,8 the purchaser an estate contract;9
• The vendor argues indefeasibility of title to prevent the purchaser
from enforcing the contract;
• In personam overrides indefeasibility (or operates outside its
purview) — the purchaser has personal rights against the vendor that
can be used to obtain an order for specific performance.
The exception, if so rightly called, is statutorily provided for in South
Australia,10 Queensland11 and the Northern Territory,12 with the remaining
jurisdictions recognising its common law authority.13 Before invoking in
personam, a recognised legal or equitable cause of action must be
established,14 and it must be unconscientious for the registered proprietor to
assert indefeasibility to defeat this identified legal or equitable cause of
action.15 In personam should also not be available where its use would be
inconsistent with the policy objectives of the Torrens system.16
Decisions prior to Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v
Say-Dee Pty Ltd
The decisions prior to the judgment of the court in Farah Constructions Pty
Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd17 starkly illustrated the evident difference of opinion as
to whether the principles of Barnes v Addy18 should be used to undermine, or
prevail over, indefeasibility. In Barnes v Addy a person is liable as a
constructive trustee where they knowingly received trust property in breach of
7 [1967] 1 AC 569; [1967] 1 All ER 649.
8 As noted in A J Bradbrook, S V MacCallum and A P Moore, Australian Real Property Law,
4th ed, Thomson Lawbook Co, 2007, at [4.100], despite the commonality in the use of the
phrase, indefeasibility is only used statutorily in four of the eight jurisdictions (Land Title
Act 1994 (Qld) ss 37, 38; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 69; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 40
and Land Title Act 2000 (NT) ss 39, 40), with its meaning in the remaining jurisdictions
extracted from the common law cases.
9 Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499.
10 Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 71(d)(e), 49(1)(e).
11 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1)(a).
12 Land Title Act 2000 (NT) s 189(1)(a).
13 Beginning with Barry v Heider (1914) 19 CLR 197.
14 Grgic v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1994) 33 NSWLR 202 at 222 per Powell JA (Meagher and
Handley JJA agreeing at 203).
15 Vassos v State Bank of South Australia [1993] 2 VR 316 at 333 per Hayne J;White v Tomasel
[2004] 2 Qd R 438 at [30] per Davies JA; LHK Nominees v Kenworthy (2002) 26 WAR 517;
[2002] WASCA 291; BC200206314 at [199]–[200] per Murray J, [210]–[216] per Anderson
and Steytler JJ. Compare White v Tomasel [2004] 2 Qd R 438.
16 Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd v Gosper (1992) 25 NSWLR 32 at 45 per
Mahoney JA; Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133 at 157
per Tadgell J.
17 (2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007] HCA 22; BC200703851.
18 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244.
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trust (knowing recipient liability), or where they knowingly assisted a trustee
in misapplying trust property (knowing assistance liability). The recognition
of a potential conflict between in personam based on Barnes v Addy, and
indefeasibility, highlighted by Tadgell JA in Macquarie Bank Ltd v
Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd, with his Honour commenting that:
to recognise a claim in personam against the holder of a mortgage registered under
[Torrens legislation], dubbing the older a constructive trustee by application of a
doctrine akin to ‘knowing receipt’, when registration of the mortgage was honestly
achieved, would introduce by the back door a means of undermining the doctrine of
indefeasibility which the Torrens system establishes . . . the proprietary rights of a
registered mortgagee of Torrens title land derive ‘from the fact of registration and
not from an event antecedent thereto’. In truth, I think it is not possible, consistently
with the received principle of indefeasibility as it has been understood since Frazer
v Walker and Breskvar v Wall, to treat the holder of a registered mortgage over
property that is subject to a trust, registration having been honestly achieved, as
having received trust property. The argument that the appellant is liable as a
constructive trustee because it had ‘knowingly received’ trust property should in my
opinion fail.19
By contrast, a majority of the Queensland Court of Appeal were equally
adamant that the principles emanating from Barnes v Addy could be used to
support an in personam claim. In Tara Shire Council v Garner, Arcape and
Martin20 property had been sold by the Garners to the Shire Council. For some
unexplained reason, the purchase monies were paid by the council to the
Garners, but the change in ownership was never registered. Accordingly, as far
as the title was concerned, the Garners remained the registered proprietors. As
the purchase monies were not paid, it was arguable that the Garners were
trustees for the land on behalf of the council. The Garners then sold the land
to Arcape, with Arcape informed that the property belonged to the council.
Notwithstanding this, they submitted that indefeasibility prevented their
registered title being impugned. The council responded by submitting that
Arcape had knowingly received and retained trust property in a manner that
was inconsistent with their interest and accordingly in personam operated to
dull the effect of indefeasibility.
By a majority,21 the Queensland Court of Appeal accepted the arguments of
the council. Indefeasibility was trumped by equity. As Arcape were informed,
they were bound to give effect to the trust. They were not constructive trustees
merely because they were agents of the trustee, but because they retained
some part of the trust property.22 Notwithstanding this strong clear view of the
majority, in dissent Davies JA commented:23
There is no authority, binding or persuasive, for the proposition that the interest of
a purchaser of land who becomes registered as owner with knowledge that the
transfer to it was in breach of trust by the vendor, let alone that of such a purchaser
who becomes registered after the making of no more than an unsubstantiated
19 Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133 at 156–7 (Winneke P
agreeing at 136).
20 [2003] 1 Qd R 556; [2002] QCA 232; BC200203548.
21 Atkinson J (with McMurdo P largely agreeing).
22 [2003] 1 Qd R 556; [2002] QCA 232; BC200203548 at [54].
23 Ibid, at [33].
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assertion that an unregistered person is the owner of part of the land is defeasible.
Nor is there any basis in principle, for the purpose of the application of s 185(1)(a),24
for distinguishing an assertion of equitable ownership in an unregistered person
from an assertion in such person of some lesser equitable interest. It if were
otherwise, the fundamental proposition that the interest of a registered proprietor is
not affected by his or her prior knowledge of unregistered interests would need to be
modified to accommodate different results depending on the nature of the prior
unregistered interest.
The competing arguments present for no easy resolution. On the one hand, lies
the stability, certainty, and blunt harshness of the indefeasibility doctrine — it
operates at a macro level, without regard to the justice that may need to be
done in an individual case, and by application of blind faith objectivity. It is
this view that was accepted by a majority of the Western Australian Full Court
in LHK Nominees v Kenworthy,25 the minority view of Davies JA in Tara
Shire Council and majority of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Macquarie
Bank Ltd. On the other hand, lies the imperative faced by individual judges,
deciding specific matter inter-partes, and seeking to achieve fairness between
understandably self-interested litigants without any interest in the blind
objectivity of the legal system, with this reasoning seeing the majority in Tara
Shire Council, a minority in LHK Nominees26 and a minority in Macquarie
Bank27 using equity to ameliorate the questionable morality of immediate
indefeasibility.28
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd29
The appellant Farah Constructions (Farah) was a company controlled by Farah
Elias (the second appellant). This man also controlled Lesmint Pty Ltd (the
third appellant), and was the husband of Margaret Elias (the fourth appellant),
and father of Sarah and Jade Elias (the fifth and sixth appellants). The
respondent Say-Dee Pty Ltd was a company controlled by Dalida Dagher and
Sadie Elias, the latter bearing no relation to the appellants. Dagher and Sadie
Elias were involved in a number of businesses, though not specifically real
estate development. The dispute in this matter revolved around three
properties, numbers 11, 13 and 15 Deane Street Burwood. In 1998, Say-Dee
agreed with Farah to enter a joint venture to develop units at No 11. Both
parties were to be purchasers in equal shares with Say-Dee advancing some
$225,000 to the joint venture. The balance of the funds required was to be
24 This provides for an exception for indefeasibility for an ‘equity arising from the act of the
registered proprietor’: Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1).
25 LHK Nominees v Kenworthy (2002) 26 WAR 517; [2002] WASCA 291; BC200206314.
26 Wallwork J (dissenting) in LHK Nominees v Kenworthy (2002) 26 WAR 517; [2002]
WASCA 291; BC200206314.
27 Ashley AJA (dissenting) in Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR
133.
28 These arguments have been considered in a number of contexts. For example in relation to
mistake and indefeasibility, see L Griggs, ‘Indefeasibility and Mistake — the utilitarianism
of Torrens’ (2003) APLJ Lexis 23; and in relation to restitution and indefeasibility,
specifically after reversal of a judgment see S Christensen and B Duncan, ‘Is Indefeasibility
of Title a Bar to Restitution after Reversal of a Judgment on Appeal’ (2005) 11 APLJ Lexis
1.
29 (2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007] HCA 22; BC200703851.
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borrowed by the joint venture and secured by way of mortgage. Upon
completion, Say-Dee was to have first priority to have the $225,000 repaid,
second priority was to repay agent and legal fees, with the balance to be
distributed equally between the two joint venture partners. Farah Elias was to
manage the development application, construction and sale. After the units
were purchased, Farah Elias lodged a development application with the
council for an eight-storey mixed commercial and residential development.
This raised a number of concerns with the council (principally about the
height of the development and lack of car parking), with the council
suggesting that the proposal was an over-development of a site that was too
small and that No 11 should be amalgamated with the adjoining properties to
allow the full development potential of the area to be realised. Subsequently,
Margaret Elias and the daughters purchased land at numbers 15 as well as
20 Deane Street, with Lesmint Pty Ltd purchasing No 13. The development
application was then withdrawn. This saw Farah seek the appointment of a
trustee for the sale of the joint venture’s land, with Say-Dee countering that a
constructive trust should be imposed over the purchases made by Lesmint Pty
Ltd, Margaret, Sarah and Jade Elias. Say-Dee submitted that Farah had
concealed the council’s advice that for the development to succeed the
adjoining land should be amalgamated, with the intent that after purchasing
the interest of Say-Dee, Farah Constructions would independently proceed
with the development. At first instance,30 Farah was successful in having a
trustee appointed to sell the joint venture land. On appeal,31 the respondent
was successful in overturning this decision, with the court holding that even
though Margaret, Sarah and Jade Elias had become registered proprietors
without any actual knowledge of breach of duty, the knowledge of Farah Elias
could be imputed to them, and therefore Mrs Elias and the daughters held the
properties on constructive trust for the joint venture. Significantly, the court
considered that even if Margaret, Sarah and Jade Elias did not have the
requisite knowledge, their title was still defeasible. The law was to be
restitutionary in approach, based on unjust enrichment with strict liability
sufficing.32 Unchallenged, this approach would severely undermine
indefeasibility, and create a massive expansion in the opportunities for in
personam to trump Torrens. Not surprisingly, the matter was appealed to the
High Court with Ground of Appeal 9 stating that: ‘The Court of Appeal was
in error in rejecting (paras 241–243) the defence of the Fourth Fifth and Sixth
Appellants based upon section 42 of the Real Property Act.’33
30 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 800; BC200405608.
31 Say-Dee Pty Ltd v Farah Constructions Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 309; BC200507416.
32 In this context, the decision of the NSW Court of Appeal echoes a judgment of the
Queensland Court of Appeal in White v Tomasel [2004] 2 Qd R 438. In this case, judgment
was given in favour of the purchaser of real estate and an order was made for the land to be
transferred to the purchaser. Pursuant to the court order, this purchaser was registered and
presumably obtained an indefeasible title. The original judgment in favour of the purchaser
was subsequently set aside and the vendor then asserted that they were entitled to use in
personam to upset the indefeasibility of the purchaser. By a majority, Williams JA and
McMurdo J allowed in personam to operate — Davies JA dissented (his Honour considered
that the title was indefeasible upon registration and nothing existed to upset that state of
affairs).
33 Section 42(1):
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The High Court judgment in Farah Constructions Pty
Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd
In upholding the appeal, the High Court was extraordinarily critical of the
NSW Court of Appeal. While there was a fiduciary duty to disclose the
council’s view about amalgamation, and recognising the difficulties in
determining this issue given the unreliability of the evidence,34 Farah had
adequately complied.35 In responding to the question of whether the Court of
Appeal was appropriate in reversing the judgment of the Trial Judge, the court
stated:
The reasoning of the Court in Appeal — erroneous in parts, exaggerated in other
parts, flawed in other ways — does not demonstrate that the trial judge’s view, which
was, in significant part, demeanour-based, was either glaringly improbable or
contrary to compelling inferences. Accordingly the Court of Appeal’s finding must
be rejected and the trial judge’s finding restored.36
Furthermore, and more significantly in the context of the current discussion
concerning in personam it was a grave error for the court to have held that a
constructive trust, (based on unjust enrichment), should have been imposed on
Margaret Elias and her daughters, even though they had no knowledge of a
breach of duty. This was a fundamental change from the accepted wisdom,
and secondly, and perhaps more extraordinarily, had never been argued in the
lower courts. Therefore, two reasons existed for why this was such a grave
error — first, it was unjust, and second, it caused great confusion.37 It was
unjust as it had never been pleaded by the respondent and never argued by the
respondent: ‘The relevant part of the Court of Appeal’s judgment would have
come as a complete surprise to all parties.’38 In addition, either the Court of
Appeal was abandoning the notice test within Barnes v Addy, or it was
creating a new form of recovery, which sat alongside the principles within
Barnes.39 ‘In doing so, it was flying in the face not only of the received view
of the first limb of Barnes v Addy, but also of statements by members of this
Notwithstanding the existence in any other person of any estate or interest which but for
this Act might be held to be paramount or to have priority, the registered proprietor for
the time being of any estate or interest in land recorded in a folio of a Register shall,
except in case of fraud, hold the same, subject to such other estates and interests and such
entries, if any, as are recorded in that folio, but absolutely free from all other estates and
interests that are not so recorded except . . .
34 The High Court commented that: ‘Neither side could be described as wholly reliable or
wholly honest, and none of the judges below did so’: (2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209;
[2007] HCA 22; BC200703851 at [85].
35 ‘It is true that Farah’s disclosures were at different times and in different ways. There was
no single occasion on which Mr Elias explained all he knew about the Council’s attitudes
and why the acquisition of adjoining properties was advantageous in the light of that
attitude. But the sufficiency of disclosure can depend on the sophistication and intelligence
of the persons to whom disclosure must be made . . . The principals of Say-Dee had much
business experience and intelligence . . . As counsel for the appellants said, they were “not
babes in the woods”’: (2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007] HCA 22; BC200703851
at [107]–[108].
36 (2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007] HCA 22; BC200703851 at [99].
37 Ibid, at [131].
38 Ibid, at [132].
39 Ibid, at [134].
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court in Consul Developments Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd.’40 In this High
Court’s view, there is only one common law of Australia, and state
jurisdictions needed to be mindful of this.41 The cases and reasoning adopted
by the Court of Appeal in abandoning fault-based liability did not support their
conclusions: ‘[They] were arrived at without notice to the parties, [were]
unsupported by authority and flew in the face of seriously considered dicta
uttered by a majority of this court. They must be rejected.’42 Similarly,
Margaret, Sarah and Jade Elias were not liable under the second limb of
Barnes v Addy (knowing assistance): ‘[There is] nothing to show that Mrs
Elias and her daughters had ‘consciousness of those elements which make
participation transgress ordinary standards of honest behaviour.’43
Having firmly rejected the extension sought by the NSW Court of Appeal
to Barnes v Addy, the next issue was peculiarly land based. Were Margaret,
Sarah and Jade Elias entitled to indefeasibility, a point not addressed in any
depth at the lower levels? The Court of Appeal had ruled that the constructive
trust operated to override indefeasibility. The High Court, without any
significant analysis,44 was quick to dismiss the idea perpetrated by Tara Shire
Council and the NSWCourt of Appeal in the instant matter that Barnes v Addy
could be used to undermine indefeasibility. The reasoning of those cases
where the High Court had routinely provided for the constructive trust remedy
in respect of Torrens land45 had no application where the defendant is not the
primary wrongdoer. They could not be applied where the allegation is merely
that a person has notice of an interest or fraud. Without any further
consideration, the court concluded: ‘There is no analogy between the
constructive trusts involved in those cases and that which can arise from the
application of the first limb of Barnes v Addy.’46 The NSW Court of Appeal
ought to have followed Macquarie Bank v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd and
LHK Nominees Pty Ltd v Kenworthy.47
In summary
The High Court, though not with any detailed critique, has, with a blunt
riposte to the NSW Court of Appeal rejected the application of Barnes v Addy
40 Ibid, at [134].
41 Ibid, at [135].
42 Ibid, at [158].
43 Ibid, at [165].
44 For a detailed and contrasting consideration of the role of restitution in indefeasibility
disputes, see R Chambers, ‘Indefeasible Title as a Bar to a Claim for Restitution’ (1998)
Restitution Law Review 126.
45 Such as in Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604; 78 ALR 1; 62 ALJR 268,Muschinski
v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; 62 ALR 429; 60 ALJR 52 and Baumgartner v Baumgartner
(1987) 164 CLR 137; 76 ALR 75; 62 ALJR 29.
46 (2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007] HCA 22; BC200703851 at [195].
47 Ibid, at [196]. Interestingly, the court also suggested that the registered proprietors would
prevail over Say-Dee even if they were volunteers: ibid, at [198]. However, apart from this
statement there was no discussion of the competing authorities on this point. For example,
see Bogdanovic v Koteff (1988) 12 NSWLR 472 at 480 per Priestley JA (Hope and
Samuel JJA agreeing at 473); King v Smail [1958] VR 273; Rasmussen v Rasmussen;
Valoutin Pty Ltd v Furst (1998) 154 ALR 119; Conlan v Registrar of Titles (2001) 24 WAR
299 at [200] per Owen J.
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principles as a method by which indefeasibility should be undermined. I have
suggested elsewhere that this is appropriate.48 What this case does illustrate
however, is the need for further development towards harmonisation of the
Torrens system. The one common law mentioned by the High Court in Farah
Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd49 is reliant on litigants with the
advice and finance to be able to take these matters through to the highest
judicial body. It is suggested that it would be more appropriate for the policy
makers to form and fund a working party to seek a national solution to the
substantive principles that govern land registration. As noted at the outset the
topic is too critical, too fundamental and too important to have decisions made
based on locality. While this fact may decide the economic value of real estate,
the substantive law of land law should not be driven by the same values.
48 L Griggs, ‘In Personam, Garcia v NAB and the Torrens System — are they reconcilable’
(2001) 1 QUTLJ 76. See also M Weir, ‘An Australian View: the Queensland Land Title Act’
in D Grinlinton, Torrens in the Twenty-first Century, LexisNexis, New Zealand, 2003, p 307;
J Moore, ‘Equity, Restitution and I personam Claims under the Torrens System’ (1998) 72
ALJ 258 (part 1); (1999) 73 ALJ 712 (part 2).
49 (2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007] HCA 22; BC200703851 at [135].
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Case Notes
To and from — but not across: the High
Court — easements, Torrens and doctrinal
purity
Lynden Griggs*
This casenote examines the recent High Court decision in Westfield
Management v Perpetual Trustee Company. The High Court, which, in
upholding the interpretation given to the easement by the earlier NSW Court
of Appeal decision, but which differed from the Trial Judge highlighted two
important points. First, purchasers of land will need to seek exceptional legal
advice in determining the meaning of an easement prior to settlement.
Second, the High Court reinforced the role that Torrens system’s ideals will
have in interpreting matters that have as their subject matter, registered
land.
Introduction
It is generally accepted that when an easement is created over land in favour
of a dominant tenement that cannot be extended to benefit other land owned
by the dominant owner. To do so would go beyond the purpose for which the
easement was created.1 However, while this may be the norm, (with this point
accepted by the High Court in Westfield Management v Perpetual Trustee
Company)2 this normality may well be altered or upset by the terms of the
easement itself or the context in which it was granted.3 However, what
Westfield has done, is clearly limit, specifically in relation to Torrens land, the
circumstances in which the exceptions (if so properly called) will apply.
Facts of Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual
Trustee Co Ltd
The registered proprietor of the servient tenement (Glasshouse) was Perpetual.
Westfield was the present registered proprietor of the dominant tenement
(known as Skygarden). These two parties were successors in title to the
original property owners. The land in question is some of the most valuable
commercial land in Australia — frontages onto the Sydney Pitt Street Mall.
The mall was created in 1987, the same time as the Glasshouse development
(with this fronting the mall as well as King Street). Skygarden was adjacent
to Glasshouse and abutted the Pitt Street Mall. There is no vehicular access
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania.
1 Harris v Flower (1904) 74 LJ Ch 127; P Butt, Land Law, 5th ed, Thomson LawBook Co,
Sydney, 2006, at [1698].
2 (2007) 239 ALR 75; 81 ALJR 1887; HCA 45; BC200708402 at [27].
3 Butt, above n 1, at [1698].
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from the mall which necessitated right of way access from the King Street
entrance of Glasshouse to Skygarden. Subsequent to its purchase of
Skygarden, Westfield had acquired the two adjoining properties — these were
known as Imperial Arcade (which adjoined Skygarden) and Centrepoint
(which adjoined Imperial Arcade). These facts can be represented as follows:
At the time of the easements creation, all four properties were in different
ownership. Westfield now wishes to redevelop the properties that it owns and
to enable that to happen wants to use the vehicular access easement from King
Street though Glasshouse and Skygarden to enter Imperial Arcade and
Centrepoint. Specifically it sought a declaration that the easement allowed
Westfield to continue under Skygarden to access driveways, parking spaces
and loading bays to be built on Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint. This
argument was accepted by the Trial Judge,4 overturned by the Court of
Appeal,5 with the High Court unanimously and jointly dismissing the appeal
of Westfield.
The terms of the easement
The opening words of the easement were as follows:
Full and free right of carriageway for the grantee its successors in title and
registered proprietors for the time being of an estate or interest in possession of the
land herein indicated as the lots benefited or any part thereof with which the rights
shall be capable of enjoyment and every person authorised by it, to go, pass and
repass at all times and for all purposes with vehicles to and from the said lots
benefited or any such part thereof across the lots burdened.6
This was supplanted by a number of conditions set out in the instrument
creating the easement. For example the grantor and grantee were liable to
share the cost of repairing and maintaining the carriageway, with no obligation
4 (2006) NSW ConvR 56-163; [2006] NSWSC 716; BC200605443.
5 (2006) 12 BPR 23,793.
6 Extracted from the High Court’s judgment: (2007) 239 ALR 75; 81 ALJR 1887; HCA 45;
BC200708402 at [15] (emphasis supplied by High Court).
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for a greater contribution from the owners of the dominant tenement, or for
any contribution from the owners of Imperial Arcade or Centrepoint
(assuming they had been in ownership of someone other than the dominant
tenement).7 Similarly, it was only the grantor and grantee that were liable to
keep insured the right of way with the grantee liable to indemnify the grantor
for any liability as a result of the acts of the grantee’s agents or servants.
The existing law on the right to access more remote
properties from a dominant tenement
Often stated as the rule in Harris v Flower,8 the principle is expressed as
follows: ‘If a right of way be granted for the enjoyment of [title] A, the
grantee, because he owns or acquires [title] B, cannot use the way in substance
for passing over [title] A to [title] B.’9 The High Court in Westfield accepted
this as the opening point of analysis.10 However, the High Court was also
careful to reiterate that, in their view, this principle should not be elevated to
a ‘rule’:
[Their Honours comment] it is important to remark that care certainly must be taken
lest the [the principle from Harris v Flower] set out above be elevated to the status
of a ‘rule’, whether of construction or substantive law. What the statement does
provide is a starting point for consideration of the terms of any particular grant. The
statement is consistent with an understanding that the broader the right of access to
the dominant tenement granted by the easement, the greater the burden upon the
proprietary rights in the servient tenement.11
This cautious, perhaps querying approach of the High Court accords with the
imperfect precedent supporting Harris v Flower. As noted by Paton and
Seabourne,12 the decision itself has a flawed pedigree, with the decision
‘[resting] heavily on questionable readings of older law reports’,13 and the
authorities inconsistent and inconclusive.14 This of course only begs the more
fundamental question: Is there a principled justification for the rule, principle
or starting point, (whatever it may be called) irrespective of, and exclusive to,
the contradictory authorities? To answer this it is suggested that the genesis for
any property law doctrine must begin with the need for certainty, stability and
security associated with land ownership. An unstable property market (with
the adverse consequences arguably heightened in the commercial real estate
7 Ibid, at [31], this clause read:
The cost of repair of damage caused to the site of the carriageway (including all
structures, equipment, fixtures and fittings erected or positioned on or over the
boundaries of the carriageway which boundaries are shown in the above mentioned plan)
by the grantor or grantee, their respective servants or agents shall be borne by such
grantor or grantee provided however that in any other case the cost of repair shall be
borne equally between the grantor and grantee.
8 (1904) 74 LJ Ch 127.
9 Ibid, at 132.
10 (2007) 239 ALR 75; 81 ALJR 1887; HCA 45; BC200708402 at [27].
11 Ibid, at [29].
12 E Paton and G Seabourne, ‘Can’t get there from here? Permissible use of Easements after
Das’ (2003) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 127 at 130.
13 Ibid, p 130.
14 Ibid, p 131
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market) can only lead to decreased property investment. Owners of land
demand security of tenure. There is a normative expectation that investment
in real estate will lead to positive inputs into the land itself with security of
tenure allowing for the elimination, or at the least the reduction of, ‘moral
hazards and adverse selection in the credit market’.15 With stability, an active,
vigorous and spirited land market is advanced with certainty, constancy and
liquidity improved. As Rose comments:
Economic thinkers have been telling us for at least two centuries that the more
important a given kind of thing becomes for us, the more likely we are to have these
hard-edged rules to manage it. We draw these ever-sharper lines around our
entitlements so that we know who has what, and so that we can trade instead of
getting into the confusions and disputes that would only escalate as the goods in
question became scarcer and more highly valued.16
Does the principle of Harris v Flower provide certainty and stability? It
certainly fits with the parameters associated with the traditional requirements
of an easement. With private easements not existing ‘in gross’,17 and the need
for the easement to accommodate the dominant tenement,18 easements
conferring advantages on contiguous land will rarely, if ever be accepted.19
Imprecise or vague easements will also be struck down.20 The result of this
analysis is that easements allowing the dominant tenement to access the
servient tenement for the purposes of moving onto further land will rarely be
permissible. If this strictness is accepted, the importance of careful drafting of
easements cannot be overstated, with this only amplified in the context of
Torrens land where material outside of the register as an aid to interpretation
will rarely, if ever be accepted. To this end, the High Court in Westfield
expressly disagreed with its earlier view that extrinsic evidence could be used
in determining the extent of a Torrens easement. In their view it is
inappropriate to allow the extrinsic material available for use in construing an
old system title easement to be adopted in respect of Torrens title.21
15 J M Ngugi, ‘Re-examining the Role of Private Property in the Market Democracies:
Problematic Ideological Issues Raised by Land Registration’ (2004) 25 Mich J Int’l 467
at 498.
16 C Rose, ‘Crystals and Mud in Property Law’ (1988) 40 Stanford L Rev 577 at 577–8.
17 Conrad Municipal District v Coles (1906) 3 CLR 96 at 104–5.
18 Hill v Tupper (1863) 2 H & C 121 at 127.
19 One possibility where it will be allowed is where the use of the non-dominant land is
ancillary to the use of the dominant land. See, eg, Shean Pty Ltd v Owners of Corinne Court
290 Stirling Street Perth, Strata Plan 12821 (2001) 25 WAR 65; National Trust v White
[1987] 1 WLR 907. This latter case was distinguished by the High Court in Westfield (2007)
239 ALR 75; 81 ALJR 1887; HCA 45; BC200708402 at [23], where the court said that it
was not necessary for those using the access to Skygarden to be at liberty to pass beyond
Skygarden to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint.
20 Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 164: ‘The cognate questions involved under this
condition are: whether the rights purported to be given are expressed in terms of too wide
and vague a character . . .’.
21 (2007) 239 ALR 75; 81 ALJR 1887; HCA 45; BC200708402 at [39]:
The statement by McHugh J in Gallagher v Rainbow [(1994) 179 CLR 624 at 639–40]
that ‘the principles of construction that have been adopted in respect of the grant of an
easement at common law . . . are equally applicable to the grant of an easement in respect
of land under the Torrens system’, is too widely expressed. The third party who inspects
the Register cannot be expected, consistently with the scheme of the Torrens system, to
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This strictness alleged clarity and transparency associated with such an
immutable position recognised by Paton and Seabourne:
If the rule [in Harris v Flower] is to be justified purely on grounds of doctrinal
‘neatness’, then it must be recognised that its application, and the concept of ‘bona
fide’ or ‘colourable’ use of a right of way for a particular purpose, produces some
odd doctrinal consequences. It introduces something like ‘guilt by intention’ to the
law of trespass in this area. Conduct which externally is wholly consistent with the
lawful exercise of the right of way to [the dominant tenement] . . . is made unlawful
by the presence of an intention to carry on throughA to B, land in which the servient
owner has no legal or practical interest.22
With this in mind, these authors23 criticise the traditional position as being
unnecessary. Servient owners will be protected by the judge made law
associated with excessive use24 of easements and the requirement that
connection to the original lands be somehow connected to the easements
association with the dominant tenement. In their view, the law is not advanced
any further by maintaining the principle of Harris v Flower ‘for the sake of
doctrinal purity’.25 Obviously, this view is not shared by their Honours on the
High Court, nor it is shared by this author, who considers that the foundation
principles of Torrens legislation, and the need to precisely attach interests in
land to specified parcels outweighs any basis on which the law should be
relaxed.
The decision of the High Court in Westfield
Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd
The High Court’s decision was based on two grounds. The first ground was the
wording used in the easement with the starting point for this analysis
emanating from the principles in Harris v Flower; the second, the aims of the
Torrens system. Having accepted that in general a right of way can only be
used to access the dominant tenement, the court adopting the accepted
principle of Harris,26 the question became one of construction. First, the terms
of the easement spoke of ‘to and from’ the dominant tenements, and not
look further for extrinsic material which might establish facts or circumstances existing
at the time of the creation of the registered dealing and placing the third party (or any
court later seized of a dispute) in the situation of the grantee.
22 Paton and Seabourne, above n 12, p 132.
23 Ibid, pp 132–5.
24 See, eg, Shean Pty Ltd v Owners of Corinne Court 290 Stirling Steet Perth, Strata Plan
12821 (2001) 25 WAR 65; Graham v Philcox [1984] QB 747; [1984] 2 All ER 643.
25 Paton and Seabourne, above n 12, p 134.
26 (2007) 239 ALR 75; 81 ALJR 1887; HCA 45; BC200708402 at [27]:
In Harris v Flower & Sons the excessive user by which it was attempted to impose an
additional burden on the servient tenement consisted in the use of right of way for
obtaining access to buildings erected partly on the land to which the right of way was
appurtenant and partly on the other land. A claim was put forward on behalf of the
plaintiffs that the right of way had been abandoned, on the ground that, as it was
practically impossible to separate the lawful from the excessive user, the right of way
could not be used at all. This contention failed, however, the court holding that there had
been no abandonment, but that the user of the way for access to the buildings so far as
they were situate upon land to which the right was not appurtenant was in excess of the
rights of the defendants, and a declaration was made accordingly, with liberty to apply.
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‘across’ the dominant tenement. This according to the court was an indication
that the purpose of the easement was designed to access to and from the
dominant tenement. There was no indication within the terms of the easement
there should be access to further land reached only by going across the
dominant tenement. If this was intended then the phrase ‘and across’ would be
have been added to the easement.27 This wording of the easement allowed for
ancillary uses of adjoining land to be supported by the easement enjoyed by
the dominant tenement,28 but this was constrained by the High Court —
ancillary required that the use be necessary for the enjoyment of the rights on
the dominant tenement.29
Additional bases for construing the easement in such a restrictive sense
rested on the additional conditions such as the repair clause and the insurance
and indemnity clauses. According to the High Court it would be ‘unduly
burdensome’30 for the costs of repair to be shared between the owners of
Glasshouse and Skygarden with no possibility of contribution from those who
were utilising the access to get to Imperial Arcade or Centrepoint. Similarly,
if Skygarden was permitted to allow access to Imperial Arcade and/or
Centrepoint, but without any obligation on those to contribute to insurance or
keep indemnified Glasshouse, the situation would be atypical.31 These
considerations supported the conventional reading of the easement, supported
by a routine consideration of the characteristics of easements.
The aims of the Torrens system
Whereas the lower courts had engaged in detailed consideration and
discussion of the use of extrinsic material to aid in the construction of the
easement, the High Court was far blunter in its analysis. Their Honours
considered that such an examination disguised the more fundamental matter.
The Torrens system of title registration, its bedrock of indefeasibility and its
publicly available register all led to the conclusion that materials and matter
available to third parties and not disclosed on the title could not be used in the
discovering what was intended by the original parties to the creation of the
27 Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (2007) 239 ALR 75; 81 ALJR 1887;
HCA 45; BC200708402 at [18], quoting from Hodgson JA in the Court of Appeal decision
Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Company Law [2006] NSWCA 245;
BC200607053: ‘Certainly, if it had been intended that the grant extended to the authorisation
of others to go across the dominant tenement to further properties, the words “and across”
could readily have been added.’ Furthermore, the phrase within the easement ‘for all
purposes’ could not be used as a justification to allow access for the purposes of
redevelopment.
28 For example in National Trust v White [1987] 1 WLR 907, the use by visitors of an
adjoining carpark was an acceptable ancillary use.
29 (2007) 239 ALR 75; 81 ALJR 1887; HCA 45; BC200708402 at [23]. In support of this the
High Court referred to the English Court of Appeal decision of Peacock v Custins [2001] 2
All ER 827; [2002] 1 WLR 1815 where it was suggested that the owner of the dominant
tenement could presumably go from the dominant tenement for a picnic — though not if this
was the purpose behind access to the dominant land. Paton and Seabourne, above n 12,
p 132 consider that this must mean that only spontaneous picnics (once someone is on the
dominant tenement) are allowed.
30 (2007) 239 ALR 75; 81 ALJR 1887; HCA 45; BC200708402 at [32].
31 Ibid, at [34].
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easement.32 This was also the tenor of recent High Court decisions concerning
Torrens land.33Authorities34 which had supported the use of extrinsic material
bore little relevance to the instant matter where the external evidence was
being used to show the subjective intentions and expectations or
contemplation of the original contracting parties.35
A sidebar
In related litigation,36 it was argued by Westfield Management that Perpetual
Trustee (or its predecessors) had failed to comply with the conditions
associated with the development of the Glasshouse site. When granted in
1986, the development consent for Glasshouse included Condition 56. This
provided that:
documentary evidence shall be provided, to the satisfaction of the City Solicitor, that
the right-of-way currently applicable to the subject property in favour of the
adjoining property, [be] extended to cover the right-of-way to the ‘Imperial Arcade’
site and the ‘Centrepoint’ site, with reciprocal rights where necessary and such rights
shall embody a provision ensuring their application in perpetuity, except with the
consent of Council.
Westfield sought to enforce Condition 56, Perpetual argued that it was void for
uncertainty. While Perpetual was successful at first instance, on appeal the
arguments of Westfield were upheld. Condition 56 required Perpetual to take
action to extend the easement to Imperial Garden and Centrepoint. Perpetual
sought leave to appeal this matter to the High Court, with this leave not being
granted.37 Therefore, while Perpetual may have won the main game as far as
the easement litigation was concerned, the victory was pyrrhic.
Conclusion
The High Court in a rare unanimous, and relatively short judgment
recommitted to a very traditional position. Despite the millions of dollars in
access and redevelopment costs that would have lain behind this litigation,
easement and Torrens orthodoxy were such that a clear response and message
was required. The necessity for strict identification of the dominant tenement,
the faith given to the Torrens register, and the wording of the instrument alone
all mandated that the easement be precisely defined according to its terms.
32 Ibid, at [37]–[39].
33 For example, ibid, at [38], citing Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230
CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007] HCA 22; BC200703851; Black v Garnock (2007) 237 ALR
1; [2007] HCA 31; BC200705972. This philosophy did not deny that the use of an easement
may change with the nature of a dominant tenement — all that is required is that the terms
of the easement are sufficiently broad to allow that change to occur: ibid, at [43].
34 Ibid, at [40], such as Overland v Lenehan (1901) 11 QLJ 59; Powell v Langdon (1944) 45
SR (NSW) 136.
35 Ibid, at [39]–[45]. An example was given where extrinsic evidence was capable of being
used — this was evidence which explains the surveying terms and abbreviations which
appear on title plan: at [44].
36 Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd [2006] NSWCA 245;
BC200607053.
37 Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd [2007] HCA Trans 367.
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This was not a case where the use of the access was ancillary to the dominant
tenement, Westfield were simply seeking to go beyond what was agreed when
the easement was created, and which was known to them when they purchased
the land. While some may suggest that the principles behind Harris v Flower
serve no useful purpose, the present system of registered title to land, and the
strict canons for the establishment of easements have served the property
system relatively well. Any reform should not be piecemeal, but part of a
larger package looking at their position within a system regulated by interests
based on registration and not on possession.38
38 It should be noted that the UK Law Reform Commission has recently issued a consultation
paper on easements: The Law Commission, Consultation Paper No. 186, Easements,
Covenants and Profits a Prendre, March 2008, at
<http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/easements.htm>. The Tasmanian Law Reform Institute is also
looking at the topic.
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Resolving the debate surrounding
indefeasibility through the eyes of
a consumer
Lynden Griggs*
From its origins in South Australia, the Torrens system of land registration
has become a truly global export. With the notable exception of much of the
United States, its reach in the Asia-Pacific region (most notably in the
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Singapore and Malaysia) is extensive.
However, despite a broad acknowledgement that indefeasibility is the
linchpin of the Torrens system, there is a far less harmonious approach on
how this concept should integrate with established property law doctrines.
With Australia and New Zealand adopting immediate indefeasibility, other
countries have softened the often harsh, immoral nature of this doctrine by
preferring to utilise deferred indefeasibility. The debate between deferred
and immediate indefeasibility has long raged and a doctrinal remedy
appears intractable. The purpose of this article is to see how consumer law
may inform the argument. The purchaser of land is no less of a consumer
than what we may intuitively associate with this term, and given the higher
expense, greater risk and more embedded emotional commitment
associated with the purchase of a home, the consumer safeguards are no
less deserving of consideration. The suggestion is made that immediate
indefeasibility can meet consumer goals, but that greater education is
needed to ensure that the fragility associated with title in the Torrens system
is understood by its consumers, and that safeguards can be taken to protect
against loss associated with the adoption of this doctrine.
Introduction
It seems wrong that the coercive power of the state should be used to force an
unconsented transfer from A to B where the operation of the open market has failed
to generate the required bargain by means of normal arm’s length dealing.1
It is an old, wise and beneficial presumption, long obeyed, that to take away
people’s rights, Parliament must use clear language. The basic human right to own
property and to be immune from arbitrary dispossession of property is one generally
respected by Australian lawmakers.2
Land is the ultimate resource.3 So described by the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe Working Party on Land Administration,
that statement crisply notes why an understanding of land, and its
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania. Email:
<Lynden.Griggs@utas.edu.au>. Sincere thanks are extended to Associate Professor Pamela
O’Connor who reviewed an earlier version of this paper. All errors, and the views expressed,
are solely my own.
1 K Gray, ‘There’s No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Jnl of South Pacific Law 73 at 75.
2 Wilson v Anderson (2002) 213 CLR 401; 190 ALR 313; [2002] HCA 29; BC200204356
[140].
3 UN Economic Commission for Europe Working Party on Land Administration, Land
Administration Guidelines, UN ECE?HB/96, New York and Geneva, 1996, p 10.
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administration and regulation is critical for modern societies.4 Despite the
importance of land, the study of land administration in a consumer context is
relatively rare. This occurs despite the knowledge that for many people the
purchase and sale of residential real estate will be the most significant one-off
financial transaction that he or she will ever undertake.5 However, for most
Australians that transaction will not be in trade or commerce for the purposes
of the ‘misleading or deceptive conduct’ or the ‘false representations and other
misleading or offensive conduct in relation to land’ sections of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) or the Fair Trading legislation.6 Nor will the
consumer legislation providing for an implied warranty that the supplier has
title apply.7 However, the lack of applicability of this consumer legislation
does not mean that the purchaser or vendor lacks safeguards, merely that these
must be found elsewhere. Therefore, in considering the purchase of real estate
4 As noted by J E Cribbet, ‘Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of
Property’ (1986) U Ill L Rev 1 at 3–4:
Land, including surface, subsurface, air rights, and water rights, represents the basic
resource for existence on this planet. In that sense, land is a unique resource and requires
special treatment. It is as permanent as anything in an impermanent world. It is
immovable yet exhaustible, and we now have as much of this resource as ever will exist.
Because land is a closed physical system, its allocation and use are critically important
to society.
5 Some indication of this is given by Davison who indicates that over the 20 year period from
1975–1995, the number of times the average male moves in the course of their lifetime rose
from 10.4 to 12.8 in that period. Interestingly the author notes that rates of movement are
significantly higher in Australia than in Europe or North America: J Davison, Assistant
Research Director, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Housing Policy and
residential mobility, Paper presented to the 2005 National Housing Conference, at
<http://www.nationalhousingconference.org.au/downloads/2005/DayOne/DavisonJ_
paper.pdf> (accessed 27 May 2009).
6 O’Brien v Smolonogov (1983) 53 ALR 107; 2 IPR 68; (1983) ATPR 40-418; Argy v Blunts
(1990) 26 FCR 112; 94 ALR 719; (1990) ATPR 41-015; Franich v Swannell (1993) 10 WAR
459. If the transaction is part of a series of transactions, then it may be considered in trade
or commerce: Gentry Bros Pty Ltd v Wilson Brown & Associates Pty Ltd (1992) 8 ACSR
405; 10 ACLC 1394; (1992) ATPR 41-184. The fair trading legislation for each jurisdiction
in Australia is Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW); Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld); Fair Trading Act
1987 (SA); Fair Trading Act 1990 (Tas); Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic); Fair Trading Act 1987
(WA); Fair Trading Act 1992 (ACT); Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990 (NT).
Interestingly, s 53A(2) provides that a ‘corporation shall not use physical force or undue
harassment or coercion in connection with the sale or grant, or the possible sale or grant, or
an interest in land or the payment for an interest in land’. There is no restriction to trade or
commerce.
7 Section 69 of the Trade Practices Act provides that in the case of a sale of goods by a
corporation to a consumer, that there is an implied condition that the supplier has the right
to sell the goods, there is an implied warranty that the consumer will have undisturbed
possession of the goods, and an implied warranty that the goods are free from any
encumbrance in favour of any third party of which the buyer is unaware. The equivalent
provisions in the Sale of Goods legislation for each state and territory (this legislation
extending the operation of this to ‘natural persons’): (ACT) s 17; (NT) s 17; (NSW) s 17;
(Qld) s 15; (SA) s 12; (Tas) s 17; (WA) s 12; (Vic) Goods Act 1958 s 17). This will generally
not apply because, as noted, the legislation is restricted to consumers. Section 4 of the
legislation defines ‘goods’ as follows:
(a) ships, aircraft and other vehicles;
(b) animals, including fish;
(c) minerals, trees and crops, whether on, under or attached to land or not; and
(d) gas and electricity.
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by way of a functional analysis,8 we see consumer safeguards built into the
process of buying property. This includes the use of the competition mantra9
to deregulate the fees charged by real estate agents and to provide for the
registration, rather than licensing, of property agents,10 together with the
mandatory and arguably paternalistic introduction of vendor disclosure. The
latter reform required because of the informational failure within the
competitive market prevents consumers from appreciating the latent risks
involved in house buying.11 Once the property is located and settlement is
required, competition in the conveyancing process is mandated by the removal
of any legal profession monopoly,12 with deregulation of the finance sector as
the tool used to minimise the interest rates imposed by the mortgage industry,
and to encourage diversity of product. However, one aspect in the
conveyancing process has undergone little analysis by way of consumer
principles. The matter that has rarely been questioned is the way in which the
title (in the sense of ‘ownership’ as it can exist in a feudal, as against an
allodial, system of land ownership)13 being sold by the vendor is sound and
that the purchaser is buying something without impairment, and that once
bought the purchaser (now owner) is secure in the knowledge that they will
not face peremptory eviction from their house through no fault of their own.
The reason for this lack of analysis is, in one sense, understandable. The
average family will not purchase a significant number of properties in the
cycle of their life. Therefore the purchaser/owner of real estate has little
incentive to bring a strong voice to force change, with at present, policy
development largely controlled through the institutions14 of real estate
conveyancing, such as lawyers, the courts and the legislature.15 Today, and
8 See Z O Gresham, ‘The Residential Real Estate Transfer Process: A Functional Critique’
[1974] 23 Emory LJ 421.
9 For the interface between competition and consumer law, see L Sylvan, ‘Activating
Competition: The consumer — competition interface’ (2004) CCLJ Lexis 14.
10 As an example of this, see Property Agents and Land Transactions Act 2005 (Tas). Arguably
licensing is used to restrict entry into the profession, whereas registration allows any person
to enter the industry, provided they have met certain objective criteria (such as the successful
completion of a course of study).
11 A number of jurisdictions presently have some system of vendor disclosure. For a discussion
of these see Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, Vendor Disclosure — Final Report,
September 2004, at <http://www.law.utas.edu.au/reform/>. Information based remedies are
generally preferred because they still leave the ultimate decision in the hands of the
consumers: H Beales et al, ‘The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information: A Research
Agenda’ (1981) 24 JL & Econ 491 at 513.
12 As an example of a recent illustration of this, see Conveyancing Act 2004 (Tas).
13 In the context of property law, the reference to ‘title’ can also mean the way in which the
ownership of land is proven, that is, the series of transactions necessary to establish the
underlying ownership of the land. The system of land ownership in Australia is feudal. This
means that all land is held ‘of or from’ the Crown. See, generally, M Stuckey, ‘Feudalism
and Australian Land Law: A “Shadowy, Ghostlike Survival”’ (1994) 16 Uni of Tas L Rev
102. Allodial title is where the land is not held of or from the Crown. See J Devereux and
S Dorsett, ‘Towards a Reconsideration of Estates and Tenures’ (1996) 4 APLJ Lexis 30.
14 For a discussion of the role of institutions in the consumer process, see L Griggs,
‘Intervention or empowerment — choosing the consumer law weapon’ [2007] CCLJ Lexis
2.
15 Traditionally, it has been the policy makers that have sought to control the land transfer
system. Early attempts reaching as far back as the time of Henry VIII and Queen Anne. The
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apart from much of the United States and some parts of Latin and South
America,16 the Torrens system of land registration, an Australian invention,17
enjoys global recognition, though the notion of one model is far more
ephemeral.18 There is no doubt that in terms of consumer outcomes, the
Torrens system is vastly superior in comparison with old system or general
law title, with its reliance on many deeds ‘difficult to read, disgusting to touch,
and impossible to understand’.19 As noted by Gresham in describing old
system title in the US context:
A system of land rights so dysfunctional for modern conditions is the product of long
obsolete historical forces. Because land ownership is feudal times imposed on the
freeholder certain duties to the overlord, the rule emerged that a person could not
abandon a freehold and thus escape obligations owed to the seigneur. The law
forbidding abandonment was extended to virtually all interests inland and continues
to stalk the countryside, perpetuating legal interests in real property that are long
dead in human contemplation and practice.20
Despite the growth or evolution of Torrens into a global industry, and an
appreciation that on a consumer basis this system is far superior to old system
title, what is not uniformly agreed is how indefeasibility, the underlying
concept of Torrens, should be interpreted. For example, Australia and New
Zealand have expressly accepted what is known as immediate indefeasibility,
first foray in the land transfer system involved the notion of feoffment and livery of seisin.
The feoffer (or grantor) gave a sod of soil to the feoffee (grantee) with this person then left
in possession. See, generally, H W B Mackay, ‘Registration of Title to Real Estate’ (1897)
11 Harvard L Rev 301.
16 J L McCormack, ‘Torrens and Recording: Land Title Assurance in the Computer Age’
[1992] 18 William Mitchell L Rev 61 at 63 n 5 notes that Brazil adopted Torrens in 1890, but
that it is little used today, and that the introduction of a Torrens system also failed in parts
of Latin America.
17 Though it must be acknowledged that many historians consider that Torrens drew heavily on
the Hanseatic system of title registration for shipping: M J Raff, Private Property and
Environmental Responsibility: A Comparative Study of German Real Property Law, Kluwer
Law International, The Hague, 2003, Ch 2; contrast G Taylor, A Great and Glorious
Reformation: Six Early South Australian Legal Innovations, Wakefield Press, 2005, Ch 2.
18 Torrens can definitively be found in Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and a
number of smaller countries in the Pacific region. Many countries will have a land
registration system based on title. For an overview of the land administration systems in
Europe and North America, see UN ECE Working Party on Land Administration, Inventory
of Land Administration Systems in North America, 4th ed, HM Land Registry, London,
2005. See also Ausaid, Improving Access to Land and Enhancing the Security of Land
Rights: A Review of Land Titling and Land Administration Projects, Quality Assurance
Series No 20, September 2000 quoted in T Stutt, ‘Transitions to Torrens: The six-fold path
to the ideal land administration system?’ (2008) 15 APLJ Lexis 1 at 34 of online version. An
interesting absence from the list of countries who have adopted title by registration systems
is the United States. For some discussion of the reasons for this, see C A Yzenbaard, ‘The
Consumer’s Need for Title Registration’ (1977) 4 Northern Kentucky LR 253.
19 Wroth v Tyler [1974] Ch 30 at 56; [1973] 1 All ER 897; [1973] 2 WLR 405. Under the old
system of land registration, where title was established by the chain of transactions, defects
would not be revealed if, for example, a document had been deliberately removed (legal
interests still prevailed against the purchaser); the conveyance by the vendor twice (eg,
Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) 7 Ch App 259); possessory interests may not be revealed; the
failure of a document to operate according to what it said (eg, non est factum). Under the
doctrine of merger, a purchaser delivered a defective title cannot sue the vendor: Pallos v
Munro (1970) 72 SR(NSW) 507.
20 Gresham, above n 8, at 446.
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yet most other nation states, if not the majority, would have adopted a concept
of indefeasibility either that is deferred, or which modifies immediate
indefeasibility. The purpose of this article is to consider this bifurcation and
analyse how consumer law can inform the debate as well as provide a practical
measure that can easily be adopted to match consumer expectations with the
legal framework. In doing this, the first part of this article will briefly outline
the expectations of a consumer in a land transaction as well as provide a
primer of the Torrens system. Indefeasibility is then examined, with this
followed by a consideration of how consumer law may resolve the current
confusion that presently exists between nation states as to its application. The
importance of this cannot be underestimated. Immediate indefeasibility can
operate to remove, almost imperiously, what many would perceive to be the
rightful owner from their land — an ejection which, as the opening two quotes
presage, should rarely occur. If this does not meet consumer expectations, then
how do the institutions that develop policy within this area respond? Should,
in this country at least, the progeny sired from the acceptance of immediate
indefeasibility be relegated to the teachings of legal history?
What are the expectations of an owner and
purchaser of real estate?
To this end, the expectations of the owner/purchaser of residential real estate
are simple. A land registration system should provide for security of title, be
simple, accurate and cheap.21 ‘[T]he avoidance of unnecessary doubt and
confusion is a proper objective of land law.’22 The owner should be confident
that he or she will receive title to the land that will correspond with their
reasonable expectations, that they will not be evicted or removed from their
property without their consent, and that the land will not be taken away except
in accordance with what could be considered ex-ante objectively justifiable
community expectations.23 The homebuyer will also expect that the title he or
she will receive will be free from defect.24 In this context, title means that the
land is free of any encumbrance, lien, right or other interest that would make
the land unmarketable. It does not mean that the land has an economic value.
A primer on the Torrens system
Two key features underlie the Torrens system. The first is that each land parcel
will be identified and the second and more important feature for immediate
21 These are four of the six criteria identified in 1913 by Brickdale, Sir C F Brickdale,
‘Methods of land transfer, being eight lectures delivered at the London School of
Economics, in the months of May and June, 1913’ (1914) The Making of Modern Law 2. The
remaining two criteria were expedition and suitability to circumstances. See also,
Yzenbaard, above n 18, at 254.
22 Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 at 221 per Kirby J; 141 ALR 129; [1996] HCA
40; BC9606282.
23 An example might be the seizure of property under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
24 The law has considerable difficulty in determining what constitutes a defect in title allowing
a person to rescind, and what constitutes a mere defect in the quality of title for which
rescission is not permissible. See generally D Skapinker, ‘A Different Perspective on defects
in title and quality’ (1994) 2 APLJ 231. See also Carpenter v McGrath (1996) 40 NSWLR
39; (1996) NSW ConvR 55-788; BC9604107 where Cole JA discusses the extent to which
the erection of a building structure without council approval will amount to a defect in title.
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purposes is that any interests or estates relevant to the title are recorded on a
public register maintained by the state. By contrast to the general law system,
which involved the registration of the instruments describing title, the Torrens
system register is conclusive evidence of the rights themselves. In some
jurisdictions, but not all, this statement by the state is backed by an insurance
or assurance fund that compensates those who have been harmed by the
operation of the Torrens system. The result of this structure is that every time
there is a sale of land the title is relinquished, and taken back by the Crown.
The Crown then issues a new title to the purchaser. Title is not derivative and
should reflect (as in a mirror or photo) the encumbrances and interests relevant
to that title. It is a positive system whereby the:
state warrants that the rights shown on the register are valid and effective according
to their terms. This is an authoritative system, a ‘register of conclusions’, which
allows purchasers to transact safely in reliance on the registered title even if it turns
out to have been procured by defective means. In a ‘negative system’, registration
does not confer or guarantee title, with the result that purchasers must examine the
deeds and draw their own conclusions.25
Torrens has also been described as ‘bijural in the way that it interacts with the
established and evolving rules of property law’.26 Bijuralism is at the heart of
the instant debate. On the one hand, it might be said that the established rules
of property law were designed to interact with this new system of land
administration and title by registration and was never meant to codify the
principles governing how a proprietary interest in land was to be obtained.
Conversely, it might be suggested that the arguable paramountcy provided by
indefeasibility was intended and directly aimed to quash the festering
complexity and incoherency inherent in old system title. In making this latter
submission, it must always be appreciated that total indefeasibility is largely
unattainable. Every successive indefeasible title will, by registration, destroy
the previously protected title. ‘Indefeasibility is a shield which will ward off
most attacks on title, but which will be pierced, with fatal results to the title
it guards, by the sword of a later indefeasible title.’27 It is this aspect where the
commonly understood expectations of the owner would not meet the legal
framework. Apart from those within the academy or in legal practice, few
would appreciate the tenuous nature of one’s title when attacked by a
subsequent purchaser acting innocently and in reliance on the tenure derived
from the Crown. Like the thread that held the sword under which Damocles
sat, indefeasibility will remain inviolate until swiftly cut by the later operation
of the register. Once cut, the head of Damocles, or in our context, the title of
the registered proprietor, is forever maimed and left lifeless as an historical
incident.
25 P O’Connor, ‘Deferred and Immediate Indefeasibility: Bijural Ambiguity in Registered Land
Title Systems’ (2009) 13 Edinburgh L Rev 194 at 195.
26 Ibid, at 195.
27 D J Whalan, The Torrens System in Australia, LawBook Co, Sydney, 1982, p 297.
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Indefeasibility — the core concept of Torrens
Once registered, the registered proprietor gains an indefeasible title to that
land, subject only to such estates and interests as are recorded on title.28 Title
cannot be set aside because of some defect in the period leading to
registration. It is the ‘foundation of the Torrens system’.29 It is, however, not
an absolute or indisputable concept, and indisputably is a principle, ‘apt to
create unfairness’.30 Broadly speaking, two theories of indefeasibility exist,
immediate and deferred, with the difference being as follows. With immediate
indefeasibility, registration will cure any defect that may have existed in the
registered proprietor’s title. This contrasts with old system title where the
process of registration of title will not cure the impediment. By contrast,
deferred indefeasibility operates so that registration will not cure any problem
that results from a void or voidable instrument — indefeasibility is deferred
to the next registered proprietor.31 Immediate indefeasibility works to protect
the security of the transaction (ie, the purchaser), whereas deferred, at least
initially, guards against loss of the assets being held (ie, the owner is
favoured). The differences can be illustrated as follows:
These principles compete. Immediate indefeasibility favours the buyer of
the land. It gives effect to the commercial transaction without consideration of
whether that transaction would sit easily with established property law
doctrines. However, once bought, immediate indefeasibility leaves the now
28 The indefeasibility provisions of the legislation are as follows: Transfer of Land Act (Vic)
1958 s 42; Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 58; Real Property Act (NSW) 1900 s 42; Real
Property Act (NT) s 69; Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 184; Real Property Act (SA) s 69; Land
Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 40; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 68.
29 Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604 at 613; 78 ALR 1; [1988] HCA 16; BC8802595.
30 Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v English [2009] NSWSC 478; BC200904808 at [156].
31 See P Butt, Land Law, 5th ed, Thomson Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, 2006, pp 726–8.
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homeowner in a precarious position. Their title is now subject to an option —
an option that if a later innocent party becomes registered, their home
ownership in that land will be brutally and harshly expunged. While in
Australia, this loss of land will be compensated in financial terms, in some
jurisdictions (eg, Malaysia), state compensation is not available:
In this terminology there is ‘static’ security to the extent that the law prevents
deprivation of property other than by consensual transfer, and there is ‘dynamic’
security (or security of transaction) to the extent that the law upholds the expectation
that bona fide purchasers will acquire a good title to an asset, free of unknown
claims. Static security allows assets to be securely held, while dynamic security
allows assets to pass securely to new owners. The dilemma is that while both
conceptions of security are desirable, they are to some extent antithetical. Rules that
promote static security tend to derogate from static security and vice versa.32
In Australia and New Zealand, the strength of immediate indefeasibility is
apparent. The High Court in Breskvar v Wall,33 in following the Privy Council
authority, on appeal from New Zealand of Frazer v Walker,34 expressly
endorsed this concept with later authorities building on this infrastructure of
immediate indefeasibility, so that in this jurisdiction at least, it has largely
become insurmountable.35 Whereas the Torrens system has largely enjoyed
successful adoption, immediate indefeasibility has not attracted the same level
of support. For example, in Malaysia and some provinces of Canada deferred
indefeasibility is arguably the norm,36 with the jurisdictional differences
stemming from how the purpose of the legislation is to be read. For example,
Barwick CJ’s statement in Breskvar v Wall is emblematic of the Australian
position.37 In the High Court’s view, the Torrens system was not a natural
evolution from old system title, but an unprecedented and uncompromising
attack on the precepts underlying its basis. The extreme position was to be
adopted thus fulfilling the promise of a slate wiped clean and replaced by a
system distinct in every respect from what it replaced. Notice of prior interests
was no longer relevant,38 nor was there any need to undertake an historical
examination of the derivation of title. It is a view endorsed recently by the
32 O’Connor, above n 25, at 198.
33 [1971] 126 CLR 376; [1972] ALR 205; (1971) 46 ALJR 68; BC7100630.
34 [1967] 1 AC 569; [1967] NZLR 1069; [1967] 1 All ER 649; [1967] 2 WLR 411.
35 See Butt, above n 31, p 728 for a discussion of these authorities. ‘So it can now confidently
be said that immediate indefeasibility is the preferred doctrine throughout Australia.’
36 See Butt, above n 31, p 728 n 85. Contrast O’Connor, above n 25, pp 208–21.
37 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376 at 385–6; [1972] ALR 205; (1971) 46 ALJR 68;
BC7100630:
The Torrens system or registered title of which the Act is a form is not a system of
registration of title but a system of title by registration . . . The title it certifies is not
historical or derivative. It is the title which registration itself has vested in the proprietor.
Consequently, a registration which results from a void instrument is effective according
to the terms of the registration.
38 See Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 59; Land Title Act 2000 (NT) s 188; Land Title Act 1994
(Qld) s 184; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 72, 186–187; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 41;
Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 43; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 134; Real Property
Act 1900 (NSW) ss 43 and 43A.
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High Court.39 By contrast to this approach, other jurisdictions have chosen to
interpret their own legislation as subject to common law principles with
nations such as Canada and Malaysia interpreting the system as merely a
complement to the established common law principles, with deferred
indefeasibility the only mechanism to provide this conflation.40 For example,
in the Malaysian authority of Macnamara v Kuan,41 the plaintiff, an
Australian, and the defendant were married in 1997, with this marriage
registered in 1999. They divorced some 5 years later. In 1999, Macnamara had
solely financed the purchase of a property at Canning Garden, Perak with this
property being placed in the name of Kuan. A trust deed established at this
time indicated that the plaintiff had solely provided the finance, and that as
consent was required for a purchase of Malaysian property by a person not of
Malaysian nationality, the defendant would hold the property in trust for her
husband until this consent was obtained. The deed further provided that once
the consent was obtained, the defendant would deal with the property as
directed by Macnamara. When the relationship broke down, the defendant, in
separate family law proceedings, obtained an order preventing the plaintiff
from entering the property. Macnamara sought a judicial decree that the trust
be upheld and that he be entitled to vacant possession of the property. In
respect of indefeasibility, the defendant argued that her title to the property
was indefeasible. However, Balia Yusof J was quick to dismiss this argument.
His Honour comments:
It should be noted that the expansion of [in personam] has been prominent in the
Australian system of registration of titles where the principle of immediate
indefeasibility applies . . . Where the system of registration of titles is one of
deferred indefeasibility . . . as it is in Malaysia . . . there is no real barrier in principle
to a generous application of equity subject to the provisions of the National Land
Code . . . The existing approach provides the system with a degree of flexibility
necessary to meet the demands of a property-owning community. There is sufficient
latitude within existing authorities to cater for this development and this is so
especially where the nature of the Torrens system in Malaysia provides for deferred
rather than immediate indefeasibility.42
Accordingly, the plaintiff was entitled to an order for vacant possession.
By contrast to this Malaysian position, Singaporean authorities have
endorsed immediate indefeasibility.43 For example, in United Overseas Bank
Ltd v Bebe Bte Mohammad44 in circumstances where a 90-year-old woman
suffering from Alzheimers allegedly granted a mortgage over her property to
secure credit in favour of her daughter and son-in-law, the court refused to
entertain the existence of any personal equity in favour of the registered
proprietor. As noted by the Court of Appeal, the ‘courts are constantly
struggling to find the right balance between the competing considerations of
39 Farah Constructions v Say-Dee (2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007] HCA 22;
BC200703851.
40 See the discussion of the Canadian position by O’Connor, above n 25, p 213.
41 [2008] 2 MLJ 450.
42 Ibid, at [28], [31].
43 See generally, B Crown, ‘Indefeasibility of Title: Developments in Singapore’ (2007) 15
APLJ 91.
44 [2006] 4 SLR 884.
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certainty and fairness’.45 In deciding in favour of the mortgagee, the court
stressed the importance of indefeasibility of title and the paramountcy of the
registered title. The policy objectives of the legislation required that certainty
prevail and unconscionability should not be used to erode the principle of
indefeasibility.46
In Canada, the diversity of the Federal system in that state has produced
even less cohesion than exists in Australia. The position can be summarised as
follows:47
Alberta Immediate Indefeasibility (though not affirmatively
decided)48
British Columbia Unsettled49
Manitoba Immediate Indefeasibility (thought not
affirmatively decided)50
Ontario Deferred indefeasibility51
Saskatchewan Immediate Indefeasibility52
Because of the polar opposition of the two approaches, the judicial
response, depending on which principle was adopted, has varied in
recognition of a need to modify the harshness of the particular result. For
example, in Australia and New Zealand and its recognition of immediate
indefeasibility, attempts are routinely made to either extend the operation of
the statutory fraud exception to indefeasibility,53 or to undermine immediate
indefeasibility through application of in personam. An illustration of how this
can occur dramatically is illustrated in White v Tomasel.54 In this case, a
transfer of land resulted from a court order. Subsequently the appeal court set
45 Ibid, at [10].
46 Ibid, at [28], [90], [91], [96].
47 See B Ziff, ‘Looking for Mr Wright: A Comment on Lawrence v Wright’ (2007) 51 RPR
(4th) 22; O’Connor, above n 25, pp 208–16. For further discussion of the Canadian position,
see F Brochu, ‘Le systeme Torrens et law publicite fonciere quebecoise’ (2001-2002) 47
McGill LJ 625; R Stein, ‘Some Aspects of Title by Registration in the Maritime Provinces
of Canada’ (1975-1976) 2 Dalhousie LJ 633; M Neave, ‘Indefeasibility of title in the
Canadian Context’ (1976) 26 Uni of Toronto L Jnl 173.
48 Ziff, above n 47, n 10.
49 Land Title Act RSBC 1996, c 250, s 25.1 as am by SBC 2005, c 35 — noted in Ziff, above
n 47, n 11.
50 Private Title Insurance (Manitoba LRC No 114, 2006) 17–18, quoted in O’Connor, above
n 25, at 208.
51 Lawrence v Maple Trust Company (2007) 84 OR (3d) 94; 278 DLR (4th) 698 at [55]–[57]
— deferred indefeasibility was consistent with the wording of the legislation, an historical
analysis of the Act and preferable for policy reasons.
52 Hermanson v Martin [1987] 1 WWR 439.
53 For example, in Bank of South Australia v Ferguson (1998) 192 CLR 248 at 255 it was said,
‘Not all species of fraud which will attract equitable remedies will amount to fraud in the
statutory sense’; 151 ALR 729; [1998] HCA 12; BC9800309. Similarly, the earlier High
Court case of Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604 at 614 per Mason CJ and
Dawson J; 78 ALR 1; [1988] HCA 16; BC8802595, considered that statutory fraud could
encompass equitable fraud. New Zealand courts have embraced a wider definition of fraud.
See the discussion of this point in Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots
Church Development Ltd (2007) 64 ACSR 31; 13 BPR 24,969; [2007] NSWSC 676;
BC200705091.
54 [2004] 2 Qd R 438; [2004] ANZ ConvR 248; [2004] QCA 089; BC200401549.
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aside that order. However, in the interim, the transfer of land had been
registered, and Tomasel, the now registered proprietor, argued that their title
was indefeasible. The Queensland Court of Appeal, by a majority, accepted
that in personam applied to make Tomasel’s title impeachable. This result of
a defeasible title was achieved despite no finding of unconscionability by
Tomasel.55Another possibility to weaken the harsh, blunt nature of immediate
indefeasibility has been to suggest that the recorders’ powers to intervene to
rectify title should be expansively read. This suggestion has not been adopted
in Australia,56 or Singapore,57 though broader powers of rectification do exist,
for example, in the United Kingdom.58 By contrast, in those jurisdictions
where deferred indefeasibility is the norm, courts have sought to engage in a
complex analysis of who had the most opportunity to avoid fault and to
modify their solution accordingly.59
Do any existing consumer law doctrines help?
Property law principles will not resolve this issue, and continuing debate over
the applicability of immediate and deferred indefeasibility only serves to
undermine the Torrens system — a system far superior on any level of
consumer protection to that which existed in the past. As indicated at the
outset, the void in the academic literature is that the issue has not been
examined from the substratum of consumer law principles. Can this body of
law provide a resolution as to whether immediate or deferred indefeasibility
should be adopted? In an era where identity fraud is of increasing community
concern,60 (with this a particular problem associated with the rise of social
networking sites), and an estimate that it costs Australians some $3.5 billion
a year,61 heightened disquiet will continue over the operation of the Torrens
55 The majority of authority would suggest that the two requirements to establish a successful
in personam claim would be a known legal or equitable cause of action, and that the
proprietor’s conscience is affected by this cause of action. See the discussion by Butt, above
n 31, pp 789–93.
56 State Bank of New South Wales v Berowra Waters Holding Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 398;
(1986) NSW ConvR 55-281. See also Butt, above n 31, at 793: ‘In practice, the
Registrar-General exercises this power only to correct obvious clerical and administrative
errors.’
57 See the discussion by O’Connor, above n 25, at 219–21.
58 Land Registration Act 1925 Sch 4 paras 1–7.
59 For example, O’Connor, above n 25, at 208–16 analyses the complexity in the Canadian
cases, where courts have distinguished between single transaction fraud (the forger takes on
the identity of registered proprietor and sells the land to an unsuspecting purchaser) and
double transaction fraud (where the wrongdoer procures registration in her or his name and
then transfers to another).
60 For a discussion of the prevalence of identity theft see S F H Allison, A M Schuck and
K Hersch, ‘Exploring the crime of identity theft prevalence, clearance rates, and
victim/offender characteristics’ (2005) 33 Jnl of Criminal Justice 19. See also M Paphyzy
and A Prpich, ‘Identity Theft in an Online Environment’ (2008) 11 Internet Law Bulletin
132.
61 M. Rannard, ‘Identity Theft is increasing — survey’, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 June 2009,
<http://news.smh.com.au> (accessed 5 June 2009). The author was quoting from the Identity
Theft Report conducted by Galaxy Research, which found that 4.4 million Australians had
been affected by identity theft in the last year. If these figures are accurate, the escalating
cost of this crime can be evidenced by a comparison with the work of AUSTRAC which,
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system and in those jurisdictions where immediate indefeasibility is
paramount, the potential undermining of the system is obvious and apparent.
In the scenario illustrated above,62 both the true owner and the purchaser are
intuitively innocent of any wrongdoing. Accordingly, what options exist to
resolve the competing claims? First, and this must be made clear, ‘the case for
immediate indefeasibility is not based on irrefutable logic, but must depend on
value judgements concerning the weight of conflicting policies’.63
At the outset it could be argued that if a registered proprietor has done
nothing to contribute to the loss of identity, then the transfer to the purchaser
is void and of no consequence. This is the approach taken under the general
law system and from a consumer perspective resonates with an appeal to nemo
dat qui non habet (the person who has not cannot give). However, the answer
to this is plain — the Torrens system was introduced as a fundamental and
substantive alteration of the legal principles that previously existed. Appeal to
established dogma fails to comprehend that the legislative basis of Torrens
was designed as a rejection of what had previously occurred, and is not in any
way an endorsement. ‘The legal rule of the positive system is that registration
confers title to the interest shown, irrespective of whether the registered
interest is valid.’64
A second consumer based option may be to analogise from the defective
goods regime contained within Pt VA of the Trade Practices Act. This
legislation provides that goods will have a defect if their safety is not such that
persons generally would be entitled to expect. By analogy it might be
submitted that the title to land containing a latent defect, such as the
underlying transaction being void, is the equivalent of a product defect within
Pt VA— a defect that a buyer would not be entitled to expect. Following this
logic, the purchaser should prevail over the existing registered proprietor. The
difficulty with this is that the product liability regime was premised on the
notion that liability should be imposed upon the party who has the greatest
chance and the least cost associated with the removal of the defect. This was
generally seen to be the manufacturer of goods. However, to apply this to the
position of the true owner in the highlighted scenario seems both inherently
unfair (that person may have taken all reasonable steps to prevent the theft of
their identity) but also fails to accord with the underlying theoretical
framework of Torrens — the sale of property involves a surrender of the title
to the Crown and the issue of a new title. Product liability thinking may well
be a reason to impose liability on the state (and provide some explanation for
the appearance of assurance funds) but does little to advance which of the two
innocent parties should be preferred. The reasonable consumer expectation in
the true owner is that her or his title is certain and not able to the arbitrarily
removed, whereas the purchaser similarly has a reasonable expectation that
the delivered title will be free of defect. Furthermore in some instances, it will
some 6 years earlier, estimated that identify theft cost Australia $1.1 billion. See Australian
Government, National Crime Prevention, ‘A kit to prevent and respond to identity theft’,
ISBN 0 642 21084 5.
62 Above Figure 1.
63 R Sackville, ‘The Torrens System — Some thoughts on Indefeasibility and Priorities’ (1973)
47 ALJ 526 at 531.
64 O’Connor, above n 25, at 195.
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be the purchaser that has the greatest opportunity and the least costs associated
with ensuring that title is free of defect, particularly in respect of mortgagee
indefeasibility.65
An additional option may be to amend the Trade Practices Act, and
associated fair trading legislation to apply to private land sales. While the
trade or commerce limitation is understandable in the context of the
constitutional restrictions on the Federal Parliament, it is ‘less clear why the
states have similarly limited most of the fair trading provisions to situations
where the conduct is engaged in by way of “trade or commerce”, or, in the
case of New Zealand, “trade”’.66 The removal of this limitation within the fair
trading legislation would see private land sales come within consumer
protection. Similarly, the restriction of the right to title provisions applying to
‘goods’ could easily be overcome by extending this to land. However, these
amendments, even if made, would not solve the conundrum in question.67 The
adversarial nature of this dispute is between two innocent parties. One is who
we may consider to be the original true owner, the other, the purchaser from
a forger (or supplier in the context of, for example, s 69 of the Trade Practices
Act) who has similarly acted innocently. There is no doubt that the wrongdoer
has engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct, nor did that person have the
title to pass. However, for whatever reason, any remedy against them is of
little utility, and demonstrating the importance of the in rem nature of
proprietary rights, the dispute lies between two innocents who both seek the
land.
A further novel solution suggested by the Scottish Law Commission68 was
to recommend that a good faith purchaser would be able to rely on the register
supported by a state guarantee. If however, it was shown that the seller had not
been in possession for a prescribed period (with a year given as an example),
the purchaser’s entitlement would be to compensation, with the property
remaining with the true owner. The practical effect of this recommendation
would be that the purchaser would have to undertake some form of identity
check to ensure that the person selling has been in possession for that period.69
Finally, a law and economics approach would have us search for the
solution which would implement the lowest transaction costs and provide the
greatest benefit to society. It would ask the question as to whether immediate
indefeasibility by fundamentally altering the previously accepted position has
increased certainty and stability to a level that the detriment associated with
65 If C is a mortgagee, they will be able to make proof of loans dependant on adequate identity
being shown. Queensland and New South Wales have introduced legislation to place an onus
on mortgagees to take the appropriate steps to check identity. See Land Titles Act (Qld)
s 185(1A); Real Property & Conveyancing Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (NSW)
s 56(c).
66 D Everett and A Ransom, The Fair Trading Acts, Longman Professional, Melbourne, 1989,
p 259.
67 In Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd (1984) (1984) 1 FCR 549; 53 ALR 225;
2 IPR 1; ATPR 40-453 it was doubted whether misleading and deceptive conduct or false
representations provisions would apply to a situation where there was a complete absence of
title.
68 Scottish Law Commission, Land Registration, Void and Voidable Titles, Discussion Paper
No 125, February 2004.
69 See L Cooke, ‘Land Registration: Void and Voidable Titles’ (2004) 8 Edinburgh LR 401.
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its introduction is less than the benefit obtained. There is no doubt that the
introduction of the Torrens system and its central tenet of immediate
indefeasibility has reduced transaction costs, and for the vast majority of
citizens provides a higher level of certainty in the transacting process. As
noted by Edwards and O’Reilly,70 any transferee innocent of fraud can have
complete confidence in the Torrens system if immediate indefeasibility is
adopted. However, they note that the trade-off is that once registered, the title
is at risk of loss through no fault of their own:71
Assuming the current owner and the transferee are equally risk-averse, one needs to
examine whether either party can reduce their risk (and at what costs) . . . It appears
that the costs to the current owner in reducing their risk in validating the bona fides
of people to whom they allow access to the title documents would usually be
cheaper than the costs of transferees in validating identities of signatories. Thus, it
seems that current owners are in fact usually best placed to reduce the risks in the
most cost effective way, and therefore that immediate indefeasibility is more
efficient than deferred indefeasibility.72
By having the title reissued from the Crown, the new registered proprietor,
can, for the most part, rest easy that they have the interest contained in the
certificate of title, that they are subject to no more encumbrances than are
noted in the certificate of title, that their ownership will be secure (subject to
the present debate between immediate and deferred indefeasibility) and their
interest transferable.73 But the instant conflict highlights that despite the
intent, ‘[r]egistration is neither as conclusive in fact as in theory’.74 With the
overwhelming majority of frauds committed by those known to the registered
proprietor,75 the question remains — who could most easily reduce the risk
and what is in accord with consumer expectations. Do we impose obligations
upon every purchaser of land to check the identity of the vendor, or conversely
would it be simpler to impose some form of qualitative obligation on each of
us to ensure that our identity is not stolen. For example, we appear to impose
no positive obligation to protect our own position by removing or controlling
access to the certificate of title. By way of contrast we, as a community,
impose far greater obligations to protect our financial details with the
Electronic Funds Transfer Code of Conduct76 imposing burdensome
obligations on the consumer. For example, the account holder will be liable for
unauthorised transactions if it can show on the balance of probabilities that the
customer contributed to the loss through her or his:
• Fraud;
70 R Edwards and J O’Reilly, [1999] Singapore Jnl of Legal Studies 82.
71 Ibid, at 109.
72 Ibid, at 109. See also their summary of the evidence at 110.
73 See the comments by J L McCormack, ‘Torrens and Recording: Land Title Assurance in the
Computer Age’ [1992] 18 William Mitchell L Rev 61 at 74–5.
74 M Friedman, Contracts and Conveyances of Real Property, 4th ed, 1984, §3.12, at 304,
quoted in McCormack, above n 73, at 90.
75 C Hammond, ‘The Abolition of the Duplicate Certificate of Title and its Potential Effect on
Fraudulent Claims over Torrens land’ (1999) APLJ Lexis 23 at 30 of online version.
76 ASIC, Electronic Funds Transfer Code of Conduct, 1 April 2001, amended subsequently
18 March 2002 and 1 November 2008, at <www.asic.gov.au>.
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• Unreasonably delaying notification of the misuse, loss or theft of the
[card];
• Voluntarily disclosing the code to any person including family
member or friend;
• Noting the code on the [card], or near the [card];
• Maintaining a record of the code where it is liable to loss or theft
simultaneously with the [card];
• Extreme carelessness in maintaining the security of the code.
Perhaps surprisingly, and with the potential for greater loss associated with
eviction from the home, similar safeguards have not been imposed on those
holding the certificate of title.77
How can consumer law inform the debate?
The starting point for this analysis begins with the words of Pitofsky:
‘[P]rotection of consumers . . . should not be a broad, theoretical effort to
achieve Truth, but rather a practical enterprise to ensure the existence of
reliable data which in turn will facilitate an efficient and reliable competitive
market process.’78 Ramsay has a similar understanding: ‘Consumer law is an
instrumental form of law, organised around achieving the goals of efficient and
fair consumer markets.’79 Immediate indefeasibility supports at least the
efficiency of the market, though arguably not its fairness. The theory behind
immediate indefeasibility simply being that the purchaser of an interest in land
should not be required to undertake detailed inquiries of the title held by the
owner of the land. Registration itself should provide the source of title. It, as
outlined, directly favours dynamic security at the expense of static security.
Combined with increasing obligations imposed on mortgagees to undertake
identity checks,80 certainty of the transaction is promoted at the expense of the
existing landowner. By contrast, the rationale for deferred indefeasibility rests
on a belief that within the Torrens system reliance on the register is critical.
If therefore the purchaser has relied not just on the register but on the
ostensible identity of the forger selling the land (a fact outside of the register),
then the Torrens system should not protect the purchaser but should only work
to assist where the innocent, but duped, individual on-sells to a second
77 In Queensland, the certificate of title in paper form no longer exists, and with the
introduction of a national electronic conveyancing system mooted for 2011
(<www.necs.gov.au>), the mechanisms for how fraud may be perpetrated may well alter:
R Low, ‘Opportunities for Fraud in the Proposed National Electronic Conveyancing System:
Fact or Fiction’ [2006] Murdoch Uni Jnl of Electronic Law.
78 R Pitofsky, ‘Beyond Nadar: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising’ (1977)
90 Harv L Rev 661 at 671.
79 I Ramsay, ‘Consumer Law, Regulatory Capitalism and the “New Learning” in Regulation’
(2006) 28 Syd LR 2 at 2.
80 Queensland has had this in place since 2005: Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1A). This
provides that a registered proprietor will not obtain the benefit of indefeasibility if the
mortgagee fails to comply with s 11A(2). This states: ‘Before the instrument of mortgage is
lodged for registration, the mortgagee under the instrument (the original mortgagee) must
take reasonable steps to ensure the person who executed the instrument as mortgagor is
identical with the person who is, or who is about to become, the registered proprietor of the
lot or the interest in the lot.’ Similar provisions have been adopted in New South Wales, see
Real Property and Conveyancing Legislation Amendment Act 2009, introduction of s 56C.
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innocent purchaser.81 What responses can be offered to solve this conundrum?
A first response to counterbalance the dangers of immediate indefeasibility
would be to promote a far greater public perception and understanding of the
inherent dangers in being a ‘static’ owner of Torrens title land. This has not
occurred in Australia and contrasts with Canada and Malaysia where the
operation of the Torrens system and the perceived immoral nature of home
loss from the operation of immediate indefeasibility led to a public outcry.82
If the first step in the pyramid of consumer protection is one of empowerment,
education of the public is necessary so that as with PIN codes, an appreciation
of the need to guard against loss of the certificate of title and identity theft is
more widely understood. By so doing, consumer protection can be seen as
improving the relationship that exists between the state, on one hand, and its
citizens, on the other.83 It is the first step in ensuring the balance between the
static owner and the dynamic transaction. The policy choices undertaken by
government must be transparent along with the reasons for their introduction.
The current judiciary seem almost blithely unaware of the consequences of the
operation of immediate indefeasibility. For this reason, the legislature must fill
the void. Without so doing, and if there is potential for increased loss through
more sophisticated criminal activity in relation to land titles as we approach
and integrate electronic transactions,84 the scorn of those affected in the
community will be long heard and only be seen to promote a response that
may well undermine much of the good provided by the introduction of the
Torrens system. Second, the promotion of certainty within the transaction that
is favoured by dynamic security and immediate indefeasibility ultimately
stems from a belief that the certainty provided by this lowers the transaction
and information costs associated with the purchase of property. It allows the
commerce of business to trade securely and safely in the knowledge that the
transaction will be upheld. It favours the movement of the land to those who
value it the most. It is a crystalline rule of certainty and precision. ‘[These
rules] are the very stuff of property: their great advantage, or so it is commonly
thought, is that they signal to all of us, in a clear and distinct language,
precisely what our obligations are and how we may take care of our
interests.’85 But as Rose further notes,86 in a brief reference to the Torrens
system, the crystalline nature of property entitlements must yield, and in
Australia, and dependant somewhat on the jurisdiction, we see exceptions for
statutory fraud, government charges, adverse possession, omitted easements
and the interests of the tenant. Later legislation can also override, with an
exemplar of this provided in the Environment Management and Pollution
Control Act (Tas) s 74M87 that states: ‘Nothing in [the indefeasibility section
81 See B Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 3rd ed, Carswell, 2000, p 427.
82 See O’Connor, above n 25, at 211 (Canada), at 218 (Malaysia).
83 See the comments by D M Trubek, ‘Consumer Law, Common Markets and Federalism:
Introduction and General Concepts’ in I T Bourgoignie and D Trubek, Integration through
Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience, Walter De Gruyter, Berline, 1986, p 6.
84 Low, above n 77.
85 C M Rose, ‘Crystals and Mud in Property Law’ (1988) 40 Stanford L Rev 577 at 577.
86 See generally, Rose, above n 85, at 588–90.
87 An interesting approach to the paramountcy of indefeasibility can be seen in recent changes
to New South Wales introduced by the inclusion of s 42(3) by the Real Property and
Resolving the debate surrounding indefeasibility 275
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 142 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Thu Sep 3 14:18:13 2009
/journals/journal/aplj/vol17pt2/part_2
of the Torrens legislation] affects the validity of a [contamination] notice or
prejudices or affects the operation of a notice.’ In these statutorily crafted,
judicially imposed or legislatively mandated circumstances, indefeasibility is
required to yield in the name of a different policy objective, and from a
consumer perspective, the battle between immediate and deferred comes
down to the morality of allowing a transaction by a forger to have legal effect.
Do we promote the security of the transaction at the expense of the existing
owner? In answering this dilemma, and rather than look at fairness ex-post,
the suggestion is made that the examination be done ex-ante.88 Therefore,
rather than see what is so unfair about the eviction of the homeowner through
the operation of indefeasibility, ask what we would anticipate the parties to
reasonably expect prior to any transaction and what should be the
understanding and responsibility of each of us to protect against misuse by
others of our own entitlements. The focus is on the rules, rather than on the
standards of behaviour that has occurred. We would expect the homeowner to
take care of their interests, and to protect against loss. Similarly, we would
hope the purchaser would not be reckless or indifferent with whom they are
dealing with, and that, as the Queensland and NSW legislation has done,89
impose obligations on those who can easily check identity. In this sense, the
difference between what has occurred in Australia with these legislative
developments and the use in Canada of deferred indefeasibility may be less
than previously thought — the Canadian authorities accepting that due
diligence is an element of deferred indefeasibility.90 Whatever may be the
avenue, we need the principles to be clear in advance and easily understood.
By so doing, we promote a fair and informed market, which as indicated
favours the instrumental nature of consumer protection law. Nevertheless,
what must be emphasised is that the clear, harsh, blunt nature of immediate
indefeasibility must not work in such a way as to deliver unfairness that would
work against the accepted culture that exists within society. ‘Decisions . . . are
constitutive, and it would corrode our moral understanding of ourselves as a
society if we were to permit gross unfairness to reign simply for the sake of
retaining clear rules and rational ex ante planning, particularly if those rules
covertly serve the wealthy and powerful.’91 It is suggested that what fails in
our Torrens system, and the reason for the dichotomy within jurisdictions
between deferred and immediate indefeasibility, is that the consumer in the
context of landowner does not understand the fragility of their interest in quite
possibly their most vital asset, the asset that connects them to the planet and
which provides a sense of belonging within the community. Their lack of
knowledge that they can be evicted without any sense of wrongdoing is
Conveyancing Legislation Amendment Act 2009: ‘[The indefeasibility section] prevails over
any inconsistent provision of any other Act or law unless the inconsistent provision
expressly provides that it is to have effect despite anything contained in this section.’
88 See generally, F Easterbrook, ‘The Supreme Court 1983 Term — Foreword: The Court and
the Economic System’ (1984) 98 Harv L Rev 4.
89 See above n 87.
90 Rabi v Rosu (2006) 83 OR (3d) 37; 277 DLR (4th) 544 at [48]. For a discussion of this case,
see J Girgis, ‘Mortgage Fraud, the Land Titles Act and Due Diligence: The Rabi v Rosu
Decision’ (2007) 22 BRLR 419.
91 Rose, above n 85, at 593, in reference to the work of L Tribe, ‘Constitutional Calculus:
Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?’ (1985) 98 Harv L Rev 592.
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understandably offensive in any society governed by the Rule of Law, with the
leading nation states to utilise rectification, introduce deferred indefeasibility,
deny indefeasibility to volunteers92 or have the judiciary attempting through in
personam to ameliorate the harshness of immediate indefeasibility. At its
heart, the Torrens system involves the purchase of property subject to an
option — that option being the potential for title to be lost, and for the
homeowner to be evicted as a result of unethical and illegal activity, through
no fault of their own. This rule is not well known outside of legal and
academic circles and without appreciation in the wider community. This must
be corrected.
Conclusion
As noted at the outset, both Kevin Gray and the High Court warn against the
power of the state (in this instance through its regulatory institutions of the
judiciary and the manner in which legislation is drafted) forcing one
individual to recognise a transfer of property to another when a wrongdoer
intermediary has intervened to dupe both parties. Why should the homeowner
with an emotional connection and a financial investment be forced to accept
monetary compensation when the new purchaser’s only commitment so far
has been financial? The answer to this lies in our expectations. Both parties
legitimately have reasonable expectations, and while the response may be that
where you have an assurance system the new purchaser can more easily be
compensated in financial terms, the underlying goal of consumer law is not to
seek truth but to have a fair and informed market. The first step in achieving
this is marrying the property principles of Torrens with the consumer by way
of education. Empower the consumer to become aware of the vagaries of their
title to land, and inform them on how to protect. The search as to whether each
jurisdiction should adopt immediate or deferred indefeasibility should not be
considered in isolation. The perfect doctrinal solution is unlikely to exist.
Consumer protection is, after all, never absolute. Any measure taken under
this rubric will involve costs and benefits. The pertinent question is how much
cost are we as a community prepared to bear. Moreover, how much protection
do we want to give each individual involved in the consumer transaction?
As O’Connor93 notes: ‘Bijural stress is most pronounced in those
jurisdictions which use the rule of immediate indefeasibility, because the
disjunction between the ordinary rules and the positive system is all the
greater.’ My response is that the Torrens system was intended to create that
disjunct, and the mean-spirited nature of immediate indefeasibility flows from
a legislative and occasional judicial reluctance to view the Torrens system as
not merely an addition to what previously existed, but as a new building not
merely separate but divorced from what has gone on in the past. At its heart
the rationale for immediate indefeasibility comes down to a judgment that
home purchasers at a minimum, (with arguably a different rule applying for
mortgagees), should not be required to undertake an enquiry into the identity
of the person with whom they are dealing:
92 For example contrast Rasmussen v Rasmussen [1995]1 VR 613; [1995] ANZ ConvR 130
with Conlan v Registrar of Titles (2001) 24 WAR 299; [2001] WASC 201; BC200104400.
93 Above n 25, at 223.
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Deferred indefeasibility potentially threatens the security of all titles . . . Ultimately
the most convincing rationale for immediate indefeasibility lies in the proposition
that no purchaser of Torrens land should be required to investigate the history of the
vendor’s titles or to make inquiries that are burdensome or difficult.94
The immediate response to this is that the due diligence required under
deferred indefeasibility is limited with the purchaser, for the most part,
protected against the narrative of the title’s underlying corruption. In
summary, however, consumer protection demands that at least for home
purchasers immediate indefeasibility is to be preferred. The cost of the
homeowner in protecting her or his identity and the documents associated with
land ownership are less than would be required by the purchaser investigating
the identity of the vendor with whom they deal. The same cannot be said of
mortgagees. They have the arsenal at their disposal and the systems embedded
in their processes to verify the identity of the person with whom they deal.
Consumer protection requires that the onus be placed on the financier. In
starting with immediate indefeasibility though, the question for any
community is how to soften the immoral results that can occur. An ex-ante
examination asks us to consider what the parties should do, and would be
expected to do before the transaction begins. Education and regulatory
safeguards must be put into the new electronic conveyancing system that is
now on the horizon, and while no system will ever be impenetrable, it is a
system that can still adopt immediate indefeasibility and still serve generally
understood community expectations.
94 Sackville, above n 63.
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The role of unregistered interests in the Torrens system has always attracted controversy. On the one hand, the
inclusion of provisions such as s 41 of the Victorian Transfer of Land Act 1958, (and its equivalent in other
jurisdictions) may have led to no recognition of any estate or interest outside of the register. However early in
the history of Torrens jurisprudence, the existence and enforceability of interests outside of the register was
accepted, despite their non-appearance on the official government record, (though one may speculate
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Garnock and highlight its ramifications for conveyancing practice. In Part II there will be consideration of the
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evaluation of the underlying precepts) to enhance the Torrens system
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CURIAL DISCRETION IN THE DRAFTING OF CAVEATS: IS IT 
PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE REGISTER? 
 
LYNDEN GRIGGS* 
 
I  Introduction 
The  role  of  unregistered  interests  in  the  Torrens  system  has  always  attracted 
controversy.  On  the  one  hand,  the  inclusion  of  provisions  such  as  s  41  of  the 
Victorian  Transfer  of Land Act 1958,  (and  its  equivalent  in  other  jurisdictions)1 may 
have  led to no recognition of any estate or  interest outside of the register. However 
early  in  the  history  of  Torrens  jurisprudence,  the  existence  and  enforceability  of 
interests outside of  the  register was  accepted, despite  their non‐appearance on  the 
official government  record,  (though one may  speculate whether  this  recognition  in 
1914 would have  occurred  if  immediate  indefeasibility  had  been  foreshadowed  or 
adopted prior  to  the decision of Barry v Heider).2 Even more explicit  than  this early 
common‐law  recognition  were  provisions  within  the  legislation  allowing  for  the 
protection  of  unregistered  interests,  the  primary  illustration  being  the  caveat. 
Notwithstanding  this  legislative  and  curial  espousal  of  the  proprietary  interest 
outside of the official record, the exact role for the caveat has  long been a matter of 
debate.3 However, the recent High Court decision of Black v Garnock4 has graphically 
                                                                  
*   Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania. 
1   ‘Subject to this Act no instrument until registered as in this Act provided shall be effectual 
to create vary extinguish or pass any estate or interest or encumbrance in on or over any 
land under the operation of this Act, but upon registration the estate or interest or 
encumbrance shall be created varied extinguished or pass in the manner and subject to the 
covenants and conditions specified in the instrument or by this Act prescribed or declared 
to be implied in instruments of a like nature.’ 
Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), s 40(1). For equivalent provisions see Real Property Act 1900 
(NSW) s 41(1); Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) (no equivalent provision); Real Property Act 1886 
(SA) s 67; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 58; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 49(1); Land Titles 
Act 1925 (ACT) s 57(1); Land Title Act (NT) (no equivalent provision). 
2   Barry v Heider (1914) 19 CLR 197. 
3   The importance of caveats can be illustrated by the vast array of written academic and 
judicial commentary on the topic. See the list of articles cited at B Edgeworth, C Rossiter 
and M A Stone, Sackville and Neave Property Law Cases and Materials, 8th edition, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Pyrmont, 2008, [5.152]. 
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highlighted  the  importance  and  contemporary  role  of  the  caveat. Accordingly,  the 
purpose of Part 1 of this paper is, first, to consider the decision in Black v Garnock and 
highlight  its  ramifications  for  conveyancing  practice.  In  Part  II  there  will  be 
consideration  of  the  jurisprudence  surrounding  the  judicial  discretion  to  remove, 
amend, or allow a defective caveat to stand. Given the uncertainty surrounding the 
capacity to amend a defective caveat, (and the High Court  in Black emphasising the 
importance of the caveat) this analysis is critical.5 After this examination, the question 
is  whether  the  substantive  and  procedural  law  on  caveats  serves  to  enhance  the 
integrity of the Torrens register. If not, and accepting for the moment that there needs 
to be some mechanism for the pre‐emptive protection of unregistered interests, what 
changes can easily be made (and which don’t involve a fundamental re‐evaluation of 
the underlying precepts) to enhance the Torrens system.  
II  Part I: Black v Garnock 
The facts can be summarised: 
 (17/9/2004): Black obtains judgment against the registered proprietor for $288,000.  
 (15/7/2005): The registered proprietor contracts to sell land to Garnock for $1ml. 
Garnock pays a deposit of $100,000.  
 (19/8/2005): Solicitors for the registered proprietors advise Black’s solicitors that 
settlement will occur on August 24, 2005. However, there will not be any proceeds 
left over to pay the money owing to Black. 
 (24/8/2005): Settlement ‐ the following events occur: 
9am: Garnock’s solicitors undertake a search of title, and only discover 
encumbrances already known. 
9.20am: Black’s solicitors call Garnock’s solicitors and indicate that they 
intend to prevent the sale going ahead. They advise that settlement should 
not proceed. In addition, they inform Garnock’s solicitors that they have 
obtained a charging order against the deposit as well as instituting 
bankruptcy proceedings. Following this phone call, Garnock’s solicitors 
confirm the existence of the charging order, but find no mention of a 
bankruptcy notice on the official records. 
11.53am: Recording of the writ of execution is completed, but Black does not 
advise Garnock of this. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
4   (2007) 230 CLR 438; 237 ALR 1; 81 ALJR 1338. 
5   Midwarren Estates Pty Ltd v Retek and Stivic [1975] VR 575; Elliott v Blanshard (1970) 17 FLR 7; 
Re CM Group Pty Ltd’s Caveat [1986] 1 Qd R 381. 
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2pm: Settlement takes place without a further title search. Garnock pays 
balance of purchase price. 
 (8/0/2005): Garnock’s solicitors receive advice that the registration of the transfer 
cannot occur because of the presence of the writ of execution. An attempt to lodge 
a caveat by Garnock is unsuccessful. The purchasers having paid the full purchase 
price are unable to have the title registered. 
Despite the simple facts, the issue was one that divided the High Court 3:2, and the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal  2:1, with  the High Court upholding  an  appeal 
from  the  lower  court.  The  resolution  of  the  case  depended  on  an  answer  to  the 
following: should the equitable interest created first in time pursuant to the contract 
prevail  over  the  later  interest,  registration  of  which  occurred  with  notice  and 
knowledge  of what  had  gone  on  earlier.  The majority  in  the High Court  and  the 
minority  in  the New South Wales Court of Appeal were  clear. The  registered writ 
prevailed. By contrast, the majority in the New South Wales Court of Appeal allowed 
an injunction by Garnock forbidding the sheriff from executing the writ for 60 days, 
with this operating to preserve the interest of Garnock from elimination by statutory 
sale. Despite the polar opposition in result (which can be appreciated was ultimately 
catastrophic  for  Garnock),  the  bifurcation  between  the  majority  and  the  minority 
judges  centered  on  the  purpose  and  role  of  the  caveat  provision.  The  majority 
(Gummow and Hayne JJ. jointly; Callinan J. separately) considered that once the writ 
of  execution  was  recorded  on  title,  (of  which  all  States  except  Western  Australia 
appear to have somewhat similar provisions)6 the legislation operated to provide the 
Sheriff with a protected period by which he or she could sell the property. To grant 
an injunction against the Sheriff was contrary to the intent and direction provided by 
the  legislation.  The  view  of  the  majority  was  that  the  purchaser  had  the  arsenal 
available  to  protect  their  own  position.  They  could  have  caveated. Gummow  and 
Hayne JJ. ask this very question – ‘If before the writ was recorded on the register, the 
purchasers  had  lodged  caveats  on  the  titles  to  the  land,  claiming  an  interest  as 
purchasers of the land, how would the relevant provisions of the [Torrens legislation] 
have  operated.’7 The  answer  to  this  was  clear:  ‘[I]f  caveats  had  been  lodged  and 
particulars of the caveats entered on the register, and if the sheriff then sought to sell 
the land in execution of the writ, a purchaser at the sheriff’s sale would not have been 
able to obtain registration of a transfer of the land so long as those caveats remained 
                                                                  
6   Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), s 52; Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 105; Land Title Act 1994 
(Qld) s 117; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 110; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) (no equivalent 
provision); Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 61; Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 170; Land Title Act 
(NT) s 133. 
7   Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438, [42]. 
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in force.’8 According to their Honours, the construction of the  legislation demanded 
this  conclusion.9 However,  this  construction  by  the  majority  is  open  to  criticism. 
Practically what would have occurred  if  lodging of  the  caveat occurred before  the 
recording  of  the  writ?  One  could  suggest  that  not  only  would  the  caveat  have 
prevented the Sheriff’s sale from proceeding, but also the purchasers would similarly 
have  been  unable  or  unwilling  to  complete  the  transfer.  Both  parties would  have 
stood ‘toe to toe’ with each other, with the likely outcome some form of compromise 
depending  on  the  financial  imperatives  facing  each  party.  ‘The  drafters  of  the 
legislation  appear  to  have  overlooked  these  practical  consequences  –  a  classic 
example  of  seeking  to  address  a  perceived  ill  without  full  consideration  of  the 
conveyancing problems likely to occur.’ 10  
Whereas Gummow and Hayne JJ. spoke directly to the wording of the legislation, the 
judgement of Callinan  J. resonated with an appeal  to  the policy of Torrens and  the 
practices of prudent conveyancers. His Honour began his  judgement  lamenting  the 
failure of present practitioners  to  lodge  caveats  in  favour of  registrable dealings  in 
pre‐emptive  protection  of  their  clients’  interests,11 and  noting  that:  ‘The  questions 
raised in this case would be unlikely to have arisen had those salutary practices not 
fallen into disuse, whether by reason of electronic recording of dealings or otherwise, 
although it is difficult to understand why some comparable prudent practice would 
not  equally,  and  perhaps  more  easily,  have  been  adopted  there  to  accommodate 
electronic  lodgement, searching and  recording.’12 Significantly, Callinan  J. expressly 
questions, and disagrees with  the earlier  reasoning of  the High Court  in  J & H Just 
Holdings v Bank of New South Wales13 as to the purpose and role of a caveat. In Just the 
registered proprietor had executed a mortgage  in  favour of  the Bank of New South 
Wales.  The  bank  did  not  register  the  mortgage,  nor  did  they  lodge  a  caveat. 
                                                                  
8   Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438, [43]. 
9   Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438, [44]‐[50]. 
10   DKL Raphael, Black v Garnock: A Practitioner’s Perspective, (2007) 81 ALJ 851, 851‐852: ‘One 
could, with a little respectful cynicism, suggest that, had a caveat been lodged on the 
purchaser’s behalf before the writ was recorded, a ‘standoff’ would have followed. Not 
only would the caveat have prevented the transfer executed at a sheriff’s sale from being 
registered, but as a practical matter the purchasers would not have completed their transfer 
without paying the amount of the judgement debt, as well as mortgages and other charges 
affecting the title of the registered proprietor. The drafter of the legislation appears to have 
overlooked these practical consequences – a classic example of seeking to address a 
perceived ill without full consideration of the conveyancing problems likely to occur.’ 
11   Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438, [52]. 
12   Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438, [53]. 
13   (1971) 125 CLR 546. 
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However,  they  retained possession  of  the duplicate  certificate  of  title. Three  years 
later  the  appellant  obtained  a mortgage  over  the  land. Again,  registration did  not 
occur, the appellants were satisfied with the registered proprietor’s explanation that 
the  duplicate  certificate  of  title  was  merely  with  the  bank  for  safekeeping.  No 
encumbrances  were  discovered  on  a  search  of  the  register.  J  &  H  Just  Holdings 
sought  a  declaration  that  its  mortgage  was  entitled  to  priority  over  the  bank’s 
mortgage. In holding in favour of the bank, Barwick CJ. stated that:  
To hold that a failure by a person entitled to an equitable estate or interest in 
land under  the Real Property Act  to  lodge a  caveat against dealings with  the 
land  must  necessarily  involve  the  loss  of  priority  which  the  time  of  the 
creation of  the  equitable  interest would otherwise give,  is not merely  in my 
opinion unwarranted by general principles or by any statutory provision but 
would in my opinion be subversive of the well recognised ability of parties to 
create or to maintain equitable interests in such lands.14 
In directly responding to this, Callinan J. in Black v Garnock was equally adamant that: 
What is much more likely to be subversive of the whole of the scheme of the 
Torrens  system  is  that  a person  interested  in, or  entitled  to deal with,  land, 
who has not acted fraudulently, might suddenly and unexpectedly be saddled 
with, or postponed to, an equitable estate or interest in land which could have 
been, but was not, made the subject of protection by prompt lodgement of an 
instrument or the filing of a caveat pending the lodgement.15 
The minority  judges, (Gleeson CJ and Crennan J. in separate  judgements) disagreed 
with the approach taken by the majority. Specifically Crennan J. saw the issue in the 
following  terms:  ‘[T]he  question  on  the  appeal  to  this  court  was  whether  the 
purchasers were  entitled  to  an  injunction,  before  a  sale  to  any  other purchaser,  to 
restrain the judgement creditors and the sheriff from execution of the writ which was 
recorded on the register, after the purchasers had acquired an interest in the land, but 
                                                                  
14   (1971) 125 CLR 546, 554. Contrast Menzies J (at 557) where his Honour, whilst agreeing 
with the other members of the Court noted that the ‘The reason for such an entry [of a 
caveat] must be to give notice of the caveat.’ See also Windeyer J (at 558) who considered 
that [T]he fact that a caveat discoverable by a search of the title is ‘notice to all the world’ of 
the interest does not mean that the absence of a caveat is a notice to all and sundry that no 
interest in claimed. To say that it would, it seems, be to equate the noting of a caveat in the 
register book with the registration of a dealing: it would make competing equitable 
interests depend not upon the priority of creation in time and other equitable 
considerations, but upon priority of the lodgement of caveats.’ 
15   Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438, [80]. 
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before  they  had  registered  that  interest.’ 16  In  her  Honour’s  view  the  provisions 
allowing for the Sheriff to have a protected period was designed to give priority to a 
purchase from  the Sheriff during  this period against any  transactions conducted by 
the registered proprietor. In this instance, the judgement debtor had contracted to sell 
prior to the commencement of the protected period.17 The lodging of the writ created 
the  interest,  not  the  failure  to  lodge  a  caveat18  and  it  was  for  another  day  the 
resolution  of  the  interaction  between  the  caveat  provisions  and  the  legislative 
provisions dealing with the recording of writs.19 
III  Implications post Black v Garnock20 
There  is no doubt  that Black v Garnock could, and  in  this writer’s view should, alter 
conveyancing practice. Specifically, the implications of this important decision are as 
follows: 
(i) In those jurisdictions where prudent conveyancing practice does not involve the 
lodgement of a priority (Tasmania) or a settlement (Queensland) notice, it may 
well now be professionally negligent not to lodge a caveat in protection of a 
client’s interest pending settlement;21 
(ii) The decision may promote the use of stay orders in Victoria,22 or Western 
Australia;23 
(iii) Conveyancers should seek to ensure that registration is not delayed unduly, and 
that the protection to the purchaser is extended until settlement occurs; 
                                                                  
16   Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438, [119]. 
17   Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438, [124]. 
18   Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438, [131], per Crennan J. 
19   Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438, [131]. 
20   See also T Cahill, ‘Caveats – current issues’, (2008) 16 APLJ 87, 100‐103. 
21   See the comments by P Butt, Land Law, 5th edition, LawBook Co, Pyrmont, 2006, 755 who 
notes that it is not the case that purchasers would routinely lodge caveats – but only do so 
in circumstances where there is a delayed settlement, a purchase off the plan, release of 
deposit, or perceived unusual risk. 
22   Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), ss 92‐93. 
23   Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA), s 148 – for a discussion of this provision, see M. Calzada, 
‘The Stay Order Procedure in Victoria and Western Australia: Deadletter Law or Negligent 
Disregard of Available Provisions’, (1998) APLJ Lexis 43. He comments (at 4 of online 
version) that: ‘It is remarkable that those in other States most at risk, namely banks and 
other finance providers, seem to choose to expose themselves to potentially substantial 
losses and particularly so in Victoria and Western Australia where the statutes already 
make provisions that substantially mitigate the risks.’ 
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(iv) Searches of the register should be undertaken as close to settlement as is feasible, 
and preferably at the office of the Recorder;24 
(v) Legal practitioners will need to consider how to protect the risk undertaken by a 
purchaser in an ‘off the sale’ plan. These routinely prevent the lodging of a 
caveat by a potential purchaser pending the issue of title. Purchasers will need 
to be appraised of this risk, and consideration given as to mechanisms by which 
the deposit may be protected;25 
(vi) Financial institutions will need to work with the purchaser’s solicitors or 
conveyancing agents to ensure protection of the mortgagees interest; 
(vii) The decision promotes the use of title insurance. The Garnock’s, if they had title 
insurance, may well have been compensated for their loss; 
(viii) The result may lead to legislative amendment. At the time of writing, the New 
South Wales Law Society is considering putting forward amendments to 
provide for priority to purchasers in the position of Garnock. Similarly, the 
Victorian Law Institute has submitted to the Law Council of Australia26 that 
Land Registry fees have priced the lodging of caveats out of the market and that 
Queensland and Tasmanian practices of settlement and priority notices may 
provide a cheaper and more administratively efficient solution to this dilemma. 
This comment was made after noting that one of the main categories of 
solicitors’ professional negligence claims is for failure to lodge a caveat; 
(ix) Finally, in those jurisdictions where the caveat is the only pre‐emptive 
protection offered for the purchaser, careful consideration of its wording is  
   
                                                                  
24   Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438, [49] per Gummow and Hayne JJ., and [52]‐[53] per 
Callinan J – though this latter suggestion of settlement at the Recorder may well have 
significant practical restrictions (i.e. absence of settlement rooms). 
25   One possibility may be the establishment of a Quistclose Trust: Barclays Bank Ltd v 
Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567; Re Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust; Lord v 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 30 FCR 491. 
26   Letter of January 7, 2008. 
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required. In order to save costs, it may be necessary to have the caveat drafted so 
that withdrawal is unnecessary prior to settlement.27  
IV  Part II: Curial Discretion in the Drafting of Caveats 
With Black v Garnock foreshadowing an even greater  role  for caveats, attention will 
focus  on  the  role  that  the  courts  should  have when  determining  the  validity  of  a 
caveat.  Each  jurisdiction  establishes  its  own  formal  requirements  for  caveats. 28 
Generally, these require the specification of the nature of the estate, a description of 
the  land  and  the  facts  specifying  the  basis  of  the  caveat.29 Over  reliance  on  these 
formal  requirements  has  attracted  a  number  of  critics,30 with  some  suggesting  the 
value of  the  caveat provisions has been  compromised by pedantic  attention  to  the 
legislative direction.31 As to whether the quantum must be stated is a matter of some 
divergence between jurisdictions.32 However, with New South Wales having specific 
legislation permitting  the waiving of  the  formal  requirements,33 and courts  in other 
jurisdictions being prepared  to overlook  technical difficulties,  the question becomes 
one of isolating the process in which the discretion will be utilised, and more broadly 
speaking,  whether  some  other  form  of  protection  is  needed  for  the  creation  and 
protection of unregistered interests. The matter is of some practical importance given 
the  court’s  power  to  amend  defective  caveats  is  unclear  with  Aristei  noting  the 
inconsistency in the cases.34 For example, in a series of cases analysed by Underwood 
                                                                  
27   See the comments by D L A Phillips Fox, ‘From the Ground Up – Legal updates for the 
New South Wales Built Environment’, 13 December 2007, 4/6 of online version – accessed 
July 3, 2007 <http://www.dlaphillipsfox.com>. 
28   Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), s 89(1); Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 74F(5); Land Title Act 
1994 (Qld) s 121; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 191(a); Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 137; 
Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 133(1); Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 104(2); Land Title Act (NT) s 
137. 
29   Sullivan v McMahon [1999] WASC 83; Re Jones (1935) 35 SR(NSW) 560; Re Whalley’s Caveat 
[1975] QD R 111; George v Biztole Corp Pty Ltd (1995) V ConvR 54‐519; Vandyke v Vandyke 
(1976) 12 ALR 621. 
30   Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 459, 467‐468; 
Gasiunas v Meinhold (1964) 6 FLR 182. 
31   Buddle v Russell [1984] 1 NZLR 537, 539. 
32   Kerabee Park Pty Ltd v Daley [1978] 2 NSWLR 222; Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 
92) Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 459. In Tasmania, it has been doubted as to whether the 
quantum must be specified Smith v Longden (1997) 7 Tas R 194; Four Oak Enterprises Pty Ltd 
v Clark [2002] ANZ ConvR 440. 
33   Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 74L. 
34   A J Aristei, ‘Recent Developments in the law of caveats’, (2008) APLJ 62, 67. 
8
Bond Law Review, Vol. 21 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol21/iss2/5
 
 
 
 
76 
J  in  Patmore  v  Upton, 35  one  view  was  that  the  amendment  power  was  largely 
unconstrained, with  the  following  comment  in Hooper v Australia  and New Zealand 
Banking Group Ltd36 illustrative of this: 
In  my  opinion,  the  nature  and  purpose  of  a  caveat  is  such  that  technical 
deficiencies  in  its  form and content should not be allowed  to deprive a bona 
fide claimant  from obtaining the advantage and breathing space  that prompt 
notification of his  claim  to  the Registrar  should,  in principle, permit him  to 
achieve. This does not mean that a fallacious claim should be allowed to clog 
the title or that imprecision or obfuscation should be rewarded, but if Stout CJ 
was correct in Plimmer v St. Maur 37when he said: 
In my opinion the caveat cannot be set aside unless the claim appears 
to be without any validity. If there  is a reasonable question to argue 
the court should not remove the caveat, but permit  the matter  to be 
litigated. 
(and, with  respect,  I  think he was)  the Court  should not destroy or  impede 
bona fide claims either by declining to amend an arguably deficient caveat or 
by removing it from the Register. 
Contrasting with this, Underwood J. in Patmore v Upton38 did recognise that cases that 
are  more  recent  highlighted  a  more  restrictive  approach.  This  line  of  authority39 
summarised  in  the  following words  from Multi‐Span Constructions No 1 Pty Ltd v 14 
Portland Street Pty Ltd:40 
                                                                  
35   [2004] TASSC 77; BC200404615. The cases being: Hooper v Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group Ltd (1996) 5 Tas R 398; Dean v Dean [1999] TASSC 15; Queensland Estates Pty Ltd v Co‐
Ownership Land Development Pty Ltd [1969] Qd R 150; Elliott v Blanchard (1970) 17 FLR 7; Re 
The Victorian Farmers’ Loan and Agency Co Ltd (1897) 22 VLR 629; Veloudos v Young (1981) 
56 FLR 182; Porter v McDonald [1984] WAR 271. See also Andel Pty Ltd v Century Car Care 
Pty Ltd (1989) Q ConvR 54‐315, 58,333; In the Marriage of Stevens (1991) 15 FAmLR 51, 53; 
Hayes v O’Sullivan (2001) 24 WAR 40. 
36   Hooper v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1996) 5 Tas R 398, 404. 
37   (1907) 26 NZLR 294. 
38   [2004] TASSC 77, [73]‐[81]. 
39   Cases such as Midwarren Estates Pty Ltd v Retek [1975] VR 575; Depsun Pty Ltd v Tahore 
Holdings Pty Ltd (1990) ANZ ConvR 334; Multi‐Span v Portland [2001] NSWSC 696, 
BC200104865; Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd v Mila Properties Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 
30; Goodwin v Gilbert [2000] WASC 309; New Zealand Mortgage Guarantee Co Ltd v Pye [1979] 
2 NZLR 188. See also Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd v Vimwise Civil Engineering Pty 
Ltd (2005) 12 BPR 23,355; Circuit Finance Pty Ltd v Crown & Gleeson Securities Pty Ltd (2006) 
NSW ConvR 56‐143; Mellish v Fetoza Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 790. 
40   [2001] NSWSC 696; BC2000104865, [127]. 
9
Griggs: Curial Discretion in the Drafting of Caveats
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
 
 
 
77 
A  caveat  is  not  an  ambulatory  or  flexible means  of maintaining  a  blocking 
position in aid of whatever interest, if any, the caveator may have from time to 
time…The  ineffectiveness of a caveat  to do more  than provide protection, by 
way of notice, commensurate with the extent of the notified estate or interest is 
emphasised in decided cases and which are of long standing and are discussed 
by John Baalman in ‘The Drafting of Caveats’, (1957) 31 ALR 17. It is beside the 
point that the caveator may have some estate or interest capable of supporting 
a  caveat which  is  not  itself  claimed  in  the  caveat.  This  is  borne  out  by  the 
following statement in Ruptash v Zawick (19560 2 DLR 145 quoted by Baalman : 
The purpose of filing a caveat is to give notice of what is claimed by 
the caveat against the land described. If an unregistered document in 
fact gives a party thereto more rights than one in a parcel of land and 
such a party sees fit to file a caveat claiming one only of such rights, it 
appears  to me  that  any  person  proposing  to  deal with  the  land  is 
entitled  to  assume  that  the  claim  expressed  is  the  only  one made. 
Expressio unius et exclusio alterius.41 
Butt42 attempts to rationalise these two conflicting positions by suggesting that where 
the  caveat merely misdescribes  the  interest  claimed,  amendment of  the  caveat  can 
occur. However, where  the caveat discloses no caveatable  interest, even  though  the 
caveator may have one, amendment of the dealing is not possible. The authorities,43 
which that learned author admits,44 do not support such a distinction. 
With this ambiguity as to whether a defective caveat can be amended, the discretion 
utilised by a court  in deciding whether  to allow a non‐compliant  caveat  to  remain 
against title becomes critical. If the resolution is that the power to amend is restricted, 
and that defects cannot be overlooked, a person lodging a caveat that fails to meet the 
specific jurisdictional technical requirements may find, at a subsequent and no doubt 
inconvenient  time,  that  the caveat has been  ineffective. To overcome  this, NSW has 
legislatively provided in s 74L of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) that: 
…If  in any  legal proceedings a question arises as  to  the validity of a  caveat 
lodged under a provision of this Part, the court shall disregard any failure of 
the caveator to comply strictly with the requirements of this Part, and of any 
   
                                                                  
41   The Latin translates to: ‘The express mention of one thing excludes all others.’ 
42   P Butt, Land Law, 5th edition, LawBook Co, Prymont, 2006, 749. 
43   See Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 624; Deabel v V’Landys [2002] NSWSC 438; Jones v Baker 
(2002) 10 BPR 19,115. 
44   P Butt, above n 42. 
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regulations made for the purposes of this Part, with respect to the form of the 
caveat. 
Despite this direction, NSW authorities display no consistency as to the operational 
breadth of the provision. For example in Windella (NSW) Pty Ltd v Hughes and Others45 
Santow  J.,  in applying  the decisions of Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) 
Pty  Ltd46  and  In Marriage  of  Stevens47  was  of  the  view  that  s  74L  was  not  to  be 
restricted to the curing of technical defects, and that with s 74L operative, there was 
no necessity for the relodging of the caveat with the non‐compliant parts omitted or 
substituted.48 By  contrast,  Palmer  J  in  FTFS Holdings Pty Ltd v Business Acquisitions 
Australia Pty Ltd49 considered that s 74L could not be used where the caveat failed to 
address the very nature or type of the estate or interest claimed. Similarly, Gzell J in 
an  ex  tempore  judgement,  Sama Zaraah  Pty  Ltd  v  888  Projects  Pty  Ltd  stated  that: 
‘[Section  74L]  only  applies  to  defects  of  form  and  does  not  deal  with  matters  of 
substance.  It  does  not  empower  the  court  to  amend  the  provisions  defining  the 
interest claimed.’50 However, this again can be compared with the earlier decision of 
Austin  J.  in  Deabel  v  VLandys51 where  his  Honour  noted  that:  ‘The  court  usually 
exercises  its  power  in  the  light  of  s  74L,  so  as  to  give  effect  to  the  caveat  if  the 
caveator has a  caveatable  interest, despite even gross defects  such as  the  failure  to 
state  the  interest being protected or even  the  failure  to state  the maximum amount 
secured by the mortgage.’  
In  summary,  no  practitioner  in  New  South  Wales  could  be  confident  that  the 
provisions of s 74L of the Real Property Act 1900 would rescue a poorly drafted caveat. 
With the regulations imposing detailed requirements as to the form and content, and 
the  Registrar‐General  having  a  duty  to  ensure  that  a  caveat  complies  with  the 
legislation,  ‘as  a  practical  matter,  caveators  should  attempt  to  comply  with  the 
requirements…’52 
No other  jurisdiction has a similar  legislative direction  to  ignore defects  in caveats. 
Rather, what we see is the Bench relying on its general discretionary powers to make 
                                                                  
45   (1999) 49 NSWLR 158. 
46   (1990) 21 NSWLR 459. 
47   (1991) 105 FLR 459. 
48   (1999) 49 NSWLR 158, [27]‐[28]. 
49   (2006) 12 BPR 23, 517. 
50   Sama Zaraah Pty Ltd v 888 Projects Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1041. 
51   Deabel v V’Landys [2002] NSWSC 438; BC200203496, [8]; citing Young CJ in Jones v Baker 
(2002) 10 BPR 19,115. 
52   P Butt, Land Law, 5th edition, Thomson LawBook Co, Prymont, NSW, 2006, 741‐742. 
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any order that  it sees fit (a  legislative direction available  in all  jurisdictions),53 or, as 
was done in Western Australia, reliance on interlocutory injunctive relief to provide 
analogous  remedial  relief.54 For  example  in  Connector  Park  Pty  Ltd  v RV  Pty  Ltd55 
Crawford  J. considered  that even  if  there were drafting difficulties with  the caveat, 
there  was  no  doubt  that  the  respondent  did  have  a  caveatable  interest  and  that 
technical deficiencies in the form and content of the caveat would not be allowed to 
deprive  a  good  faith  claimant  from  the  benefits  of  protection  provided  by  the 
caveating system.56  
V  Where to From Here 
The question  remains, and  if  integrity of  the  register  is placed at  the  forefront, as  I 
suggest  it  should, which approach,  if any achieves  this aim. The  caveat provisions 
have  undoubtedly  played  a  critical  role  in  the  history  of  Torrens  legislation. 
Alongside  indefeasibility,  they  are  probably  the  most  discussed  area,  and  would 
represent,  in pure numbers, the most  litigated part of Torrens legislation. However, 
there is no doubt that at a practical level, abuse of the use of caveats occurs, and any 
unrestrained  freedom  to  lodge  capricious  caveats  can only  exacerbate  that  abuse.57 
Perhaps  it  is  this practical  reason, as much as slavish adherence  to  the prescriptive 
requirements of the legislation that has led to, for the most part, a strict compliance‐ 
   
                                                                  
53   Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 135(2). All other jurisdictions also have a similar broad power, 
see Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), s 89A(7); Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 74MA; Land Title 
Act 1994 (Qld) s 127(2); Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 191(e); Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 
138(c); Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 107; Land Title Act (NT) s 143.  
54   Midland Brick Company Pty Ltd v Welsh [2006] 32 WAR 287, [417]. ‘I am of the view that in 
circumstances where the statutory procedure to protect an unregistered equitable interests 
in the subject land may not be sufficient to protect that interest owing to a defect in the 
form of the caveat a restraining order by way of injunction should be made in favour of 
Midland Brick as a means of holding the defendant to what I have found to be her bargain.’ 
55   [2006] TASSC 9. See also Hooper v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1996) 5 Tas 
R 398; ANZ ConvR 400. 
56   Applying the earlier decision of Hooper v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1996) 
5 Tas R 398. See also Four Oak Enterprises Pty Ltd v Clark [2002] ANZ ConvR 440. 
57   L Aitken, ‘Many shabby manoeuvres – the use and abuse of caveats in theory and practice’, 
(2005) ABR Lexis 16, 3 of online version: A cavea, captiously or capriciously lodged, permits 
the person lodging it to wring the withers of the registered proprietor with a claim which 
ultimately proves baseless. It will necessarily take time, effort and expense to remove the 
caveat; once removed, there may be little to recover by way of damages for the loss 
sustained while there was a blot on the title.’ 
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orientated approach to the caveat provisions. Perhaps  it may also hark to a concern 
about  the  operation  of  unregistered  or  equitable  interests  in  a  system  of  title  by 
registration. 
It must be said that equity embodies the Aristotelian ideal that the law must be 
rectified where  it falls short by reason of  its universality. From this,  it can be 
seen  that  there  is an  instant philosophical and practical  tension between  the 
Torrens  system’s  universality  and  equity’s  specificity….Equitable  interests 
cannot  be  discovered  by  looking  at  the  register  (unless  a  caveat  has  been 
lodged).  Therefore,  equitable  interests  undermine  the  conclusiveness  of  the 
register  because  the  ‘mirror’  of  title  can  no  longer  provide  an  accurate 
reflection if there are interests which cannot be recorded.58 
Given this, and with an appreciation that equitable  interests have prospered, rather 
than  fallen  into  disuse,  the  time  for  equity  and  Torrens  to  find  some  form  of 
homology has arrived. Perhaps Black v Garnock is the beginning of this, the failure to 
caveat  arguably  now  elevated  to  the  stature  of  professional  negligence,  and  the 
inherently  practical  effect  of  notice  to  someone  searching  now  recognised.  With 
caveats  for  the  most  part  operating  as  the  singular  mechanism  to  warn  of  the 
presence of an unregistered interest, the line of authority suggesting that the function 
of  a  caveat  is  only  to  protect  the  interest  holder, must  now  come  into  question.59 
Contemporary thinking may well see the purpose of a caveat as a means to prevent 
dealing with  the  land by  the  registered proprietor  in a manner  that  is  inconsistent 
with  the  rights  of  the  caveator. As  noted  by Hughson, Neave  and O’Connor,  this 
approach is preferable: 
It emphasises the protective function of the caveat procedure, and allows any 
kind  of  proprietary  interest  to  be  caveated.  It  also  allows  a  caveat  to  fulfil 
different  functions  depending  upon  the  circumstances.  Thus,  the  caveator 
might proceed to litigation if appropriate in the circumstances, or the caveator 
might be  required  to  lodge  a  registrable  instrument, or  the  caveat might be 
allowed  to  remain  on  the  register  indefinitely  to  protect  it  from  being 
overridden by registration.60 
                                                                  
58   K Barnett, ‘The mirror of title crack’d from side to side? The amazing half‐life of the 
equitable mortgage’, (2007) APLJ Lexis 4, p 4 of online version. 
59   Jacobs v Platt Nominees [1990] VR 146; Avco Financial Services Ltd v Fishman [1993] 1 VR 90; J 
& H Just Holdings Pty Ltd v Bank of New South Wales (1971) 125 CLR 546; Person to Person 
Financial Services v Sharari [1984] 1 NSWLR 745. 
60   M A Hughson, M Neave and P O’Connor, ‘Reflections on the Mirror of Title: Resolving the 
Conflict between Purchasers and Prior Interest Holders’, (1997) 21 Melbourne Uni L R 460, 
465. 
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Black v Garnock may also have more  far‐reaching effects. The  line of authority61 that 
suggests  that  the  equitable  interest  created  first  in  time  will  prevail  over  a  later 
created equitable interest, despite a failure to caveat, must now be questioned. There 
are  of  course,  obvious  dangers  with  this.  Equitable  interests  under  the  Torrens 
system arise out of two mechanisms. The first deriving from agreement between the 
parties,  such  as  equitable  mortgages62 and  equitable  leases63 for  which  it  may  be 
expected  that caveats could be  lodged  in protection.64 The second category deriving 
from  operation  of  law,  and  which  sees  the  recipient  unaware  of  any  proprietary 
interest  until  resolution  by  the  Court  –  these,  for  example,  resulting  out  of 
unconscionable  conduct65 or  equitable  estoppel.66 In  addition  to  this,  if  the  role  of 
caveating  is  now  more  significant,  the  next  question  becomes  the  exercise  of  the 
discretion by the  judiciary. If the significance is raised, does this serve as a message 
that more caution should be exercised  in  the drafting and acceptance of caveats, or 
will  the  compensation  provisions  existing  in  a  number  of  jurisdictions  be  used  to 
stamp out vexatious and frivolous additions to the register.67 If greater caution  is to 
be  used,  should  the  discretion  be  exercised  as with  a  statutory  provision  in New 
South Wales, or by reliance on the inherent discretionary powers to make any order 
the court sees fit. Another alternative may be to use the analogous precedent offered 
by  the  voluminous  litigation  on  the  power  of  a  court  to  order  the  removal  or 
extension of a caveat –  this asking whether  there a serious question  to be  tried and 
determining where the balance of convenience lies.68 It is submitted that the approach 
                                                                  
61   For some of the case law on this issue, see J & H Just Holdings Pty Ltd v Bank of New South 
Wales (1971) 125 CLR 546; Australian Guarantee Corp (NZ) Ltd v CFC Commercial Finance Ltd 
[1995] 1 NZLR 129; Double Bay Newspapers Pty Ltd v AW Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 7 BR 14,858; 
Abigail v Lapin [1934] AC 491; Heid v Reliance Finance Corporation Pty Ltd (183) 154 CLR 326. 
62   ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Widin (1990) 26 FCR 21; 102 ALR 289. 
63   Chan v Cresdon Pty Ltd (1989) 168 CLR 242; 89 ALR 522. 
64   See Barnett, above n 58, p21 where similar comments are made. 
65   Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137. 
66   Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387. 
67   Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), s 118; Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 74P; Land Title Act 1994 
(Qld) s 130; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 191(j); Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 140; Land 
Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 138; Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 108; Land Title Act (NT) s 146. 
68   There is a huge range of litigation on this topic pertaining to the decision to remove or 
extend a caveat. Just some of the recent authority to discuss this are as follows: (NSW): 
Antar v Fairchild Development Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in liq) [2008] NSWSC 638; 
Country Law Services Pty Ltd v Duff [2007] NSWSC 1509; Buchanan v Crown & Gleeson 
Business Finance Pty Ltd [2007] 13 BPR 2, 513, NSW ConvR 56‐173; (Vic) Graham v Gameday 
Enterprises Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 140; S & D International Pty Ltd v Malhotra [2006] VSC 280; 
Sarandal Pty Ltd v Nameplan Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 568; Riverview Projects Pty Ltd v Elleray 
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in New South Wales has much to favour it. The establishment of a specific legislative 
power to ignore irregularities expressly allows a basis on which to permit a claim to 
remain known and sees the Register becoming closer to the ideal of a mirror or photo 
of  the  title. This  legislative power, combined with a stated  framework  for analysis, 
could  include  the  following criteria  (with  these criteria developed  from established 
authority on comparable areas (such as the power to extend a valid caveat): 
(i) The strength of the claim of the caveator;69 
(ii) The availability of an alternative remedy for the caveator;70 
(iii) That the caveat is being lodged in good faith and not for an ulterior purpose – for 
example in the Victorian decision of Goldstraw v Goldstraw71 counsel conceded 
that the caveat was lodged as a ‘practical and well used method in order to get 
something to the bargaining table.’72 The response of Dodds‐Streeton J was that 
such a practice ‘would undermine the operation of an essential feature of the 
Torrens system’;73 
(iv) The consequences for the registered proprietor, and whether there is some other 
mechanism by which the economic value of the caveator’s interest can be 
protected (e.g. payment into court);74 
(v) Compensation linked to improper lodgement.75 
                                                                                                                                                                           
[2007] V ConvR 54‐738; Aircon Heating and Airconditioning Pty Ltd (in liq) v Crane Distribution 
Ltd [2006] V ConvR 54‐179; (Qld) AB v IJ [2008] QSC 046; BC200801470; Landlush Pty Ltd v 
Rutherford [2003] 1 Qd R 236; Global Capital Industries Pty Ltd v Dela Property Developments 
Pty Ltd [2006] 1 Qd R 501; Jedhar Pty Ltd v Grosse [2004] Q ConvR 54‐606; (WA) D&M 
(Australia) Pty Ltd v Crouch Developments Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 160; McGiveron v Stanton‐
Bovis [2007] WASC 240; BC200709171; Police and Nurses Credit Society Ltd v Weber [2003] 1 
BFRA 21. See S Jackson, ‘Removal of a Caveat – How Convenient’, (1996) APLJ Lexis 5. 
69   Country Law Services Pty Ltd v Duff [2007] NSWSC 1509; Union Finance Pty ltd v Rateki Pty 
Ltd (No 2) [2007] SASC 11; BC200700253. 
70   D&M (Australia) Pty Ltd v Crouch Developments Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 160. 
71   [2002] VSC 491; BC200208479. 
72   [2002] VSC 491, [36]. 
73   [2002] VSC 491, [42]. 
74   D&M (Australia) Pty Ltd v Crouch Developments Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 160; Marinkovic v Pat 
McGrath Engineering Pty Ltd (2004) 61 NSWLR 150; Jean‐Pierre Cosmetics Pty Ltd v Garrty 
Trustweel & Associates Pty Ltd (1994) 6 BPR 13, 497; Australian Security Estates Pty Ltd v 
Bluecrest Holdings Pty Ltd (1999) 9 BPR 17,533. 
75   All jurisdictions presently provide for this: see (ACT) Land Titles Act 1925, s 30(3); (NT) 
Land Title Act 2000, s 146; (NSW) Real Property Act 1900, s 74P; (Qld) Land Title Act 1994, s 
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By  this  legislative mechanism  and  common  law  reflection  on  the  stated  criteria,  a 
body of law would quickly formulate the parameters around the lodging of caveats. 
Practitioners would have a better understanding and appreciation of when caveating 
could  occur  and  the  litigation  that  currently  surrounds unregistered  interests may 
well be reduced. 
VI  Conclusion 
The  unregistered  interest  continues  to  bedevil  the  Torrens  system.  It  appears  as 
though we have traveled too far to adopt the original idea of Torrens that there be a 
reduction  in  the  quality  of  equitable  interests  to  a  mere  contractual  or  personal 
right.76 Indeed  once  Sir  Robert  Torrens  became  Registrar‐General,  it  appeared  as 
though he even recognised that equitable  interests may well exist, and be protected 
by,  for example, possession of  the certificate of  title.77 Many suggestions have been 
made  for  reform,  with  perhaps  the  most  notable  being  the  Canadian  model  of 
recording  the  interest with priority determined by  time of recording,78 based on the 
Registration of Deeds  legislation.79 McEniery also suggests that there be a dedicated 
means of giving notice of the existence of an unregistered interest – simpler, cheaper, 
and  more  easily  compliant  than  the  caveat  mechanism. 80  However,  these  ideas, 
worthy  as  they  are  of  consideration,  involve  more  fundamental  changes  to  the 
Torrens system and perhaps with the mooted introduction of the National Electronic 
   
                                                                                                                                                                           
130; (SA) Real Property Act 1886, s 44; (Tas) Land Titles Act 1980, s 138; (Vic) Transfer of Land 
Act 1958, s 118; (WA) Transfer of Land Act 1893, s 140. 
76   See the comments by M A Hughson, M Neave and P O’Connor, ‘Reflections on the Mirror 
of Title: Resolving the Conflict between Purchasers and Prior Interest Holders’, (1997) 21 
MULR 460, 461. 
77   South Australian Parliamentary Papers 1858, No 161, p3; South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers 1859 No 151, p5; South Australian Parliamentary Papers 1860, p4, cited in Barnett, 
above n 58, fn 27. 
78   See L McCrimmon, ‘Protection of Equitable Interests under the Torrens System: Polishing 
the Mirror of Title’, (1994) 20 Mon. LR. 300. 
79   Eg Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW); Property Law Act 1974 (Qld); Registration of Deeds Act 1935 
(SA); Registration of Deeds Act 1935 (Tas); Property Law Act 1858 (Vic); Registration of Deeds 
Act 1856 (WA); Registration of Deeds Act 1957 (ACT). 
80   B McEniery, ‘A Dedicated Means of Giving Notice of the Existence of Unregistered 
Interests under Torrens’, (2006) 12(3) APLJ 244. 
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Conveyancing System in 201081 the time may be opportune for a national approach to 
the substantive law. Prior to this nevertheless, the suggestion is that the taking of the 
following  steps would  reduce  the  complexity,  cost  and  litigation  surrounding  the 
unregistered interest in the Torrens system of land registration – all of which do not 
involve a significant departure from what presently occurs. 
(i) All jurisdictions should include the use of settlement82 or priority notices83 to 
preserve the place in the queue for the unregistered interest pending a standard 
settlement. This method of protection is considerably cheaper and easier to 
initiate than a caveat; 
(ii) The lodging of a caveat should be recognised as the giving of notice to the world 
of an unregistered interest; 
(iii) To support the importance of the caveat, the establishment within legislation of a 
rebuttable presumption that would see the failure to lodge a caveat as leading to 
loss of priority.84 The judiciary would have the opportunity to craft the limited 
circumstances in which the failure to lodge would lead to a loss or priority (such 
as the exceptional factual considerations in Jacobs v Platt Nominees85, where the 
proprietary interest arises by operation of law, and an exception for fraud) make 
it understandable that no caveat would be lodged; 
(iv) That there should be an express legislative direction, based on stated criteria to 
allow judges to ignore defects in the drafting of caveats. Uniformity between 
jurisdictions would allow the quick establishment of a depth of authority as to 
how these provisions would operate. 
                                                                  
81   See www.necs.gov.au. 
82   Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), ss 138‐152. 
83   Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas), s 52. 
84   This idea is not new. In 1989 the Victorian Law Reform Commission recommended that 
caveats should determine priority. See Victorian Law Reform Commission, Priorities, 
Report No 22 (1989). See also M A Hughson, M Neave and P O’Connor, Reflections on the 
Mirror of Title: Resolving the Conflict between Purchasers and Prior Interest Holders, (1997) 21 
Melbourne ULR 460, 482‐489. 
85   [1990] VR 146. The failure to lodge a caveat did not lead to a loss of priority as the daughter 
in that case thought that her interests would be protected by her mother (who would need 
to sign off on any changes), the fact that she did not want to upset the relationship with her 
father, and she had no reason to believe that a fraud would occur involving the sale of the 
land to another party. Contrast Mimi v Millenium Developments Pty Ltd [2004] V ConvR 54‐
687. 
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Perhaps the argument as to whether land law or equitable principles should prevail 
has  become  passé.  In  this  age  of  supposed  cooperative  federalism, we  should  no 
longer  look  to  see  who  occupies  the  higher  position,  but  whether  Torrens  and 
equitable  principles  can  marry  and  consummate  that  relationship  in  the  spirit  of 
mutual respect that arguably fusion of law and equity was intended to deliver. 
18
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Introduction
The verification of identity of the parties to land transactions stands as a bulwark
against rampant abuse and an undermining of the integrity of the conveyancing
system. After all, it is that connection between the conveyancing system, the need
to identify the parties to the transaction and the all too easy theft of one’s soul (be
it through credit card manipulation, the stealing of documents that verify identity,
the openness of social networking sites, the possession of the certificate of title
and the simple lack of knowledge and carelessness of the consumer in knowing
how to protect their reputation) that provides the avenue by which one person can
assume to be another? In the context of land transactions, this can easily lead
mortgagees forwarding finance to a fraudster, the innocent registered proprietor
unaware this is occurring. Because of this the more steps that can be put in place
to ensure that the parties to the transaction are the people who they say they are,
without compromising the efficiency of the system, can only lead to greater reliance,
understanding and confidence—a confidence that we are now seeing questioned
in the populist media in Australia and the Parliament of England.1 Furthermore,
with a State guaranteed compensation scheme in place to compensate those who
suffer loss, the purse of the public is protected by a system that takes the necessary
steps to minimise fraud. As noted by Matthews, it is “laughably simple”2 the way
in which frauds can occur.What this paper does is examine what steps are currently
required for identity verification in the context of land transactions, (particularly
in the context of a mortgagee lending money based on a representation that the
person seeking the finance is the fee simple owner of the property), and as we
move inexorably towards a fully electronic system for conveyancing,3 what steps
should be incorporated in this future model. The need for this examination cannot
be doubted.
*Thanks for the comments and insights from Simon Libbis and Ann Kinnear from the National Electronic
Conveyancing office andMax Locke (Registrar of Titles, Queensland). Appreciation is also expressed to an anonymous
referee. Your thoughts have improved the article, and for this the authors are appreciative.
1 For example in Australia on December 30, 2009, a story aired on Today Tonight, highlighting how land could
be sold, or mortgaged to strangers, without the consent or knowledge of the true owner. Recently a scammer has been
able to sell a property in Perth,Western Australia—the true owner being overseas at the time of the sale. See “Scammer
sells home in Perth”, www.creditcrunch.co.uk/forum.index/php?showtopic=7064 [Accessed September 28, 2010].
2 P. Matthews, “Registered land, fraud and human rights”, (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 351, 351.
3 See generally http://www.necs.gov.au [Accessed July 5, 2011] (National Electronic Conveyancing System) for
an overview of the current process and timetable for implementation (at March 25, 2010).
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“The intended move to an electronic business environment for conveyancing
represents the most significant change in industry practices over the last 150
years … The most significant change from the land standing paper-based
conveyancing arrangements … is the shift from transacting parties signing
the instruments necessary to effect changes in each jurisdiction’s … Register
to an appointed agent signing on the transacting party’s behalf. The signing,
by a legal or conveyancing practice or practitioner, on the transacting party’s
behalf will necessarily require the transacting party’s identity to be verified.”4
(Emphasis supplied.)
Whilst the focus of this paper is on land, readers would be aware that any
discussion of remedial responses for identity fraud5 arises in the wider context that
this problem can equally occur outside the milieu of land transactions. However,
there is also no doubt that a significant portion of the billion-dollar fraud that
occurs relates to land transactions.6 As transactions are undertaken in cyberspace,
“new opportunities arise for people within organisations as well as for external
customers to misrepresent themselves and to manipulate electronic transactions
for gain”.7
4NECS Request for Tender, CIV Standard and Application Procedures Development for NECS, January 22, 2010,
2.8–2.9.
5The literature on identity fraud in Australia and overseas has used the terms “identity fraud” and “identity theft”
interchangeably. There does not seem to be a standardised definition for these terms: see S. Sproule and N. Archer,
“Defining identity theft” (2007) EighthWorld Congress on theManagement of eBusiness and ACPR, Standardisation
of definitions of identity crime terms: A step towards consistency, Report Series No.145.3, 2006, 5. This paper will
use the definition fromModel Criminal LawOfficers’ Committee of the Standing Committee of the Attorneys-General
(Final Report: Identity Crime, 2008) which define the terms “identity crime”, “identity fraud” and “identity theft” as
follows: “Identity crime is a generic term to describe activities/offences in which a perpetrator uses a fabricated
identity, a manipulated identity, or a stolen/assumed identity to facilitate the commission of crime. Identity fraud is
the gaining of money, goods, services, or other benefits or the avoidance of obligations through the use of a fabricated
identity, a manipulated identity, or a stolen/assumed identity. Identity theft is the theft or assumption of a pre-existing
identity (or a significant part thereof), with or without consent, and whether, in the case of an individual, the person
is living or deceased”: at p.8.
6R. Graycar and R. Smith, “Identifying and Responding to Electronic Fraud Risks”, 30th Australasian Registrars’
Conference, Canberra, November 13, 2002, p.1.
7R. Low, “Maintaining the integrity of the Torrens system in a digital environment: a comparative overview of
the safeguards used within the electronic land systems in Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and Singapore”,
(2005) 11 Australian Property Law Journal 155, 167 quoting from Graycar and Smith, “Identifying and Responding
to Electronic Fraud Risks”, 30th Australasian Registrars’ Conference, Canberra, November 13, 2002. The Australian
Government has also prepared a kit to prevent identity theft: Australian Government, National Crime Prevention, A
kit to Prevent and Respond to Identity Theft, ISBN: 0 642 21084 5. Losses in Australia are estimated to be AU $3.5
billion per year: M. Rannard, “Identity Theft is increasing—survey”, Sydney Morning Herald, June 3, 2009, http:/
/news.smh.com.au June 5, 2009 [Accessed July 6, 2011]. The author was quoting from Identity Theft Report conducted
by Galaxy Research, which found that 4.4 million Australians had been affected by identity theft in the last year. If
these figures are accurate, the escalating cost of this crime can be evidenced by a comparison with the work of
AUSTRAC, which, some six years earlier estimated that identify theft cost Australia AU $1.1 billion. See Australian
Government, National Crime Prevention,A kit to Prevent and Respond to Identity Theft, ISBN: 0 642 21084 5. “Some
estimates in 2002 put the number of identify theft victims at close to 10 million, an 81% rise from 2001 and at a cost
of nearly US$53 billion.” Wenjie Wang, Yufei Yuan and Norm Archer, “A contextual framework for combating
identity theft”, (2006). (March/April) IEEE Security and Privacy 30, 30. See also Model Criminal Law Officers’
Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Final Report Identity Crime, (March 2008), 9–10. The
rise in the use of smartphones has also led to new concerns about identity theft: MCT, “Smartphones offer new frontier
for identity theft”, http://www.theage.com.au [Accessed July 6, 2011].
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How can identity fraud in land transactions be perpetrated?
As numerous Australian cases8 illustrate, the way in which identity fraud can occur
in relation to land is all too simple. For example in Grgic v ANZ Banking Group
Ltd,9 the father, the registered proprietor of land, had refused to provide a guarantee
for his son’s business. The son, aggrieved by this, set about on a course of action
whereby the son, his wife, and a person impersonating his father was introduced
to the bank manager. They had possession of the certificate of title. The mortgage
was prepared with imposter signing the relevant documents and appearing as if
he was the father. The monies were then advanced, the fraud possible because of
the bank failing to check the identity of the imposter, the reliance by the bank on
the possession of the certificate of title as a safeguard against identity fraud, and
the relationship between the parties allowing the son to have possession of the
certificate of title. A very similar scenario occurred in Ratcliffe v Watters,10 where
the daughter of the registered proprietor, in possession of the certificate of title,
saw a solicitor, accompanied by an imposter represented by the daughter, to be
her father. The solicitor, in this instance, prepared to witness the contract of sale
and memorandum of transfer—the possession of the certificate of title and the
relationship between the parties critical to the committing of the fraud.
Whilst the above examples came about through the familial relationship and
easy access to title documents, Challenger Managed Investments Ltd v Direct
Money Corporation Pty Ltd11 illustrates how fraud may occur without possession
of a certificate of title, or a pre-existing relationship to the victim. The imposter
in this instance made application for a new certificate of title, based on the loss of
the previous certificate. A cyclone was alleged to be the cause of the loss of the
certificate. This application was supported by statutory declarations. The Land
Titles Office issued new certificates of title with these being used to obtain a loan.
What these cases highlight is the ease in which identity fraud can occur, and
perhaps given this, it is surprising that more is not made of the lack of safeguards.
However, with the impending dawn of a new era based on technology which few
will technically understand, a failure to put in place nationally consistent safeguards
for identity verification will, as noted, only serve to undermine a land registration
process that serves the vast majority of transactions exceptionally well. In Australia
total land sales yearly exceed AU $240 billion, with this approximating 26 per
cent of gross domestic product, mortgages of some AU $790 billion, and the total
value of real estate in this country estimated at AU $3.4 trillion, a failure to put in
place the necessarymeasures to protect the revenue of the Crown and the underlying
economics of demand and supply could have disastrous consequences for the wider
economy.12 Furthermore, as Matthews notes, the public nature of the land registry
and the opportunities it presents for fraud could potentially be seen as a violation
8 See generally, Rouhshi Low, “The use of technology to automate the registration process within the Torrens
System and its impact on fraud: an analysis”, unpublished PhD thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2008,
86–90, and Rouhshi Low, “Opportunities for fraud in the proposed national electronic conveyancing system: fact or
fiction?” (2006) 13(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 225.
9Grgic v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1994) 33 N.S.W.L.R. 202.
10Ratcliffe v Watters (1969) 89 W.N. (Pt. 1) (NSW) 497.
11Challenger Managed Investments Ltd v Direct Money Corporation Pty Ltd (2003) 59 N.S.W.L.R. 452.
12These figures represent the estimates in 2005/2006. NECS Request for Tender, CIV Standard and Application
Procedures Development for NECS, January 22, 2010, 2.2. Intuitively, today the sums may be considerably greater.
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of human rights.13 These factors, with the additional recognition that consumers
(such as purchasers of real estate) overstate the probability of something tragic
occurring, even when objectively of a low probability,14 and the comprehension
that whilst the risk of identity fraud is of a low probability it is nonetheless
material,15 the key question is what safeguards are available, and what should be
available to protect what many see as an inherent part of the culture of many
jurisdictions—that of home ownership. With this background in mind, this paper
will be structured as follows. Part one will consider just how loss and risk should
be allocated in consumer land transactions generally—where should the
responsibility lie when one’s identity is taken. Three major principles inform this
debate—how should the loss be spread, how should it be reduced and how should
it be imposed? Part two will examine just what is identity fraud, its prevalence in
land transactions and contrasting how it occurs in the traditional paper based
environment, with what will likely happen in an electronic environment. Part three
will assess the risk associated with the activity of land transactions and identity
fraud and provide an overview of the current legislative and regulatory responses
to prevent it occurring. Part four will use the elements discussed in Parts one to
three to discuss loss allocation in an electronic environment for land transactions.
Part one: loss allocation in identity fraud cases
“Cassio: Reputation, reputation, reputation, O, I have lost my reputation! I
have lost the immortal part of myself, and what remains is bestial.
Iago: “Reputation is an idle and most false imposition: oft got without
merit, and lost without deserving.”16
There is no doubt that whilst many would see loss of reputation and identity as
a modern phenomenon brought about by the rise of the internet, the complexity
of modern lives and ready access to the personal information of others, the lament
by Cassio in Shakespeare’s Othello demonstrates the issue has a long lineage.
Indeed, it must be remembered that the better-known quote of Iago was said in
the context of this man seeking to destroy the reputation and identity of Othello.
Today, we understandably value our reputation or identity, and with modern means
allowing this to be destroyed silently, covertly, from afar, and from enemies close
at hand, the necessity to guard against loss of identity is all the more apparent.
However, it cannot be over-emphasised—no system exists which will eliminate
fraud. With this in mind, the question is one of how to deal with and minimise the
risk, and allocate the loss when something does go awry. The starting points for
this analysis are the three major principles behind economic efficiency and the
allocation of loss in cases of forgery. These are loss spreading, loss reduction and
loss imposition.17
13Matthews, “Registered land, fraud and human rights”, (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 351, 351.
14 See the discussion of behavioural economics on consumer policy in Productivity Commission, Review of
Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Final Report, Canberra, 2008, Appendix B.
15Clayton Utz, “Risk assessment of the National Electronic Conveyancing System”, Final Report to the National
Steering Committee, February 9, 2007, 26.
16William Shakespeare, Othello Act 11, Scene 3, lines 256–265 (cited from The Complete Works of William
Shakespeare, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p.912).
17The seminal article on this are is Robert D. Cooter and Edward L. Rubin, “A theory of loss allocation for consumer
payments” (1987–1988) 66 Texas Law Review 63.
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Loss spreading
Consumers are traditionally regarded as loss averse. This is the reason we insure.
Even though the loss of property through a bushfire may be small, the consequences
are so catastrophic that we will take precautions to protect against this. In so doing,
the premiums payable will exceed the expected claims—if they did not, insurance
companies would quickly become insolvent. Loss spreading allows the consumer
to pass that risk onto another person where that risk can be spread by the insurance
company over a larger group of people. Both parties are then in a position to
beneficially exchange from that arrangement. A common example will highlight
this point. Assume a person has a 1 per cent risk that they will be subject to identity
fraud. A risk-averse registered proprietor owning a property worth AU $1,000,000
will likely pay more than AU $10,000 (i.e. greater than 1 per cent) to guard against
that risk. By contrast, the financial institution or insurer is likely to be risk neutral.
It can safely assume that risk at a price of AU $10,000, and then spread that risk
over a large number of homeowners. Therefore, the guiding economics behind
loss allocation and loss spreading is that the risk should be borne by the person
who can achieve risk neutrality at the lowest level.
“In general, the party that can achieve risk neutrality at the lowest cost is the
one that has greater economic resources and is in a position to spread the loss
most effectively.”18
This is most likely to be the financial institution.
Loss reduction
The second guiding principle is that the party who can guard against the loss most
easily should incur that cost—the lowest cost avoider. The legal system must put
in place incentives for each party to achieve loss reduction.Whereas loss spreading
was predicated on a loss already having occurred, the analysis here is far more
complex and must incorporate, by necessity, the intangibles of human behaviour.
What reasonably can we expect to do with respect to the owners of land? We
currently expect and require owners of debit and credit cards to take precautions
to guard against misuse, and provided this occurs, then liability is limited to a
minimal amount. Should we impose obligations on owners of land to take steps
to protect the certificate of title and minimise the potential for one’s identity to be
stolen. Currently in Australia, we see the state jurisdictions of New South Wales
and Queensland imposing obligations on mortgagees to verify identity, yet little
is imposed on the owners of real estate. Should we? If responsibility and liability
is solely imposed on financial institutions, then there is little incentive for
homeowners to take steps to take precautions. For example, as noted above in
Grgic and Ratcliffe one reason the fraud was possible was the familial relationship
that allowed a person who is not the registered proprietor to obtain access to the
certificate of title with this then allowing that fraudster to misrepresent the truth.
18Cooter and Rubin, “A theory of loss allocation for consumer payments” (1987–1988) 66 Texas Law Review 63,
71.
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The question is, if we were to impose greater responsibility on homeowners to
protect against misuse of the certificate of title and other identity documents, will
their behaviour alter?
“[T]he loss reduction principle is a useful guide for assigning liability only
if the supply of precaution or innovation is elastic with respect to liability.”19
In other words, requiring homeowners to take precautions will only be of use
if the behaviour of those people alters. If it does not, imposing liability makes little
sense. For this reason, whereas loss-spreading clearly favoured the imposition of
liability on the bank in a land transaction, the result is not as clear for loss reduction.
Both financial institution and consumer are in a position to take relatively easy
steps to minimise the potential for identity fraud. The financial institution with its
capacity to easily undertake identity checks and pass costs associated with this
over a great number of people can remove many of the risks associated with this
type of forgery. Similarly, the consumer can take greater measures to protect their
own identity.
Loss imposition
This principle asks who should enforce or have the loss imposed on them. The
clearest solution is to let the loss lie where it occurs. Thus, if a registered proprietor
has a mortgage attached to their land by an imposter, the mortgagee should be
entitled to enforce that mortgage, even though they may have taken no steps to
check identity. The lesson learnt by the landowner would be clear: protect identity.
However, this fails to take into consideration that the consumer is less likely than
the mortgagee to be in a position to enforce their rights. The financial institution,
acting rationally, will take the necessary steps to assert their rights and has a legal
incentive to do so given the vast array of like transactions in which they are
involved. This is not the case for the registered proprietor, and even more so with
consumers that may have limited financial resources to take legal action. Putting
these elements together, we see the framework sitting as follows:
Onus should be placed on mortgagee—they are risk neutral, whereas most
homeowners would be risk-averse. The financial institution can spread the loss
over a large group of people at little expense to each.
Loss Spreading
This factor is neutral. Both parties are able to reduce the potential for loss. The
bank by taking steps to verify identity, the homeowner utilising precautions to
avoid loss of identity. This would suggest that not all liability should be placed
on the mortgagee.
Loss Reduction
Financial institutions will have greater access to enforcement mechanisms with
it being rational for them to take action to recover loss. Consumers do not have
the same opportunity either because of a lack of finance or ignorance of their
rights—consumers have less incentive to be appraised of their legal actions.
Loss Imposition
19Cooter and Rubin, “A theory of loss allocation for consumer payments” (1987–1988) 66 Texas Law Review 63,
75.
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Putting the elements together
As noted by the framework, two of three principles favour responsibility on the
mortgagee, the third is not clear, and no suggestion is being made that the solution
is simply quantitative—that the mathematical formula favours responsibility and
liability for loss being imposed on the bank. However, we believe that there is a
further consideration that can help resolve the conundrum. Bearing in mind that
in Australia, even if the mortgage is forged or would otherwise be invalid due to
fraud, the mortgagee, provided it has acted without fraud, will get an indefeasible
title,20 albeit subject to such estates and interests as are already noted on the register:
the person who bears the cost of preventing identity fraud should also obtain the
benefits of so doing. Accordingly, if costs are imposed on one party, they should
receive the benefit of taking those measures. The legislative reforms in New South
Wales and Queensland (discussed below) operate on this premise: imposing
responsibility for verification onmortgagees. In Queensland and New SouthWales,
provided that mortgagees follow the legislative guidelines of identity verification,
indefeasibility of title is theirs to enjoy. However, this leaves the pivotal question
unanswered—what should be the legislative guidelines, that is, what steps should
be taken to verify identity, and who should take them? In stating this however, it
is important to recall that imposing obligations merely on one party diminishes
the incentive on another party to reduce the risk of loss—the problem of moral
hazard. We suggest the answer from the perspective discussed in this Part one is
as follows: first, the primary responsibility for loss caused by the identity fraud
should lie with lender. This institution has the capacity to check identity—if they
do not check then the assumption can be made that they would rather bear the loss,
than take the costs of additional checks, “[s]ociety should not pay for measures
that cost more than the evil they are intended to avoid”.21 However, this fails to
reflect the importance and public confidence necessary for the correct operation
of the land registers. For this reason, mandated client identification must be
imposed. Secondly, mortgagees have a far greater capacity to spread the loss than
do consumers. Presently, each of us could have our identity stolen, though for the
vast majority, this will never occur. It is a type of “reverse lottery”.22 Identity fraud
for the individual consumer is devastating—for the financial institution rarely so.
The institution can achieve risk neutrality.23 This is not possible for the individual
consumer. It is the mortgagee who should bear the responsibility and the loss
associated with identity fraud. By so doing a raft of measures should be put in
place to assist the mortgagee to guard against this. In the next section, we further
this analysis by developing a taxonomy of identity frauds that can occur in a
conveyancing transaction.
20 For an excellent discussion of the options surrounding indefeasibility, (i.e. whether indefeasibility should be
immediate, deferred or discretionary), see Pamela O’Connor, “Deferred and immediate indefeasibility: bijural
ambiguity in registered land title systems”, (2009) 13 Edinburgh Law Review 194. See also Matthew Harding and
Michael Bryan, “Responding to fraud in title registration systems: a comparative study”, in Martin Dixon (ed.),
Modern Studies in Property Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), p.3.
21 Jess Sovern, “The jewel of their souls: preventing identity theft through loss allocation rules”, (2002–2003) 64
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 343, 380–381.
22 Sovern, “The jewel of their souls: preventing identity theft through loss allocation rules”, (2002–2003) 64
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 343, 383.
23Risk neutrality refers to the attitude that one has to risk.
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Part two: a taxonomy of identity frauds in a conveyancing system
As noted in the section above, the ease in which fraud can be perpetrated in relation
to land is staggering. They usually, but not always, occur in “the demimonde of
low finance, of high interest [and] short term loans granted by demanding lenders
to desperate borrowers”.24 The first two cases discussed above illustrate the situation
where the fraudulent person had a pre-existing relationship with the victim and
where the fraudulent person colludedwith a third party to impersonate the registered
owner to perpetrate the fraud. In both Grgic25 and Ratcliffe,26 as was noted above,
the fraud occurred because the impostor had in his/her possession the certificate
of title and it was assumed that this then meant that the impostor was the registered
proprietor of the land and had a right to deal with the land.27 In both cases, if further
identification had been required to be produced to substantiate the claim as to
identity, the fraud may have been averted.28
These two cases also show that the relationship with the victim of the fraud was
key to enabling the fraud. The relationship in both cases made it possible for the
fraudulent person to obtain possession of the certificate of title and other documents
necessary to perpetrate the fraud. In Grgic for example, the son was able to obtain
the certificate of title because the father had agreed to support an earlier loan
application that was made to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. The father
had accompanied the son and his wife to the bank, taking with him the certificate
of title and other documents relating to the property. The certificate of title and
other documents, including the form of mortgage executed by the father were left
with the bank pending application of the loan. The loan was not approved and the
son and his wife then went to bank to collect the certificate of title and the other
documents that were left with the bank.29
Fraud can also occur without using a third party to impersonate the landowner.
In Young v Hoger,30 for example, the parents of the fraudulent person were joint
tenants of the subject property.31 Without the knowledge of the father, the daughter
and the mother obtained a loan secured by a mortgage over the property, by forging
the father’s signature on the memorandum of mortgage.32 Default occurred and
the daughter and the mother sought to refinance the loan; in doing so, the daughter
forged the signatures of both her mother and father on the mortgage.33 In both
cases, the signatures on the mortgage were purportedly witnessed by a Justice of
the Peace.34 However that Justice of the Peace died before the trial, hence there
was no evidence on the circumstances of the execution.35 Similarly, in Sansom v
24Hilton v Gray (2008) Q. ConvR. 54-686 at [1].
25Grgic (1994) 33 N.S.W.L.R. 202.
26Ratcliffe (1969) 89 W.N. (Pt. 1) (NSW) 497.
27Grgic (1994) 33 N.S.W.L.R. 202 at 205–206, 223–224.
28 For example in Grgic (1994) 33 N.S.W.L.R. 202 at 221, Powell J.A. noted that it may be possible to say that
the bank officers “were less than meticulous in seeking to establish that the person who was introduced to them as
Mr Grgic Snr was in truth the registered proprietor of the subject property”.
29Grgic (1994) 33 N.S.W.L.R. 202 at 204–205.
30 Young v Hoger [2000] QSC 455 (Supreme Court of Queensland trial division); Young v Hoger [2001] Q.C.A.
453 (Supreme Court of Queensland Court of Appeal).
31 Young [2000] QSC 455 at [8].
32 Young [2000] QSC 455 at [13].
33 Young [2000] QSC 455 at [21].
34 Young [2000] QSC 455 at [13], [14] and [21].
35 Young [2000] QSC 455 at [22].
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Westpac Banking Corp,36 a wife and her husband were the registered proprietors
of certain properties, as well as joint holders of an overdraft account withWestpac
Banking Corporation. The wife in Sansom had caused these properties to be
mortgaged to the bank by forging the husband’s signature on the mortgage
instruments.37
In both cases, the pre-existing relationship38 between the fraudulent person and
the victim was a key factor in enabling the fraud. In these cases the fraudulent
person is usually trusted and relied on by the victim of the fraud. In Young for
example, the father relied upon and trusted his wife and daughter. The wife attended
to all of the family dealings, the books of account, chequebooks, and all money
matters.39 Similarly in Sansom, the wife looked after the financial affairs; she
controlled the chequebooks and did all the banking, signing most of the cheques
drawn on their joint account.40 This relationship of trust between victim and
fraudulent person can enable the fraudulent person access to various documentation,
such as the certificate of title, which can be used to aid in the perpetration of the
fraud. It may also be said to encourage the lender to believe that the fraudulent
person was acting or speaking on behalf of the victim so that all correspondence
and relevant documentation, particularly the mortgage instrument, were given to
the fraudulent person for the purposes of procuring execution. It is this ability to
obtain the necessary documentation, particularly the mortgage instruments from
the lender, which then gives the fraudulent person the opportunity to forge the
victim’s signature on the mortgage instrument. In Sansom for example, the wife
had told the bank officer that her husband was ill with cancer and the bank officer
had believed her and had given her mortgage documents to be signed by her
husband. This gave her the opportunity to forge the husband’s signature on the
mortgage and return it to the bank.41 It is no coincidence that the most common
perpetrators of land title fraud in Australia are those who are known to the victim
of the fraud, such as the victim’s family members.42
In both cases, fraud may have been averted if the lender had attempted to contact
the victim of the fraud. In Young, no contact was made with the victim, although
the victim was a party to the transaction. All correspondence by the solicitor acting
for the lender was addressed to the daughter and her mother, or just to the
daughter.43 More importantly, the mortgage instrument was given to the daughter
and the mother for procuring execution. The solicitor did not have any dealings,
direct or indirect, with the father; had he attempted to contact the father, he might
have discovered that the father was being defrauded by his wife and daughter.44
In Sansom, the bank did not get in contact with the husband before the mortgages
36Westpac Banking Corp v Sansom (1994) 6 B.P.R. 13,790; (1995) N.S.W. ConvR. 55-733; (New South Wales
Supreme Court) BC9403430; Sansom v Westpac Banking Corp (1996) 7 B.P.R. 14,615; (1996) N.S.W. ConvR.
55-790; BC9600344 (appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal).
37 Sansom (1996) 7 B.P.R. 14,615; (1996) N.S.W. ConvR. 55-790; BC9600344 at 7–8.
38 In Sansom, it was the wife and in Young, the daughter in collusion with the mother.
39 Young [2000] QSC 455 at [8].
40Westpac Banking Corp (1994) 6 B.P.R. 13,790; (1995) N.S.W. ConvR. 55-733; BC9403430 at 4–5.
41Westpac Banking Corp (1994) 6 B.P.R. 13,790; (1995) N.S.W. ConvR. 55-733; BC9403430 at 36.
42Low, “Opportunities for fraud in the proposed national electronic conveyancing system: fact or fiction?” (2006)
13(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 225, 228.
43 Young [2000] QSC 455 at [20].
44 Young [2000] QSC 455 at [20] and [36].
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were signed nor did the bank attempt to verify the truth as to the husband’s illness.45
Perhaps if the bank had contacted the husband to verify the mortgage transactions,
the fraud might have been uncovered.
Both cases also highlight the situation where witnessing procedures were either
disregarded, such as in Sansom, or circumvented, such as by forging the signature
of the witness (which could be of a genuine or a fictitious person), thereby enabling
the fraud. In Sansom, the witness (the bank officer) attested to the husband’s
signature on the mortgage instruments even though they were not signed in his/her
presence.46 Two recent fraud cases in Queensland show that the circumstances in
which the fraud in Young and Sansom were perpetrated are not unique, and that
they continue to feature in fraud cases occurring today. In Hilton v Gray47 the
fraudulent person was the stepdaughter. In that case, the lender believed he was
lending money to Mr Gray (the victim of the fraud); with the monies to be
forwarded to Mr Gray’s step daughter (Mrs Lonergan).48 In fact, Mrs Lonergan
had forged Mr Gray’s signature to the mortgage. Mr Gray knew nothing of the
loan.49 When the lender’s solicitors began to suspect fraud, they checked the
witnessing of the documents and contacted the Justice of the Peace who had
purportedly witnessed Mr Gray’s signature.50 At trial, the Justice of the Peace
confirmed that she did not witness signatures unless some form of photo
identification was provided.51 Douglas J. opined that perhaps Mrs Lonergan may
have used a third party to impersonate her step father and provided the impostor
with identification documents in her step father’s name to assist her in the fraud.52
Mrs Lonergan also forged the signature of a fictitious person to the independent
solicitor’s advice when a second advance increasing the principal sumwas sought,
so that it appeared that a solicitor by the name of “Jacinta Rose” had signed the
independent solicitor’s advice. No solicitor of that name was admitted to practice
in Queensland. Had the lender’s solicitors checked the name, they might have
discovered the fraud.53 In Royalene Pty Ltd v Registrar of Titles,54 the fraudulent
person was the victim’s son-in-law, who had forged both the victim’s signature
on the mortgage as well as the signature of the witness to the mortgagor’s
signature.55 The son-in-law had contacted a mortgage broker and informed the
mortgage broker that he was the husband of the victim of the fraud, that he wanted
to obtain a loan and that there was an unencumbered property in his wife’s name
that could be used as security.56 The son-in-law was also able to fax a number of
documents to the mortgage broker, including a copy of the victim’s driver’s licence
and a rates notice of the property.57 The lender’s solicitors sent the mortgage and
other documents to the mortgage broker who then forwarded the documents via
45Westpac Banking Corp (1994) 6 B.P.R. 13,790; (1995) N.S.W. ConvR. 55-733; BC9403430 at 36.
46Westpac Banking Corp (1994) 6 B.P.R. 13,790; (1995) N.S.W. ConvR. 55-733; BC9403430 at 36 and 39.
47Hilton (2008) Q. ConvR. 54-686.
48Hilton (2008) Q. ConvR. 54-686 at [1].
49Hilton (2008) Q. ConvR. 54-686 at [1].
50Hilton (2008) Q. ConvR. 54-686 at [14] and [15].
51Hilton (2008) Q. ConvR. 54-686 at [15].
52Hilton (2008) Q. ConvR. 54-686 at [15].
53Hilton (2008) Q. ConvR. 54-686 at [13].
54Royalene v Registrar of Titles [2008] Q. ConvR. 54-689.
55Royalene [2008] Q. ConvR. 54-689 at [2].
56Royalene [2008] Q. ConvR. 54-689 at [10].
57Royalene [2008] Q. ConvR. 54-689 at [12].
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email to the fraudulent person.58 This then enabled the fraudulent person to forge
the signatures on the mortgage documents. No certified copy of the driver’s licence
was provided with the executed documents.59 Daubney J. found that had the
mortgage broker or the solicitor been more vigilant in obtaining a certified copy
of the driver’s licence, the fraud may not been uncovered.60
The cases thus far highlight frauds perpetrated by those who have a pre-existing
relationship with the fraud victim. However, as observed in the previous section,
fraud can also be perpetrated by those without a pre-existing relationship with the
victim of the fraud. For example, in 2003, it was reported that illegal finance
brokers were manufacturing false identities to enable customers to obtain bank
loans. These brokers created new identities using fake drivers’ licences, council
rates notices, medicare cards, employers’ references, credit cards and bank
statements.61 In 2007, Land and Property Information (LPI) New South Wales
uncovered a mortgage fraud scheme involving counterfeit certificates of title. Nine
counterfeit certificates of title were discovered by LPI.62 According to LPI, the
counterfeit Certificates of Title used in the fraud scheme are produced by
superimposing details from title searches of genuine titles on forged certificates
in the format used prior to the introduction of certificates with enhanced security
features in January 2004. The counterfeits were of reasonably high quality and
were used in conjunction with forged identity documents as a means of proving
ownership.63 Then in 2009, LPI uncovered a mortgage fraud scheme operating in
Victoria affecting land in NSW, again using counterfeit titles. Two counterfeit
certificates were identified by LPI affecting the same property.64 False identity
documents were also used to perpetrate fraud in New Zealand in 2005, when false
passports, bank statements and tax certificates were used by the fraudulent person
to convince three lawyers to arrange mortgages over homes that the fraudulent
person did not own.65 These frauds, the manner they are perpetrated and the factors
enabling them are captured in the table below.66
58Royalene [2008] Q. ConvR. 54-689 at [46].
59Royalene [2008] Q. ConvR. 54-689 at [46].
60Royalene [2008] Q. ConvR. 54-689 at [48].
61Kara Lawrence, “Forging a New ‘Industry’ of Fraudulent Bank Loans”, The Daily Telegraph, February 24,
2003.
62 Land and Property Information NSW, Mortgage Frauds Involving Counterfeit Certificates of Title (2007)http:/
/rgdirections.lands.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/48103/2007-01_Mortgage_frauds_involving_counterfeit
_Certificates_of_Title.pdf at April 6, 2010 [Accessed July 6, 2011].
63 Land and Property Information NSW, Mortgage Frauds Involving Counterfeit Certificates of Title (2007)http:/
/rgdirections.lands.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/48103/2007-01_Mortgage_frauds_involving_counterfeit
_Certificates_of_Title.pdf at April 6, 2010 [Accessed July 6, 2011].
64 Land and Property Information NSW, Mortgage Frauds Involving Counterfeit Certificates of Title (2009)http:/
/rgdirections.lands.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/93294/2009-01_Mortgage_frauds_involving_counterfeit
_Certificate_of_Title.pdf at April 6, 2010 [Accessed July 6, 2011].
65 See Catriona MacLennan, “Warning about conveyancing fraud using false passports” (2005) (39) Auckland
District Law Society Law News 1 and Anne Gibson, “Department Protects Homes From More Fraud” New Zealand
Herald (Auckland), 2006.
66This table was adapted from the table in Low, “Opportunities for fraud in the proposed national electronic
conveyancing system: fact or fiction?” (2006) 13(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 225.
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Factors facilitating fraudRelationship
with victim
Mode of perpetrationCatego-
ry
There is a
pre-existing
relationship.
G r g i c
t y p e
f r a u d
cases
• Fraudulent person’s rela-
tionship with the victim
provides the fraudulent
person with access to the
victim’s identity docu-
ments.
• Fraudulent person,
with or without the
aid of a third party,
claiming that he/she
has a right to deal
with the land by
producing the appro-
priate identity docu-
ments.
• Lack of vigilance by the
lender in verifying identi-
ty.
• The identity docu-
ments may be gen-
uine or falsified.
There is a
pre-existing
relationship.
Yo u n g
t y p e
f r a u d
cases
• Relationship between
victim and fraudulent
person—fraudulent per-
son is trusted by the vic-
tim which provides the
• Land title instru-
ment given to the
fraudulent person to
procure execution
by the victim of the
fraud. fraudulent person with
easy access to the paper
certificate of title and
various other documents.
• Fraudulent person
forges the victim’s
signature on the
land title instrument. • Lack of vigilance by the
lender, for example:• Witnessing require-
ments are circum-
vented, either by:
— all correspon-
dences ad-
dressed to the— forging the
signature
of the wit-
fraudulent per-
son as the fraud-
ness. This ulent person is
can be of a usually seen as
real person speaking for or
on behalf of the
victim;
or a ficti-
tious per-
son; or — land title instru-
ment provided
to the fraudulent
— persuading
the witness
to attest to party to procure
execution from
the victim;
the signa-
ture even
though it — the victim is not
contacted or
dealt with even
was not
signed in
though the vic-the pres-
ence of the
witness.
tim is a party to
the transaction
(e.g. Young);
• The witness to the signa-
ture(s) on the instrument
attests to the signature(s)
even though the signature
was not signed in front of
thewitness (e.g. Sansom).
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Factors facilitating fraudRelationship
with victim
Mode of perpetrationCatego-
ry
There is a
pre-existing
relationship.
G r g i c
t y p e
f r a u d
cases
• Fraudulent person’s rela-
tionship with the victim
provides the fraudulent
person with access to the
victim’s identity docu-
ments.
• Fraudulent person,
with or without the
aid of a third party,
claiming that he/she
has a right to deal
with the land by
producing the appro-
priate identity docu-
ments.
• Lack of vigilance by the
lender in verifying identi-
ty.
• The identity docu-
ments may be gen-
uine or falsified.
No pre-exist-
ing relation-
ship.
LPI type
f r a u d
cases
• Ability to falsify identity
documents or to obtain
genuine identity docu-
ments.
• Fraudulent person,
with or without the
aid of a third party,
claiming that he/she
has a right to deal • Lack of vigilance by the
lender in verifying identi-
ty.
with the land by
producing the appro-
priate identity docu-
ments.
• Lack of vigilance by the
entity responsible for issu-
ing identity documents in• The identity docu-
ments may be gen-
uine or falsified.
incorrectly issuing the
identity documents (such
as the NSW Land Titles
Office issuing certificates
of title in Challenger’s
case).
Howwill these frauds translate to an electronic environment, such as the National
Electronic Conveyancing System (NECS), where users of the system log in to the
system, prepare land title documents online, which are then digitally signed and
electronically lodged for registration? It has been found that all the paper-based
frauds described here can continue to occur in an electronic environment.67 Using
a conveyance under NECS as a case study,68 the facts in Young, Sansom andGrgic,
67 See Low, “The use of technology to automate the registration process within the Torrens System and its impact
on fraud: an analysis”, unpublished PhD thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2008, 86–90; Low,
“Opportunities for fraud in the proposed national electronic conveyancing system: fact or fiction?” (2006) 13(2)
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 225; Rouhshi Low, “From paper to electronic: exploring the fraud
risks stemming from the use of technology to automate the Australian torrens system” (2009) 21(2) Bond Law Review
107.
68An overview of property conveyancing and how it will operate under the National Electronic Conveyancing
System can be found in Clatyon Utz, “NECS Legal Framework Development Volume 2”, May 27, 2009, updated
February 15, 2010, [4.1]. For present purposes, it is relevant to note that a legal practitioner or financial institution
would be a subscriber to the system, within these organisations there would be designated users and certifiers—certifiers
having the authority to sign transactions digitally. A client purchasing land would go to a solicitor and the solicitor
(subscriber) would then verify that person’s identity. The subscriber will need to keep records that the identity checks
have been done and performed. Once the normal title and associated checks have been done, the instruments will be
prepared by the NECS for certification. The certifier will then review the instruments and use their private key to
sign the documents. The NECS will verify that the certifier does in fact have the accreditation to sign. For more on
these roles, see National Electronic Conveyancing Office, NECS Draft Operations Description V6, 2007 [4.3].
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may be used hypothetically as an illustration (though if these facts are transposed
to an English context, the power of rectification available via the Land Registration
Act 2002 Sch.4 para.2(1) may lead to a different result)69:
• The daughter in Young could perpetrate fraud if the mortgagee’s
solicitor, who is a NECS Subscriber, provides her with the
authorisation form70 to procure execution on behalf of the father and
mother. The daughter then forges her father’s signature on the
authorisation form, as well as the signature of the witness, so that it
appears that the father’s signature has been properly witnessed. The
form is brought back to the solicitor, who acts upon the form as the
authorised user and proceeds with the transaction.
• The wife in Sansom approaches a bank, who is a NECS Subscriber,
stating that she wishes to mortgage the property owned by her and
her husband. The bank officer prepares an authorisation form. The
wife then tells the bank officer that her husband is too ill with cancer
to attend at the bank, requesting that she be allowed to take the form
back to procure execution from him. The bank officer allows her to
do this. She forges the husband’s signature on the authorisation form
and it is witnessed by the bank officer, even though it was not signed
in his or her presence. The authorisation form is then acted on—the
property is mortgaged with the proceeds going to the wife.
• The son in Grgic finds a person willing to impersonate his father.
The son has in his possession a rates notice of the property in
question. If certificates of title are used in the NECS,71 the son could
obtain the paper certificate of title. The son and the impostor visit a
bank, who is a NECS Subscriber. The son introduces the impostor
to the bank officer as his father and produces the rates notice and
certificate of title. The bank officer prepares an authorisation form,
which is signed by the impostor. The property is mortgaged and the
monies advanced to the son.
In addition, an automated system, such as the NECS, may even provide different
opportunities for fraudulent conduct.72 For example, a certifier employed by a
subscriber of the NECS could be careless in the way he/she stores his/her private
69Relevant English authorities to consider include Argyle Building Society v Hammond (1985) 49 P. & C.R. 148;
(1984) 81 L.S.G. 3425 CA (Civ Div); Barclays Bank Plc v Guy [2008] EWCA Civ 452; [2008] 2 E.G.L.R. 74 (this
case is presently under appeal).
70The authorisation form is the document used in NECS by the Subscriber to obtain authorisation from the client
so that the Subscriber can represent the client in a transaction, digitally sign registry instruments and electronically
lodge the instruments on behalf of the client: National Electronic Conveyancing Office, NECS Draft Operations
Description V6, 2007, [9.2.3.3].
71At the time of writing, the question of whether certificates of title will be used in the NECS is still the subject
of national uniform consultations: National Electronic Conveyancing Office, NECS Draft Operations Description
V6, 2007, [9.2.6.15].
72For more on this see Low, “The use of technology to automate the registration process within the Torrens System
and its impact on fraud: an analysis”, unpublished PhD thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2008, 86–90;
Low, “Opportunities for fraud in the proposed national electronic conveyancing system: fact or fiction?” (2006) 13(2)
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 225 and Rouhshi Low and Ernest Foo, “The susceptibility of digital
signatures to fraud in the national electronic conveyancing system: an analysis” (2009) 17 Australian Property Law
Journal 303.
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key which is used to digitally sign land title instruments.73 The certifier may store
the private key in a USB device but leave the USB device at work on the office
desk. The certifier may have written down both the user-id and password required
to log in to NECS.74 Another employee of the subscriber could then use the
certifier’s user-id and password and private key to access NECS and perpetrate
fraud. Alternatively, a fraudulent person could apply to be registered75 with the
NECS as a subscriber and certifier of the NECS. For example, the fraudulent
person could compile a set of identity documents that identify him/her as a legal
practitioner, apply to a Gatekeeper Certification Authority/Registration Authority
(CA/RA) for a digital signature certificate76 and lodge an application to be listed
as a subscriber and certifier.77 If successful, the fraudulent person would be listed
on NECS as a subscriber and certifier, will be given a user-id and password to
access NECS and will also have a digital signature certificate to sign instruments.
The fraudulent person could then access NECS and perpetrate fraud.78
73For more about the use of digital signature certificates in the NECS, see: NECSNational Electronic Conveyancing
Office,NECSDraft Operations Description V6, 2007, [9.3.3], National Electronic Conveyancing Office, Risk Analysis
of DSC Types for Authorised Officers and Certifiers, 2008; Clayton Utz,NECS Legal Framework Development, Final
Report Vol.1, 2010, [17] and Low and Foo, “The susceptibility of digital signatures to fraud in the national electronic
conveyancing system: an analysis” (2009) 17 Australian Property Law Journal 303.
74To access the NECS, a user-id and password is required to log-in to the NECS: see National Electronic
Conveyancing Office, NECS Draft Operations Description V6, 2007, [9.2.4]. The case that occurred at the Fairfax
County Public School in Falls Church, Virginia show how easy it is for someone to make use of a password that has
been written down to access a system. In that case, a nine-year-old student at the school had taken a teacher’s password
from a desk and used it to access the school’s system to change enrolment lists and other teachers’ passwords: Robert
McMillan, “Nine-year-old steals password to school system” http://news.techworld.com/security/3220809/nine-year
-old-steals-password-to-school-system/?olo=rss at June 17, 2010 [Accessed July 6, 2011].
75To be able to use NECS, industry participants must first become registered with the NECS as a user. This can
be done in one of two ways: (1) apply to the NECS to be registered as a Subscriber and User; or (2) have an existing
Subscriber sponsor the application to be a User supervised by that Subscriber: NECSNational Electronic Conveyancing
Office, NECS Draft Operations Description V6, 2007, [7.3].
76The NECS application process requires the applicant to obtain an approved type of digital signature certificate
to sign the application: National Electronic Conveyancing Office, NECS Draft Operations Description V6, 2007,
[7.3], Clayton Utz, NECS Legal Framework Development, Final Report Vol.1, 2010, Attachment 3, [1]. The term
Registration Authority (RA) refers to the entity responsible for verifying the identity of applicants and the term
Certification Authority refers to the entity responsible for issuing digital signature certificates to those applicants
whose identity has been verified. Gatekeeper is a Federal Government initiative to increase confidence in the online
economy providing a Government endorsed online trust framework using public key technology: see Verisign,
“Gatekeeper Digital Certificates overview”, http://www.verisign.com.au/gatekeeper/overview.shtml at April 16, 2010
[Accessed July 6, 2011]; Verisign, “Gatekeeper Services Whitepaper” (2003)http://www.verisign.com.au/gatekeeper
/gatekeeper.pdf at October 8, 2010 and Low and Foo, “The susceptibility of digital signatures to fraud in the national
electronic conveyancing system: an analysis” (2009) 17 Australian Property Law Journal 303. Given that users of
the Victorian EC System obtain the required Gatekeeper Australian Business Number-Digital Signature Certificate
(ABN-DSC) from Verisign, it is likely that Verisign, which is Gatekeeper accredited, will also be used by NECS:
Verisign, “Verisign gatekeeper: electronic conveyancing” http://www.verisign.com.au/gatekeeper/ec/index.html at
October 8, 2010 [Accessed July 6, 2011].
77 See National Electronic Conveyancing Office, NECS Draft Operations Description V6, 2007, [9.1.2.1]: a sole
practitioner can be listed as a Subscriber and Certifier.
78 For more on this see Low and Foo, “The susceptibility of digital signatures to fraud in the national electronic
conveyancing system: an analysis” (2009) 17 Australian Property Law Journal 303 and National Electronic
Conveyancing Office, Risk Analysis of DSC Types for Authorised Officers and Certifiers, 2008. A recent example
occurred in New Zealand where a lawyer had, when acting for clients in the sale of their farm through the Landonline
system, withdrawn a caveat placed over the farm by third parties. The lawyer had no authority to act for the third
parties, did not have their consent to withdraw the caveat and did not hold a Landonline Authority and Instruction
from the third parties authorising him to withdraw the caveat. The New Zealand Standards Committee commented
that “unauthorised actions of this kind imperil the e-dealing system”. The Committee said that certified practitioners
have a responsibility “to ensure that all relevant matters are in order before instruments are submitted and the Land
Register altered” and that this responsibility is “fundamental to the integrity of the system”. In that case, the lawyer
was censured and required to pay AU $1,300 by way of penalty, plus AU $12,000 in respect of the costs of the inquiry:
New Zealand Law Society, “Lawyers Complaints Service Decisions—Bringing the profession into disrepute:
withdrawal of caveat placed by third parties”http://www.lawsociety.org.nz/home/for_the_public/lawyers_standards
_committee_decisions at October 8, 2010 [Accessed July 6, 2011]. This case confirms the concern voiced by Rod
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The point is that in the paper system, it is the registered proprietor of the property
in question who is the target of the fraud and its victim because in the paper system,
it is this person who must execute the appropriate land title instruments. So they
are targeted for fraud purposes, such as by forging the person’s signature on the
land title instrument or impersonating the person—the Young, Grgic type fraud
cases or preparing a set of false identity documents, including false certificates of
title to assume ownership (the LPI type fraud cases).
However, if an automated system, such as NECS, alters this process by allowing
only an authorised user of the system to prepare land title instruments and to sign
them on behalf of clients, then these authorised users may be targeted instead,
raising a new opportunity for perpetrating fraud. In these frauds, there may be no
connection between the fraudulent person and the registered proprietor of the
land—the fraud is perpetrated because the fraudulent person has or is able to gain
access and has the ability to sign instruments digitally or is able to acquire this
ability. It is not the relationship between the victim and the fraudulent person that
is the facilitative factor in the fraud, this type of fraud simply depends on whether
or not the fraudulent person is able to obtain access, digitally sign the instruments
and lodge for registration.79
The various frauds that can potentially be perpetrated in an electronic
environment are represented in the table below.80 This is then followed by
consideration of the current steps taken to prevent identity fraud in land transactions.
Factors facilitating fraudRelationship
with victim
Mode of perpetrationCatego-
ry
There is a
pre-existing
relationship.
G r g i c
t y p e
f r a u d
cases
• Fraudulent person’s rela-
tionship with the victim
provides the fraudulent
person with access to the
victim’s identity docu-
ments.
• Fraudulent person,
with or without the
aid of a third party,
claiming that he/she
has a right to deal
with the land by
producing the appro-
priate identity docu-
ments.
• Lack of vigilance by the
Subscriber acting for the
lender in verifying identi-
ty.• The identity docu-
ments may be gen-
uine or falsified.
There is a
pre-existing
relationship.
Yo u n g
t y p e
f r a u d
cases
• Relationship between
victim and fraudulent
person—fraudulent per-
son is trusted by the vic-
tim which provides the
• Authorisation form
given to the fraudu-
lent person to pro-
cure execution by
the victim of the
fraud. fraudulent person with
easy access to various
documents such as rates
notice.
• Fraudulent person
forges the victim’s
signature on the au-
thorisation form.
Thomas regarding the New Zealand Landonline system of its potential for abuse by solicitors entrusted with its use:
Rod Thomas, “Fraud, Risk and the Automated Register” in David Grinlinton (ed.), Torrens in the Twenty-first Century
(Wellington: LexisNexis, 2003), p.349.
79Low, “The use of technology to automate the registration process within the Torrens System and its impact on
fraud: an analysis”, unpublished PhD thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2008, 86–90, [6.5].
80This table was adapted from the table in Low, “Opportunities for fraud in the proposed national electronic
conveyancing system: fact or fiction?” (2006) 13(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 225.
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Factors facilitating fraudRelationship
with victim
Mode of perpetrationCatego-
ry
• Lack of vigilance by the
lender, for example:
• Witnessing require-
ments are circum-
vented, either by: — all correspon-
dences ad-
dressed to the
— forging the
signature
of the wit- fraudulent per-
ness. This son as the fraud-
can be of a ulent person is
real person usually seen as
or a ficti-
tious per-
son; or
speaking for or
on behalf of the
victim;
— —persuading
the witness
to attest to
author isa t ion
form provided
to the fraudulent
the signa- party to procure
execution from
the victim;
ture even
though it
was not — the victim is not
contacted or
dealt with even
signed in
the pres-
ence of the
witness.
though the vic-
tim is a party to
the transaction
(e.g. Young);
• The witness to the signa-
ture(s) on the authorisa-
tion attests to the signa-
ture(s) even though the
signature was not signed
in front of the witness
(e.g. Sansom).
There is a
pre-existing
relationship.
G r g i c
t y p e
f r a u d
cases
• Fraudulent person’s rela-
tionship with the victim
provides the fraudulent
person with access to the
victim’s identity docu-
ments.
• Fraudulent person,
with or without the
aid of a third party,
claiming that he/she
has a right to deal
with the land by
producing the appro-
priate identity docu-
ments.
• Lack of vigilance by the
lender in verifying identi-
ty.
• The identity docu-
ments may be gen-
uine or falsified.
No pre-exist-
ing relation-
ship
LPI type
f r a u d
cases
• Ability to falsify identity
documents or to obtain
genuine identity docu-
ments.
• Fraudulent person,
with or without the
aid of a third party,
claiming that he/she
has a right to deal • Lack of vigilance by the
Subscriber in verifying
identity.
with the land by
producing the appro-
priate identity docu-
ments.
• Lack of vigilance by the
entity responsible for issu-
ing identity documents in• The identity docu-
ments may be gen-
uine or falsified.
incorrectly issuing the
identity documents (such
as the NSW Land Titles
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Factors facilitating fraudRelationship
with victim
Mode of perpetrationCatego-
ry
Office issuing certificates
of title in Challenger’s
case).
Relationship
with victim
not relevant
to the fraud
Unauthorised use of an existing
Certifier’s user-id/password and
digital signature certificate to ac-
cess NECS and perpetrate fraud.
Newcat-
egory of
fraud
• Certifier was careless in
storing login and pass-
word details and careless
in storing the private key
for digital signing.
Relationship
with victim
not relevant
to the fraud
Falsely registering with NECS as
a Subscriber and Certifier.
Newcat-
egory of
fraud
• Ability to falsify identity
documents or to obtain
genuine identity docu-
ments.
• Gatekeeper CA/RA care-
less in verifying identity.
Part three: assessment of the risk and legislative and regulatory
responses
As noted in the request for tender for the client identification protocols of the
national electronic conveyancing system:
“Acceptance of [the] new arrangements by industry participants generally
and by key industry and government stakeholders in particular is dependent
on their confidence that all significant risks are known, have been fairly
allocated and will be effectively managed … It is critical to the operation of
the [land registration] system in each jurisdiction that there is a fair allocation
of residual risk to the assurance funds.”81
Indeed, and with a recognition that whilst any one individual being subject to
identity fraud and losing their property is of low probability, there is conversely
no doubt that some people will lose their property because of identity fraud. The
risk to the individual, small; the risk to the system, certain. The goal of any risk
minimisation and allocation of loss strategy must therefore be to highlight who is
the most appropriate individual(s) to apportion loss to, and what practical risk
reduction strategies can be put in place. Indeed Clayton Utz suggest that the more
rigourous responsibilities imposed under an electronic conveyancing system82will
involve a threat that a participant may fail to meet those more onerous burdens,
the “overall effect … should be a net reduction in conveyancing risk and a safer
and more robust conveyancing system”.83 Connected to the thesis of this article is
a requirement that certifier or the subscriber under the national electronic
81NECS Request for Tender, CIV Standard and Application Procedures Development for NECS, January 22, 2010,
[2.10].
82 See generally Celia Hammond, “The abolition of the duplicate certificate of title and its potential effect on
fraudulent claims over Torrens land” (2000) 8 Australian Property Law Journal 115 for a discussion of the potential
for fraud to arise in an electronic environment. See also Low, “The use of technology to automate the registration
process within the Torrens System and its impact on fraud: an analysis”, unpublished PhD thesis, Queensland
University of Technology, 2008, 86–90.
83Clayton Utz, “Risk assessment of the National Electronic Conveyancing System”, Final Report to the National
Steering Committee, February 9, 2007, [1.12]
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conveyancing protocols undertake and maintain adequate records of client
identification with this mandated by land registry offices. The goals of this
obvious84:
• Ensuring that the public has confidence with the system;
• maintenance of the integrity of the land registration system;
• achieve highest practical and functional accuracy within the Register;
• ensure that the electronic system is efficient, viable, attractive and
cost effective when compare with paper processes; and
• be cost neutral in terms of the potential liability upon the assurance
funds.
The importance of meeting the previously mentioned goals is obvious from a
policy perspective. However there is a far more basal reason for why subscribers
to the systemwould seek to mandate a high standard. This arises from the operation
and implementation of the Federal Government’s responsibilities under various
international law instruments including the United Nations Convention against
Corruption 2003, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised
Crime 2000 and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism 1999, with these soft-law instruments leading to the enactment of
the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Act 2006. Before considering
these Federal initiatives which understandably have a focus and reach far beyond
conveyancing, it is necessary to consider the specific measures to address identity
fraud within the land registration systems in Australia and describe how two
jurisdictions, New South Wales and Queensland, have sought to respond to these
concerns.
New South Wales legislation
Section 56C of the Real Property and Conveyancing Legislation Amendment Act
2009 provides that the mortgagee must take reasonable steps to ensure that the
person who executed the mortgage, or on whose behalf it has been executed as
mortgagor, is indeed the same person as the registered proprietor of the land.
Subsection 2 indicates that these requirements will be met if the mortgagee has
taken the steps as prescribed in the regulations. A failure to do this provides a
reason by which the Registrar-General may cancel a recording in respect of a
mortgage (s.56(6)). In the absence of promulgated regulations at the time of writing,
we see in late 2009, a consultation paper was released by the Land and Property
Management Authority of New South Wales85 seeking discussion on the level of
identity verification that should be imposed on mortgagees. The concluded view
of this paper was that the verification regime should contain the following elements:
• a face to face interview with the mortgagor(s);
• document based verification rather than verification by electronic
data;
84 See also, National Electronic Conveyancing Office, Memo to National Project Team, December 23, 2008,
“Standard for Client Identity Verification”, 2.
85Land and Property Management Authority NSW, Consultation Paper Confirmation of Identity—Sections 56C
and 117 of the Real Property Act 1900, December 21, 2009.
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• a minimum of two and preferably three identification documents
(one of which should contain a photograph)86; and
• original documents must be sighted, rather than certified copies.87
Queensland legislation
This legislation has a like objective to that of New South Wales—impose greater
obligations on the mortgagees. Section 11A of the Land Title Act 1994 is in similar
terms to its southern neighbour with the reference in s.3 to compliance with the
manual of land title practice.88 A point of difference between the jurisdictions is
that rather than provide a discretion to the Registrar-General to cancel the mortgage,
this legislation expressly provides that a failure to undertake the verification steps
will see a mortgagee unable to rely on indefeasibility (s.185(1A)).
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Act 2006
Under s.35 of this legislation a reporting entity must carry out and verify the identity
of those with whom it deals. A reporting entity is one that carries out designated
services, with this latter phrase (s.6) including the making of a loan where that
loan is made in the course of carrying on a loans business. In short, the financial
institutions associated with the housing and commercial mortgage market in
Australia would undoubtedly comewithin the province of this legislation. Relevant
for instant purposes is that the legislation prescriptively mandates certain
requirements vis-à-vis client identification. The Anti-Money Laundering and
Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules Instrument 2007 (No.1) then puts the flesh to
the skeleton outlined in the establishing legislation. Part 4.2 of the Rules provides
that a reporting entity must collect at a minimum, the following information in
respect of an individual:
• the customer’s full name;
• the customer’s date of birth; and
• the customer’s residential address.
This information must then be verified either by:
• reliable and independent documentation;
• reliable and independent electronic data; or
• a combination of reliable and independent documentation and
electronic data.
86Satisfactory documents to meet the requirements of the photographic ID are stated to be and Australian passport
(current or expired in last two years); an Australian driver’s licence; a NSW photo card or an overseas passport. Land
and Property Management Authority NSW, Consultation Paper Confirmation of Identity—Sections 56C and 117 of
the Real Property Act 1900, December 21, 2009, 3.
87Land and Property Management Authority NSW, Consultation Paper Confirmation of Identity—Sections 56C
and 117 of the Real Property Act 1900, December 21, 2009, 4.
88At themoment this refers to the Commonwealth Financial Transactions Reports Regulations 1990. This subordinate
legislation refers to the 100 point identity check whereby certain documents must be produced before, for example,
a bank account can be opened. Documents are given a different value (e.g. a photographic driver’s licence is worth
40 points, a land record 35 points and a public utility bill 25 points).
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Paragraph 4.2.8 also requires the reporting entity to establish risk-based systems
and controls for the reporting to know whether any additional information should
be sought to enable the recording entity to know their customer.
It is the view of the authors that the safe-harbour as established by this legislation
is inadequate in the context of land transactions and the application of indefeasibility
to the title of the non-fraudulent owner. The objects of the anti-money laundering
legislation are very much different from the more mundane focus of land
transactions. As noted, the Federal Government introduced this legislation to meet
its international obligations with a focus on combating the pernicious activities as
outlined in the legislation’s title. Further, this legislation allows the reporting entity
to establish its own level of risk for each transaction and to embed the level of
verification dependant on the perception of risk attached to that transaction. As
can be seen from the examples highlighted above, the contemporary capacity to
produce documents that can easily pass the standards required for client
identification mandate a higher onus. Similarly, it is considered that the options
of New South Wales and Queensland, whilst superior to the vacuum that exists in
other states still falls far short of what is required.
The Australian Government’s gold standard
The view of the authors is that the recommended level of identity verification for
land transactions should be that of the Australian Government’s gold standard on
client identification.89 This view is supported by the land registrars.90 Principle 2
of this standard states:
“The Gold Standard should be applied in circumstances where the
consequences flowing from registering a false identity are high and a high
level of confidence in establishing a person’s identity is required. It should
be used when issuing key POI (Proof of Identity) credentials or for national
security checking purposes.”91
Adopting these principles sees three levels of evidence required:
• evidence of commencement of identity in Australia (such as a birth
certificate);
• evidence of a person’s identity in the community—that is the
verification of a person’s social footprint (e.g. local government rates
information); and
• a linkage between the claimed identity and the applicant. Most
commonly this would require photographic or biometric evidence.
This evidence would then need to be verified by face-to-face interview and for
future reference, bind the applicant through additional photographic evidence or
biometric evidence of the applicant. The recommendation of us is that this standard
should be the safe-harbour for Subscribers to the National Electronic Conveyancing
89 See Commonwealth Government, Report to the Council of Australian Governments on the elements of the
National Identity Security Strategy, April 2007.
90National Electronic Conveyancing Office, Memo to National Project Team, December 23, 2008, “Standard for
Client Identity Verification”, 3.
91Commonwealth Government, Report to the Council of Australian Governments on the elements of the National
Identity Security Strategy, April 2007, 4–5.
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System, with additional obligations imposed on Subscribers to the NECS where
there is a reason to believe that the person is not whom they appear to be. This
gold standard must be adopted and utilised in Australia—not only because it is
consistent with the policy behind certainty of title in a land registration system,
and with most fraudulent transactions involving mortgagors acting as imposters,
the extra costs associated with verifying identity will be merely the burden of
gaining the benefits of immediate indefeasibility.
Part four:What the adoption of this Gold Standard shouldmean
for the future in reducing risk and allocating loss in land
transactions
To date the prevailing argument from Parts one and two is that the mortgagee
should primarily bear the risks associated with identity fraud. We then suggested
that in meeting that obligation the Federal Governments Gold Standard on identity
verification should be adopted. It is the view of the authors that, for the reasons
listed in above, the mortgagee in the NECS should continue to bear the
responsibility for the paper type identity frauds identified in Part two that can
continue to occur in the NECS; that is:
• Young type frauds;
• Grgic type frauds; and
• LPI type frauds.
These frauds occur at the point where the fraudulent person approaches the
mortgagee for a loan. As can be seen from the discussion in Part two, in these
frauds, whether they occur in the paper system or in NECS, the registered proprietor
is the victim of the fraud and it is the registered proprietor’s identity that is used
to perpetrate fraud. Whilst the registered proprietor may, in some cases, bear some
responsibility for facilitating identity fraud, the entity best able to prevent fraud
in these cases, as can be seen from the discussion above, is the mortgagee, by
verifying identity. The mortgagee is therefore the most appropriate entity for
assuming the responsibility of verifying identity in these types of fraud and in both
Queensland and New South Wales the regulatory response has been to pass
legislation mandating mortgagees to take on this role.
However for the frauds unique to NECS, the position is less clear. In these cases,
because of the nature of the fraud, the entity best able to prevent identity fraud via
identity verification techniques may not be the mortgagee. Take for example the
situation where a fraudulent person is incorrectly registered as a Certifier and
Subscriber of the NECS, giving the fraudulent person full access to the NECS and
the opportunity to perpetrate fraud. It can be argued that the entity best able to
prevent this type of fraud is the Gatekeeper Ca/RA, by verifying identity, because
it is the entity responsible for issuing digital signing certificates to applicants and
its designated role in NECS is to verify identity. Therefore it should be responsible
for ensuring that the identity documents are in order. Contrast this to the situation
where fraud occurs because the Certifier is careless in storing his/her private key
and NECS user-id and password. Who should bear the responsibility then? The
Certifier, or the Subscriber (if the Certifier is an employee of that Subscriber)? In
all of this, it is likely that some homeowner would have his/her house fraudulently
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mortgaged or sold. Thus the issue of allocation of liability within the NECS for
these new types of frauds is more complex than for the traditional types of frauds
because there are new entities92 involved in the NECS and therefore new
relationships to consider that is not present in the current conveyancing system.
This issue of liability allocation within the NECS and its participants was
examined extensively in a consultation package in 2009. Prior to that consultation
package, three other consultation packages were commissioned. The culmination
of these four consultation packages is a report titled the NECS Legal Framework
Development Final Report.93 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail
the recommendations proposed by the final report. Generally, the report
recommended using contract and service charters to govern the relationships
between the various NECS stakeholders.94 The report suggested that a contract,
known as a Participation Agreement and Participation Rules, would be mandated
to govern the relationship between the electronic lodgment network operator
(ELNO)95 and each Subscriber. This Participation Agreement would take effect as
a bilateral contract between each Subscriber and the ELNO.96 The Participation
Agreement and Participation Rules would contain requirements with regard to
other aspects of the NECS legal framework. For example, provisions setting out
the Subscribers obligations under NECS, such as ensuring that all of its Users
nominated as Certifiers comply with their rules and obligations under the
Participation Rules could be contained in the Participation Agreement and
Participation Rules. Obligations to perform client identity verification requirements
would also be included the Participation Rules.97
With regards to the Subscriber and the Certifiers used by the Subscriber, the
Report recommended that legal liability arrangement between these two parties
be left to commercial negotiation and agreement.98 The Report noted that because
Subscribers control the choice of and terms of service of the Certifier, Subscribers
should be responsible to other parties in the NECS for the Certifiers used by the
Subscriber and that Subscribers can cover the risk of the Certifier’s acts and
omissions (including fraud) by taking out insurance and appropriate contractual
arrangements with the certifier.99However, the report also suggested that Certifiers
could enter into a subset of the Participation Agreement and Participation Rules
(called the certifier agreement) with the ELNO under which they agree to certain
obligations such as the safeguarding and use of their private key and use of the
92These entities are NECS stakeholders. The NECS stakeholders discussed in this paper are the NECS users,
including subscribers and certifiers, Land Registries, the Gatekeeper CA/RA and the ELNO. However, the range of
NECS stakeholders extend far beyond that, including stakeholders such as participating governments, regulators of
industry professionals who conduct conveyancing the NECS, insurers of stakeholder liability in relation to NECS
and Revenue Offices: Clayton Utz, NECS Legal Framework Development, Final Report Vol.1, 2010, [3].
93Clayton Utz, NECS Legal Framework Development, Final Report Vol.1, 2010. Details of the four consultation
packages and stakeholders who responded can be found in this report.
94Clayton Utz, NECS Legal Framework Development, Final Report Vol.1, 2010, [6.3].
95 It is currently envisaged that there will be one national ELNO, operated by a company owned by all of the
jurisdictions and the ELNO will be authorised to operate an electronic lodgement network for land in each of the
jurisdictions. Thus the ELNO is the entity that will be responsible for operating the systemNECS: Clayton Utz,NECS
Legal Framework Development, Final Report Vol.1, 2010, [1.1].
96Clayton Utz, NECS Legal Framework Development, Final Report Vol.1, 2010, [5.6], [10].
97Clayton Utz, NECS Legal Framework Development, Final Report Vol.1, 2010, [5.2] and Attachment 3, [4].
98Clayton Utz, NECS Legal Framework Development, Final Report Vol.1, 2010, [14].
99Clayton Utz, NECS Legal Framework Development, Final Report Vol.1, 2010, [16.2] and [17.1].
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NECS system.100 So it would appear that where the Certifier has been careless in
keeping the private key safe and fraud occurs, the Subscriber and Certifier will be
held responsible.
At the time of writing this paper, the Report has the status of independent advice
and is currently being considered by all NECS stakeholders.101 Victoria, which has
developed its own electronic conveyancing system (Victorian ECV system), also
use contractual rules (called the EC System Rules)102 to govern the relationship
between the various participants of ECV. However, the manner in which the EC
System Rules allocate liability has been a source of discontent for some ECV
stakeholders, namely the Law Institute and the Legal Practitioners Liability
Committee, arguing that the EC Rules result in one-sided liability arrangements.103
Thus effective liability allocation arrangements can be a contentious issue and
the successful uptake of NECSmay ultimately depend on its stakeholders agreeing
on the manner in which liability is divvied up in the NECS. Further research into
this area is therefore timely and, in the authors’ opinion, necessary. To that end,
the loss allocation principles and framework discussed in this paper and adopted
in the Report104 provide a good starting point for analyzing effective liability
allocation arrangements in the NECS.
Conclusion
Over the past few years, studies have shown that identity fraud has grown to
become a significant problem.105 It is therefore unsurprising that many Australians
are becoming more concerned about identity fraud. In a survey conducted in 2007
by the Wallis Consulting Group on behalf of the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner, one of the issues examined in the survey was a series of questions
concerning awareness and experience of identity fraud. More than 1,500
respondents took part in this survey. Nine per cent of those surveyed claimed they
had been a victim of identity fraud whilst 17 per cent said they knew of someone
who had been the victim. The survey also found that people aged between 35 and
49 were the most likely to have been the victim or know someone who has been
a victim, with 60 per cent of Australians concerned that they may become a
victim.106 Within the arena of land transactions, the impact of identity fraud is no
less devastating because its occurrence strikes at the very heart land registration
system—security of title. The case examples used in this paper have shown that
100Clayton Utz, NECS Legal Framework Development, Final Report Vol.1, 2010, [5.6], [11].
101Email from Ann Kinnear (National Electronic Conveyancing Office) to Rouhshi Low, April 16, 2010. Thus
for frauds resulting from incorrect registration of applicants to NECS, it was argued in this paper that Verisign should
bear responsibility for these frauds as its role as Gatekeeper RA is to verify identity. However, it may be that this
responsibility should be shared with the ELNO if the ELNO also has the responsibility of verifying identity, such as
subscriber credentials and insurance and financial capacities of the subscriber: Email from Simon Libbis (National
Electronic Conveyancing Office) to Rouhshi Low, June 24, 2010.
102 State Government of Victoria EC, “Registration documents”
http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/r_regdocs.html at April 16, 2010 [Accessed July 6, 2011].
103Clayton Utz, NECS Legal Framework Development, Final Report Vol.1, 2010, [15.2]. Also see Law Institute
Victoria Submissions, “Electronic conveyancing Victoria” (September 10, 2007)http://www.liv.asn.au/Membership
/Practice-Sections/Submissions at April 18, 2010.
104Clayton Utz, NECS Legal Framework Development, Final Report Vol.1, 2010, [4.2].
105Discussed in this paper in fn.7.
106Wallis Consulting Group, Office of the Privacy Commissioner Australia, “Community Attitudes to Privacy”,
2007, 66–67.
307
[2011] 75 Conv., Issue 4 © 2011 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Ltd and Contributors
identity fraud in land transactions can occur in many different ways, with the effect
of the victim of the fraud either losing title or finding his/her title being encumbered
with a mortgage.
This paper has examined the processes that can be put in place by stakeholders
within the land registration system to verify identity so as to prevent the occurrence
of identity fraud in land transactions without compromising the efficiency of the
system. The approach taken by this paper is to say that it is through the adoption
of these identity verification processes that there will be greater reliance and
increased confidence in the system, and this is critical for its future when it moves
to an electronic environment. To this end, this paper examined the three major
principles behind economic efficiency and the allocation of loss in cases of forgery
to develop a framework to determine the most appropriate individual(s) on whom
to apportion loss. Our finding from this examination is that the mortgagee should
primarily bear the risks associated with identity fraud. In terms of the level of
identity verification required to meet this obligation, this paper examined various
State and Federal initiatives for the verification of identity and found that the
Australian Government’s Gold Standard on identity verification should be adopted
as the standard for identity verification as it is consistent with the policy rationale
of certainty of title and meets the allocation of loss principles examined in this
paper. Should the NECS be implemented, it is suggested that mortgagees continue
to bear the loss for the types of identity frauds that currently occur in the land
registration system and that the Federal Government’s Gold Standard should be
used in the NECS. However, what this paper highlights is that it is entirely possible
that under an electronic system the allocation of risk and liability will fall on the
stakeholders involved in consummating the transaction, rather than the landowner.
The tension between these stakeholders (including conveyancers, lawyers, registry
offices, issuers of identity and the government) as to this allocation of risk is
palpable and will demand sensitive negotiation and much introspection and
examination as we embrace the efficiency, advantages, and complexity of the
national electronic conveyancing system.
Thematter is now under investigation by five government agencies: (http://www
.commerce.wa.gov.au/Corporate/Media/statements/2010/September/Intensive_joint
_investigation_.html [Accessed September 28, 2010]). The matter has also been
raised in the English Parliament, see Hansard, HC, col.238–246 (November 7,
2007) “Land Title Transfers” at 245. The currency of this examination in Australia
is also highlighted by the reference from the National Electronic Conveyancing
Office to KPMG in June 2010 to establish a single client identification verification
standard. See NECS press, “Work on an Identity Verification Standard Kicks Off”,
Issue 49, June 2010.
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Immediate indefeasibility — Is it under
threat?
Rouhshi Low and Lynden Griggs*
Immediate indefeasibility has been adopted in Australia for close to 40 years.
Recently however, and against the backdrop of economic fragility and global
deregulation, there has been a polite questioning of its place. In Australia,
some may argue that case law developments and legislative reform have
placed indefeasibility under the microscope — in New Zealand, a similar
telescoping by the respected views of their Law Commission. This note
examines these reforms. It concludes that these reforms do not place
immediate indefeasibility under threat. Rather, they modify and adapt the
doctrine to fit within the context of contemporary financial instruments.
Nevertheless, changes have so far been piecemeal, and its time for a
consistent and logical examination of this issue to occur on the national,
rather than the stage of each state.
Introduction
The land registration systems that operate in Australian states are rarely the
subject of interest to talk back radio, current affairs shows, or the public.
However, this all changed recently in Western Australia. Considerable
publicity and angst amongst the community of Perth was seen when a property
owner, living in South Africa and owning investment properties in Western
Australia, discovered that he had been the subject of a swindle that saw his
property being sold without his knowledge. What occurred was that fraudsters
from Nigeria intercepted documents on route to the true owner. Pretending to
be him, they then, through a series of emails and telephone calls contracted
with a real estate agent in Perth to sell the property. The property was
ultimately sold, and the proceeds of sale moved to an offshore bank account.
The true owner was only alerted when his second property was put on the
market and a neighbour alerted him of this fact. While undoubtedly
regrettable, it must be remembered that the possibility of identity fraud has
been present in whatever land registration system one adopts. Perhaps what
should be seen as unusual is that the matter of mortgage fraud has not attracted
greater attention. After all, statistics indicate that some 21% of all serious
fraud involves mortgage fraud.1 Similarly, the determining cases on land law
synopses throughout Australia and New Zealand would feature cases from the
late 1890’s to the present day: Gibbs v Messer,2 Fraser v Walker3 and
* Respectively Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology: Senior Lecturer, University of
Tasmania.
1 P Watkins, Fraud in Conveyancing, paper presented at the Australian Institute of
Conveyancers, 2007 National Conference, March 2007, quoting from R Smith, Serious
Fraud in Australian and New Zealand, Research and Public Policy Series No 48, Australian
Institute of Criminology and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003, cited in New Zealand Law
Commission, A New Land Transfer Act, June 2010, n 33.
2 [1891] AC 248; [1891–4] All ER Rep Ext 2047.
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Breskvar v Wall.4 Respectively, these involved a solicitor utilising the identity
of a non-existent Cameron in an attempt to defraud Mrs Messer; Mrs Fraser
forging the signature of her husband, and Wall having his identity taken by
one Petrie. In one way or another, all cases, extending from the 1890’s to 2010
in Western Australia involve, directly or indirectly, someone assuming or
fraudulently taking the identity of another. A problem only exacerbated today
with the rise of social networking sites and the seeming comfort of millennial
children (the next generation of property owners) to disclose personal details
to the world at large.
For at least 40 years, the resolution of the underlying property disputes to
these scenarios (usually, the context is whether the mortgagee can realise their
security against the true owner) has been guided and informed by the
operation of immediate indefeasibility — the notion that title by registration
cures any invalidity in the preceding instruments. In 1971, the High Court of
Australia accepted that this was the doctrine of choice for Torrens system
registration.5 While one may have thought that this would end the debate, at
least until legislative reform or an overruling by our highest judicial body,
argument continues, at least in academic circles, as to the correct role and
place for immediate indefeasibility and its effect on land transactions. For
example, we see O’Connor describing the controversy between immediate
and deferred indefeasibility in terms of a bijural ambiguity,6 jurisdictions
differing as to whether indefeasibility should be deferred or immediate,7
Zhixiang considering its operation uncertain8 and in the somewhat analogous
context of English registered land, as ‘statutory magic’.9 In addition to this, or
perhaps because of it, we see the academic community and law reform
bodies10 suggesting that irrespective of whether deferred or immediate
indefeasibility is adopted, there should, in addition, be a discretion to override
this should the result of that application be deemed unfair.11 Despite these
concerns about how it should be applied, the High Court’s description of
indefeasibility as the ‘foundation of Torrens system’12 continues to this day,13
with immediate indefeasibility also seemingly endorsed by the Property Law
3 [1967] 1 AC 569; [1967] 1 All ER 649; [1967] 2 WLR 411; [1967] NZLR 1069.
4 [1971] 126 CLR 376; [1972] ALR 205; (1971) 46 ALJR 68; BC7100630.
5 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376; [1972] ALR 205; (1971) 46 ALJR 68; BC7100630.
6 P O’Connor, ‘Deferred and Immediate Indefeasibility: Bijural Ambiguity in Registered Land
Title Systems’, (2009) 13 Edinburgh L Rev 194.
7 Australia has accepted immediate indefeasibility, some Canadian provinces are immediate,
some deferred, and differences exist between Singapore and Malaysia. See generally
O’Connor, above n 6; L Griggs, ‘Resolving the Debate Surrounding Indefeasibility through
the Eyes of a Consumer’, (2009) 17(2) APLJ 259.
8 S Zhixiang, ‘Rationalising the Singapore Torrens System’ (2008) Singapore Jnl of Legal
Studies 165 at 166.
9 P Matthews, ‘Registered Land, Fraud, and Human Rights’ (2008) 124 LQR 351 at 351.
10 See the comments and sources cited by M Harding and M Bryan, ‘Responding to Fraud in
Title Registration Systems: A Comparative Study’ in M Dixon (Ed), Modern Studies in
Property Law — Volume 5, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009, pp 3, 10.
11 Another approach can be seen with Ontario, who, when introducing electronic registration
diluted the effect of indefeasibility by statutorily modifying the legislation so that deferred
indefeasibility became the norm. B Arrun˜ada, ‘Leaky Title Syndrome’ (2010) New Zealand
L Jnl 115 at 116.
12 Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604 at 613; 78 ALR 1; 62 ALJR 268; BC8802595.
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Reform Alliance in the early stages of its draft uniform Torrens Code.14
However, potential for unfairness is patent and overt with this unfairness the
reason why calls continue for reform or rejection of immediate
indefeasibility.15 This inequity is dramatically amplified in Queensland, South
Australia, Victoria and Western Australia where the landowner, subject to
fraud by an imposter, may be sued in a personal capacity for the debt incurred
by the deceiving party.16 This conclusion seems implausible and has not been
accepted in New South Wales, New Zealand and Canada.17 Despite this, the
NSW Supreme Court has described, in emphatic fashion, the importance of
indefeasibility:
Indefeasibility of title is the most fundamental feature of the land registration system
in Australia. Under it, the state guarantees the title of those with a registered interest
in land, to the extent of that interest. The foregoing is trite. But the principle is so
important, and adherence to it so essential, that registered title is able to be
challenged, under the legislative provisions in each of the states, only in the most
exceptional circumstances. The Torrens system has enabled conveyance with
certainty in Australia, and even though there may be occasions where notions of
comparative justice may seem to have been transgressed, it is essential that
indefeasibility of title is not undermined.18
What we seek to do in this brief note is show how the legislative responses to
immediate indefeasibility have, rather than sounded the death knell to the
doctrine, in fact merely responded to the underlying and contemporary
financial deregulation that currently exists in Australia. In so doing, they have
sought to make sense of the confusing morass of case law that is emanating
out of the states. While response to this bayou has differed from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, all responses have, we believe, as their motif, the protection of
the land registration system that has served Australia well for over 150 years,
with at least 40 of those guided by immediate indefeasibility. Our thesis is that
immediate indefeasibility has not been weakened by recent actual and
proposed changes, merely morphed into a doctrine suitable for the context in
which it necessarily sits.
Case law developments
Victoria
The Victorian position is represented by the decision of Tarik Solak v Bank of
Western Aust Ltd.19 An imposter, pretending to be Solak and having obtained
13 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007]
HCA 22; BC200703851.
14 See Property Law Reform Alliance, at <www.plra.com.au> (accessed 2 June 2010).
15 Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v English [2009] 14 BPR 26,675; [2009] NSWSC 478;
BC200904808 at [156].
16 For a current analysis of this issue surrounding the right of a mortgagee to pursue a
landowner who has a mortgage attached to the land by a fraudster, see M Harding, ‘Property,
Contract and the Forged Registered Mortgage’ (2010) 24 New Zealand Universities L Rev
22.
17 See the discussion by Harding, ibid, at 29–31.
18 Perpetual Ltd v Barghachoun [2010] NSWSC 108; BC201000922 at [25].
19 [2009] VSC 82; BC200901550.
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possession of the duplicate certificate of title and passport and driver’s licence,
obtained a loan from the Bank of Western Australia. It advanced some
$560,000 to the imposter. The bank registered a mortgage over the land. Most
of this money had been withdrawn by the time the fraud was discovered. The
documents used to create and register the mortgage were standard financial
documentation. The loan contract was an offer from the bank to ‘you’ the
borrower. The imposter acting as ‘Mr Solak’ identified himself as the
borrower. The mortgage instrument did not identify the receipt of an actual
sum of money, this being $560,000. Rather the borrower was liable to repay
the amount owing, with this defined in the registered mortgage document as
‘all monies which you owe the Bank for any reason, under or in relation to a
bank document . . .’. Bank document was defined to include an agreement or
arrangement under which you incur or owe obligations to the bank.
Solak’s argument was simple. He had not assumed any obligation to the
bank. Therefore, he was not a party to a bank document. The document was
void for fraud. There was no amount owing. Indefeasibility was for nothing,
he had an in personam right, supported by authority in New South Wales to
have the mortgage discharged. Despite what may be a natural tendency to
accept each proposition within this logical and linear progress towards
justification of the position of Solak, the Victorian Supreme Court rejected
these arguments. The use of the word ‘you’ was merely a drafting device. In
this instance, the ‘you’ was the imposter and the position would have been the
same had Mr Solak been addressed in the documents by name. In effect, the
policy of immediate indefeasibility was to be given its full force. The bank had
obtained by registration, the benefit of that doctrine and no exceptions could
apply to them. Despite the certainty by which this conclusion was reached,
criticism was swift and stinging. For example, the NZ Supreme Court in
Westpac Banking Corporation v Clark,20 a decision, which on the material
facts for present discussion, could not be distinguished from Solak said as
follows in respect of the reasoning of the Victorian court:
It is erroneous to interpret the loan contract as addressing the imposter and then to
work backwards by transferring that interpretation to the registered documents
merely because the language is common to all. The fact that ‘you’ in the loan
contract is the imposter cannot possibly affect what ‘you’ means in the registered
documents. . . . The registration of a forged mortgage and the consequent
indefeasibility of the charge cannot extend the scope of the intended linkage when
the ‘you’ in the mortgage is the registered proprietor. The covenant to pay in the loan
contract was not secured under the mortgage . . . its indefeasible charge secured
nothing.
New South Wales authority
By contrast to the Victorian position, and arguably emblematic21 of the
position in New South Wales is Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v English.22
20 [2009] NZSC 73 at [49].
21 The matter has been raised in a large number of cases. See Chandra v Perpetual Trustees
Victoria Ltd (2007) 13 BPR 24,675; [2008] NSWSC 178; BC200801332; Provident Capital
Ltd v Printy (2008) 13 BPR 25,199; [2008] NSWCA 131; BC200804171; Vella v Permanent
Mortgages Pty Ltd (2008) 13 BPR 25,343; [2008] NSWSC 505; BC200803886. As to how
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The facts are simple and all too familiar. Mr English forged his wife’s
signature to a loan with Perpetual Trustees. Who should bear the loss, Ms
English or the financial institution? The NSW Court of Appeal held in favour
of Ms English. The document in question provided that ‘I agree to pay the
Secured Money . . .’. The definition of secured money included all amounts
payable under the agreement secured by the mortgage. The offer document
sent to Mr English required that to accept the offer, ‘you, and if there is more
than one person, all of you, must sign’. The conclusion of the court was that
as Ms English had never signed, the loan agreement was never validly created.
The registered mortgage secured nothing. Perpetual was left with a claim
against the now bankrupt Mr English’s interest in the property.
This case can be compared with the recent NSW Court of Appeal decision
in Registrar General of NSW v Van Den Heuvel.23 In facts largely similar to
the above case (a husband forging a wife’s signature), the NSW Court of
Appeal, in a 2:1 decision, concluded that the mortgage secured a debt under
a secured agreement and because of this, the wife’s interest in that land was
charged with that security. Importantly, in terms of distinguishing this from
English, the definition of ‘Secured Agreement’ was interpreted to mean ‘Any
present or future agreement between me or us, or any one of us, and You, or
any agreement which varies such an agreement’. The expression, ‘me, or us,
any one of us’, was ‘apt to refer to the persons named as mortgagors, that is
the husband and the wife, or either of them’.24 By contrast, in English, the loan
offer was only capable of acceptance if both parties to whom the offer was
addressed signed the acceptance, and only one of them had done so. For this
reason, English could be distinguished. Young J in Van Den Heuvel concludes:
The balance of probabilities is that in the light of past history in the industry, the
possibility that the wife’s signature was forged or that the loan was unenforceable
against the wife would have occurred to Perpetual. It would more likely than not
accept that in that situation, so long as the husband was bound, it was commercially
appropriate to lend out the money.25
The dissent of Basten J was equally comprehensible.26 It was not possible to
infer that there would be a concluded agreement in the absence of signing by
both husband and wife. From the contractual material the fact that both
husband and wife were joint tenants and the husband’s belief that forging his
wife’s signature was necessary to receive the monies, the conclusion that was
reached in English (ie, indefeasibility for nothing) was to be preferred.
Addressing the policy implications that a registered mortgage achieved little
if his Honour’s view was to be accepted, Basten J stated:
changes in the language can alter the outcome, see Van Den Heuvel v Perpetual Trustees
Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWCA 171; BC201005096. See S Schroeder and P Lewis,
‘Indefeasibility of title and invalid all moneys mortgages: Determining whether invalid
personal covenants to pay are protected under the indefeasibility umbrella’, (2010) 18 APLJ
185.
22 [2010] ANZ ConvR 10-015.
23 [2010] NSWCA 171; BC201005096.
24 [2010] NSWCA 171; BC201005096 at [4].
25 Ibid, at [168].
26 Ibid, at [51]–[70].
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This conclusion does not undermine the security of the Register, nor the ability of
a transferee of the security to obtain a good title to the mortgage. As explained by
Sackville AJA in English at [97]:
‘It is true that the consequence of the invalidity of antecedent documentation may
produce the result that a registered mortgage does not secure a debt. But that is the
situation where a mortgagor repays the mortgage debt, yet the mortgage remains
undischarged.’27
Legislative proposals
New South Wales legislation
Legislation in New South Wales has been passed, but not yet commenced,
designed to reinforce what we see as the operation of immediate
indefeasibility, while at the same time imposing responsibility on those who
are most able to do this. Section 56C of the Real Property and Conveyancing
Legislation Amendment Act 2009 provides that the mortgagee must take
reasonable steps to ensure that the person who executed the mortgage, or on
whose behalf it has been executed as mortgagor, is the same person as the
registered proprietor of the land. The legislation will indicate that compliance
with the regulations will meet this standard, and that a failure to do this may
lead to a recording being cancelled: s 56(6). The regulations are yet to be
passed, but a consultation paper released by the Land and Property
Management Authority of New South Wales28 sought discussion on the level
of identity verification that should be imposed on mortgagees. The concluded
view of this paper was that the verification regime should contain the
following elements:
1) A face to face interview with the mortgagor(s);
2) Document based verification rather than verification by electronic
data;
3) A minimum of two and preferably three identification documents
(one of which should contain a photograph);29 and
4) Original documents must be sighted, rather than certified copies.30
Recently, New South Wales has also announced enhanced security measures
in respect of certificates of title. Part of the measures includes a new
watermark and a security trustseal designed specifically for certificates of title.
Queensland legislation
Section 11A of the Land Title Act 1994 has a similar intent as the NSW
legislation, and does predate by some years, the NSW reforms. However, there
is a critical difference, and one that we endorse. This legislation expressly
27 Ibid, at [57].
28 Land and Property Management Authority NSW, Consultation Paper Confirmation of
Identity — Sections 56C and 117 of the Real Property Act 1900, 21 December 2009.
29 Satisfactory documents to meet the requirements of the photographic ID are stated to be and
Australian passport (current or expired in last 2 years); an Australian driver’s licence; a
NSW photo card or an Overseas passport. Land and Property Management Authority NSW,
ibid, p 3.
30 Land and Property Management Authority NSW, ibid, p 4.
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provides that a failure to undertake the verification steps will see a mortgagee
unable to rely on indefeasibility: s 185(1A). The New Zealand Law
Commission has suggested that similar reforms be adopted in their
jurisdiction. As the commission notes:
We are . . . of the view that it is prudent to impose a legislative requirement on
mortgagees to take reasonable steps to check that they are dealing with the actual
registered owner and not with a fraudster. This may go some way towards
preventing mortgage fraud becoming widespread. Mortgagees are also usually the
‘cheapest cost avoider’ and are usually in a better position to prevent fraud than is
a registered owner. They can ensure that providing a loan is conditional upon proof
of the borrower’s identity.31
Law reform proposals
New Zealand
The New Zealand Law Commission, in its recent report A New Land Transfer
Act,32 undertake a brief examination of the operation of immediate
indefeasibility. In reforming the law, four options were outlined:
i) Immediate indefeasibility, whereby registration would cure any
forged or otherwise invalid instrument (ie, retention of the current
position);
ii) Immediate indefeasibility with a discretion to order alteration;
iii) Deferred indefeasibility, whereby the original owner could defeat the
title of an innocent purchaser or mortgagee where that title was
obtained from a forged or otherwise invalid instrument (as adopted in
some Canadian jurisdictions); and
iv) Immediate indefeasibility subject to statutory exceptions.33
Option two was preferred. Only a small number of submitters favoured
retention of the status quo, with a small number preferring deferred
indefeasibility. However, as the commission noted, ‘[d]eferred indefeasibility
is the approach adopted in some Canadian provinces like Ontario and New
Brunswick, but there have been subtle differences in its application, and it
suffers from complexity and lack of clarity’.34 Accordingly, it was suggested
that cl 13 of the new Act be in the following terms:
(1) This section applies to a person (person A) —
a) who has been deprived of an estate or interest in land through the
registration under a void or voidable instrument of another person
(person B) as the owner of the estate or interest; or
a) whose estate or interest in land has been adversely affected by the
registration under a void or voidable instrument of another person
(person C) as the owner of an estate or interest in land.
(2) The court may on the application of person A, make an order cancelling the
registration of person B or person C as the owner of the estate or interest . . .
31 New Zealand Law Commission, A New Land Transfer Act, June 2010, at [2.20].
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid, Ch 2.
34 Ibid, at [2.9].
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(4) The court may make an order only if it is satisfied that it would be manifestly
unjust for person B or person C to remain registered owner of the estate or
interest.
Subsection 7 goes on to consider a range of factors that can be taken into
account in considering whether something is manifestly unjust. These include,
amongst others, the circumstances surrounding the acquisition, the nature of
any improvements, the time someone has been in occupation, the identity of
the person in occupation, and the conduct of the parties.
Choices going forward
The financial deregulation that brought us a global economy and the produce
and services of nation states to our doorstep has undoubtedly and, to be
expected, some downsides. One such downside is evident in what happened
in Perth. A person, residing peacefully in South Africa, could expect that the
chance of having their Australian property sold without their authority, and
without any possibility to recover the land itself would be negligible. All too
tragically for this man, his understandable reliance on what many would think
would be the accepted position was sadly mistaken. Monetary compensation
was his only recourse. Immediate indefeasibility was to prevail. The same
result was occasioned upon Solak and Van Den Heuvel, with the mortgagees
enduring the pain in cases such as English. Given this inconsistency, what
should occur? First, the changes made in Queensland seem a worthwhile
initiative and involve little extra compliance for mortgagees. They should
prevent the endemic growth of mortgage fraud. Second, and perhaps allied to
this, mortgagees need to look for ways so that the technical deficiencies of
their mortgage documentation (particularly in the case of ‘all moneys’
mortgages) are overcome. Incorporation of allied documents by direct
reference, or perhaps a ‘return to the future’ of reliance on mortgages for a
specific amount, with this quantum incorporated by express mention in the
registered documents may also be a result of the current tsunami of litigation
on forged mortgages. Third, enhanced and modern security features should be
incorporated in land and other identity documents. No system will ever be fool
proof, but the greater the obstacles, the commensurate reduction in the number
of people who can access the resources to undertake the fraud. Fourth,
consideration should be given to dual or multi factor authentication whereby
someone assuming or claiming title to land would be required to produce not
only evidence of identification, but meet a standard of authentication. In this
context, it can be noted that authentication techniques can be broken down
into three categories:
i) Something you have (such as a certificate of title, or smartcard);
ii) Something you know (such as password or PIN); and
iii) Something you are (biometric facilities — facial image, retinal scan
for example).
Arguably land transactions need to require at least two of these, and if the
concern is so great, and the damage to the system so extensive, then possibly
all three. However, the authors do not downplay, in any way, the difficulties in
achieving this. Land transactions, at least for most natural persons, are
conducted with a level of infrequency that any increase in security would need
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to be balanced with operational requirements. A system so intrusive that
legitimate persons are put to an unduly burdensome onus only imposes costs
within a competitive market that may not match the corresponding benefits.
Accordingly, what may be critical as these matters are debated in the context
of the National Electronic Conveyancing system is how the owner of land
should be involved in determining the appropriate level of security.
Finally, we would argue for the introduction of a general discretionary
provision as has been suggested in New Zealand that would also serve to
ameliorate the most obvious of unfair results. In many cases, the mortgagee
will be fairly compensated in monetary terms, yet the pain felt by the true
owner’s eviction may never be fully met by financial settlement. All of these
measures do not impinge, weaken or mollify immediate indefeasibility. What
they do is place this doctrine within modern times. Immediate indefeasibility
is not under threat from these developments, merely adapting to contemporary
needs. Recognition of this could see greater consistency amongst the cases,
and a uniform response from the legislature. Given the incremental nature of
common law evolution, its time our parliamentarians seriously began to
examine this issue. The impending arrival of electronic conveyancing only
serves to remind us that the time is opportune for this assessment to occur.
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Abstract
“Defrauding land titles systems impacts upon us all. Those who deal in land include
ordinary citizens, big business, small business, governments, not-for-profit
organisation, deceased estates… Fraud here touches almost everybody.”1 The
thesis presented in this paper is that the current and disparate steps taken by
jurisdictions to alleviate land fraud associated with identity-based crimes are
inadequate. The centrepiece of the analysis is the consideration of two scenarios
that have recently occurred. One is the typical scenario where a spouse forges the
partner’s signature to obtain a mortgage from a financial institution. The second
is atypical. It involves a sophisticated overseas fraud duping many stakeholders
involved in the conveyancing process. After outlining these scenarios, we will
examine how identity verification requirements of the United Kingdom, Ontario,
the Australian states, and New Zealand would have been applied to these two
frauds. Our conclusion is that even though some jurisdictions may have prevented
the frauds from occurring, the current requirements are inadequate. We use the
lessons learnt to propose what we consider core principles for identity verification
in land transactions.
Introduction
In 2010, we wrote about the disparate measures taken by Australian and other
common law jurisdictions to reduce or alleviate the incidence of title and/or
mortgage fraud within land transactions.2 In that article we argued that the primary
responsibility for loss caused by identity fraud in land transactions should lie with
the mortgagee. We also recommended that the level of identity verification should
be that of the Australian Government’s gold standard on client identification. This
article builds on that earlier work in the following manner: first, by testing current
identity verification requirements across the Australian jurisdictions as well as the
*Respectively: Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology; Senior Lecturer, University of Tasmania.
1Adam Graycar and Russell Smith, Identifying and Responding to Electronic Fraud Risks, 30th Australasian
Registrars’ Conference, Canberra, November 13, 2002, 1.
2Lynden Griggs and Rouhshi Low, “Identity fraud and land registration systems: an Australian perspective” [2011]
75 Conv. 285, 285–308.
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United Kingdom, Ontario and New Zealand against two recent but very different
fraud scenarios. What will be seen is that the approach taken in the jurisdictions
where the frauds occurred did not prevent the fraud happening, but importantly,
this article will also show that had the frauds played out in the other jurisdictions,
the same conclusions would have been reached.Wewill argue that this test confirms
our findings in the 2010 article that what is critical is face-to-face verification of
identity. However, this test will also point to the need for expanding the burden
of identity verification. Whilst we are still of the opinion that mortgagees are still
best placed to prevent identity fraud, we will argue in this article that those who
profit from the conveyancing process (banks, conveyancers, real estate agents and
individual buyers and sellers) all have a role to play in reducing the incidence of
identity based crimes and should correspondingly share part of the burden. The
result of this analysis is that we will take the lessons learnt from the practical
application of the two fraud scenarios to identity verification requirements to
propose what we consider core principles of identity verification.
The matter is not unique to Torrens based systems
Whilst we recognise that the registration of “forged mortgages under the Torrens
system is a surprisingly common phenomenon”3 the issue is not exclusive to this
system. For non-Torrens jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom4 and the United
States,5 land fraud is equally visible with a long history. In Australia where land
is now valued at AU $3614 billion,6 and housing loan commitments amount to
AU $14,465 million,7 the role, and perhaps more importantly, the interest of all
stakeholders in reducing the likelihood for fraud and correctly allocating loss when
fraud inevitably occurs is of critical importance. In this country where on average
there will be one mortgagee fraud occurring in every 133,000 transactions and one
title fraud every 350,000 dealings8 the likelihood of an owner losing ownership of
their castle is undoubtedly small.9 Figures from the United Kingdom10 and New
Zealand11 also show relatively low levels of fraud in numeric terms—the table
below presents the figures from the United Kingdom.
3Perpetual Trustee v English [2010] NSWCA 32 at [7].
4Land fraud in the United Kingdom can be traced as far back as 1306 (Bernadette Hewitt, “A Tangled Web: Land
Registration and the Facilitation of Fraud—the England and Wales Perspective”, forthcoming in, Property and
Sustainability, (Thomson Reuters, 2011)). Recently property title fraud cost the land registry office some £26 million
(Simon Goodley, “Property title fraud costs Land Registry £26ml in compensation”, The Observer, May 15, 2011).
5This saw large sections of what is now Mississippi sold to land companies for considerably less than the market
value. The matter not played out until the United States Supreme Court in Fletcher v Peck deciding that the legislation
rescinding the land sales was constitutionally invalid (the third parties having bought from the land companies
successful in their arguments promoting the sanctity of the contract): Fletcher v Peck 10. U.S. 87 (1810).
6Australian Bureau of Statistics, 5204.0, Table 61, June 2010.
7Australian Bureau of Statistics, 5609.0 November 2010.
8NECDL’s Client Identity Verification Solution, Presentation to the Law Institute of Victoria, Melbourne, February
25, 2011.
9Looking more broadly at identity frauds, the Australian Bureau of Statistics report into Personal Fraud indicated
that in the 12 months prior to the survey, identity fraud accounted for 3 per cent of all personal frauds (approximately
499,500 victims). Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4528.0 Personal Fraud, 2007.
10Obtained under Freedom of Information legislation, April 1, 2011.
11 Figures supplied indicate 10 claims were collectively made in the years 2001, 2002, 2008–2010. Thanks to Mr
Rod Thomas, for supplying the information that he had previously obtained under a Freedom of Information application
in New Zealand (email correspondence, May 12, 2011).
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Despite these low levels of fraud, and low likelihood of risk for any one person,
there is no doubting the catastrophic impact that losing title to one’s home would
have on that individual—irrespective of the availability of compensation. In the
next section we outline two recent scenarios that differed in outcome and in
application as to how the fraud occurred. Following this, we apply current identity
verification requirements of the United Kingdom, Ontario, the Australian states,
and New Zealand and consider whether any of these would have minimised or
alleviated the opportunity for the fraud to occur.
Part 2: Constructing a modern land fraud—a tale of two ways.
Tale 1: Queensland: the Perrin fraud—one spouse forging the
partner’s signature (the typical fraud)
The fraud that occurred in Queensland in 2008 involving the husband forging the
wife’s signature on two mortgages in respect of property owned by the wife is a
textbook example of the type of fraud that is familiar and prevalent in many
common law jurisdictions.
Facts
Mrs Perrin was the registered owner of a property situated in Surfers Paradise,
Queensland. In June 2008, the Commonwealth Bank lent AU $10 million to Mr
Perrin and later this amount was further increased by AU $3.5 million.12 The bank
made those loans to Mr Perrin based on a guarantee by Mrs Perrin and mortgages
over the property that Mrs Perrin owned.13
In 2009, Mr Perrin declared himself bankrupt and following default, the Bank
sued to recover under the guarantee as well as seeking declaratory relief as to the
enforceability of the mortgages.14 Mrs Perrin denied ever signing mortgages over
the property. She claimed that her signature on the two mortgage documents and
on the guarantee was forged. Lawyers for Mrs Perrin also claimed that the
signatures ofMr Perrin’s brother, solicitor Fraser Perrin, who purportedly witnessed
the security documents, were also forged.15
12Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Perrin [2011] QSC 274 at [1].
13Perrin [2011] QSC 274 at [2].
14Perrin [2011] QSC 274 at [3].
15Perrin [2011] QSC 274 at [2].
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Modus operandi
For the first mortgage, an employee of the Bank, Michael Parker, went to the
property onMay 16, 2008 with documents contained in three envelopes, including
one envelope for Mrs Perrin.16 Mrs Perrin was leaving the property as Mr Parker
arrived. Mr Parker spoke to Mrs Perrin but did not say that he had documents for
her to sign and did not give her the envelope addressed to her.17 Instead, after Mrs
Perrin had left the property, Mr Parker gave all of the documents to Mr Perrin,
including the envelope addressed to Mrs Perrin.18 Perrin Partners also released the
certificate of title into the custody of Mr Perrin. The solicitors did not require a
signature from Mrs Perrin.19 According to McMurdo J. it was probably on May
16, 2008 that the certificate of title as well as the documents relating to the first
mortgage which were delivered to the house on May 16 were handed to the bank.
The documents, including the first mortgage, purportedly bore Mrs Perrin’s
signature and Fraser Perrin purportedly witnessed the signature.20A similar scenario
occurred for the second mortgage.21 McMurdo J. concluded that the signatures of
Fraser Perrin as well as that of Mrs Perrin were forgeries.22
What enabled the fraud?
Clearly the critical factor enabling the fraud was the leaving of the security
documents including themortgages withMr Perrin, the lack of contact by the bank
with Mrs Perrin regarding the mortgages, and the failure to insist that Mrs Perrin’s
signature be witnessed by an employee of the bank. These activities provided Mr
Perrin with the opportunity to forge both Mrs Perrin’s signature on the documents
as well the signature of the purported witness.
Another factor was the release of the certificate of title to Mr Perrin without
requiring a signature from Mrs Perrin. In Queensland, the issuing of the paper
certificate of title is optional—it is only issued following the registration of a
dealing if requested by the registered proprietor.23 However, where a certificate of
title has been issued, it must be returned to the titles registry office for cancellation
prior to the registration of an instrument (including a first or subsequent mortgage)
in the freehold land register.24 Had the solicitors requested Mrs Perrin for a release
signature, the fraud might have been prevented. Mrs Perrin might have started
making enquiries as to why the certificate of title was needed and this might have
uncovered Mr Perrin’s fraudulent plans.25
16 Fifth Amended Defence and Counterclaim filed on behalf of the defendant, April 19, 2011, p.7.
17 Fifth Amended Defence and Counterclaim filed on behalf of the defendant, April 19, 2011, p.7.
18Perrin [2011] QSC 274 at [25].
19Perrin [2011] QSC 274 at [26].
20Perrin [2011] QSC 274 at [27].
21Perrin [2011] QSC 274 at [30].
22Perrin [2011] QSC 274 at [103]–[104].
23 Section 42 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld). According to the Queensland Department of Environment and
Resource Management, they were 546,974 applications for certificates of titles made between April 24, 1994 and
July 28, 2011. Many of these would have been subsequently cancelled under s.154(1) of the Land Title Act 1994
(Qld) but the Department is unable to ascertain how many would have been subsequently cancelled. As at July 28,
2011, less than 17 per cent of lots currently have a certificate of title. This information was provided to the authors
on July 28, 2011: email from Shradha Prasad to Rouhshi Low, July 28, 2011.
24 Section 154(1) of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld).
25 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the role played by the paper certificate of title as a safeguard against
fraud. However the move towards electronic conveyancing systems by various jurisdictions including the United
Kingdom and Australia has made this a live issue. Questions have been raised as to whether abolishing the paper
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The arguments made by Mrs Perrin
At first, it is critical to note that Queensland denies the benefits that flow from
registration of an interest where the mortgagee has not taken reasonable steps.26
Accordingly, counsel for the bank initially argued and pleaded a case that it had
taken reasonable steps to verify identity and therefore it should be entitled to the
protection of registration (s.11A of the Land Title Act 1994). Whilst the argument
surrounding the application of s.11A was not pursued at trial,27 the further and
better particulars associated with the claim indicate the direction that this argument
would have taken if it had proceeded. In these pleadings, lawyers for Mrs Perrin
argued that for the first mortgage Mr Parker should have been alert to the fact that
Mrs Perrin did not appear to know of the proposed guarantee and mortgage, was
not immediately available to obtain legal advice in relation to the guarantee and
mortgage, and was not then immediately available to sign the proposed guarantee
and mortgage in the presence of a qualified witness.28 The receipt by the bank of
the signed documents later that afternoon, within one to one-and-a-half hours of
Mr Parker giving the documents to Mr Perrin indicated that there was insufficient
time forMrs Perrin to obtain legal advice and then sign the guarantee andmortgage
in the presence of a qualified witness.29 Also the lawyers for Mrs Perrin argued
that the documents received by the bank did not include a letter from Mrs Perrin
confirming that she had sought independent legal or financial advice and fully
understood her liability under the guarantee.30 Lawyers for Mrs Perrin also argued
that the bank (by Mr Parker) knew that Fraser Perrin, who purportedly witnessed
the signature of Mrs Perrin on the mortgage and guarantee was the brother of Mr
Perrin and as such was not in a position to give independent legal advice. Further,
the bank did not contact Fraser Perrin to confirm that he had indeed witnessedMrs
Perrin’s signature on the documents.31
Taking these factors together, lawyers forMrs Perrin argued that the bank should
have been put on alert for the possibility that the signature of Mrs Perrin on the
documents, including the Instrument of Mortgage had been forged and that the
bank should have, as a prudent lender would, made further checks to satisfy itself
that the person who signed the mortgage was indeed Mrs Perrin by either
confirming by direct inquiry with Mrs Perrin or Fraser Perrin.32 Similar arguments
were made with respect to the second mortgage.33 As such it was said that the
certificate of title would increase the incidence of fraud (see for example, Hewitt, “A TangledWeb: Land Registration
and the Facilitation of Fraud—the England and Wales Perspective”, forthcoming in, Property and Sustainability,
(Thomson Reuters, 2011) and UK Land Registry, “Report on responses to e-conveyancing secondary legislation Part
3”http://www1.landregistry.gov.uk/upload/documents/econveyancing_cons.pdf [Accessed March 9, 2012]). In New
South Wales, Clayton Utz was recently commissioned by the NSW Land Registry to identify and evaluate possible
solutions to provide the necessary functionality and risk management currently provided by the paper certificate of
title (Clayton Utz, “NSW Land Registry: certificate of title solution for concurrent electronic and paper based
conveyancing”, September 22, 2011. It remains to be seen what the solution will be for Australia.
26 See ss.11A, 185A of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld).
27The bank had elected not to pursue its reasonable steps case and instead, conceded that it was not entitled to rely
on the indefeasibility from the registration of the mortgages because it had failed to take reasonable steps to ensure
that it was Mrs Perrin who executed them as required by s.11A. Perrin [2011] QSC 274 at [5].
28Further and better particulars of the reply and answer filed on behalf of the defendant, March 15, 2011, p.3 [18].
29Further and better particulars of the reply and answer filed on behalf of the defendant, March 15, 2011, p.4, [20].
30Further and better particulars of the reply and answer filed on behalf of the defendant, March 15, 2011, p.4, [20].
31Further and better particulars of the reply and answer filed on behalf of the defendant, March 15, 2011, p.5, [21],
[22] and [23].
32Further and better particulars of the reply and answer filed on behalf of the defendant, March 15, 2011, p.6, [25].
33Further and better particulars of the reply and answer filed on behalf of the defendant, March 15, 2011, pp.9–11.
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Commonwealth Bank failed to comply with s.11A(2) of the Land Title Act 1994
in that the Bank had failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the person who
executed the mortgages was identical with Mrs Perrin who was the registered
proprietor of the property.34 By virtue of s.185A, this failure meant the bank did
not obtain the benefit of indefeasibility with respect to the mortgages.35
The arguments made by the Commonwealth Bank
By contrast to what was submitted on behalf of Mrs Perrin, lawyers for the bank
said that Mrs Perrin had opened a new bank account with the bank on August 1,
2000. In the course of opening this bank account, the bank had verifiedMrs Perrin’s
identity by reference toMrs Perrin’s passport and her Queensland driver’s licence.
The bank also obtained her signature on a document called “New Account” and
this was scanned into the bank’s “CommSee” computer system on February 4,
2005 and could be accessed by other officers of the bank for the purpose of
verifying the signature of Mrs Perrin on future occasions.36 This verification of
identity constituted 110 points of identification pursuant to the Financial Transaction
Reports Regulations 1990 (Cth).37 Further, the bank’s lawyers argued that Mrs
Perrin had been married to Mr Perrin since September 8, 199638 and that prior to
end August 2008, Mr Perrin was considered a reputable businessperson and had
been admitted as a solicitor in Queensland.39 Prior to his bankruptcy, Mr Perrin
held accounts with the bank since February 2000 and had been a client of the
“Private Bank” section of the bank that services individual customers with an
income exceeding AU $250,000 per annum and assets that exceed AU $2.5 million
excluding their home.40 The bank argued that its officers had verified the signatures
on the security documents (instruments of mortgage for the first mortgage) by
comparing the signatures on the security documents to the signature on documents
held by the bank, such as the signature of Mrs Perrin on the “New Account”
document.41 A similar argument was made for the second mortgage.42 The bank
claimed that the signature on the security documents bore a close resemblance to
that of Mrs Perrin’s on the NewAccount form and that it was not possible to detect
that it was a forgery without detailed forensic examination.43 At no time before the
end of August 2008 had any issue or allegation of fraud or misconduct arisen or
34 Fifth amended defence and counterclaim filed on behalf of the defendant on April 19, 2011, [15] and [20].
35 For non-Torrens readers, indefeasibility means that once an interest in land is registered, that interest is subject
only to such estates and interests that are recorded against the title. Things known about the title, but which are not
on the title, would not normally bind the person registering.
36 Second further amended further and better particulars of the amended reply and answer filed on behalf of the
plaintiff and first defendant by counterclaim, December 8, 2010, pp.2–3, [3].
37 Second further amended further and better particulars of the amended reply and answer filed on behalf of the
plaintiff and first defendant by counterclaim, December 8, 2010, p.3, [4].
38 Second further amended further and better particulars of the amended reply and answer filed on behalf of the
plaintiff and first defendant by counterclaim, December 8, 2010, p.3, [5].
39 Second further amended further and better particulars of the amended reply and answer filed on behalf of the
plaintiff and first defendant by counterclaim, December 8, 2010, p.3, [6].
40 Second further amended further and better particulars of the amended reply and answer filed on behalf of the
plaintiff and first defendant by counterclaim, December 8, 2010, p.4, [8].
41 Second further amended further and better particulars of the amended reply and answer filed on behalf of the
plaintiff and first defendant by counterclaim, December 8, 2010, pp.9–10, [22].
42 Second further amended further and better particulars of the amended reply and answer filed on behalf of the
plaintiff and first defendant by counterclaim, December 8, 2010, p.14, [31].
43 Second further amended further and better particulars of the amended reply and answer filed on behalf of the
plaintiff and first defendant by counterclaim, December 8, 2010, p.16, [31B].
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come to the attention of the bank in respect of the operation of any of the accounts
held with the bank by Mr Perrin or Mrs Perrin.44 By May 2005, the bank had
developed relationships with both Mrs Perrin and Mr Perrin and them together as
a couple, which were distinguishable from the situation in which a mortgagee had
no relationship or history with a mortgagor and third party borrower.45
Thus the pleadings were to the effect that the steps it had taken in verifying the
signature on the instruments of mortgage for the first and second mortgage, given
the surrounding circumstances, constituted reasonable steps as required by s.11A.46
Tale 2: Western Australia—the Mildenhall fraud—the overseas
registered owner having their land sold by a sophisticated criminal
network (atypical, but possibly on the rise)
In contrast to the Perrin fraud, the fraud that occurred inWestern Australia in 2010
is not one that commonly occurs in common law jurisdictions.47 It was not one
perpetrated by a family member, but by professional fraudsters pretending to be
the registered proprietor.
Facts
MrMildenhall was the registered owner of two unencumbered properties inWestern
Australia. Mr Mildenhall’s investment property in Karrinyup was sold in June
2010 for AU $485,000 without his knowledge. Hewas living in Cape Town, South
Africa at that time. He found out about the fraud when his neighbour rang him and
told him that it had been sold. He then returned to Perth, only to find that the second
property he owned in Wembley Downs was also about to be sold. A contract of
sale for the second property had been executed but settlement had not taken place.
A bank based in China received the proceeds of sale on the Karrinyup property.48
Modus operandi
According to the officer-in-charge of the Major Fraud Squad investigating the
fraud, the fraudsters were fromNigeria with possible collaborators in South Africa.
44 Second further amended further and better particulars of the amended reply and answer filed on behalf of the
plaintiff and first defendant by counterclaim, December 8, 2010, p.16, [31D].
45 Second further amended further and better particulars of the amended reply and answer filed on behalf of the
plaintiff and first defendant by counterclaim, December 8, 2010, [31E].
46 Second further amended further and better particulars of the amended reply and answer filed on behalf of the
plaintiff and first defendant by counterclaim, December 8, 2010, p.17, [33] and p.18, [34].
47 See the comment by Detective Senior Sergeant Pete Davies that “such cases are uncommon”: ABC News,
“Allegations another house sold without owner knowing”, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-08-10/house-sold-from
-under-owner/2833664 [Accessed November 21, 2011]. Also see Rouhshi Low, “Opportunities for fraud in the
national electronic conveyancing system: fact or fiction?” (2006) 13Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law
225, 227 showing that the more common types of fraud are the ones perpetrated by those known to the victim of the
fraud, such as family members and the more uncommon type of frauds are the ones perpetrated by those unknown
to the victim of the fraud such as in the Mildenhall fraud.
48Various sources were used to piece together the details of the fraud—see: WA News, “House sold from under
owner in property scam”, http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/house-sold-from-under-owner-in-property-scam
-20100911-155qq.html [Accessed November 21, 2011]; WA News, “Property scam highlights need for greater
security”http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/property-scam-highlights-need-for-greater-security-reiwa-20100913
-15952.html [Accessed November 21, 2011]; Eileen Webb, “Scammers target WA real estate transactions” (2010)
Australian Property Law Bulletin 186; ABC News, “House scam victim can seek compensation”http://www.abc.net
.au/news/2010-09-21/house-scam-victim-can-seek-compensation/2269164 [Accessed November 21, 2011] and
Settlement Agents Supervisory Board, “Urgent scam warning” eBulletin issue 25, September 10, 2010.
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The fraudsters intercepted Mr Mildenhall’s mail in South Africa. With the
intercepted mail, the fraudsters were then able to obtain information about the
properties and falsified a number of documents.49 They instructed the agency to
list the properties for sale, claiming that the sale was required because of financial
hardship. The agency said they had dealt with Mr Mildenhall before using the
same email account. The agency acted on the email and contacted the purported
vendor on the telephone number provided in the email where it was found that the
person was well informed of the details of the property to be put on the market.
The agent listed the properties, selling the Karrinyup property in June 2010.50
Mr Mildenhall’s signatures on the listing form as well as his signature on the
contract of sale and the ensuing transfer documents were forged.51 Verification of
identity was purportedly performed by a Notary Public in Nigeria.52
What enabled the fraud?
MrMildenhall had dealt with the real estate agent and the settlement agent before,
and his signature was on the relevant files, but no comparisons between the
signature on file and the one for the contract of sale was made.53 There was also a
change of all the vendor’s contact details before the listing but this did not alert
the real estate agent to possible fraudulent conduct. The emails authorising the
sale were sent from Nigeria and on most occasions the email showed poor English
but this too did not alert the real estate agent to the fraud.54 Neither the real estate
agent nor the settlement agent attempted to contact Mr Mildenhall to confirm the
transaction, instead relying on the emails sent by the fraudsters.
Both Landgate and real estate agents claimed that this was a sophisticated fraud
but Mr Mildenhall did not accept that assessment. He said when he saw the
documents, his signature was obviously forged and very different to his real
signature that the real estate agent and settlement agent had on file.55
A new fraud trend?
When the news broke on Mr Mildenhall’s plight, another fraud similar to that of
Mr Mildenhall was revealed. This earlier swindle occurred in 2008. Dr Peter
D’Allessandro said he was 10 days from settlement on a west Perth apartment
when the legitimate owner, who had been living in South Africa, found out about
the sale and brought the process to a halt. The property had been on the market
without the legitimate owner’s knowledge and was to be sold for AU $775,000.
49Webb, “Scammers target WA real estate transactions” (2010) Australian Property Law Bulletin 186, 186.
50 Settlement Agents Supervisory Board, “Urgent scam warning” eBulletin issue 25, September 10, 2010.
51Webb, “Scammers target WA real estate transactions” (2010) Australian Property Law Bulletin 186, 187. It is
not exactly clear as to whether a false certificate of title was created based on false documentation, or whether the
scammers were able to access the certificate of title. The latter is more unlikely. It is also possible that this property
was one where a paper-based certificate of title was required to be produced to the land registry office. See: WA
News, “Property scam highlights need for greater security”http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/property-scam
-highlights-need-for-greater-security-reiwa-20100913-15952.html [Accessed November 21, 2011].
52Webb, “Scammers target WA real estate transactions” (2010) Australian Property Law Bulletin 186, 187.
53Webb, “Scammers target WA real estate transactions” (2010) Australian Property Law Bulletin 186, 186.
54Webb, “Scammers target WA real estate transactions” (2010) Australian Property Law Bulletin 186, 187.
55 See ABC News, “Allegations another house sold without owner knowing”, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011
-08-10/house-sold-from-under-owner/2833664 [Accessed November 21, 2011].
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Dr D’Allessandro said the email address used for correspondence with the agent
was traced to Nigeria. Police investigated the fraud in 2008 but it was not resolved.56
More recently, Western Australia police authorities have been reported as
investigating allegations that another house has been sold in Perth without the
knowledge of the owner. Police say they have been told that a home in the suburb
of Ballajura, worth around $400,000, was recently sold by Nigerian scammers.57
The authors spoke to a spokesperson from Consumer Protection in WA who
confirmed that this fraud in 2011 was very similar in nature to what happened to
Mr. Mildenhall in 2010. In both cases, the owners were overseas and in both cases
the sale proceeded without any face-to-face interaction between the ‘owners’ and
the estate and settlement agents.
This scam was then followed by another one, this time in Sydney. Similar to
the Perth scams, the Sydney scam involved property that was under management
by a real estate agency, with the owner living in South Africa. The real estate
agency thought the request to sell was legitimate and solicitors in Double Bay
drew up contracts. The unit was due to go to auction in September. The fraud was
uncoveredwhen the real estate who originally sold the owner the property happened
to see an advertisement for the auction on the Internet and emailed his former
client. This allowed the owner to stop the sale.58
In the next section, we examine how these frauds would have played out in a
number of jurisdictions. Is there any jurisdiction that would have prevented the
frauds occurring?
Part 3: Applying current legislative and practice oriented
guidelines to the two tales
The UK requirements—Perrin scenario
Under the UK requirements, the conveyancer has the onus of identity verification.59
It is this person when acting for Mrs Perrin who would have needed to confirm
her identity as she would be lodging an application to register a mortgage and
would need to complete the relevant details on the application. However the UK
requirements do not specify how identity is to be confirmed. As such, reliance is
placed on the conveyancer having complied with their professional duties in
verifying the client’s identity. It is only if the conveyancer is unable to confirm
identity that evidence of identity must be provided in the requisite form. These
forms require inspection of identity documents as well as certification on a passport
size photograph of the person whose identity is being verified.60 Of course, the
fraudulent person could forge certification and signatures so it would appear as if
evidence of identity has been inspected. However if the conveyancer/solicitor
complies with her/his professional duties and heeds the guidelines provided by
56TheWest Australia, “Another real estate scam case emerges”http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/wa/7945937
/another-real-estate-scam-case-emerges/ [Accessed November 21, 2011].
57ABC News, “Allegations another house sold without owner knowing”, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-08-10
/house-sold-from-under-owner/2833664 [Accessed November 21, 2011].
58See ABC AM, “Calls for strict ID checks for property sales”, http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2011/s3370958
.htm [Accessed November 21, 2011].
59 See generally Land Registration Rules 2003, Land Registry, Practice Guide 67, Evidence of Identity.
60Land Registry Practice Guide 67, Evidence of Identity, 3.
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the Law Society,61 such as those that warn solicitors that non face to face
transactions increases the risk of fraud, and given that conveyancers could be liable
for fraud for dishonestly providing information or making a statement that the
conveyancer knows is untrue, then arguably the conveyancer would not lodge the
application without having verified the identity of Mrs Perrin.62 Therefore, whilst
the authors conclude that the opportunity to eliminate the Perrin fraud was possible,
much would depend on the practices and arrangements of the particular
conveyancer. Would that person, if having dealt with Mr Perrin on a regular basis
in the past have reason to think that something untoward was occurring in this
particular instance. As there was no mandated identity verification or checking,
the fraud was still possible in the United Kingdom.
The Ontario provisions—Perrin scenario
The Ontario provisions differ markedly from all other jurisdictions in that they
link the right to receive compensation for fraud from having undertaken due
diligence within the transaction.63 Whereas Mrs Perrin would have been able to
utilise the provisions in the legislation that provide that registration of a void
instrument leaves the underlying instrument void, a provision not in existence in
Australian Torrens jurisdictions,64 the bank would then have had to apply to the
fund for compensation having shown a requisite level of due diligence. In essence,
can the bank demonstrate that65:
• it had verified the identity of the person mortgaging the property
and;
• it had verified that the registered owner was in fact mortgaging the
property.
Whilst the bank had not conducted an in person meeting with Mrs Perrin it
would presumably argue that it had obtained, on previous occasions, the relevant
identity documents from Mrs Perrin, which Mrs Perrin was a known customer to
the bank, and as such, the bank had verified the identity of the person mortgaging
the property.
Did the bank verify that Mrs Perrin was in fact mortgaging the property? The
bank had simply received instructions from Mr Perrin but did not confirm these
instructions with Mrs Perrin. Arguably, the bank had not taken reasonable steps
to verify that Mrs Perrin was in fact mortgaging the property. The bank will argue
that it had, given that Mr and Mrs Perrin were both known customers of the bank
and that Mr Perrin usually handled the financial matters with the bank.
The Ontario due diligence requirements are drafted in a similar manner to
Queensland , that is, the steps specified are non-exhaustive and face to face
verification is not mandatory. As such it is likely to be deficient in preventing the
fraud that occurred here.
61UK Law Society, Property and Registration Fraud, October 11, 2010.
62The UK Law Society guide cross-references to the UK Money Laundering Regulations 2007.
63 Sections 57(4)(b) and 57(4.1)(b) of the Land Titles Act 1990 (Ontario).
64 Section 155 Land Titles Act 1990 (Ontario).
65 See: Order of the Director of Titles, available at http://www.ontario.ca/ontprodconsume/groups/content/@onca
/@bundles/@landreg/documents/document/ont06_023539.pdf [Accessed September 4, 2012].
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Queensland—Perrin scenario
As can be recalled,66 failure by a mortgagee to undertake reasonable steps to verify
identity will result in a loss of the benefits of title by registration. What is clear
and evident from the banks’ preliminary arguments is that the very amorphous
nature of the non prescriptive Queensland manual67 as to what can constitute
reasonable steps leaves it open for mortgagees such as the Commonwealth Bank
in the Perrin case to argue that it had complied with its obligations to take
reasonable steps to verify identity despite not having any direct contact with the
registered proprietor. As can be seen in the Perrin case, a requirement for
face-to-face contact would have prevented the fraud and the bank would not have
been able to argue that it had met its obligations despite not having any direct
contact with Mrs Perrin. For this reason, the authors suggest that the Qld
requirements are deficient.
New South Wales—Perrin scenario
In New South Wales, mortgagees are similarly required to take reasonable steps
to ensure that the person who has executed the mortgage is in fact the person whom
they are representing.68 A failure to do this could lead to the Registrar-General
refusing to register the mortgage. Compliance with Commonwealth Anti-Money
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules meets the standard required
by the regulations.69 The Bank would suggest that it had appropriate risk based
systems in place and was satisfied given the background and banking relationship
that they had with the Perrins, which the customer was indeed the person that
he/she claims to be. Thus similar to Queensland, the authors suggest that the NSW
provisions also not necessarily have provided a mechanism to break the inexorable
links that are needed for this type of fraud to occur.
Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania—Perrin
scenario
None of these jurisdictions would have required the mortgagee to verify identity,
though there is a broad provision in Victoria that allows the Registrar to refuse to
register if that person is not satisfied as to the identity of a person by or on behalf
of whom the instrument was executed.70 However, without the need for identity
verification, the Perrin fraud could have occurred in these jurisdictions.
New Zealand—Perrin scenario
In New Zealand an electronic instrument cannot be accepted for registration unless
it is certified in accordance with the certification requirements found in ss.164A
to 164E of the Land Transfer Act (NZ) 1952. Amongst the certifications is one
66Lynden Griggs and Rouhshi Low, “Identity fraud and land registration systems: an Australian perspective”,
[2011] 75 Conv. 285, 302.
67 See Queensland Land Title Practice Manual [2-2005]. See also s.11A(2) of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld).
68 Section 56C of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW); Real Property Amendment Regulations 2011 (NSW), now
incorporated in the Real Property Amendment Regulations 2008.
69Clause 11A of the Real Property Amendment Regulations 2008.
70 Section 27AB of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic).
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that requires the conveyancing practitioner to confirm that he/she has taken
reasonable steps to confirm the identity of the person on whose behalf the certifying
practitioner is acting. To assist conveyancing practitioners with compliance, Land
Information New Zealand (LINZ) published a standard (hereafter LINZ standard)
setting out the minimum requirements for verifying identity.71 Applying the LINZ
standard the Perrin transaction would be classed as a routine, rather than a high-risk
transaction.72 This means that identity can be verified via an original
government-issued photographic ID and a document showing the landowner’s
name and the physical address of the property.73 However, because Mrs Perrin is
known to the bank, the second requirement may be dispensed with, but an original
government issued photographic ID is still required.74 The need to produce the
photographic ID, regardless of whether the client is known to the mortgagee may
have prevented the Perrin fraud. It would have meant that the bank officer would
have had to askMrs Perrin to produce photographic ID. She would have then been
alerted to the fact that her husband was attempting to mortgage the property.
Requiring practitioners to examine photographic identity despite knowing the
landowner personally has a similar effect to requiring face-to-face verification of
identity which, as postulated by the authors, is critical in preventing identity fraud.75
It is however possible for the practitioner to disregard the requirement for
production of a photographic ID.76 Should this occur—should the practitioner not
have requested Mrs Perrin to produce photographic ID but instead used an ID
previously obtained that was kept on file, and the mortgage was registered, the
bank would obtain an indefeasible title. Unlike Queensland, the New Zealand
provisions at present do not link the requirement for identity verification with loss
of indefeasibility.77
Summary and application of recommended framework to the Perrin
fraud
None of the jurisdictions would indubitably prevent the Perrin fraud. The critical
factor would have been a requirement for face-to-face verification of identity and
as seen from the examination above, none of the requirements had this necessarily
mandated. It is for this reason that the authors recommend that any identity
verification framework should have as its starting point a requirement for
face-to-face contact or if this is not physically possible, delegation to trusted
71Land Information New Zealand, “Verification of identity for registration under the Land Transfer Act 1952”,
LINZS0002.
72LINZS0002, [4].
73LINZS0002, [4].
74LINZS0002, [4].
75According toMrMuir, Registrar-General of Land, Land Information NewZealand, the NewZealand requirements
“involve face to face identity verification (either directly or via a trusted delegate) on each occasion that a lawyer
obtains client authority for a land transaction. The form used to document client authority requires the person verifying
identity to certify that they have witnessed the client sign the form and sighted the relevant photo ID”: Email to the
author on November 14, 2011.
76 In a recent case for example, the NZLawyers Standards Committee found a Rotorua lawyer guilty of unsatisfactory
conduct. The lawyer had falsely witnessed an Authority and Instruction form for a LINZ transaction—the lawyer
had verified a photo ID when he had not met the client: New Zealand Law Society, “Quality Control of E-dealing”,
LawTalk 4, November 2011, 5.
77 It has been proposed in New Zealand that a direct obligation should be imposed on mortgagees, similar to what
has happened in Queensland. See: New Zealand Law Commission, Report 116 A New Land Transfer Act, June 2010,
[2.20].
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entities. Mrs Perrin was in the state, contactable. The means to verify identity
through face-to-face contact was available to the Bank. Compliance by the bank
of this requirement alone would have prevented the fraud.
Now the atypical fraud
The UK requirements—Mildenhall scenario
Under the UK requirements, the fraudsters would contact a conveyancer to act on
their behalf. The conveyancer would fill in relevant form as the application involves
a transfer and complete the appropriate information for confirmation of identity.
Because the transferor, Mr Mildenhall, is not represented (the fraudsters are
impersonating the transferor), evidence of identity would need to be supplied. The
conveyancer receives from the fraudsters the form that appears to have been
completed with the section dealing with evidence of identity having been inspected
and certified. The question in the United Kingdom, is whether the conveyancer,
having received these documents would necessarily go further. If the documents
appear genuine, then the answer may well be no. In the Mildenhall scenario the
fraudsters were able to dupe real estate agents, settlement agents, and the land
registry office. There is no reason to believe that a conveyancer could not similarly
have been misled.
The Ontario provisions—Mildenhall scenario
Similar to Mrs Perrin, Mr Mildenhall will be able to rely on the legislation to have
the transfer removed. The bona fide purchaser will then be able to apply to the
assurance for compensation and to succeed here, will need to demonstrate the
required due diligence. The purchaser must demonstrate that they took reasonable
steps to verify that the registered owner was in fact selling the property. Assuming
the purchaser had a solicitor/conveyancer acting on his behalf and the conveyancer
had access to the emails that the fraudsters were sending to the real estate agent
instructing the real estate agent to sell the property, then given the poor English,
change of details, and other warning signs, due diligence would arguably have not
been met. The lack of certainty in whether the bona fide purchaser would or would
not succeed in her/his argument that due diligence was met demonstrates the
deficiency in the Ontario requirements and the importance of requiring face to
face or delegated to a trusted individual with independent confirmation.
The Queensland/New South Wales provisions—Mildenhall scenario
As discussed, neither the Queensland nor New SouthWales provisions could have
been invoked as the fraud did not involve a mortgagee. This starkly highlights that
identity verification cannot solely be placed on the mortgagee.
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Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania—Mildenhall
scenario
There are no provisions that would have assisted in preventing this, thoughWestern
Australia would now require that witnessing of the relevant documents be before
an Australian consular official. This official would need to verify identity by the
provision of certified documents, with the original documents that were sighted
by the consular officer to be lodged in the registry office in Western Australia.78
South Australia has also emphasised to registering parties the importance of
verification of identity.79
The New Zealand provisions—Mildenhall scenario
For New Zealand, assuming the owner was not known to the settlement agent, and
the owner is transferring unencumbered land, then the transaction would be classed
as a high-risk transaction.80 In the case of high-risk transactions, further steps are
required. These include independently obtaining contact details for the physical
address of the property and contacting the landowner using those details, or other
independent corroboration.81 These further steps are in addition to the documents
required for verifying identity in routine transactions. This additional requirement
would most likely have uncovered the fraud because it would have meant the
settlement agent independently obtaining contact details of the registered proprietor
and contacting the registered proprietor using those contact details, as opposed to
relying on the contact details given in the email by the scammers.
The guidance material in the New Zealand standard also provides assistance for
situations where it is not possible for the practitioner to verify the identity of an
interested party (for example where the interested party lives in another location
or is overseas). In these circumstances, the practitioner may have the verification
carried out by a delegate.82 However, applying this to the Mildenhall scenario may
not have prevented the fraud. As indicated above, the documents were witnessed
by a notary public and the New Zealand guidelines83 would have allowed the
witnessing that actually occurred to have met the compliance requirements of New
Zealand. It is for this reason that the authors suggest that whilst delegation should
be allowedwhere face-to-face verification is not possible, independent confirmation
or corroboration is still necessary and should be required, whether or not the
registered proprietor is known to the mortgagor.
Summary and application of the recommended framework to the
Mildenhall scenario
Again, none of the current jurisdictional requirements would have necessarily
prevented theWestern Australia fraud. The authors argue that the more independent
78The requirement of a transferor to travel some distance to a consular office will alleviate the obligations. Landgate,
Bulletin No.201, October 3, 2011, p.3.
79Government of South Australia,Mortgage frauds involving counterfeit certificates of title, No.156, February
24, 2009.
80LINZS0002, [5.1].
81LINZS0002, [5.2].
82LINZS0002, [5.2], p.13.
83LINZS0002, [5.2].
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corroboration of instructions, the less likely the fraud. This is particularly the case
for transactions where face-to-face verification is not physically possible due to
the owners living, for example, overseas. Advances in technology have equipped
fraudsters with the ability to produce high quality forgeries, identity documents
are not precluded from this.84 In a non face-to-face transaction, fraudsters have the
opportunity to forge identity documents, signatures and a multitude of other
documents to impersonate the registered proprietor. Therefore independent
corroboration of instructions and identity verification is a necessity in these types
of cases.
Part 4: What have we learnt—recommendations for core
principles of identity verification
The lessons are quite simple. If the Commonwealth Bank in the case of Perrin
had simply contacted her to verify her instructions to mortgage the property, the
saga of spousal deceit and the expensive litigation that inevitably followed would
not have occurred. Thus the author’s first recommendation is that identity
verification requirements should have at its core a requirement for face-to-face
identity verification. The history of dealings and past relationships between
customers should not, under any circumstances obviate the need to have
independent and face-to-face verification of what is occurring.Where face-to-face
verification is not physically possible, as in the case of theMildenhall fraud, simple
measures to counteract this inability are available, as highlighted by recent changes
to witnessing requirements. The important point here is the delegation of
face-to-face verification of identity to a trusted third party where the relevant
conveyancing stakeholder can then independently verify with the trusted third
party that identity verification had been performed.
The Mildenhall fraud also shows that not all frauds involve a mortgagee. In
these types of frauds, identity verification requirements that place the burden of
identity verification solely on the mortgagee would not have prevented these frauds
from occurring. Thus the authors’ second recommendation is for all stakeholders
involved in the conveyancing process to play an active role in identity verification.
Had the solicitors involved in the conveyancing process and purportedly acting
on behalf of Mr Mildenhall verified instructions with him, both in writing and
verbally, particularly as there were some aspects of the transaction that looked
suspicious (changing of contact details, poor English in the emails) then likely the
fraud would have been prevented. In the authors’ view, fraud prevention would
be more effective with the collaborative efforts of all stakeholders involved in the
conveyancing transaction.
The authors’ final recommendation is for the linking of identity verification
obligations with the benefits of registered title because then the law appositely
84For example, in 2003, an identity fraud syndicate was uncovered by the multi agency Identity Crime Task Force.
Investigations revealed a vast amount of allegedly false identity documents as well as equipment capable of
manufacturing such documentation: Australian Federal Police, “Identity fraud syndicate arrested”, http://www.afp
.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2003/November/identity-fraud-syndicate-arrested.aspx [Accessed November 21,
2011]. Recently, officers of the Australian Federal Police executed a search warrant at a residential address in the
eastern Melbourne suburb of Mitcham on November 17, 2011 and seized 10,000 fake credit cards and a large amount
of related sophisticated manufacturing equipment: Australian Federal Police, “Identity crime raids seize 10,000 fake
credit cards”http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2011/november/identity-crime-raids-seize-10000-fake
-credit-three-arrested.aspx [Accessed November 21, 2011].
Identity Verification in Conveyancing 377
[2012] 76 Conv., Issue 5 © 2012 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
provides a carrot and a stick to ensure that the parties to whom the title should
reside is correctly placed. If one is to receive the advantages of the registered title
system, the corresponding obligations to share the burden should be imposed.
Conclusion
Complete elimination of fraud may never be possible. But in many instances, these
frauds are preventable, usually by taking simple measures such face-to-face contact
with the owner of the land. For Mr Mildenhall the consequences were disastrous
and whilst Mrs Perrin succeeded the stress associated with litigation of this nature
is something to which she should not have had to bear. In these instances the law
cannot be seen to be meeting the expectations of the community. In the case of
Mr Mildenhall, the result (despite whatever compensation he receives) appears
perverse. Those jurisdictions that have increased obligations on stakeholders
deserve credit. Nevertheless, at present it is not enough. Face-to-face verification
by mortgagees and increased vigilance by other stakeholders involved in the
conveyancing transaction represents the best opportunity to minimise the potential
for nefarious conduct.
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Going through the obstruction, the Torrens
System Assurance Fund and contemporary
solutions — a tale weaved from a story of
a nun, a romantic triangle and sibling
corruption
Rouhshi Low and Lynden Griggs*
Private title insurance has been the subject of much debate by law reform
bodies and academics. This article adds a new dimension to the discussion
by analysing its role against a recent scenario where a nun was betrayed by
the actions of her brother, and compensation payable from the assurance
fund, after much challenge by the registrar, amounted to in excess of
$4 million. We ask whether the slow burning of title insurance into the psyche
of Australian home purchasers will see state-based assurance fundings
looking to minismise their role in the Torrens system. We also query how the
rather more immediate electronic establishment of electronic conveyancing
will alter the balance between the assurance fund, private title insurance and
the increasing responsibilities on stakeholdes involved in conveyancing.
Introduction
The title guarantee that exists in the modern land registration system is a
remarkable one. Nothing quite like it exists for other types of property, and in
a majority of countries in the world buyers of land are not so well protected.1
In 1859, 1 year after the introduction of the legislation2 establishing the land
registration system that was to bear his name, Sir Robert Torrens wrote, in
respect of the establishment of the assurance fund, that its introduction was to
‘go through the obstruction’:
[The assurance fund] proceeds upon the principle of transferring the liability to
claim by a rightful owner from the land itself to the person of the individual to whom
certificate of title may be granted in error, the personal security being supplemented
by an assurance fund with government guarantee. This message method may be
described as ‘going through the obstruction’.3
The words of 1859 resonate no less strongly today than they did then. The
NSW Supreme Court recently recognising that:
Recognising loss or damage and paying compensation became normal parts of the
workings of the Torrens system, and are not enormities requiring intervention of the
* Respectively, Queensland University of Technology, University of Tasmania. The authors
would like to thank Caroline Younis, General Counsel of First Title, for her invaluable
assistance and input into this paper.
1 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration, Scot Law Comm, No 222,
pp 207–8.
2 Real Property Act 1858 (SA) (original emphasis).
3 R R Torrens, The South Australian System of Conveyancing by Registration of Title,
Adelaide, 1859, p 23.
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law of tort. The Torrens System pursues efficiency and promptitude in establishing
land titles, and deals with the risks which pursuit of these advantages brings with it.4
Today we can only speculate as to what obstacles Robert Torrens was
referencing. Undoubtedly opposition by the legal profession was fierce, with
the conservative mantra of this profession adhering strictly to the principle of
nemo dat quod non habet,5 — any movement away from this seen as a cross
too strong to bear.6 Despite the commonly accepted view that this was the
primary driver for the establishment of the assurance fund, perhaps the
reasons for its introduction by the one-time Collector of Customs, elected to
parliament on a mandate of land law reform,7 were more prosaic and
somewhat less responsive to the political opposition of the day. As Whalan
notes the original Bill did not have an assurance fund, but its inclusion at the
last minute was probably more to do with the receipt by Torrens of the 1857
report by the English Royal Commissioners into Registration of Title with
Reference to the Sale and Transfer of Land, than of placating the views of
solicitors. This report landing on his desk on the eve of the second reading
speech to the South Australian Real Property Act — the English
Commissioners identifying the need for some form of state indemnity.8 But
whatever may have been the reasons, for Australia at least, the establishment
of an assurance fund made its mark as one of the pillars of title by registration,
and serves practically, as a measure to compensate those the subject of
wrongdoing. But will this continue? Our thesis is to question, not so much its
viability, but as the culture and style of conveyancing changes in a modern
e-environment, will governments seek to use other measures to appease those
who might have otherwise have been wronged by the registration of another
innocent party as owner. Will governments, as increasingly seems to be their
want, absolve themselves from responsibility, instead promoting a view that
compensation can be more efficiently delivered through market mechanisms.
What lies behind these practical considerations is our view that the onus of
liability and payment of compensation has subtly shifted from the state to the
stakeholders in this era of e-conveyancing (specifically the subscribers such as
conveyancing agents and mortgagees), through either legislative or regulatory
means, and at an operational level, the rise of private title insurance will
operate to deflect claims from an assurance fund that at times, can be costly
and expensive to access, to an insurance system where competitive pressures
will seek to deliver appropriate consumer outcomes.
Intriguingly, the circumstances that demand this re-examination are
arguably no different from what they were in the 1850s. The wanton land
fraud9 of that time has become the mortgage epidemic of today.10 While the
4 Challenger Managed Investments Ltd v Direct Money Corp Pty Ltd (2003) 59 NSWLR 452;
12 BPR 22,257; [2003] NSWSC 1072; BC200307738 at [84].
5 No one gives what he does not have.
6 F Selnes, ‘Who Should Pay when Lawyers are Rogues? Queensland’s Real Property Act
Assurance Fund or the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund’ (1994) APLJ Lexis 2 at 3.
7 L A McCrimmon, ‘Compensation Provisions in Torrens Statutes: the existing structures and
proposals for change’ (1993) 67 ALJ 904 at 906.
8 Report of the Commissioners appointed to consider the subject of Registration of Title with
Reference to the Sale and Transfer of Land, 1857, London, c 2215.
9 Torrens, above n 3, p 13.
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modern causes of this are probably somewhat speculative, (the historical
reasons for Torrens polemic against general land law are well known) though
one can guess that the current capacity to assume another’s identity, the
de-personalised and intermediated nature of mortgage broking and
intergenerational doubts as to the receipt of an inheritance may be somewhat
to blame. But are the compensation provisions, (as was suggested by the then
Minister for Information Technology, when introducing amendments to the
NSW assurance scheme in 2000), ‘so deeply ingrained . . . that without such
a scheme there would be significant and detrimental repercussions in
conveyancing costs and practices’.11 Obviously we think not. Modern
developments may well see states questioning the very existence of an
assurance fund perhaps revealing that, as the Scottish Land Commission
noted, the assurance fund may well have a psychological importance, but
rarely contribute significantly at the practical interface.12 Further, we know
that other nation states have, rather than provide compensation as a foundation
stone of land registration, increased the responsibility on those participating
and profiting in the system of land transfer. For example, Germany has very
little identified land fraud, with some suggesting the detailed and mandated
procedures relating to attestation of transfer documents and the carrying of
national identity cards (the Personalausweis) as somewhat of a prophylactic
measure against land fraud.13 While the claims of the 1850s that the Torrens
System would not stand the test of time have been proven horribly wrong,14
our thesis is that the current culture and direction of reform will see the
barriers placed in different locations and the movement through the
obstruction dealt with in a way that is more nuanced involving different
measures and options. While we don’t see these measures as going so far as
to undermine the existence of the Torrens system, their presence and
introduction will need to be carefully managed to avoid any public shock or
community reaction to something that has served us well for 160 years. Can
the modern developments achieve the same business efficiency and fairness,
as has the present compensation system? As noted by the Canadian Joint Land
Titles Committee:
If there were no compensation system, persons dealing with the land would be likely
to take expensive and time consuming precautions to avoid losses which could, but
are not likely to, occur under the system. The social cost of taking such precautions
10 P Butt, ‘Indefeasibility and Forged Mortgages: The Mortgage Fraud Epidemic spreads to
Victoria’ (2012) 86 ALJ 84.
11 Second Reading Speech, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 3 May 2000, p 5187.
12 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Land Registration: Void and Voidable
Titles, The Stationery Office, Edinburgh, 2004, at [1.21]: Noted, in R Wu and
M Y B Z Kepli, ‘Expedition of Torrens system in common law world and its Asian
development in Singapore and Hong Kong’ [2012] 2 Prop Law Review 99 at 105.
13 For a discussion around the German land system, see E P Polten, German and Canadian
Real Property Law: A Comparison, 2011,
at <http://www.poltenassociates.com/Links/German-and-Canadian-Real-Property-Law-A-
Comparison.pdf> (accessed 16 May 2014). For a discussion of corruption levels, see The
International Fraud and Corruption Report — A study of selected countries, NHS Counter
Fraud and Security Management Service, July 2006.
14 Torrens, above n 3, p 13.
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is not justifiable. It is better to accept that fact that there will be losses and to spread
them over all users through a user-funded compensation system.15
Our argument is that undoubtedly there is a movement afoot in the direction
and responsibility for compensation. While many of these developments are to
be applauded (increasingly responsibility on mortgagees to verify identity),
what is less known is the practical import of measures such as private title
insurance on the psyche of buyers and sellers. If there is to be a wholesale
change in culture that would see this becoming an accepted part of
conveyancing, the state will naturally begin to examine its place as the
provider of compensation. After all, it was only some 25 years ago that the
very abolition of a compensation fund was considered by reform bodies in
Australia.16 While the view that was ultimately taken was to enhance the
embedded assurance fund, rather than remove it altogether, it was noted that
‘it would be quite strange, in this era of consumerism, to remove a long
standing consumer protection measure unless it is replaced with a superior
consumer protection measure; and it is the right time to introduce such a
change’.17 If that time has not quite arrived, we have no doubt that the
footsteps approaching the door may well look to walk straight through any
obstruction.
Our approach in examining this topic will be to consider the current context
for the assurance fund in Australia, and then through a contemporary example,
ask how the existence of title insurance, increased legislative obligations on
mortgagees, or enhanced regulatory measures on conveyancing agents may
have seen the fraud either being uncovered before reliance on compensation
measures need occur, (the ideal outcome) or a more efficient receipt of
compensation when the fraud occurred (a more efficient response to today’s
situation). The latter point particularly relevant in those jurisdictions such as
Tasmania, Western Australia, South Australia and the Australian Capital
Territory, where the fund is one of last resort,18 and the claimant must first take
action against the wrongdoer, (assuming that this is possible) before recourse
can be had to the fund.
The current compensation provisions and how they
operate
The principles surrounding the current assurance fund provisions are
relatively straightforward and can be simply stated. Compensation is payable
when a person is deprived of land or an estate or interest in land.19 The amount
of compensation will be that which will put the claimant in a position that they
15 Joint Land Titles Committee, Removing the Foundation: Proposals for a Model Recording
and Registration Act for the Provinces and Territories of Canada, July 1990, p 28.
16 New South Wales Commission, Torrens Title: Compensation for Loss, Report No 76, 1996.
17 Ibid, at [4.3].
18 P Carruthers and N Skead, ‘150 years on: The Torrens compensation provisions in the last
resort jurisdictions’ (2011) APLJ Lexis 4.
19 Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) ss 143–151; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) ss 150–159; Land Title
Act 2000 (NT) ss 192–196; Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) ss 188–190; Real Property Act 1886
(SA) ss 201–205; Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) ss 128–135; Transfer of Land Act 1958
(Vic) ss 108–111; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 201.
20 (2014) 23 Australian Property Law Journal
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would have been had the deprivation not occurred, though, this is not as clear
cut as it would appear to be.20 For example, if the value of the land has
significantly increased between the date of deprivation and the date of
judgment, authorities support the idea that the claimant should recover the
increased value of the property rather than its value at the time of loss.21 This
propitious view supported somewhat by the broader policy rationale that
access to the fund should be approached on the basis that it is to benefit those
affected. For example, in Solak v Registrar of Titles22 the court was of the
mind that:
the registrar appears to have forgotten that he is administering a beneficial fund. The
purpose of the fund is not to accumulate money but to provide compensation to
persons who are deprived of an interest in land by the operation of the indefeasibility
provisions. The Registrar’s primary role is to ensure that persons who are entitled to
compensation receive it. The responsibility to protect the fund from unmeritorious
claims is not paramount.23
The current provisions in operation — Pedulla v
Panetta24
This case provides an archetypal example of how the compensation provisions
operate in practice. However, what drew the authors to the use of this case as
an exemplar of what could possibly be achieved were a different
compensatory or regulatory regime were adopted was, at least from an
academic viewpoint, the very significant though reasonable legal costs
incurred in pursuing this matter on behalf of the claimant. Despite
compensation in the sum of $3.8 million, which in the opinion of the authors
was clearly available to the plaintiff, legal costs, which she also recovered,
totalled over $329,000. If a more efficient system of recovering the
compensation could be made or precursor checks imposed to prevent the fraud
happening in the first place, the savings are obviously significant.
The property in question had at one point in time been jointly owned by the
plaintiff (Teresa Nadia Pedulla) and a husband. When her husband died in
1986, Pedulla became the sole registered proprietor. In 2004 the plaintiff
travelled to Calabria, Italy and began to reside with an order of nuns. At, and
prior to this time, the plaintiff’s brother was living in the property. In 2006, and
with Pedulla living a life of religious exclusion, the brother of the plaintiff
(Panetta) began a series of manoeuvres that ultimately saw the property
transferred to him and his soon to be wife. It began with a question by Panetta
to the ex-partner of the person who was to become his wife. The question he
raised of this individual, a solicitor by profession, was: ‘My sister is in Italy
in a convent and she is supposed to transfer all of her assets to the Church. Is
there any way we can transfer the property to me rather than giving it to the
Church?’ This solicitor communicated with another firm, indicating that he
acted on behalf of the plaintiff and that he had the authority from the plaintiff
20 Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Peter Van Den Heuvel (No 2) (2009) 14 BPR 26,765.
21 Registrar-General v Behn [1980] 1 NSWLR 589; (1980) NSW ConvR 55-002.
22 (2011) 33 VR 40; [2011] VSCA 279; BC201107117.
23 Ibid, at [88].
24 (2011) 16 BPR 30,229.
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to act in the transaction for the sale of the property to the brother. This was
untrue. To support these manoeuvres, statutory declarations, a forged power of
attorney and a forged authority were all produced. In 2007 the transfer was
completed with the brother becoming the registered proprietor, consideration
of $1 noted on the various documents. Now with ownership of the property,
the brother raised various mortgages against the property. In 2011, the brother
and his partner finally sold the property to innocent purchasers for the sum of
$3.8 million, settlement occurring in late April 2011. By this time Pedulla had
left the cloisters to care for her dying father, and she became aware, after
disclosures by her brother, that she was no longer the owner of the property.
In May of 2011, the brother and his partner left Australia on separate flights
and have not been seen since. Net proceeds to each of them were in excess of
$684,000. On her return to Australia, Pedulla was penniless, distraught and
without a home.25
Despite what would appear to be a clear example of a deprivation of an
interest in land, the court was required to consider possible limitations on the
plaintiff’s entitlement. These limitations were as follows:
1) What was the market value of the land as regards compensation;
2) Was the conduct of the plaintiff in any way responsible for what
happened; and,
3) Would the solicitor’s professional indemnity insurer be liable for the
conduct of the solicitor.
In the circumstances of this case, none of these grounds operated to reduce
Pedulla’s claim. The court quickly dismissed the Registrar’s tentative and
speculative submission26 that the market value was something other than
$3.8 million. ‘The outcome [ie, the payment by the purchasers] according to
conventional market theory, the daily staple of economists, is the market
value’.27 Furthermore, the plaintiff had no reason to think that her brother and
sister-in-law would take any steps in relation to the property that would see its
sale. While some may have criticised her failure to caveat, given the small gap
between when she became concerned about the behaviour of her brother and
his conduct in relation to the property and settlement, her omissions were
excusable and did not represent any failure by her to take care of her own
interest.28 The final ground of possible exclusion from the assurance fund was
that LawCover, the solicitor’s professional indemnity insurer, would be
required to indemnify against the actions of the solicitor. This attracted more
attention by Pembroke J. In coming to the conclusion that it was not an
exclusionary ground, his Honour closely considered the conduct of the
solicitor, noting that if his behaviour was dishonest or fraudulent, his
professional indemnity policy would not operate to provide recourse should he
be personally pursued by Pedulla. In examining all the facts, and most notably
the solicitor’s previous relationship with the wife of the brother, the procuring
of the relevant documents by false statements and his implausible excuses in
court all led to a view that it was unlikely that the loss was compensable under
25 Facts summarised from at [1]–[14] of the case: (2011) 16 BPR 30,229.
26 Ibid, at [20].
27 Ibid, at [22].
28 Ibid, at [25].
22 (2014) 23 Australian Property Law Journal
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the professional indemnity policy, a view subsequently accepted in litigation
between the Registrar-General and LawCover.29 Ms Pedulla was entitled to
$3.8 million, plus her legal costs, which as noted amounted to in excess of
$329,000.30 Her costs subsequently being accepted as reasonable and
compensable,31 with the court noting that there are sound reasons why the
amount and recognition of legal fees associated with Torrens claims should be
regarded more generously than the way costs are awarded in ordinary
proceedings.32 ‘The clear legislative intention appears to me that a person in
[the position of claiming under the assurance fund] should not be left out of
pocket — except to the extent that costs have been unreasonably incurred.’33
This sorry tale, with its elements of religion, relationships, flight from the
law, and money, is one of those rare circumstances in which the Torrens
system of land registration attracts the attention of the mainstream media.34
But how could it have been avoided, or if it couldn’t have been avoided in any
simple manner, was there a way in which compensation could have flowed to
Pedulla without the stress, expense and delay of legal proceedings. In our next
section, we examine the possibility that title insurance may well have operated
more quickly to resolve the claim of Pedulla, and without the incursion of high
legal fees. After that we consider the recent amendments in New South Wales
and Queensland, and note that they would not have prevented the fraud.
Finally, we show how the verification of identity requirements now being
introduced under the guise of the e-conveyancing rules would not have
prevented Panetta and his partner from leaving Australia with their ill-gotten
gains. We conclude that it was only the presence of title insurance that would
have seen a superior outcome for the Calabrian nun.
Title insurance
Unlike in the United States where title insurance has an ‘ironclad foothold’ in
the US economy,35 title insurance has been viewed with some suspicion in
Australia. The New South Wales Law Reform Commission for example, in its
review of the compensation provisions of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW)
concluded that it did not support the introduction of private title insurance in
Australia.36 Subsequent to this review, First American Title Insurance
29 Registrar-General of NSW v LawCover (2013) 17 BPR 32,681; [2013] NSWSC 1471;
BC201313605.
30 Pedulla was also successful in obtaining judgment against the solicitor, though his part in
this sordid example was limited to 30%, the other two parties were each responsible for 35%
of what went on.
31 Pedulla v Panetta (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1533; BC201109832.
32 Ibid, at [10].
33 Ibid, at [10].
34 L Hall, ‘Woman awarded $3.8m after brother sold home and fled’, Sydney Morning Herald,
5 December 2011, at <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/woman-awarded-38m-after-brother-
sold-home-and-fled-20111204-1odgr.html> (accessed 16 May 2014).
35 See M Ziemer, ‘Title insurance — The good, the bad and the ugly: Does Victoria need it?’
(2011) 20 APLJ 1 at 8, citing B Arrunada, ‘A transaction cost view of title insurance and its
role in differing legal systems’ (2002) 27 The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance: Issues
and Practices 582 at 583 that ‘at the end of the 20th century, title insurance was taken out
in 85 per cent of residential sales and purchases in the United States’.
36 NSW Commission, above n 16, at [4.14].
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Company of Australia Pty Ltd, trading as First Title, began offering title
insurance policies for residential mortgage lenders in Australia in 1998. This
was later followed by Stewart Title Ltd in 2003.37 At the time of writing this
article, title insurance continues to be issued in Australia by First Title and
Stewart Title.
The availability of title insurance in Australia sparked fresh debate among
academics as to whether there is a place for title insurance in Australia.
O’Connor, for example, questioned whether the establishment of a private title
insurance industry would undermine or contribute to achieving the twin
objectives of security of title and ease of transfer within the Torrens system.38
In 2004, responding to queries raised by practitioners following the circulation
of marketing material by First Title, the NSW Property Law Committee stated
that it had reservations about the impact of a system of title insurance if it were
to become embedded in New South Wales before concluding that it did not see
that there was any warrant for title insurance in New South Wales.39 One view
of title insurance is that it will lead to the dilemma of moral hazard and that
its widespread use will see a decrease in due diligence and result in more title
defects.40 O’Connor raised the possibility that if changed conveyancing
practices induced by title insurance adversely impacted on the assurance fund,
governments may respond by introducing measures so as to shift the risks
back to the insurers, barring title insurers from exercising the subrogated
rights of the insured to claim from the fund and exclude claims on the fund by
privately insured persons for losses covered by their policies.41 Winton also
questioned the actual likelihood of having to depend on private cover, in the
face of indefeasibility, the assurance fund and professional indemnity funds.42
However there can be benefits to title insurance. Most academics agree that
the Torrens assurance scheme is far from perfect43 and that it is the
deficiencies in the scheme to which title insurance can provide relief.
O’Connor examines these gaps in the Torrens assurance scheme in detail,
dividing the deficiencies into two categories — gaps in the legal security and
gaps in the economic security. The former relates to limitations arising from
the compensation provisions itself, for example, indefeasibility provisions
contain exceptions (exceptions to indefeasibility), known as overriding
interests. Where there is an overriding interest, title insurance can provide
cover against the risk of losses caused by overriding interests.44 The economic
risks arise out of the process and rules associated with making a claim.45 It is
37 P O’Connor, ‘Title insurance-Is there a catch?’ (2003) 10 APLJ 120.
38 P O’Connor, ‘Double indemnity — Title insurance and the Torrens System’ (2003) 3(1)
QUTLJ 142 at 143.
39 NSW Law Society Property Law Committee, ‘Drawbacks to title insurance’ (2004) 42(11)
LSJ 70 at 71.
40 N Winton, ‘Title insurance in a Torrens context’ (2007) Polemic 49 at 51; O’Connor, above
n 38, at 149.
41 O’Connor, above n 38, at 149.
42 Winton, above n 40, at 52.
43 See, eg, L Griggs, ‘The Assurance Fund: Government Funded or Private?’ (2002) 76 ALJ
250.
44 O’Connor, above n 38, at 154.
45 Ibid, at 150–64. See also J Flaws, ‘Compensation for loss under the Torrens System —
Extending State Compensation with Private Insurance’,
24 (2014) 23 Australian Property Law Journal
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generally agreed that claiming under the Torrens assurance scheme is not
without difficulties. As noted in this article, in some states the fund still
operates as a fund of last resort which can cause hardship to claimants.46
Another advantage of title insurance is that it indemnifies the insured on a
no-fault basis whereas the trend in the state-based indemnity schemes is to
restrict the right to indemnity by introducing or extending fault-based
exclusions.47 In addition, the insurer has a duty to defend challenges to the
insured’s title, which includes the payment of necessary costs, legal fees and
expenses incurred in that defence,48 though opinion is divided as to whether
the realities of business will see title insurance companies, disputing the
claims rather than paying out claims or defending challenges.49 Some state
compensation schemes have a limitation period for commencing an action, the
periods ranging from 6 years to 20 years.50 The presence of such limitation
periods only giving cause for further utilisation of title insurance. Title
insurance does not have such limitation periods as the cover is forever and no
excess is charged even in the event of a claim.51 The delay and difficulty in
claiming compensation under the state guarantee of title is also an issue. As
noted by the NSW Law Reform Commission there is a ‘quite repulsive
tenacity with which some jurisdictions are prepared to resist even valid claims
upon the fund. Some claimants become so frustrated with litigation that they
decide to bear the loss themselves.’52 The delay, frustration and resistance in
meeting valid claims are evident in the case of Ms Pedulla.
Would title insurance have aided Ms Pedulla?
To answer this question, the authors examine the policies available from
Stewart Title and First Title, pinpoint analogues case examples provided by
First Title and Stewart Title and apply these to Ms Pedulla’s predicament.
at <http://www.firsttitle.com.au/media/10545/Media%20-%20Compensation%20for%20
loss%20-%20Jonathan%20Flaws.pdf> (accessed 5 June 2014) discussing these gaps in
relation to the NZ Land Transfer Act 1952.
46 O’Connor, above n 38, at 163.
47 Ibid, at 159 and 162.
48 See, eg, Stewart Title’s purchaser residential policy cl [1.2] and First Title Home Owners
GOLD policy cl [4]. See also Flaws, above n 45, p 12 providing an example on how the duty
to defend would operate and stating that internationally, 45% of all payments under title
insurance policies are paid to lawyers to assist in resolving claims relating to covered risks.
49 See M Ziemer, ‘Title insurance — The good, the bad and the ugly: Does Victoria need it?’
(2011) 20 APLJ 1 at 26, citing the Alberta Land Surveyors’ Association. On this point,
Caroline Younis noted that since First Title started in Australia, First Title had developed a
very solid claims history and thus far have not denied any fraud claims: Email from
Caroline Younis, General Counsel, First Title, to Rouhshi Low, 14 August 2014.
50 A Bradbrook, S MacCallum, A Moore and S Grattan, Australian Real Property Law, 5th ed,
Thomson Reuters, at [4.700].
51 O’Connor, above n 38, at 163 and Ziemer, above n 49, at 27. See, eg, First Title’s Home
Owners GOLD policy cl [6.1] at <http://www.firsttitle.com.au/media/9422/
Policy_Wording_%5BEHOG%5D_%5BLR%5D.pdf> (accessed 13 June 2014) and Stewart
Title’s Residential Purchaser Policy cl [4.1] at <http://www.stewartau.
com/multimedia/Residential_Purchaser_Policy.pdf> (accessed 13 June 2014).
52 New South Wales Commission, above n 16, at [2.40]. Also see Ziemer, above n 49, at 27.
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(a) Available policies
For residential properties, First Title offers a residential home owner’s policy
called Home Owners GOLD,53 which covers the homeowner or purchaser
against various risks including fraud. The premium paid is a one-time
premium and the amount of premium payable varies depending on the value
of the property, for example, for a residential property valued at less than
$500,000 the premium payable for a purchaser is $359.70 and for a
homeowner $479.60.54 The Stewart Title Residential Purchaser Policy
provides protection to purchasers and existing home owners. The range of
risks covered also includes fraud.55 Similar to First Title, the premium is a
one-time premium, the amount varying depending on the value of the
property. For example, the premium for property valued less than $500,000 is
$359.70.56
The residential policies in both Stewart Title and First Title insure against
actual loss resulting from the covered risks for up to 200% of the purchase
price of the property.57
(b) Case examples
The authors contacted both First Title and Stewart Title to request for data on
the number and type of policies issued in Australia and the value of claims
paid. First Title were unable to release the value of claims paid on any type of
claim but provided the authors with some examples of fraud claims that First
Title paid:58
• The gambling ex-husband: The insured and her husband had been
separated for some time. The husband continued to reside in the
matrimonial home. The husband re-mortgaged the home to pay his
53 A sample policy wording of the Home Owners GOLD policy is available
at <http://www.firsttitle.com.au/property-owners/about/brochures-and-forms> (accessed
13 June 2014).
54 The premium schedule is available at <http://www.firsttitle.com. au/media/17282/Premium
%20Schedule_QLD_AUG13.pdf> (accessed 13 June 2014).
55 A sample policy wording of the Residential Purchaser Policy is available
at <http://www.stewartau.com/public//ResidentialPurchaser.html> (accessed 13 June 2014).
56 The premium schedule is available at <http://www.stewartau.com/public/PremiumSchedules
.html> (accessed 13 June 2014).
57 For Stewart Title see cl [1] of the Residential Purchaser Policy
<http://www.stewartau.com/multimedia/Residential_Purchaser_Policy.pdf> (accessed
13 June 2014). For First Title see cll [3] and [6.2] in the Home Owners GOLD Policy,
<http://www.firsttitle.com.au/media/9422/Policy_Wording_%5BEHOG%5D_%5BLR%5D
.pdf> (accessed 13 June 2014).
58 Email from Caroline Younis, General Counsel, First Title, to Rouhshi Low, 25 June 2014.
First Title also brought to the authors attention the various fraud cases that First Title were
involved in, including Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Tsai (2004) 12 BPR 22,281;
Chandra v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2007) 13 BPR 24,675; Mitchell Morgan v Vella
(2011) 16 BPR 30,189 (NSWCA); Hunt & Hunt v Mitchell Morgan (2013) 247 CLR 613;
296 ALR 3; [2013] HCA 10; BC201301509; Perpetual Trustees Victoria v Ann-Marie
Menzies [2009] NSWSC 352; BC200903509; Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Menzies
(2012) 16 BPR 31,541; [2012] NSWSC 1066; BC201210440; Perpetual Trustees Victoria
Ltd v Menzies (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 290; BC201301898; Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd
v El-Bayeh (2010) 15 BPR 29,353; [2010] NSWSC 1487; BC201009914; Perpetual Trustee
Company Ltd v CTC Group Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 252; BC201206238.
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gambling debts, he forged his wife’s signature on the documents. All
was well until the loan repayments ceased and the husband informed
the wife that the house was being possessed by the lender.
• The entrepreneurial son: The son took out a mortgage over his
parents’ house, the parents, who did not speak or read fluent English
thought they were going guarantor on a loan. The son lost all the
money in a failed business venture and then failed to make the loan
repayments. The lender commenced possession proceedings. The
retiree parents were then put on notice that the documents they had
signed were actually transferring the property out of the mother’s
name and into the son’s name and then taking out a mortgage on that
property in the father and son’s name.
• The way-ward Power of Attorney: The borrower provided her two
children (son and daughter) with a joint POA. The borrower suffered
from dementia. The son took a loan out in his name and the
borrower’s name using the POA to execute the documentation on
behalf of the borrower. A solicitor certified the documents and the
funds were advanced. The daughter became aware of the fraud and
contacted solicitors to rectify the fraud against her mother’s title.
• The shifty business partner: The borrower and the fraudster entered
into a business arrangement and opened a joint bank account. The
fraudster took out a loan in the borrower’s name and had it paid into
the joint account, the borrower’s property was used as security. The
alleged fraudster withdrew all the funds and disappeared. The
borrower was surprised to find that the loan had been taken out and
that his property had been used as the security.
• The trusting friend: The borrower had an unencumbered title which
came to the attention of a well-known crime figure, who the borrower
considered a friend at the time. A loan was taken out over the
borrower’s property which she denied any knowledge of. The
borrower says she only became aware of the loan when the
possession proceedings were commenced. It was alleged that the
fraudster must have intercepted the mail between the borrower and
the lender.
According to Caroline Younis, where the claims involved litigation, one of
the benefits of having title insurance is that the cost of the legal fees and
expenses associated with the claim is borne by First Title and there is no limit
on this.59
Stewart Title provided three case examples on their website:
The Dominicks owned a home and were the victims of a fraud committed by Mr
Dominick’s brother. The brother stole the identity of Mr Dominick and obtained a
$120,000 mortgage over their home. When the mortgage went into default, the
lender, Cass Comm, contacted the Dominicks for payment. It was then that the
Dominicks discovered what had happened and as a result, they refused to make
payment on the grounds that they didn’t sign the mortgage and they didn’t receive
any money. Although the brother was sent to jail for the forgery, Cass Comm sued
the Dominicks and the court held that the mortgage was valid and Cass Comm was
59 Email from Caroline Younis, General Counsel, First Title, to Rouhshi Low, 25 June 2014.
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allowed to take possession of the home to recover their debt. The Stewart Title
Existing Owner Policy compensates home owners for losses resulting from
fraudulent mortgages registered against their title. Under the coverage provided by
a Stewart policy, the Dominicks’ ownership in their property would have been
protected and the costs associated with removing the Cass Comm mortgage from
their title would have been covered by us.60
After settlement but prior to registration of the mortgage, the insured lender became
aware that the borrowers were actually fraudsters who had used stolen identities and
stolen bank cheques in the transaction. The loan is now in default and the insured
lender’s security is unable to be registered due to caveats being lodged on the title.
Stewart Title indemnified the insured lender in accordance with the Commercial
Lender Policy. Under the policy Stewart Title is responsible for all legal costs and
expenses in resolving the issue on behalf of the lender.61
A lender insured by Stewart Title was sued by a prior owner of the mortgaged
property. The insured lender had advanced funds to a person claiming to be the
owner of the property to finance the purchase of the mortgaged property. Less than
a year later, the lender was sued by a woman who had, with her husband, owned the
property for a number of years. She claimed that her signature on the transfer, as
well as a series of mortgages were all forgeries. She claimed that title to the property
should be returned to her, and enforcement proceedings by the lender halted until the
matter of the fraud was resolved.62 In this case, Stewart Title under the defence of
title provision in the Policy defended the enforceability of the insured mortgage.
This meant, amongst other things, that Stewart Title paid the legal fees and
associated costs from the time of notification of the claim to the conclusion of
proceedings.63
Applying these cases to Ms Pedulla:
• The nature of Ms Pedulla’s claim is a risk that is covered by either
insurance company in their residential home owner policy;
• Ms Pedulla would need to complete and lodge a claim form in which
she must provide a brief summary of the facts giving rise to the claim
and a value of the loss if known;64
• The insurance company would then decide on how to resolve the
claim. Using Stewart Title as an example, the options include
payment of the loss sustained by the insured, negotiating a
settlement, litigation to prosecute or defend a case;65
• In Ms Pedulla’s case, as the house has already been sold and the
fraudsters having flown the country, the available option may be
payment of the loss sustained by Ms Pedulla;
60 Stewart Title, ‘Title Insurance for Home Owners’, <http://www.stewartau.com/multimedia/
brochures/Home-Owners_Brochure.pdf> (accessed 13 June 2014).
61 Stewart Title, ‘Recent Lender Claims’, <http://www.stewartau.com/public/ClaimsInfo63
.html> (accessed 13 June 2014).
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 See, eg, the Stewart Title residential purchasers and existing owners claim form,
at <http://www.stewartau.com/PUBLIC/multimedia/PurchaserClaimForm.pdf> (accessed
13 June 2014).
65 Stewart Title, ‘Our Claims Philosophy’, at <http://www.stewartau.com/public/ClaimsInfo15
.html> (accessed 13 June 2014).
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• In this case, the actual loss suffered would be $3.8 million and that
would be the amount paid out to Ms Pedulla;66
• There would be no need for Ms Pedulla to incur legal costs because
these would be borne by the insurance company;
• As the insurance policy would indemnify Ms Pedulla on a no-fault
basis, the issue faced by Ms Pedulla in her court action as to whether
compensation would not be payable because the loss was occasioned
by the conduct of Ms Pedulla would not be a cause for concern if she
had title insurance;
• Similarly, with title insurance, there would not be an issue of whether
compensation would not be payable because of the actions of the
solicitor; and,
• With title insurance, Ms Pedulla would not have to contend with the
Registrar General resisting her claim for compensation.
It would seem that title insurance would have operated more quickly and
efficiently to resolve Ms Pedulla’s claim thereby averting the stress and delay
incurred by Ms Pedulla in her legal proceedings.
Ms Pedulla’s case could be classed as the usual type of fraud cases that
typically occur in Australia — where the fraudulent person is someone known
to the victim of the fraud, such as the spouse or children. It was rare for frauds
to be perpetrated by professional criminals. Unfortunately, a spate of
professionally perpetrated frauds in Western Australia has caused growing
concern that professionally executed land title frauds are on the rise in
Australia. In these cases, the fraudsters will have at their disposal
sophisticated technological devices that can be used to forge identity
documents, making the fraud virtually undetectable.67 The state’s response to
fraud has been to shift responsibility to the stakeholders in the conveyancing
66 Caroline Younis was able to confirm that had Ms Pedulla had title insurance, the actual loss
of $3.8m would have been paid out to her by First Title: Email from Caroline Younis,
General Counsel, First Title, to Rouhshi Low, 14 August 2014.
67 See R Low and L Griggs, ‘Identity Verification in Conveyancing: The Failure of Current
Legislative and Regulatory Measures, and Recommendations for Change’ (2012) 76(5) The
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 363, discussing the Mildenhall fraud that occurred in
Western Australia which involved Nigerian fraudsters using fake identity documents to sell
the owners house when the owner was overseas. Mr Mildenhall has received compensation,
though the precise terms of settlement are confidential. Subsequent to the Mildenhall fraud,
another attempted fraud in Western Australia was reported, the facts of which bear a striking
resemblance to the Mildenhall fraud: ‘Man arrested in Nigeria over attempted real estate
fraud in Western Australia’, at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-15/arrest-in-nigeria-
over-real-estate-fraud/4890178> (accessed 10 June 2014). In 2014, a similar fraud was
reported to have occurred in the Australian Capital Territory (see Australian Federal Police,
‘Police Investigating Real Estate Fraud’, at <http://www.police.act.gov.au/media-
centre/media-releases/act/2014/july/police-investigating-real-estate-fraud.aspx> (accessed
18 August 2014) which led Landgate, the WA Department of Commerce and the WA Police
to issue a joint media statement warning property professionals to be vigilant when
identifying their clients as the true owner when selling and otherwise transacting in property
(see Landgate, ‘Agent Alert Issued following Real Estate Fraud in ACT’,
at <http://www.landgate.wa.gov.au/docvault.nsf/web/AU_NM_MEDIA_2014/$FILE/2014-
07-24-Agent-alert-following-real-estate-fraud-in-ACT.pdf> (accessed 18 August 2014).
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process, namely, the mortgagee.68 For example, in Queensland, s 11 of the
Land Title Act 1994 provides that the mortgagee must take reasonable steps
to verify identity, where a failure to do so would result in the mortgagee
unable to rely on indefeasibility (s 185(1A)). In New South Wales, mortgagees
are similarly required to take reasonable steps to ensure that the person who
has executed the mortgage is in fact the person whom they are representing.
A failure to do this could lead to the Registrar-General refusing to register the
mortgage.69 Western Australia issued its new verification of identity rules in
July 2012, full compliance expected on documents lodged on and after
2 January 2013. The rules were initiated as a response to the professional
frauds and is said to be a higher standard of verification of identity than has
been used in the past.70 The new rules recommend that conveyancers and
other property professionals take reasonable steps to verify the identity of their
clients and confirm their clients’ authority to give instructions when dealing
with a particular property. In verifying the identity of a client, the rules
expound two fundamental requirements:71
• First, a person transacting on a property should be able to produce
current, original identity documents, preferably with photographs.
• Second, a visual verification or ‘face to face’ is required, which is the
practice of checking that the photograph on the identity document is
the person being identified.
If a person is outside of Australia, the verification of identity and the
witnessing of land documents should be conducted by an Australian Consular
Officer.72
As noted by the authors in an earlier article, stringent identity verification
rules, particularly rules that mandate face-to-face identity verification, will
assist in preventing fraud.73 However, as recognised by Landgate, ‘fraudsters
constantly change the way they operate. They take advantage of opportunities
as they arise’,74 such that vigilance is constantly required. In addition,
conveyancers and property professional are not forgery experts and there will
be cases when fraudsters are able to slip through the cracks despite all efforts
at complying with identity verification requirements. When the state assurance
fund can be difficult and costly to access as evident in Ms Pedulla’s claim,
could market mechanisms be the key in resolving this inefficiency with private
title insurance?
Another more pressing concern is the advent of electronic conveyancing.
Would title insurance have a greater role to play in this era of technological
68 L Griggs and R Low, ‘Identity Fraud and Land Registration Systems: An Australian
Perspective’ (2011) 75(4) The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 284 and Low and Griggs,
above n 67.
69 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 56C; Real Property Amendment Regulations 2011 (NSW),
now incorporated in the Real Property Amendment Regulations 2008.
70 Landgate, ‘Verification of Identity’, at <http://www.landgate.wa.gov.au/docvault.
nsf/web/PS_TR_VI/$FILE/VOIBRO.pdf> (accessed 13 June 2014).
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Low and Griggs, above n 67.
74 Landgate, ‘Verification of Identity Information Session’, at <http://www.landgate.
wa.gov.au/docvault.nsf/web/PS_TR_VI/$FILE/InfoSession.pdf> (accessed 13 June 2014).
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reform? We ask this question because much of the academic literature on the
role of title insurance in Australia (as distilled in this aticle) preceded the
nationwide adoption of a national electronic conveyancing system.75 While
O’Connor did note the trend in some state governments of seeking to protect
the assurance fund by shifting losses back to the victims if they or their agents
can be said to have contributed to the loss by their conduct,76 we can see this
trend taking tangible shape with the arrival of a national electronic
conveyancing system (NECS), particularly in the proposed rules for
verification of identity. It is therefore pertinent to re-examine the role of title
insurance within Australia’s newly adopted national electronic conveyancing
system. This is the focus of the next section of our article.
Re-examining the role of title insurance in light of the
Australian NECS and the shifting of responsibility on
stakeholders
The idea of a national electronic conveyancing system was mooted since the
early 1920s but it is not until the last few years that we finally see this idea
come to fruition.77 The key legislation enabling the adoption of a nation-wide
electronic conveyancing system is the Electronic Conveyancing (Adoption of
National Law) Act 2012 (NSW). The Act establishes the right to lodge
documents electronically and to create a mutually accessible electronic
workspace for stakeholders involved in the transfer of land. Existing to
support the operation of the legislative framework lies the Model Operating
Requirements (MOR) and the Model Participation Rules (MPR).78 Both the
Model Operating Requirements and Model Participation Rules have been the
subject of numerous stakeholder consultation sessions. This is unsurprising
given their role but another reason for their intense scrutiny is that both
documents cover uncharted territories. Some conveyancing practices and
processes may remain the same but the introduction of NECS will also see
new processes being put in place, requiring new rules to govern these
processes. One example would be rules requiring subscribers79 to obtain client
authorisation (cl 6.3 and Sch 4) and to take reasonable steps to verify the
identity of their clients (cl 6.5), whereby compliance with the verification of
identity standard specified in Sch 8 will be deemed to constitute reasonable
75 With perhaps the exception of the paper by Flaws, above n 45, which had a section on title
insurance and the automated register (p 18) though this is in relation to the NZ automated
system, not the Australian national electronic conveyancing system.
76 O’Connor, above n 38, at 161.
77 The rollout schedule for the national electronic conveyancing system is available from
<http://www.pexa.com.au/TheLegalFramework> (accessed 10 June 2014). At the time of
writing, deployment of the system will begin in New South Wales and Victoria in 2014,
followed by Queensland and Western Australia in February and May 2015 and South
Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory in the third quarter of 2015.
78 The MPR is available at <http://www.arnecc.gov.au/publications_mode
l_participation_rules> (accessed 13 June 2014) and the MOR is available
at <http://www.arnecc.gov.au/publications/model_operating_requirements> (accessed
13 June 2014).
79 Electronic Conveyancing National Law s 3 defines a subscriber as ‘a person who is
authorised under a participation agreement to use an ELN to complete conveyancing
transactions on behalf of another person or on their own behalf’.
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steps.80 As noted by the authors in relation to the verification of identity
standard in Sch 8, there is no parallel in Australia to this in terms of
paper-based conveyancing. Another change would be the use of digital
signatures in place of manual signatures. Unlike current practices, in the
NECS, subscribers to the system (ie, those authorised to use the system, such
as lawyers) will digitally sign electronic documents prepared on NECS on
behalf of their clients (such as a home owner). The use of digital signatures
necessitates the obtaining of digital signing keys to enable the creation of the
digital signatures and the need to keep the signing key safe so that
unauthorised personnel cannot create digital signatures to perpetrate fraud.
The NECS will also see new stakeholders involved in the conveyancing
process, such as the Electronic Lodgement Network Operator (ELNO) whose
function it is to provide and operate and Electronic Lodgement Network
(ELN) which is an electronic system that enables the lodging of registry
instruments and other documents in electronic form for the purposes of the
land titles legislation.81
One major question arising out of the adoption of NECS is who would bear
the loss in the event of fraud? The verification of identity standard requiring
face-to-face verification of identity (Sch 8 cl 2.1) is a step in the right direction
in minimising fraud. Less fraud would mean less stress on the assurance fund.
However, not all frauds are detectable despite face-to-face identity
verification. Intriguingly, Pedulla is one such fraud. As it involved a solicitor
as a party to the wrongdoing, it is reasonable to assume that in an electronic
environment the fraud would be as easily perpetrated. The solicitor as
subscriber to the system could forge the client authorisation forms and his role
as a stakeholder would allow access to the ELN. In effect, the risk of
wrongdoing here was no more or less in an electronic as against a paper
environment. Contrast this matter with that of Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd
v El-Bayeh.82 David El-Bayeh was the registered proprietor of land on which
there was a mortgage in favour of Perpetual Trustee Company. The defendant
alleged his signature had been forged, purportedly by the hand of his older
brother Youseff (a claim denied by Youseff). The loan had originated from the
offices of CTC Group Ltd, a mortgage originator with a commercial
relationship with Perpetual. The relevant documents prepared to support the
mortgage had been considered by one Naaman, an employee of CTC. In terms
of unravelling this saga, Naaman could not be called to give evidence, he had
left Australia to conduct business in Lebanon and indicated that he never
intended to return.83 Naaman had indicated that David El-Bayeh had signed in
his presence and had provided a passport, rates certificate, and Medicare card
to verify identity. The evidence presented to the court was that all members of
the El-Bayeh family would have had access to these documents. As noted by
80 For a more in depth discussion of the verification of identity standard in Sch 8, refer to
R Thomas, R Low and L Griggs, ‘Australasian Torrens Automation, Its Integrity, and the
Three Proof Requirements’ (2013) NZLR 227.
81 See ss 13 and 15 of the Electronic Conveyancing National Law. The Electronic
Conveyancing National Law appears as an appendix to the Electronic Conveyancing
(Adoption of National Law) Act 2012 (NSW).
82 [2010] 15 BPR 29,353.
83 Ibid, at [39].
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her Honour, McCallum J, if David El-Bayeh had not signed the documents,
three options were possible:84
i) Someone had impersonated David El-Bayeh;
ii) Naaman had negligently presented the documents to Perpetual with
such documents not being prepared and attested in the presence of
David El-Bayeh; or
iii) The speculative possibility that Naaman was a knowing participant in
some type of fraud.
Although her Honour was suspicious, she was not persuaded that Naaman was
anything other than a victim of fraud, the land documents were undoubtedly
fraudulent, the mortgage not permitted to stand on the register, the mortgage
documents not securing anything.85
Would this fraud have been detectable under the electronic framework
against a backdrop of NSW requirements that the mortgagee verify identify?
Assuming Naaman was not party to the fraud, the verification of identity
requirements would have been likely met by Naaman. He allegedly conducted
a face to face interview and had before him documents that should have
matched the likeness of the individual in front of his desk. Verification of
identity requirements would not have uncovered the fraud. Further, as the
assurance fund would not have covered the loss incurred by Perpetual Trustee,
any option for compensation would have to come from a mortgagees title
insurance policy. While there may be sound policy reasons for denying
compensation under the assurance fund in cases such as El-Bayeh’s case86 the
case also highlights the complexities surrounding the assurance fund.
Further what may evolve from this type of scenario is a movement of
responsibility. For example, assume the subscriber, such as CTC, has
undertaken verification of identity in accordance with the MPR cll 6.4 and 6.5
and has made the necessary certifications as to identity, such certifications
being relied on by the other parties to the transaction and by the ELNO and
the Registrar but the identity turned out to be false.87 In professionally
executed identity fraud cases, it would be quite easy for the subscriber, who
is not an expert at detecting document forgery, to fall prey to such forgery.
Could the state shift liability for the fraud onto the subscriber based on the
certifications provided by the subscriber, and thereby deny the victim of the
fraud compensation under the assurance fund?
The use of technology and changed processes to accommodate this
technology in NECS may see new types of frauds capable of being perpetrated
in the NECS.88 For example, a subscriber could be the victim of criminal
hacking enabling a third party to apply the subscriber’s digital signing key to
84 Ibid, at [43].
85 Ibid, at [150].
86 See S Grattan, ‘Forged but Indefeasible Mortgages: Remedial Options’, Paper presented at
the Ninth Australasian Property Law Teachers’ Conference, 17–19 April 2009, pp 17–21.
87 [2010] 15 BPR 29,353 at [172].
88 For more on new opportunities for fraud, see R Low and E Foo, ‘The susceptibility of digital
signatures to fraud in the National Electronic Conveyancing System: An analysis’ (2009) 17
APLJ 1; R Low, ‘Opportunities for fraud in the proposed Australian National Electronic
Conveyancing System: Fact or Fiction?’ (2006) 13(2) ELaw Journal: Murdoch University
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an electronic document without the subscriber’s knowledge or consent.89
Alternatively the subscriber may discover that his/her digital signing key has
been improperly used and notifies the ELNO as required under cl 7.9 of the
MPR. The ELNO must act to prevent that electronic instrument from being
presented for lodgment with the Registrar or if it is not possible to prevent
lodgment, to immediately notify the Registrar (cl 7.10 of the MOR). Suppose
the instrument was presented for lodgment and registered, could the
subscriber argue that the ELNO should bear liability for the fraud because the
reason fraud occurred was because the ELNO had not acted with sufficient
speed so as to notify the Registrar and to prevent the instrument from being
lodged for registration? Or would s 12 of the ECNL apply, that is, unless that
subscriber is able to repudiate that digital signature, that registry instrument is
to be taken to be signed by that subscriber and binding on that subscriber, on
all other persons for whom that subscriber acts under a client authorisation for
that conveyancing transaction, on the other parties, including their
subscribers, to the conveyancing transaction and on the Registrar.
Until NECS is fully operational questions surrounding how liability will be
allocated in the event of fraud and how the state will respond will continue to
loom. Cases such as Pedulla’s case show that these issues are never easily
resolved and litigation can become protracted, involving multiple parties.90
For most home owners who are not regular partakers of the conveyancing
market, the state assurance fund may be sufficient. For investors and
commercial lenders however, these uncertainties may increase concerns
regarding security of title. One option to ameliorate against this uncertainty
may be market mechanisms in the form of private title insurance and it is this
option that would have markedly improved the position of Ms Pedulla.
Conclusion
The tale told her of religion, sibling betrayal and flight from law’s
enforcement has all the hallmarks of a Shakespearean tragedy. But where the
tragedy truly lies is in the treatment of a penniless, distraught and homeless
nun on her return to Australia. To require Ms Pedulla to engage solicitors,
incur legal costs in excess of $320,000 with the delay and stress that this
would involve, with no guarantee that success would come her way represents
an insult to commonly accepted notions of fairness. While the assurance fund
ultimately compensated her, there is no doubt in the authors’ minds that title
insurance (and we are not so naı¨ve as to think insurance companies will not
occasionally seek to delay compensation)91 would have led to a superior
Electronic Journal of Law 225 and, R Low, ‘From paper to electronic: Exploring the fraud
risks stemming from the use of technology to automate the Australian Torrens System’
(2009) 21(2) Bond LR 107.
89 For further discussion on this, see Griggs and Low, above n 67 and Low and Foo, above
n 88.
90 See also Grattan, above n 86.
91 On this point, Caroline Younis commented that as far as First Title is concerned, this would
be an inaccurate statement because it would not be in First Title’s commercial interest to act
in this manner in the sense that First Title would go out of business very quickly if the
market perception was that First Title did not pay any claims or deliberately slowed up
settlement. According to Caroline, First Title’s claims procedures and manuals dictate the
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outcome, both in terms of speed to Ms Pedulla, but also in overall terms of
economic welfare, with the legal costs of the Registrar and the malfeasant
solicitor greatly minimised or eliminated. Interestingly, the introduction of
electronic conveyancing and the increased verification of identity
requirements would have had no change to the outcome. Perhaps the lesson to
be learnt after all, is that given the one-off lifetime cover provided by title
insurance, it is the market that will go through the obstruction identified by
Sir Robert Torrens some 160 years ago.
timeframes for the resolution of claims and further, First Title is also subject to the Financial
Ombudsman Service and its terms of reference: Email from Caroline Younis, General
Counsel, First Title, to Rouhshi Low, 14 August 2014.
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Debunking negligence’s role in imposing a
duty on the servient owner of an easement
towards the dominant owner
Lynden Griggs*
The rights and responsibilities of servient and dominant owners in respect of
right of ways is largely settled. However, one area remains unclear. Can tort
law impose positive duties on the servient owner towards the dominant
owner via the law of negligence? Whereas some have suggested this is the
case, and recent developments in tort support this development, this article,
using the paradigm of the agenda setter within property law, argues that the
dominant owner should remain as the primary institution making decisions in
relation to the easement. It is they that set the agenda on how the right of
way is to be used, with this power emanating from the original grant given by
the first servient owner. Any extension of negligence law is unnecessary, and
has the potential to damage the coherency of established property law
arrangements between the dominant and servient owners.
One of the enduring issues in the doctrinal understanding of the law of
easements relates to the rights and obligations that the dominant and servient
owners have towards each other. Case law is replete with examples of where
harmonious neighbourly relations have been soured by disputes, most
typically around the extent of the obligations each party has in relation to the
right of way. Property law practitioners and academics would be aware that
the extant authority, at least doctrinally from property law, is strongly of the
view that the obligation owed by the servient owner is simply a negative one
to refrain from acts of misfeasance that would obstruct the enjoyment of the
right of way by the dominant owner.1 The theoretical foundation for this
emanates from the idea that when the right of way is granted by the servient
owner no positive obligation is attached to that grant, or to the servient land.2
Should the dominant owner want to utilise the right of way granted on title,
then it is this person that is responsible for the construction and maintenance
of the easement. While this property law principle has been litigated and
resolved, recent developments in tort law and associated academic writings
suggest there are circumstances in which positive obligations will be owed
from a servient owner to the dominant owner. The answer provided by this
article is that given the history, tradition, and well recognised principles of
property law, torts intrusion is both unnecessary, and more dangerously, has
the potential to undermine the legal coherence that currently exists in the
jurisprudence surrounding easements. ‘[I]n tort law, a possessor of land is
defined in an altogether different manner than in property law’,3 and those
* Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania.
1 P Butt, Land Law, 6th ed, LawBook Co, 2010, at [16107].
2 Duncan v Louch (1845) 6 QB 904.
3 Wagner v Doehring 553 A 2d 684 (1989) at 688.
183
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 24 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Fri Apr 17 08:41:06 2015
/journals/journal/aplj/vol23pt3/part_3
differences, if applied to easement law, can undermine the structure and
framework of this area of property law that is well-understood and
well-recognised.
A brief recap of the property solution
An easement is a ‘right enjoyed by a person [the dominant owner] with regard
to the land of another person [the servient owner], the exercise of which
interferes with the normal rights of the owner or occupier of the servient
land’.4 The simplicity of this definition can mask the fraught emotional divide
that easement disputes can cause to good neighbourly relations. In terms of the
obligations that lie between the servient and dominant owners, the resolution
is often context specific, though the principles are well-known. Servient
owners may,5 or may not,6 obstruct the way with the resolution of this
dependent on whether the servient owner’s actions represent a substantial
interference with the use of the easement.7 For example, in Boglari v Steiner
School and Kindergarten8 the respondents enjoyed a right of way over the
land of Boglari. Boglari installed a gate across the right of way, with this
occasionally being locked. Given the nature of the dominant land as a school,
and the need for parents and staff to routinely access the property, what was
deemed reasonable in this context was that no gate be placed across the land.
This can be contrasted with Buckley v Timbury9 where, in a detailed
examination of the authorities surrounding the installation of a gate across an
easement, it was held that in the context of this rural property the installation
of a solar powered access gate was not such a substantial interference that
intervention by the court was warranted. Burke v Frasers Lorne Pty Ltd10 is
another illustration of the fact specific nature of these disputes. The right of
way had been asphalt for many years. The servient owner sought to replace
this with reinforced turf. The reason the servient owner sought to do this was
to meet a planning condition around the percentage of the land that had to be
4 Municipal District v Coles (1906) 3 CLR 96, accepted recently in City Developments P/L v
Registrar General and the NT (2000) 156 FLR 1; 135 NTR 1; [2000] NTSC 33;
BC200002941.
5 Bunney v South Australia (2001) 112 LGERA 213; [2001] SASC 18; BC200100314.
6 Guests Estate Ltd v Milners Safe Ltd (1911) 28 TLR 59.
7 Forestry Comrs for England and Wales v Omega Pacific Ltd [2000] All ER (D) 17.
8 (2007) 20 VR 1; V ConvR 54-748; [2007] VSCA 58; BC200702311.
9 (2013) 17 BPR 32,187; BC201311497. Slattery J at [5]–[6] also addressed the lack of
capacity of the parties to negotiate a solution:
Looked at objectively the issues that divided these parties seemed eminently capable of
consensual resolution through the application of a modest degree of mutual goodwill. But
despite the court encouraging some kind of consensual outcome, it has eluded the parties.
And so the court must determine their differences for them.
This is unfortunate for several reasons. First, these neighbours still have to live together.
And the outcome of these proceedings is unlikely to make this part of Maitland Vale a
happier place for them all. Moreover, as these reasons will demonstrate, the law can provide
only limited solutions to the issues that divide them. More creative and mutually satisfactory
solutions for the parties may only be possible by agreement. Though the parties were bitterly
divided about the matters in issue before the court, they nevertheless all appeared to the
court to be people of reason and goodwill who could and would one day see past their
present differences.
10 (2008) 14 BPR 26,111; [2008] NSWSC 988; BC200808309.
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reserved for deep soil landscaping. While the reinforced turf would still be
passable, it would not provide the same quality of access for the dominant
owner. Fraser Lorne, the servient owner, argued that as access was still
available to the dominant land, the substitution of reinforced turf for asphalt
was of no concern. This was rejected by the NSW Court. As the dominant
owner had the right to construct an access on the servient owner’s land, this
access could not then be replaced by an inferior, but still usable access by the
servient owner. In effect, and this goes to the heart of my argument, it was the
dominant owner that retained the capacity to set the agenda in relation to their
property interest. Because this person has the capacity to set the agenda, legal
responsibilities relating to maintenance and liability should rest on this
individual.
We see a similar balancing exercise undertaken in Mantec Thoroughbreds
Pty Ltd v Batur,11 though the language in this case bears some analogy to tort
law. The dominant owner wished to improve the easement to allow access by
large farm vehicles and other heavy machinery. While the court accepted that
a dominant tenement was permitted to undertake improvements, any such
right was not unlimited – the agenda setting had to be in line with the terms
of the easement and not outside its parameters. Any improvements or works
could only be undertaken if they were reasonably necessary and did not cause
injury to the neighbours. Habersberger J stating:
[The] defendants have an ancillary right to undertake works in respect of the
easement in order to make it passable for all types of vehicles, if those works can be
performed without causing injury to the plaintiff’s land.12
Finally, in Lawrence v Griffıths13 the dominant owner sought to construct a
right of way over the servient land. This right of way would require detailed
engineering and construction costs as the passage of the right of way was
across the top of a gully with a severe slope on either side. In undertaking a
comparative examination of common law precedent,14 the court accepted that
a dominant owner was entitled to construct a right of way, provided that no
injury was done to the servient land. In specifically relying on the ‘ strongly
persuasive’15 Canadian decision of Smith v Morris16 where the dispute was
about the right of the dominant owner to undertake excavation works of a
steep slope to allow passage over the right of way by a motor vehicle. The SA
Court of Appeal held that the dominant owner was entitled to construct a road
access over the right of way provided that so doing was possible within the
terms of the grant and without injury being caused to the land of the servient
owner.17 In essence, the dominant owner set the agenda.18
11 (2009) 25 VR 507; [2009] VSC 351; BC200907625.
12 Ibid, at [94] (emphasis added).
13 (1987) 47 SASR 455.
14 The English authority referred to by the court was Newcomen v Coulson (1877) 5 Ch D 133;
Gerrard v Cooke (1806) 2 Bos & Pul (NR) 109; 127 ER 565; Stenhouse v Christian (1787)
1 TR 560; 99 ER 1251; Abson v Fenton (1823) 1 B & C 195; 107 ER 73.
15 (1987) 47 SASR 455 at 481.
16 [1935] 2 DLR 780.
17 (1987) 47 SASR 455 at 482–3.
18 Whereas these cases, and there are many more, have involved consideration around the
balancing of rights in relation to a right of way, little has been said, either academically or
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Beyond this, the responsibilities that each party to an easement may have
towards the other seem to lie in a nebulous, if not lawless vacuum. Consider
a scenario where a right of way is provided to the dominant owner over the
servient land. It is the servient owner’s land, though the dominant tenement
has an accepted property interest in that land. Who is responsible should an
injury be caused by a person coming onto that land? Does responsibility lie
with the owner, or the person entitled to use that area as an easement.
Anglo-Saxon authority on these questions are rare, though not surprisingly,
the matter has been considered in the American context. In Wagner v
Doehring,19 the Wagners were the dominant owners. On their property they
ran a boarding kennel for show dogs. The servient estate was owned by
Shiling and Hess, and while they had reserved the right to use the right of way,
they had not done so. The servient tenement was at the time of the incident
uninhabited, the owners intending to develop the estate into a residential
development at some future point. At times, unauthorised motorcycles would
use the right of way, to get to a dirt pathway on the servient estate. The cyclists
would drive at high speed and cause considerable tension to the Wagners. Not
only were the grandchildren of the Wagners perceived to be in danger, but also
the noise of the motorcycles scared the animals that were being boarded.
Occasionally unauthorised parties were held on the pathway and the servient
estate. Presumably to discourage such activity, the Wagner’s stretched a chain
between two poles at the top of the right of way. The plaintiff Doehring
entered the property at midnight driving at high speed on an unlit motorcycle
and without wearing a helmet. He died after hitting the chain. The father of the
decedent filed a wrongful death action against the Wagners. In finding no
liability attaching to the Wagners unless they had acted wantonly or wilfully
in entrapping the trespasser, the court held that the resolution of this matter
rested on the distinction between property and tort concepts of possession.20
Whereas the property rights established the relationship between the servient
and dominant owners, it was tort that defined the relationship between the
possessor of the land and, in this case, the trespasser. The determinative factor
in determining liability would be the degree of control one had, (or as I may
describe it, the extent to which the parties can set the agenda):
We . . . hold that the holder of an easement for ingress and egress is afforded the
same protection to which a landowner is entitled with respect to a trespasser, when
the easement holder exercises a degree of control over the land which permits the
holder to exclude trespassers from the easement. This is consistent with the rationale
that a possessor of land should be free to use his land without the burden of watching
for and protecting against trespassers.21
judicially around the issue of contribution for maintenance where either the right of way is
enjoyed by a number of dominant owners, or is shared between a servient and dominant
owner. Peter Butt, in referencing the lack of authority suggests logic and fairness would
dictate that apportionment of cost should be done on an equitable based on proportionate
use. Such a position seems unarguable: P Butt, ‘Sharing the cost of Maintaining an
Easement’, (2014) 88 ALJ 603, referencing the US authority of Baker v Hines 406 SW 3d
21 (2013).
19 315 Md 97; 553 A 2d 684 (1989).
20 315 Md 97 (1989) at 103.
21 Ibid, at 107.
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The court did go on to note that the duty of the easement holder would be
different if the injured party had been one which the easement holder could not
rightfully exclude from the premises.22
The Court of Special Appeals subsequently held, by a majority, that the
actions of the Wagners were not wilful or wanton.23 Critical to this seemed to
be the finding that there was no reason for them to consider that people riding
at high speed and without protective clothing or lighting would venture onto
the property at midnight.
By contrast, a New York State Court in Piluso v Bell Atlantic Corporation
held that the servient owner was responsible when a jogger was injured while
running over the servient owner’s land. The servient owner had sought to deny
liability as the jogger had tripped over a utility wire the ownership of which
was vested in the entity receiving the benefit of a utility easement. In finding
liability, the court found that the servient owner still retained rights of control,
and could have removed the hazard without interfering with the easement
rights of the dominant owner. In other words, the servient owners retained
control.
While these American cases are perhaps only of minor interest to an
Australian court, it is the element of control that I wish to pursue as the key
ingredient in determining liability and responsibility between the dominant
and servient owners, particularly in respect to each other and to third parties.
My argument will be, and contrary to the view of Waite,24 that the
circumstances in which the servient owner should be held responsible for
liability to others, or that positive duties should be imposed on the servient
land owner towards the dominant owner are rare. My conclusion will be that
it is the dominant owner that should carry primary responsibility when a
dispute arises between the adjoining landowners; such as in respect of
maintenance or repairs to the right of way. In so doing, my argument stems
from the application of long accepted property law principles, and not in the
evolution of negligence law into this domain. In making this argument, I will
first address the foundational aspect of what is property. From this I will
discuss the rising influence of tort law into neighbourly relations where once
property principles stood unimpeded.
Property’s role
Doctrinally property law’s principles are clear. While context and fact specific,
the servient owner cannot object to what is reasonably done by a dominant
owner pursuant to the terms of an easement. The grant which formed the
foundation of that right expressly or implicitly includes the right to construct
the easement, and this right cannot be interfered with, or ameliorated, unless
damage would be done to the servient land. If some damage is done, the use
of the easement was beyond what was intended by the grant and this is what
founds liability. In this sense, what property law did was to reflect the
hierarchical supremacy of its doctrines. So, for example, it is the easement
holder, the dominant tenement, which is entitled to construct the access, to
22 Ibid, at 108 n 5.
23 Doehring v Wagner 80 Md App 237 (1989).
24 305 AD 2d 68 (2003).
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decide whether it is asphalt or reinforced turf, or to object to a barrier that
restricts or prevents the use of the easement (though this will only be valid if
it somehow restricts the use the easement as defined by the grant). In effect,
when resolving these cases what the judiciary is doing is deciding what
ownership, possession or to use the feudal language, what seisin means in this
context. In coming to this, property law, in the writer’s view, like Katz,25 is
largely built on ideas that the theoretical framework for deciding what is
property, and what it means to have a property interest, revolves around who
can set the agenda in relation to that thing. While some suggest property is
largely about exclusivity, (that is by removing others or denying others access
to your land, one sets the boundary or dominion around that interest with the
owner the sole, despotic decision-maker),26 whereas others see it as possibly
around the notion of a bundle of sticks or bundle or rights,27 in my view it
comes down to agenda setting. This asks us to consider who has the capacity
to set that agenda, or describe the plan in relation to that proprietary interest.
It encompasses notions of exclusivity and a bundle of sticks, but builds and
includes these to bring a coherence to property law and its outer limits.
For example in Yanner v Eaton, the High Court described property in the
following way, with these comments, incorporating the notion of control over
access, or what I have described as agenda setting:
The word ‘property’ is often used to refer to something that belongs to another.
But in the Fauna Act, as elsewhere in the law, ‘property’ does not refer to a thing;
it is a description of a legal relationship with a thing. It refers to a degree of power
that is recognised in law as power permissibly exercised over the thing. The concept
of ‘property’ may be elusive. Usually it is treated as a ‘bundle of rights’. But even
this may have its limits as an analytical tool or accurate description, and it may be,
as Professor Gray has said, that ‘the ultimate fact about property is that it does not
really exist: it is mere illusion. . .’.
Nevertheless, as Professor Gray also says ‘An extensive frame of reference is
created by the notion that “property” consists primarily in control over access. Much
of our false thinking about property stems from the residual perception that
“property” is itself a thing or resource rather than a legally endorsed concentration
of power over things and resources.’
‘Property’ is a term that can be, and is, applied to many different kinds of
relationship with a subject matter. It is not ‘a monolithic notion of standard content
and invariable intensity’. That is why, in the context of a testator’s will, ‘property’
has been said to be ‘the most comprehensive of all the terms which can be used,
inasmuch as it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which the party
can have’.
25 A J Waite, ‘Developing the law of easements: the role of the tort’ (1987) Conv (Jan-Feb) 47;
A J Waite, ‘Easements: Positive Duties on the Servient Owner’ (1985) 44 Cambridge LJ
458.
26 L Katz, ‘Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law’, (2008) 58 U Toronto LJ 275.
27 See, eg, J E Penner, ‘The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property’, (1996) 43 UCLA L Rev 711.
Sole and despotic refers to the work of Blackstone’s Commentaries.
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Because ‘property’ is a comprehensive term it can be used to describe all or any
of very many different kinds of relationship between a person and a subject matter.
To say that person A has property in item B invites the question what is the interest
that A has in B?28
Similar in Telstra v Commonwealth, the High Court opined that:
In the present case it is also useful to recognise the different senses in which the
word ‘property’ may be used in legal discourse. Some of those different uses of the
word were identified in Yanner v Eaton. In many cases . . . it may be helpful to speak
of property as a ‘bundle of rights’. At other times it may be more useful to identify
property as ‘a legally endorsed concentration of power over things and resources’.
Seldom will it be useful to use the word ‘property’ as referring only to the
subject-matter of that legally endorsed concentration of power.29
What does this mean in ascertaining the correct division of responsibility
between servient and dominant owners? What it suggests to me is that in
deciding the concentration of power in respect of an easement dispute, one is
required to consider who can set the agenda in relation to the proprietary
interest. What the common law has asked us to find is where that legally
endorsed concentration of power lies and this is answered by identifying who
has the capacity to set the agenda. What rights from the bundle that can be
enforced against the world at large, and specifically the servient owner.30
This is why I suggest the obligation of the servient tenement has, for the
most part, been expressed in the negative. This land owner must simply not do
anything that would impede with the right of the dominant owner to set the
agenda — the grant having been made by the original servient owner and
without a capacity to have it removed or taken away unless certain formalities
are met. Whereas the original servient proprietor established the bounds of
that agenda, in respect of one part of this land, a stick or right has been excised
and placed in the hands of another. Where the agenda cannot be set, then the
interest, such as the right of recreation,31 struggles to be considered an
easement — the holder unable to establish the parameters around what can, or
can’t be done with that right. When this idea of the agenda setting is seen as
paramount, and the principle by which the dominant owner guides the
relationship between the holder of the in rem right and the world at large, we
may then view property’s doctrinal thinking as paramount and governing. And
to do so, weakens the role of tort. If this is our understanding, the servient
owner will not have positive duties owed to the dominant tenement. The
former not having the capacity to set the agenda, nor to restrict or control what
the dominant landowner does.
But is this view supported by history. Waite32 suggests not. His research
28 One of the earlier articles identifying this is F Cohen, ‘Dialogue on Private Property’ (1954)
9 Rutgers L Rev 357.
29 (1999) 201 CLR 351; 166 ALR 258; [1999] HCA 53; BC9906413 at [17]–[20] (references
removed).
30 (2008) 234 CLR 210; 243 ALR 1; [2008] HCA 7; BC200801217 at [44].
31 For a recent discussion around the issue of the theory and importance of the notion of
property, see S N Glackin, ‘Back to bundles, deflating property rights, again’; (2014) 20(1)
Legal Theory 1.
32 Mounsey v Ismay (1865) 3 H & C 486; Re Ellenborough Park [1955] 3 All ER 667; Dukart
v District of Surrey (1978) 86 DLR (3d) 609.
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identified a long series of case stemming from the 1300’s which supported the
notion that positive duties were accepted. He states:
[Duties] on the servient owner to repair sea-walls, river banks and gutters, to clean
out ditches and other repairing obligations also appear to have ranked as easements.
These duties are well established and recognised in a long line of cases.33
Despite Waite’s view, which was repeated in a subsequent article in the
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer34 the modern position, at least from the
perspective of property law, appears to be clear. The servient tenement has no
obligation or liability to construct, maintain, or repair a right of way.35 By
contrast, circumstances can exist where the dominant owner may be liable for
failure to repair.36 The fee simple interest of the servient owner is
counterpoised by the existence of the easement; it is the latter that prescribes
the agenda. But is this view accepted within tort law?
The role of tort law
What we have seen in recent times in tort law is the development, particularly
in England, of a general duty to do what is reasonable in the circumstances to
‘prevent or minimise the known risk of damage or injury to one’s neighbour
or his property’.37 So for example in Goldman v Hargrave,38 a Privy Council
decision on appeal from Australian courts, it was held that in circumstances
where a red gum was struck by lightning and a fire resulted in damage to the
neighbour’s land, the landowner on which the red gum stood was responsible.
The landowner on which the tree stood had taken some measures to remove
the tree, but did nothing to stop the fire from spreading, believing that it would
burn itself out. The ratio of the court was that an occupier of land is under a
duty to remove or reduce hazards on his or her land, irrespective of whether
those hazards are man-made or natural. They did qualify, what initially may
be seen as a harsh decision, by suggesting that the existence of such a duty
will depend on the knowledge of the hazard, the consequences of not
checking, what should have been foreseen, and the capacity to reduce that
hazard. As noted by Butt, the applicability of this line of thinking in the
context of a servient owner’s obligations to repair an easement is that it is
possible tort law will be used to implant an obligation on the servient owner,
despite having granted the easement, and I would argue having transferred the
capacity to set the agenda to a dominant owner.39 Potentially tort law could
suggest that a servient owner should remove hazards, even if not man-made
that influence the use of the easement by the dominant owner.
33 A J Waite, ‘Easements; Positive Duties on the Servient Owner?’, (1985) 44(3) Cambridge LJ
458.
34 Ibid, at 461.
35 A J Waite, ‘Developing the law of easements: the role of the tort’ (1987) Conv (Jan-Feb) 47.
36 This is supported by a long line of cases, some of which are Taylor v Whitehead (1781) 2
Doug KB 745; Ingram v Morecroft (1863) 33 Beav 49; Southwark Borough Council v Mills
[2001] 1 AC 1; [2001] ANZ ConvR 266; [1999] 4 All ER 449; [1999] 3 WLR 939.
37 Jones v Prichard [1908] 1 Ch 630.
38 Leakey v National Trust [1980] QB 485; [1980] 1 All ER 17; [1980] 2 WLR 65, 524.
39 [1967] 1 AC 645; [1966] 2 All ER 989; [1966] 3 WLR 513; the Australian High Court
citation is Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40 at 51 per Taylor and Owen JJ, 62 per
Windeyer J.
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Our next case for consideration is the English decision of Leakey v National
Trust for Places of Historic Interest and Natural Beauty.40 The National Trust
were in ownership of a property on which there was a large conical hill. At the
base of the western side of this hill, lay the titles owned by Leakey. The hill
was particularly susceptible to cracking and slipping as a result of weather. A
large crack was noticed and the plaintiffs notified the National Trust that the
hill was liable to collapse. They offered to pay half the costs of remedial work.
The offer was not taken up, and a few weeks later, the banks of the hill
collapsed onto Leakey’s properties. The National Trust suggested that it had
no responsibility as this was the natural condition of the soil. Leakey was
successful in rebutting this. There was a general duty to minimise hazards on
one’s land, be they man-made or natural. The duty was to ‘to do which is
reasonable in all circumstances, and no more than that, if anything is
reasonable, to prevent or minimise the known risk of damage or injury to
one’s neighbour or his property’.41 While this decision concerned an action in
nuisance, the broader principle is very applicable to the scenario under
consideration. For example from this, it would be very easy to draw an
analogy that a servient owner has a positive duty to the dominant owner, and
to third parties to remove hazards, irrespective of whether they were
responsible for the hazard, that could foreseeably damage a neighbour.
The progeny of Leakey has been significant. For example in Bradburn v
Lindsay the defendant had permissively allowed dry rot to spread from her
house and infect the then adjoining property. The defendant’s house was then
demolished by local authorities because of the dry rot, and this left exposed a
party wall of the neighbours. Following Leakey, the defendant was held liable
for the damage to the neighbour. In Holbeck Hall Hotel Ltd v Scarborough
Borough Council,42 the hotel stood some 65 metres above the coastline. Due
to natural erosion, the grounds of the hotel and part of the building collapsed
into the sea. The problem had been identified and some remedial work
instigated by the hotel failed to alleviate the problem. The council which had
responsibility for the coastline had failed to take action to alleviate the
problems. In applying Goldman and Leakey, the Court of Appeal was satisfied
that a landowner could be liable where they had simply omitted to take the
necessary steps to prevent damage to a neighbour. However, on the facts
before the English Court, the council were not liable, the plaintiff unable to
show that the council had knowledge of the problem.43
Finally, the potential effect on these cases in respect of the law of easements
can be seen in Rees v Skerrett.44 In this case the English Court of Appeal held
that the owner of a property which is being demolished does owe a duty of
care to a neighbour to provide adequate protection against weathering. Any
concern that this decision would infringe the well-recognised rule that there
40 Butt, above n 1, at [16109].
41 [1980] QB 485; [1980] 1 All ER 17; [1980] 2 WLR 65. For academic discussion around this
cases and their progeny, see R A Buckley, ‘March of Negligence: Has Nuisance a Future’
(2007) 58 N Ir Legal Q 395; Hang Wu Tang, ‘The Right of Lateral Support of Buildings
from the Adjoining Land’ (2002) (May/June) Conv 237.
42 [1980] QB 485; [1980] 1 All ER 17; [1980] 2 WLR 65 at 83.
43 [2000] QB 836; [2000] 2 All ER 705; [2000] 2 WLR 1396.
44 Ibid, at [35].
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was no easement for protection from the weather45 was of no concern to the
court. ‘The balance between the position of those who are neighbours (both in
fact and in law) is now to be drawn differently . . .’.46 And by differently,
presumably the court meant differently from what the obligations in land law
would have imposed.
Critiquing torts role
While these authorities don’t directly provide a duty of care from a servient
owner to a dominant owner outside and in addition to the principles that apply
in property law, they certainly lead in that direction. But to extend them in
such a way would be a mistake. The person who owns an interest in property
has certain rights and obligations established by the bundle and defined by the
extent to which that person can set the agenda. In the jurisprudence of
easements, nuisance currently operates to enforce those obligations when
needed. Where, in the case of an easement, you have potentially competing
property rights — on the one hand, the fee simple owner, on the other, the
dominant tenement — the resolution of where responsibility should lie stems
from the acceptance of who can set the agenda. In the case of rights of way,
this is the dominant tenement. ‘Property is not a thing but a power relationship
. . . a relationship of social and legal legitimacy existing between a person and
a valued resource.’47 So in this power relationship who is best able to exploit
the rights that they have in relation to the land? Provided the servient owner
does nothing to deliberately infringe the capacity of the dominant tenement to
enjoy the right of way, that power belongs to the dominant tenement. It is they
who can set the agenda. An illustration of this can be seen in Transco plc v
Stockport Municipal Borough Council.48 In this case, the council were
responsible for the supply of water to a block of flats. For reasons that were
not discovered, a leak developed in the pipes, with the water than pooling
around an embankment. This caused the embankment to collapse exposing the
gas main of Transco. Transco had an easement in respect of this gas main.
Given the danger of an exposed and unsupported gas main Transco quickly
did emergency remedial work. It subsequently sought compensation of
£93,000 from the council. Without negligence being shown Transco relied on
the principle of Ryland v Fletcher,49 but were unsuccessful. This doctrine
(which no longer applies in Australia),50 being only relevant where the use is
shown to be extraordinary and unusual. However, what was relevant to the
instant discussion were the obiter comments by Lord Scott of Foscote. His
Honour remarked:
The same conclusion [that no liability to the Council should attach] can equally well
be reached by considering the relationship between the council as servient owner
and Transco as dominant owner of the easement under which Transco was entitled
to maintain the gas main in the embankment. It is well established that a servient
45 [2001] 1 WLR 1541; [2001] EWCA Civ 760.
46 Phipps v Pears [1963] 1 QB 76.
47 [2001] 1 WLR 1541; [2001] EWCA Civ 760 at [36].
48 K Gray and S F Gray, Elements of Land Law, 3rd ed, Butterworths, 2001, pp 93–9.
49 [2004] 2 AC 1; [2004] 1 All ER 589; [2003] 3 WLR 1467.
50 (1868) LR 3 HL 330.
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owner has, in general, no positive obligation to repair or keep in good condition the
servient land. Entitlement to the easement carries with it the subsidiary right of the
dominant owner to carry out any necessary repairs to the servient land (see generally
Gale on Easements 17th ed (2002), pp 51–2, para 1-86). A deliberate act by the
servient owner in damaging the servient land and thereby interfering with the
enjoyment of the easement would be actionable in nuisance. In principle I can see
no reason why a servient owner should not owe a duty of care to the dominant owner
not to damage the servient land so as to interfere with the enjoyment of the easement.
But it would, it seems to me, be contrary to principle to hold a servient owner liable
to the dominant owner for damage to the servient land, or for any other interference
with the easement, caused neither by a negligent act nor by an intentional act of the
servient owner.51
What Lord Scott of Foscote seems to be implying is that given the
well-recognised liability in nuisance of a servient owner who seeks to interfere
with the rights of a dominant owner, the extension to negligence and the
establishment of a duty of care is unnecessary. As noted recently by the High
Court, the ‘problems in determining the duty of care “may sometimes concern
the need to preserve the coherence of other legal principles”’.52 I would
suggest that this is such an area. The extension of the duty of care only
complicates an arrangement which is adequately covered by property law. The
coherence of the legal relationship between dominant and servient owner
undermined by any unnecessary imposition of tort law.
Where to from here
Land ownership is unique, distinct, and involves both rights and increasingly,
a sense of obligation or community to ones neighbours. In doing this, property
ownership has emerged from the exclusive ideas of dominion or despotic
control of Blackstones Commentaries to a scenario where, there is a sense of
mutual, communal, neighbourly responsibility. ‘Far from being an
untrammelled right, property is liable to be curtailed on all sides by an
interpenetrating sense of civic responsibility.’53 We can build on this without
the necessity to influence or impede property’s rules with the application of
negligence law. ‘Property law is the only generalisable device that operates
between persons whose relationship consists solely of mutual interaction with
a thing.’54 Easement law involves competition or priority setting between
people over the one thing. The way to resolve this is not to go down the path
of a generalised standard in negligence of a duty owed by a neighbour to
another — these principles can sit and be applicable where property law has
no role. Legal coherence is undermined where negligence occupies space
where centuries of common law thinking have struck a balance between the
51 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 120 ALR 42; [1994]
HCA 13; BC9404607.
52 [2004] 2 AC 1; [2004] 1 All ER 589; [2003] 3 WLR 1467 at [80] (emphasis added).
53 Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 313 ALR 408;
(2014) 88 ALJR 911; [2014] HCA 36; BC201408266 at [25] per French J, quoting from
Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 183 ALR 404; [2001] HCA 59; BC200106147 at
[50].
54 K Gray and S F Gray, ‘The Idea of Property in Land’ in Land Law Themes and Perspectives,
S Bright and J Dewar (Eds), Oxford, 1998, pp 1, 41.
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rights and obligations of the warring parties.55 In the case of easements and
disputes between the dominant and servient tenement, property law has a
history and provision of rules that can resolve the most modern of disputes.
We see evidence of this capacity in Clos Farming Estates v Easton.56 At its
heart, the question asked of the court was whether the right to operate a
vineyard could qualify as an easement. In saying no, Bryson J at the trial
level,57 made the following comments:
This is a novel scheme of ownership with rights of ownership not known to the law.
It is a re-invention, and an imposition on freehold title, of the substance of the
scheme of manorial and copyhold title which existed in England centuries ago and
has been abolished there, but was never introduced into Australia. In my opinion the
law of easements cannot be used to change the nature of freehold ownership in this
way and to create a substantially different kind of land title. The freeholders are
neutralised and powerless, unable to control or in truth to influence what is to happen
on their agricultural land. Putting the land to its highest and best use is impeded, to
the detriment of the public interest as well as the interests of the freeholders.58
My thoughts echo this sentiment. To introduce negligence law into the
relationship between the dominant and servient owner would be to create a
substantially different kind of land interest, one that is uncertain, unstable, and
subject to ongoing adjudication. The law of easements is well known, the
servient tenement cannot interfere with the access granted by the right of way
to the dominant tenement, but it is the dominant tenement that can set the
agenda in terms of how that way is to be constructed, and how it is to be
maintained. Waite suggests that:
The next logical step is to destroy or at least modify [the traditional easements rule].
The rule might be that the servient owner owes a duty of care to the dominant owner
to ensure that the servient tenement is sufficiently well repaired to avoid damage to
the dominant owner or to the dominant tenement.59
He goes on to further suggest that the common law’s motif is to provide
solutions and that there is ‘no good reason for stultifying necessary progress
by reference to artificial boundaries between different areas of the law’.60 This
is where I fundamentally disagree. To move beyond where we are by
establishing some nebulous responsibility on the servient tenement is both
undesirable and simply unnecessary. Working from the foundation principles
of what is a property interest, the control, or agenda setting from the bundle
of rights rests with the dominant owner. To reach beyond this paradigm is to
weaken the incidents of ownership that have been refined and considered and
understood for many centuries. There is no evidence that an overarching
55 L Bennett Moses, ‘The Applicability of Property Law in New Contexts: From Cells to
Cyberspace’ (2008) 30(4) Syd LR 639 at 641.
56 See the comments in Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 183 ALR 404; [2001] HCA 59;
BC200106147 at [42].
57 (2001) 10 BPR 18,184.
58 On appeal the decision of Bryson J was upheld: Clos Farming Estates Pty Ltd v Easton
(2002) 11 BPR 20,605.
59 (2001) 10 BPR 18,184 at [50].
60 A J Waite, ‘Developing the law of easements: the role of the tort’ (1987) Jan-Feb, Conv 47
at 49.
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reconceptualization of the duty between the dominant and servient tenement
is necessary. Any such move must be resisted.
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Developing the ultimate cadastre: Using
indefeasibility to guarantee geodetic defined
land boundaries
Lynden Griggs*
Boundary disputes between neighbours can often escalate beyond their
objective economic worth. The law has provided many approaches to resolve
these disputes.These measures have included the law of adverse possession,
encroachment legislation, rectification of the title register, survey adjudication
based upon the competing opinions of land surveyors, as well as reliance on
the good sense of neighbours to resolve these matters amicably. However, one
thing is clear in the law – the Australian States, through their title registers, do
not guarantee the boundaries of a parcel of land as depicted on the plan
attached to certificates of title. The argument presented here is that with the
development and integration of a fully digital cadastre, and the role of the
surveying profession in the development and implementation of Cadastre
2034, the time is appropriate to begin the legal steps to extend indefeasibility
to the boundaries of land. This article seeks to begin the discussion that could
see land law move hand-in-hand with Cadastre 2034 to establish, by that year,
a legally coordinated cadastre, with indefeasibility extending to the granting of
boundaries. The possibilities and advantages of linking the land administration
records with a digital cadastral map are too significant to dismiss as either
unnecessary, too expensive, or unneeded.
INTRODUCTION
Land Surveying is not an exact science like mathematics and where there is a discrepancy the actual
boundaries of the allotment sold, prevail over measurements and bearing shown in the grant, the map or
plan being intended merely as a picture of what is found on the ground.1
Boundary disputes are a particularly painful form of litigation. Feelings run high and disproportionate
amounts of money are spent. Claims to small and valueless pieces of land are pressed with the zeal of
Fortinbras’ army. It is therefore important that the law on boundaries should be as clear as possible.2
The Torrens system of land registration guarantees, through the prism of indefeasibility, the estate or
interest as noted on the applicable State register of land holdings. But what the Torrens system does
not do is guarantee the physical boundaries of the specific lot. This is what the spatial cadastre does.
Through fixed boundaries (such as survey measurements) and general boundaries (such as physical
features within the land) the corners of a particular parcel of land are mapped with precision, with any
dispute between surveyors ultimately resolved by the courts. The spatial cadastre then relates to the
textual component, with the latter represented by the Torrens register. Even in those countries where a
cadastre has not been developed, land boundaries act in a similar way to the fences of suburban
Australia. Reflecting the social relationship between the people in possession of those lands,3 land
* Academic, University of Tasmania. Thanks are expressed to Dr Jon Osborn (Senior Lecturer in Surveying and Spatial Sciences,
University of Tasmania), and a referee for valuable insights. Any errors are the responsibility of the author.
1 National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of A’Asia Ltd v Hasset (1907) VLR 404, 412.
2 Alan Wibberley Building Ltd v Insley (1999) 78 P & CR 327, 328 (this case involved two neighbours warring for 11 years over
a hedge). The reference to Fortinbras’ army is a reference to Hamlet, Act IV, Sc IV, where Hamlet meets Captain Fortinbras who
is moving to retake a worthless piece of Poland: “We go to gain a little patch of ground/ That hath in it no profit but the name./
To pay five ducats, five, I would not farm it”.
3 See the comments by Rohan Bennett, Paul van der Molen and Jaap A Zevenbergen, “Fitted, Green and Volunteered: Legal and
Survey Complexities of Future Boundary Systems” (2012) 66(3) Geomatica 181, 181.
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boundaries4 exist to set parameters around the use of land, the extent of one’s rights in that parcel and
as a means to define and set limits around territorial disputes. What this article seeks to do is to begin
a discussion as to how the legal and surveying profession can work together to develop a legally
coordinated cadastre; ie one combining spatial and textual components, with indefeasibility extending
to both. This goal, long-term in its vision, would work with the International Government Committee
on Surveying and Mapping and its flagship document, Cadastre 2034,5 to establish a cadastral system
that would enable people to easily identify the extent of their rights, obligations and restrictions in
relation to land. It would provide an integration of the legal and spatial interests and deliver a “digital
representation [of land] that is survey accurate, 3-dimensional and dynamic”.6
The importance of boundary identification, however, is nothing new. The first common law
method of conveyancing7 involved what was known as “livery of seisin” where the vendor and
purchaser would meet on the actual location, with abutting neighbours as witnesses. In this era before
writing, the verbal acknowledgement was stated, in a clear and firm voice, as to what was being sold,
with the boundaries identified and located by expert witnesses. This was variously known as “beating
the bounds”, “hunting the borough” or “perambulation”. As the parties walked across the land, and to
ensure that the boundaries were memorised, adults would somehow mark the spot, often by the act of
holding a child on the spot and hitting the child’s head onto the specific location, or by lesser
traumatic events such as hitting the spot with sticks.8 When writing become the norm, these acts were
recorded in the parish books of the local church, which often imposed legal, religious and spiritual
weight upon the transaction. Once writing became the norm, and centralised authority more accepted,
logic and reason dictated that the perambulations of the past would be removed in favour of legal
recognition and use of the metes (this referring to distance and direction) and bounds (this referring to
the fixed points which anchor the measurements with this, including objects as diverse as rocks, rivers,
trees, or some artificial object)9 as the way in which the boundaries of land could be identified. It was
this description of the land, and the enactment of the Statute of Uses in the 16th century in the United
Kingdom (allowing conveyance by deed) that allowed the transfer and identification of land to occur
without any necessity to walk or be present physically on the location of the land. The deed would
provide the metes and bounds of the land, and today, some 500 years later, it could be said that little
has advanced with the plan of the land attached to the title often describing the land by way of
distance, but precise determination of corner boundaries and distances between those boundaries still
to be determined by the hierarchy of evidence10 used by the surveying profession, with this
4 The definition of a “land boundary” is the “three-dimensional space, its position identified by natural or imaginary points
located by reference to the earth’s crust”: Peter Butt, Land Law (LawBook Co, 6th ed, Sydney, 2010) [202]. See also Callinan J
in Risk v Northern Territory (2002) 210 CLR 392; [2002] HCA 23, [119].
5 Intergovernmental Committee on Surveying and Mapping, Cadastre 2034: Powering Land & Real Property <http://
www.icsm.gov.au/cadastral/Cadastre2034.pdf> (Cadastre 2034).
6 Cadastre 2034, n 5, 6.
7 For a discussion of the history of conveyancing, see Allegra Bonaventura, “Beating the Bounds: Property and Perambulation
in Early New England” (2007) 19 Yale JL and Human 19.
8 As noted by Bonaventura, n 7, 117: “Beating the bounds was a customary Old English ‘performance’, understood here as an
enacting of events that 1) evokes the senses and 2) serves to validate that event, especially in law. These perambulations were
annual Rogation rites (occurring on the three days preceding Ascension Thursday in the Christian liturgical calendar) at which
the inhabitants of an English parish gathered to walk, mark and verify its bounds. As the processional party passed through the
landscape, men struck bounds, markers and sometimes children with sticks, stones, or other gear. When the bounders reached
significant points along the way, adults might lift a child upside down, memorably touching the spot with the child’s head. The
rite of perambulation had legal effect, record of which priests wrote into parish books at a time when church courts had
jurisdiction over property and probate matters. Originally, it also carried both religious meaning and spiritual power.”
9 See LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia (2 December 2013), Title 355 Real Property, “Boundaries, Fences and
Encroachments” [355-13910].
10 This clause is designed to support the hierarchy of evidence as follows: 1. natural features; 2. original crown marking of grant
boundaries; 3. monuments; 4. original undisturbed marking of private surveys; 5. occupations; 6. measurements. The relative
importance of each matter is subject to other evidence to the contrary. NSW Government, Surveyor General’s Directions No 7,
Surveying Regulation Application, cl 19.
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information placed before a legal decision-maker with authority to resolve competing disputes. The
accuracy and importance of this cannot be understated, the value of a registry dependent on the asset
in the seen world corresponding to its description in the spatial and textual components of the
cadastre.11
While we still rely largely on distances and objects as the core for describing the boundaries of
land, what is less understood is the connection between surveying and the Torrens system of land
registration. It is suggested that the land administration system, working in harmony with the
surveying industry, could achieve the guarantee of land boundaries under the umbrella of
indefeasibility. As pointed out by the previously mentioned Intergovernmental Committee on
Surveying and Mapping: “The cadastral systems of Australia underpin stable and reliable registration
of land based property rights. They serve as the foundation for effective land tenure transactions and in
securing the legal status of property boundaries”.12 To ensure that this aspiration can work, and given
that political and economic drivers demand the digitisation of our world (a matter to which the
surveying industry is not immune and has embraced),13 the legal concept of indefeasibility must be
amended to incorporate the guarantee of the boundaries as represented by the title plans. This must,
however, be accompanied by a simple, inexpensive mechanism that would allow minor encroachments
to be resolved by an adjudicator with designated statutory powers.14 Described judicially, where it
exists, as remedial legislation,15 this type of enactment overcomes the problems of the common law
where the primary rules are that the offending encroachment should be removed, or an order for
possession provided to the landowner on which the building encroaches.16 Encroachment legislation
provides for a remedial smorgasboard, with options including: the payment of compensation; the
conveyance, transfer, or lease to the encroaching owner of an estate or interest in the encroached land;
or the removal of the encroachment. In determining which remedy to apply, the court will have regard
to the extent of the encroachment, the effect the encroachment has on the value of the land, the
interference that the encroachment causes, the cost of removal and the damage such removal would
cause.17 Knowledge of the encroaching owner will also be relevant.18
With Australian Torrens legislation currently allowing adverse possession claims to override the
registered title, with the registered owner unable to access the compensation provisions of the
assurance fund,19 and misdescription of boundaries an exception to indefeasibility,20 a new process
and regime is required to ensure that, as far as possible, the de jure, or true boundaries, accord with
what is currently happening on the land, or what could be described as the de-facto possessory
11 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, “Of Property and Information” (2016) 116 Colum L Rev 237, 244.
12 Cadastre 2034, n 5.
13 Simon Chester, “Creating an Authoritative Virtual World”, Spatial Source online, August/September 2014, 28-29
<www.spatialsource.com.au> explains the concept of a new legal framework whereby a virtual world will mirror the physical
world, and allow the trading in the digital rights associated with land. The digital database would be a single authorised database
for all property related activities. “In time, when we buy and sell property, we will hand over the digital key to our virtual
property alongside the physical key to the property” (29). See also the website of the Virtual Australia and New Zealand
Initiative, <www.vanzi.com.au>.
14 Encroachment legislation is currently existing in the Northern Territory (Encroachment of Buildings Act 1982 (NT)); New
South Wales (Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW)); Queensland (Property Law Act 1974 (Qld)); South Australia
(Encroachments Act 1944 (SA)); and Western Australia (Property Law Act 1969 (WA)).
15 Clarke v Wilkie (1977) 17 SASR 134, 139; Bunney v South Australia (2000) 77 SASR 319; [2000] SASC 141, [29]; Steven
M Clark No 3 Pty Ltd v Noack (2004) SASC 249, [30].
16 Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v PCH Melbourne Pty Ltd (2007) 20 VR 311; [2007] VSCA 311. LJP Investments Pty Ltd v
Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490. In extreme circumstances it is possible that a building built entirely
on the wrong block will belong to the owner of the land on which the building is constructed, rather than the person building the
house: Brand v Chris Building Co Pty Ltd [1957] VR 625.
17 Encroachment of Buildings Act 1982 (NT) s 6; Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW) s 3; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld)
s 185; Encroachments Act 1944 (SA) s 4; and Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s 123 (relief granted where just and equitable).
18 Pesic v South Sydney Municipal Council [1978] 1 NSWLR 135, 142.
19 MM Park and IP Williamson, “The Need to Provide for Boundary Adjustments in a Registered Title Land System” (2003) 48
Australian Surveyor 50, 51.
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boundaries. To achieve this, the cadastre and the land administration system must unite as one to form,
in what is described in this article as the legally coordinated cadastre, with the support and need for
this highlighted by the considerable wealth that land adds to the collective riches of Australia. Torrens
jurisdictions can only benefit from an enhanced alignment between the asset (ie the land) and the
information pertaining to that land (such as the interests relevant to that land and the boundaries of the
parcel).21
Importantly, this move would also respond to contemporary macro inputs, such as the need for the
cadastre to provide real-time information that relates to emergency management in times of natural
disasters. It would also allow us to use the technological drivers that we currently have, such as the
capacity of wireless sensor networks to enable the onsite linking of property boundary information
with land administration networks, as well as advancing the use of the cadastre in the financing of
security interests.22 The ultimate aim is for the division between maps and registers to be abolished,
enabling a new integrated role for conveyancers and surveyors.23
THE IMPORTANCE OF LAND
There is no doubting the importance of land to the Australian psyche. In a nation with total assets
approximating $12.5 trillion in 2014, land is far and away the asset class with the highest value,
comprising 34% of the value of our national assets.24 The next most significant asset class, and for
many purposes these would not be differentiated from the title to land itself (offices, factories and
other infrastructure) comprises some 18%, with dwellings constituting a further 15% of the balance
sheet.
What is perhaps more remarkable is the extra resources the Australian households have used to
purchase, from one another, the land on which these bigger and better dwellings sit. Indeed, most of the
extra money that has gone into residential property has not gone into the physical stock of housing, but
rather into land. So our fascination with housing is really, mostly, a fascination with land.25
This interest in land, however, is neither an Australian phenomenon nor particularly new. History
informs us of the challenges of the Greek and Roman26 empires in controlling the land which they
possessed, to the current modern-day disputes concerning land. The exclusion of others from that land
and the right to the resources of that land is central to the relationship that one person, one state, one
group has with terra firma. Even more fundamentally, the relationship that humans have with each
other involves a right to control land and space. Land has become central to government thinking, is
critical to the policy machinations of major political parties, and is a lever by which stability in the
central economy can be achieved. More prosaically, however, suburban boundary disputes can be
20 Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 58(1)(c); Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 42(1)(c); Land Title Act 2000 (NT) s 189(1)(f); Land
Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1)(g); Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 69(c); Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 40(3)(f); Transfer of Land
Act 1958 (Vic) s 42(1)(b); Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 68(1).
21 As noted by Bell and Parchomovsky, n 11, 276: “The Torrens System is even more valuable when combined with a common
reform that has generally accompanied Torrens registration systems … land parcels are commonly circumscribed in one of two
systems. In the metes-and-bounds system, land parcels can be irregular in shape, and they are circumscribed by features of the
land and measures described in a deed or other document. The rectangular system, by contrast, describes land by coordinates on
a common map … because Torrens systems and rectangular systems often go together, Torrens jurisdictions often frequently
benefit from both advantageous asset configurations and from the tight alignment between asset and information”.
22 See the comments by Rohan Bennett, Abbass Rajabifard et al, “Cadastral Futures: Building A New Vision for the Nature and
Role of Cadastres” (Paper presented to the FIG Congress 2010, Sydney, 11-16 April 2010) 6-7, copy held with the author.
23 See Daniel Steudler (ed), Cadastre 2014 and Beyond (FIG Publication No 61) Figures 1 and 3,
<https://www.fig.net/resources/publications/figpub/pub61/Figpub61.pdf>.
24 Reserve Bank of Australia, “National Wealth, Land Values and Monetary Policy” (Address by Philip Lowe, Deputy Governor
Reserve Bank of Australia to the 54th Shann Memorial Lecture, 12 August 2015) 1, 3.
25 Reserve Bank of Australia, n 24, 7. At the end of 2014, Australians owed some $1.4 trillion in housing loans, against value of
property that amounted to $5.2 trillion. Cadastre 2034, n 5, 9.
26 In 173BC, Lucius Postumius Albinus, a senior figure within the Roman Empire, was required to be sent to southern Italy to
resolve a dispute between the state and private citizens who were expanding their land into the public space:
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucius_Postumius_Albinus_(consul_173_BC)>.
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costly and stressful. An illustration of this is the litigation between Wibberley and Insley where an
11-year protracted boundary dispute over a strip of land some 87ft by 6ft and worth a few hundred
pounds saw 11 judges hearing the matter, some £500,000 in costs incurred and the loss by the
ultimately successful plaintiff of his computer business and his life savings.27 If we are unable to
identify who owns what, the chilling effect on the investment economy, productivity, and economic
growth is significant.28
In answering this question, as to who owns what, history informs us that, originally, possession
(the state of affairs speaking to what can be seen on the land) was critical, but as our appreciation of
land evolved financially, emotionally and culturally, the land administration systems in all Western
jurisdictions became increasingly formalised. In Australia, this was most evident with the adoption of
the Torrens system of land registration, the mechanical process whereby the registration of a dealing to
a public database was not merely evidence of ownership, but the creation of ownership. Evolving from
this to the constituent elements of an integrated legally coordinated cadastre would allow us:
1. to know for certain who the owner of the land is (traditionally, the domain of the textual
component of the register situated at the Land Titles Office);
2. to understand the extent of that ownership right (with this information gleaned from the Registrar
as interpreted by the common law);
3. to identify who controls the right to deal with the land; most commonly this will be the
mortgagee, (sometimes not clear from the textual component, but an aspect of increasing
importance);29
4. to understand the limitations public law brings to land ownership (such as heritage restrictions,
the identification of land as bushfire or flood prone, planning and subdivision concerns, or
conservation covenants); and, finally, and most critically for this article
5. to identify the boundaries of the land so that it is clearly and specifically possible to articulate the
physical portions to which that parcel relates (the spatial component presently within the realm of
the surveying profession).30
Property is defined and illustrated by its shape, its texture and its context. Land should, because of
its relative fixed location within the crust of the Earth, be easily and conclusively bound by its own
parameters.31 While it unnecessary to present a summary of the law surrounding boundary disputes in
this article, others having already articulated this,32 it is suggested that it is entirely possible, as other
jurisdictions have done, to guarantee boundaries within the concept of indefeasibility and by so doing
connect the spatial component of the cadastre to the land title system. If this is achieved, Australia will
27 Alan Wibberley Building Ltd v Insley (1999) 78 P & CR 327; see Clare Dyer, “Lord’s Ruling Ends 11-year Hedge Row”
<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/apr/30/claredyer>.
28 This is evidenced by what is occurring in Greece where the weakness of land titles and the cadastral system in that country
has been directly linked to the difficulties that that nation faces in achieving its economic recovery: Suzanne Daley, “Who Owns
this Land? In Greece, Who Knows”, The New York Times, 26 May 2013.
29 See, eg the Registrar-General’s directions in New South Wales: <http://rgdirections.lpi.nsw.gov.au/e-dealings/control_right_
deal>. Control of the right to deal will often be shown by possession of the certificate of title, or possession of the e-certificate
of title.
30 See generally Fernando P Mendez Gonzalez, “Property Rights, Boundaries and Legal Transactions: Musings on the Land
Registry and Some of the Challenges it Faces” (1 January 2015), 4 <http://www.elra.eu/author/fpmendez>.
31 Though it is recognised that the doctrine of accretion (Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia [1982] AC 706;
[1982] 2 WLR 544; [1982] 1 All ER 283; Sunlea Investments Pty Ltd v New South Wales (1995) 7 BPR 14,598) and the doctrine
of diluvion (Re Hull & Selby Railway Co (1839) 151 ER 139; 5 M & W 327) can alter those boundaries from time to time. It
should also be noted that a fixed location is relative to its neighbours. Australia, for example, is moving some 70mm each year
to the north-east. As to how this might be reflected in a dynamic spatial datum is difficult to say at this stage. With the
movement of the earth’s crust, the combining of the digital datum with an acknowledgement that a current position can only be
located by a shared representation with the boundaries and distances of the plotted land may be the spatial solution needed. For
a discussion as to how the continent of Australia is moving, see <http://www.ga.gov.au/webtemp/image_cache/GA10407.pdf>.
32 For a summary of the law regarding land boundaries, see LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia (2 December 2013) Title
355 Real Property, “Land Boundaries” [355-14033]; Lawbook Co, The Laws of Australia (1 March 2013) Title 28 Real
Property, Ch 15 Physical Limits to Land [28.15.1070]-[28.15.1140].
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remove an impediment that can hinder economic investment and promote community and civil discord
between neighbours. Today, the surveying industry will often rely on physical monuments, aerial
photos, survey pegs (often removed or displaced), and adjacent lands to identify the boundaries when
digital data through the geodetic system can precisely identify the corners that make up the parcel of
land to which Torrens provides a connecting title. At the present time, however, we are constrained in
the way noted in Comserv (No 1877) Pty Ltd v Figtree Gardens Caravan Park:
Identifying the land described and accepting the indefeasibility of title to that land are quite different
things. The Certificate of Title certifies title and does not certify that the land has all the dimensions and
characteristics attributed to it in the Deposited Plan. As with other documents which are human
productions, it must be recognised and accepted that there may be inaccuracies and misdescriptions,
which may appear either wholly from an attempt to resolve among themselves the statements in the
plan or from an attempt to apply the plan to the facts found on the ground. Where inconsistencies
appear it is necessary to press on and to make a finding on the probabilities about what land was the
subject of description (even imperfect description) in the Deposited Plan when it was written …33
THE CURRENT STATE OF INDEFEASIBILITY AND THE GUARANTEE OF BOUNDARIES
State legislation in Australia is not, as is disappointingly common in the federation, uniform when it
comes to the relationship between indefeasibility and the boundaries of land; though it must be said
that there does seem to be some consistency in the outcome, though not in the process to get there. To
summarise, indefeasibility is not granted where any portion of land by a wrong description has been
included in the title of the land.34 Apart from the jurisdictions of Tasmania, Queensland and the
Northern Territory, the legislation then provides an exception for the purchaser for valuable
consideration who does gain indefeasibility.35 Undoubtedly included to deal with surveying errors
(though not exclusively),36 or errors in the conversion of general law land to Torrens title (again not
solely),37 the misdescription exception to indefeasibility relates to the scenario where there is
misdescription of land over which title is claimed,38 rather than a scenario where there is a correct
description of land where title has been issued with the applicant suggesting that this does not
correspond to what is owned. In the former, indefeasibility will not extend to the land held by the
owner, though it will extend to a bona fide purchaser in the majority of jurisdictions. In the latter, the
matter will be dealt with under the prior certificate of title exception to indefeasibility, such that if the
titles are considered competing, the first title issued will prevail.39
Thus, while it may be said that purchasers of value (at least in most States) do get a title from
which they cannot be ejected even though the boundaries are in error, this provision has no application
to bequests, or to volunteers, or to situations where the boundary dispute is minimal and an action in
ejectment would not lie. Despite the limited operational sphere of the misdescription exception to
33 Comserv (No 1877) Pty Ltd v Figtree Gardens Caravan Park (1999) 102 LGERA 74, [30].
34 Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 58(1)(c); Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 42(1)(c); Land Title Act 2000 (NT) s 189(1)(f); Land
Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1)(g); Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 69(c); Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 40(3)(f); Transfer of Land
Act 1958 (Vic) s 42(1)(b); Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 68(1). There is a specific statutory exception for the purchaser for
value in: South Australia (Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 69(c)); Victoria (Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 42(1)(b)); New
South Wales (Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 42(1)(c)); the Australian Capital Territory (Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT)
s 58(1)(c)); and Western Australia (Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 68(2)(b)(ii)).
35 The ejectment provision in Tasmania (Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 149) provides that a person cannot be ejected from land
where are they are a bona fide purchaser of land and there has been a misdescription of the boundaries. Indirectly, Queensland
may also achieve the same outcome: see Beames v Leader [2000] 1 Qd R 347; [1998] QCA 368. It is unclear what the position
in the Northern Territory would be.
36 For example, it was the solicitor in error in Pleasance v Allen (1889) 15 VLR 601, 602.
37 See Michael v Onisiforou (1977) 1 BPR 9356.
38 Marsden v McAlister (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 300.
39 Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 58(1)(a); Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 42(1)(a); Land Title Act 2000 (NT) s 189(1)(d);
Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1)(e); Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 69(e); Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 40(3)(b); Transfer of
Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 42(1)(a); Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 68(1). For a discussion of the operation of the exceptions
relating to misdescription and to prior certificate of title, see Penny Carruthers and Natalie Skead, “The Prior Certificate of Title
and Wrong Description of Land Exceptions to Indefeasibility: Resolving the Overlap” (2009) 17 APLJ 241.
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indefeasibility suggesting that the extension of indefeasibility to boundaries may be unnecessary, the
view of the legal profession in Tasmania that, potentially, as many as one in 20 boundaries are
incorrect,40 and the recent South Australian decision of Skalkos v Gebski,41 all serve to highlight the
continuing resonance of this issue. In Skalkos, neighbours were in dispute about the boundaries of
land, and three surveyors employed produced different results flowing from the methodology used by
each surveyor (one had relied primarily on previous surveys that had been lodged with the land titles
office, the others primarily relied on evidence of occupation). In considering the evidence presented,
Anderson J decided in favour of reliance on the certified survey that had been provided to the registry
office, and which had been relied upon by the Registrar. In that instance, possession and identification
surveys were not to override the existing registered surveys and the survey marks.42
Today we can address the problems noted by Moore, who said:
Many Certificates of Title are not based on survey, and errors in survey and differences in standard of
chainage mean that any attempt to treat measurements in Certificates of Title as being invariably of
paramount importance in fixing boundaries must lead to wrong decisions.43
THE MARRIAGE OF THE SPATIAL CADASTRE WITH THE TEXTUAL CADASTRE
The availability today of geodetic data,44 collocated with a mature and well-understood legislative
regime maintained by knowledgeable and experienced staff, enables us to consider a marriage of the
two elements of the cadastral system. This would see indefeasibility extending to the boundaries of
land, thus reducing inefficiencies demonstrated through legally contested boundary disputes.45 We can
finally combine the textual component, ie the land administration system which identifies the land
property parcels, and the rights, restrictions, encumbrances), with the spatial component, represented
by the cadastral maps identifying parcels of land identified through fixed and general boundaries.46
What this linkage can achieve is to connect the physical to the legal, the soil to the tenurial interests,
the land to the legal estate,47 and to establish a unified legally coordinated cadastre where the
boundaries of land are determined by some digital datum that might48 encompass a shared
representation between absolute coordinates as well as metes and bounds and linked to the registered
estates and interests noted on the current textual title. Large-scale resurveys of boundary points have
40 Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania, Report on Adverse Possession and Other Possessory Claims to Land, Report No 73
(1995) 22: “As many as 1 in 20 suburban properties [have] problems with boundaries [and] the ability to regularise these
problems … is an essential part of practical conveyancing in Tasmania”.
41 Skalkos v Gebski [2011] SASC 213.
42 Skalkos v Gebski [2011] SASC 213, [82], [102].
43 John E Moore, “Land by the Water” (1968) 41 ALJ 532, 533.
44 Geocentric Datum of Australia is the datum for horizontal coordinates or position in Australia. It has been introduced by all
State and Commonwealth authorities. It is linked with the global satellite navigation systems. See <http://www.ga.gov.au/
scientific-topics/positioning-navigation/geodesy/geodetic-datums/gda> for a discussion of this.
45 It should be noted that surveyors do a lot more than simply determine boundaries. For this reason, some purchasers may still
require surveys when buying land. For example, surveyors will also consider underground and aboveground easements and the
location of boundary setbacks. The advantage of using GPS/GNSS data for the boundary identification is that consumers will be
able to more easily identify for themselves whether the boundaries are correct.
46 Kate Dalrymple, Ian Williamson and Jude Wallace, “Cadastral Systems within Australia” (2003) 48 Australian Surveyor 37,
40. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider, but given the movement of the earth’s crust relative to its GPS location,
consideration would need to be given as to whether the dynamic datum provided by the spatial cadastre would encompass
distances and directions rather than precise coordinates, or a dynamic datum represented by absolute coordinates with distances
and directions – a shared representation as such.
47 As noted by Bennett, van der Molen and Zevenbergen, n 3, 190: “History shows that an exemplary tool for [the task of
providing strength to artificial boundaries] is the cadastral survey, with all its legal and technical dimensions: it links the fiat to
the bona-fide, the legal to the physical”. See also Cadastre 2034, n 5, 17 which speaks of the need to align legislation and survey
law, and linking rights, restrictions and responsibilities on the land, with all interests on land spatially depicted.
48 Such a shared representation may be necessary because of the movement of the earth’s crust. See n 31.
Developing the ultimate cadastre: Using indefeasibility to guarantee geodetic defined land boundaries
(2016) 5 Prop L Rev 149 155
already been completed in New Zealand49 and Quebec,50 with work also being undertaken in South
Korea.51 The advantages of this cannot be underestimated and, for Australia, should not be quickly
discarded. The legally coordinated cadastre is in place in Austria,52 and to a degree in Singapore
(though land boundaries are not guaranteed in the sense that is used here) as well as Sweden,53 though
it must be recognised that in many of these countries their historical evolution of the cadastre led to a
substantially different culture and practice around conveyancing.54
For Australia, the failure to travel this path may well lead us to the same concerns highlighted by
the British Columbian Court of Appeal decision in Phillips v Keefe,55 where, in a dispute about a
fenceline (echoing the previously mentioned dispute between Wibberley and Insley), the land was
worth some Can$40,000, damages of Can$16,000 were awarded, and the parties spent in the vicinity
of Can$280,000 to resolve the dispute.56 What occurred was that the property of Phillips was located
adjacent to the property of Keefe. The original survey that supported the property boundaries was
detailed in an 1893 subdivision plan. A surveyor undertook a survey in 1989 and, as was later
established, he incorrectly came to the view that the fenceline of the adjoining property needed to be
moved some four metres. The approach of this surveyor was to consider all the evidence, including
some wooden stakes, and, after concluding that these were not original, he adopted a mathematical
algorithm to find the correct fenceline. Following this, some of the neighbours in this particular street,
including the Keefes, tore down the existing fence and removed trees and other plants that they
believed were on their property. While the Keefes ultimately sold and moved on, Phillips sued in
trespass as well as for the repair of the fence.
Surveyors subsequently appointed by the plaintiffs disagreed with the approach of the first
surveyor, instead accepting that the fenceline was evidence of occupation relating back to the time of
the original survey. Their view was that the original fence was constructed in line with the first
monuments and could, therefore, be related back to the original survey.57 This was accepted by the
judge.
49 For a discussion of the New Zealand digital cadastre, see: <http://www.linz.govt.nz/data/linz-data/property-ownership-and-
boundary-data/accuracy-digital-cadastre>. As noted at <http://www.linz.govt.nz/land>: “Topographic data, or maps, show the
physical features of land – critical information for emergency response, defence planning and land management. The ‘cadastre’,
the official collection of land records, captures property boundaries, telling us where pieces of land start and end. Such a
national record of physical features is critical in helping us understand our country and its assets, and for supporting economic
development … Together, these elements form the backbone of one of the world’s most efficient and robust property rights
system. It’s so certain, it’s even Government guaranteed.” The Canterbury Earthquakes in New Zealand in 2011 also presented
particular difficulties for a guaranteed systems of titles and land boundaries. Legislation is proposed to assist with this:
Canterbury Property Boundaries and Related Matters Bill 2015 (NZ).
50 A description of the Quebec process and its ongoing role to ensure accuracy of the register can be seen here:
<http://mern.gouv.qc.ca/english/land/cadastre/index.jsp>, though it is conceded that Quebec, with its origins in civil law, rather
than common law, was always likely to marry the land titles to the cadastre.
51 Bennett, Molen and Zevenbergen, n 3, 184.
52 Kristin Andreasson, “Legal Coordinated Cadastres – Theoretical Concepts and The Case of Singapore” (Paper delivered to
XXIII FIG Congress, Munich, Germany, 8-13 October 2006) 1, 2.
53 Andreasson, n 52. An outline of the Swedish process can be found at
<http://www.lantmateriet.se/en/Real-Property/My-Property-/Uncertainties-regarding-real-property>.
54 For example, in Sweden a municipal officer will have a central role in determining boundaries, there is no role for private
surveyors, and no rules of adverse possession. This can be contrasted with Australia where disputes between neighbours about
boundaries, employing their own experts, is played out in the court system, and adverse possession, in various guises, still exists.
55 Phillips v Keefe [2012] BCCA 123.
56 Izaak de Rijcke, “Phillips v Keefe, Legal Uncertainty of a Boundary Location, or Uncertainty of Remedies for the Resolution
of Boundary Disputes” (2012) 66 Geomatica 56, 59.
57 See the discussion by the trial judge Dickson J in Phillips v Keefe [201] BCSC 2005, [77]-[86]. The judge applied the
hierarchy taken by surveyors in determining boundaries. It was described in this way at [66]: “The boundary lines of land
conveyed in a grant, should a dispute arise, is a matter for legal determination: … The common law rule governing resolution
of boundary disputes mirrors the survey profession’s hierarchy of evidence. In Nicholson v Halliday (2005) 74 OR (3d) 81, the
Griggs
(2016) 5 Prop L Rev 149156
As commented by Rijcke, in a reflection on this decision, and endorsed by the present author:
We now have a finding of “legal correctness” for this one boundary. But is the outcome worth the cost.
Most laypersons would definitely not think so … But laypersons keep resorting to the courts in order to
adjudicate boundary disputes. The propensity to litigate over a boundary must have a benefit that is
more about non-economic factors … [As] a society we have … reached the point of intolerance for this
state of affairs. Litigation as a means of accomplishing legal certainty and correctness of a boundary
location seems to be a luxury that we can no longer afford in respect of just one boundary.58
If this example informs us of anything, it is the need to think creatively to respond to the current
impasse or dissonance between the land administration system and the spatial cadastre. A comity
between the two would achieve innumerable benefits, not the least of which would be the elimination
of claims of the nature that occurred in Phillips v Keefe and Alan Wibberley Building Ltd v Insley.
Scenarios such as these cannot be allowed to fester, if only because the legal costs and fracturing of
civil discord must outweigh the perceived reliance on principle by the parties. “Most countries in the
world are committed to the development of land registration and boundary demarcation systems that
do not tolerate inefficiencies and costs of the kind dealt within in Phillips v Keefe”.59 And while few
would disagree with these sentiments the question that remains is what are the elements that will lead
to the solution demanded by the economic interests at stake in boundary disputes, the community
expectation of access to justice, and the need for an accurate, durable and reliable land administration
system. Most lay people would find it unusual that the current land administration system grants
indefeasibility to the interests or estates that pertain to land, but it does not provide any assurance as to
the physical boundaries of that land. The next section examines the necessary elements to allow this
legally coordinated cadastre to evolve.
THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS TO CADASTRE 2034
First, we must recognise the limitations inherent from the nature of the Australia cadastral system.
Born out of the mapping of individual parcels for individual owners, with this generally connected to
requirements of the land administration system and the issuance of certificates of title, it does not
derive “from a complete cadastral record of all land parcels as shown on a cadastral map having its
genesis in a land taxation system, which is the case with most European systems”.60
Second, land administration systems such as title by registration systems in Australia are currently
suffering from the serious weakness of not being linked to cartographic technology. To link a land
administration system with a digital cadastre would overcome that deficiency and would, as described
by Gonazales “[act] as a saviour to compensate the Registry’s shortcomings in this field”.61 Given
federation is axiomatic within Australian life, it is only through actions of the state that the uncertainty
around legal boundaries can be overcome.62
Third, what this ideal cadastre/land administration system would provide63 is the following:
Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed the applicable legal principles. The evidentiary hierarchy, to be applied sequentially, is: i)
natural boundaries; ii) original monuments; iii) fences or possession that can reasonably be related back to the time of the
original survey monuments; and iv) measurements (as shown on the plan or as stated in the metes and bounds description)”.
58 Rijcke, n 56, 59.
59 Rijcke, n 56, 60.
60 Melkamu B Moges, “Sharing the Principles: Founding the Australian Cadastral System on Robust Legislative Framework”
(2014) 23 APLJ Lexis 11, 60 (online version), quoting from Ian Williamson, “The Australian Cadastral System” (Paper
presented at Cadastral Reform Seminar, Seoul, Korea, July 1994) 4.
61 Gonzalez, n 30, 2.
62 Gonzalez, n 30, 2.
63 See similar comments by Carlton A Brown, “The Millimeter Legal Coordinated Cadastre” (PhD thesis, The University of
Maine, May 2011) 2 (copy held with author). He describes the elements mentioned in the present article as forming the basis of
the “ultimate” cadastre – which term is used in the title of this article. See also Sharon Christensen, Bill Duncan and
Pamela O’Connor, “Regulating for Sustainability: Property Issues”, 22 <http://eprints.qut.edu.au/41637/1/1193-QUT_
SustainPropertyW.pdf>, where the authors speak of how a limited range of property interests can lower the transaction costs of
market exchange and how new kinds of property rights can create uncertainty where they are not specified with precision.
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• It would provide information as to the major estates and interests owned by whom regarding what
(ie it would connect the fee simple owner/mortgagee/easements/covenants/leasehold interests with
the parcel of land).
• It would describe the parcel of land and provide accurate and precise boundary detail using the
most current technology which presently is geodetic data.
• For those existing parcels where minor intrusion occurs, uniform encroachment legislation64
would operate Australia wide.
• The continued relevance and presence of possessory based doctrines,65 such as adverse possession
and possessory easements, will need to be questioned, and while beyond a full discussion in this
article, their continuing applicability could ultimately be corrected by allowing for a suitable
period for the register to be amended to reflect the current possessory based interests, after which
assertion of these interests will no longer be possible.
If the land administration system were to achieve this, and in promoting this the present author is
cognisant that Cadastre 2034 is a long-term goal and that these legal changes would operate along a
similar timeframe and in conjunction with Cadastre 2034, then title by registration would achieve the
provision of relevant and needed information concerning the purchase of land.
[Title by registration] systems create incentives for owners to enter title information onto the register, give
publicity to the registered information, validate the content of the register and suppress the relevance of
much unregistered material in favour of the purchaser. The intended result is that market transacting should
be stimulated by the lure held out to the prospective purchaser: an otherwise defective title becomes good
when the purchaser is entered as the new proprietor.66
But the value of this is severely diluted if the boundaries as represented by that newly minted title are
incorrect. Either this requires the purchaser to undertake a certification survey of that land or purchase
title insurance67 to protect against the risk that the boundaries are later incorrect; remembering that the
assurance funds within Torrens systems do not guarantee boundaries and will not compensate if the
indicative plan attached to the title is incorrect. All of these measures add cost to the individual
consumer, yet the state has the power to remedy this through the linkage of the cadastre to the land
administration system. The current arrangements carry a significant and heavy cost burden for each
individual purchaser. Either the purchaser takes the precautionary measures to comfort themselves that
the boundaries are correct, or they run the risk of later losing part or all of their land. Land represents
for many individuals the most significant purchase they will ever incur, and it presently comes with
established transaction costs, the most notable being stamp duty and conveyancing fees. As Phillips v
Keefe points out all too well, consumers are ill-equipped to emotionally respond in an objective
practical way to loss of land. To this end, some will suggest that the measures suggested, as potentially
radical as the introduction of the Torrens system itself, impose precautionary costs that are
unnecessary in our current framework. This argument might follow that while boundary disputes may
well cause significant angst and concern for individuals,68 and with bona fide purchasers protected in
many instances, imposing a cost on all individuals in linking the spatial data to the textual analysis of
land is unnecessary and unwanted. In terms of Kaldor-Hicks,69 it might be said that the costs would
64 Encroachment of Buildings Act 1982 (NT); Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW); Property Law Act 1974 (Qld);
Encroachments Act 1944 (SA); and Property Law Act 1969 (WA).
65 Lynden Griggs, “Possessory Titles in a System of Title by Registration” (1999) 21 Adelaide Law Review 157.
66 Simon Cooper, “Resolving Title Conflicts in Registered Land” (2015) 131 LQR 108, 108.
67 As an example of a title insurance policy operating in Australia, see <www.firsttitle.com.au>.
68 Consider the fallout from the Tasmanian Supreme Court decision of Woodward v Hazell [1994] TASSC 26 (17 March 1994).
This case led to Report 73 of the Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania (see n 40), which saw the amendment of legislation
(see Pt IXB Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas)). The amended legislation has severely curtailed, though not eliminated, the chance of an
adverse possession claim or possessory easement being established in Tasmania.
69
“A concept that is often cited in the economic analysis of law. A Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is said to occur when an alteration
in the allocation of resources produces more benefits than costs overall. A Pareto efficiency arises when at least one person is
made better off and no one is made worse off. In practice, however, it is extremely difficult to make any change without making
at least one person worse off. Under the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency test, an outcome is efficient if those who are made better off
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exceed the benefits, even though a small number of individuals such as Keefe would avoid a
catastrophic loss. The present author’s argument would be that the cost, while high initially,
transforms conveyancing and land ownership in a way that will yield benefits for a millennia or
longer, such as has happened in Austria where boundaries are guaranteed and a legally coordinated
cadastre established.70 The boundary positions, once identified by geodetic data and accompanied by
indefeasibility, will yield benefits to all purchasers and to the static owner, and to the process of
buying and selling land. Every person willing to buy land will transact in the security that what they
are getting is what they are seeing as reflected by the diagram attached to the certificate of title. By
adjusting the legal rules in the way outlined, an individual’s need to survey boundaries will be
eliminated (although it is recognised that there are additional reasons for a survey, such as the
establishment of boundary setbacks, or the identification of below-ground or above-ground
easements), and it would eliminate one of the reasons for taking out title insurance (although this
admittedly has a wider coverage than just boundary issues).
The encroachment legislation will also complement this by ensuring that current impingements
which only have a minimal effect on the extent of ownership of land are not used to justify expensive
and unnecessary legal intervention in the affairs of neighbours.
The final factor in ensuring the integrity of this utopian cadastre would be the elimination of
possessory based interests, which sit uneasily within a model of title by registration. As the digital
cadastre is progressively connected to the land parcels, any possible possessory interests would be
noted, and in line with current models that allow for the introduction of qualified titles,71 a 20-year
period would allow any contested possessory titles to be litigated and resolved before the issuance of
a title that guaranteed indefeasibility to land boundaries.
CONCLUSION
A better cadastral system is the legal coordinated cadastre in which the location of a boundary comer of
a parcel of land is definitively described only by a coordinate of a national reference system and not by a
physical monument set in the ground. In this case, the coordinate location of a parcel boundary corner is
not just a model of the actual location; the coordinate location shown in the cadastre is in fact the actual,
definitive boundary corner location.72
The genie is now out of the bottle with geodetic data and history informs us that technological
advances are likely to continue, with or without legal frameworks. As noted, land is too valuable to the
Australian economy and too important to the Australian psyche to allow the law to operate in such an
expensive manner. Disputes of the type seen in Comserv (No 1877) Pty Ltd v Figtree Gardens
Caravan Park, Phillips v Keefe and Skalkos v Gebski cannot be allowed to occur where a practical
solution is at hand. That solution involves combining the best features of the Torrens system of land
registration (this being indefeasibility and the conclusive non-derivative nature of the title), with the
technical accuracy and precision of modern positioning systems. If other jurisdictions, such as Austria
and Quebec, can combine legal certainty with precision-based identification of the metes and bounds
of contemporary land ownership to establish the legally coordinated cadastre, then there is no reason
could in theory compensate those who are made worse off and so produce a Pareto efficient outcome. Although all Kaldor–Hicks
efficient situations are Pareto optimal, in that no further Pareto improvements can be made, the reverse is not true. Conversely,
although every Pareto improvement is a Kaldor–Hicks improvement, most Kaldor–Hicks improvements are not Pareto
improvements”: J Law and EA Martin, Kaldor-Hicks Effıciency, A Dictionary of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford
Reference, 2009), <http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.bond.edu.au/view/10.1093/acref/9780199551248.001.0001/
acref-9780199551248-e-2160&gt>.
70 See the discussion of this in Gerhard Navratil, Jeannine Hafner and Dmitri Jilin, “Accuracy Determination for the Austrian
Digital Cadastral Map”, <http://publik.tuwien.ac.at/files/PubDat_184753.pdf>. The process in Austria involves, where there is a
conflict between neighbours, for all neighbours to be present on the land, at which point a chartered surveyor presents their
findings as to the correct boundary. Once agreement is reached, the parties must sign a document to that effect and, from there,
the boundaries are entered into the digital cadastre. A copy is lodged with the land titles office and this process has the same
effect as if the matter had been resolved by a judge. See the discussion by Brown, n 63, 47-48.
71 See eg s 21 of the Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas). This provision allows for the notion of a qualified title.
72 Brown, n 63, 4 (emphasis in original).
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why Australia cannot follow suit. Cadastre 2034 provides a framework, an aspiration and a mission for
the surveying profession. The law must quickly connect with the coat tails of Cadastre 2034 and attach
itself to its progress. Australian purchasers and owners of real estate are significantly disadvantaged if
this is not done, with the only winners being lawyers and surveyors engaged to provide expert counsel
or witness to a boundary dispute. Australians should be discouraged from becoming Fortinbras’ army.
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